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Adra Raine: Resonance Over Resolution: Resisting Definition in Susan Howe, Nathaniel 
Mackey, and Ed Roberson’s Post-1968 Poetics 
(Under the direction of Tyler Curtain and Joseph Donahue) 
In this dissertation on contemporary U.S. literature, I situate the poetry of Susan Howe, 
Nathaniel Mackey, and Ed Roberson within post-1968 leftist projects that share a common 
liberatory impulse. I mark the period of cultural production over the past fifty years by the term 
“post-1968” in order to evoke the popular imagination of “the sixties” as a time of revolutionary 
action that came to both real and imagined conclusions in 1968 in the U.S., France, China, 
Mexico, and elsewhere. In response, I argue, post-1968 writers developed a poetics based in 
cautiousness, wary of the double-edged danger of the tools we deploy toward social 
transformation. I insist that by doing so, their move from direct action to study represents a 
continuation rather than a departure from the liberatory projects that precede (and succeed) them, 
even as their political-aesthetic strategies shift from the certainty of resolute political visions 
toward the uncertainty of a politics of plurality.  
In the dissertation’s chapters, I excavate the ways Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s post-
1968 poetics draws on diverse cultural traditions to document American experience in ways that 
challenge formal convention—in their use of diction, syntax, and narrative, as well as 
historiography, literary study, and critical argument—while allowing multiple and often 
contradictory meanings to resonate with one another in cross-cultural relation, rather than resolve 
into single definitions that privilege one culture of meaning over another. Furthermore, by 
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practicing a liberatory poetics with historical consciousness, they re-vision the American 
landscape as one haunted by the history of global capitalism, colonialism, and slavery during an 
age in which this history was increasingly obscured. 
By bringing Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work into literary-historical relation, I 
highlight a liberatory impulse and sensibility that was moving through the post-1968 period not 
otherwise accounted for by the existing narratives of innovative, experimental, avant-garde and 
oppositional poetry. By showing that what makes their individual work distinctive while charting 
a shared set of concerns and innovations, I make visible a wider field of liberatory poetic practice 
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Why these three writers? This is an intellectual question—the answer to which should 
justify my choice to bring Susan Howe, Nathaniel Mackey, and Ed Roberson together in a 
dissertation with which I seek to earn my credentials. It is also a historical question—how did 
this happen? My first encounter with this tradition of U.S. American poetry—variously referred 
to as avant-garde, experimental, innovative, or oppositional poetry, The New American Poetry, 
and open field poetics—was at the University of Maine, Orono where I completed my Masters in 
English in 2010. In graduate seminars taught by and reading series curated by the poetry and 
poetics faculty—Carla Billitteri, Steve Evans, Benjamin Friedlander and Jennifer Moxley—I 
studied a lineage that began with Walt Whitman, Herman Melville and Emily Dickinson in the 
nineteenth century, leading to Ezra Pound, H.D., William Carlos Williams, Gertrude Stein, and 
Wallace Stevens in the early twentieth century, then to Jack Spicer, Robert Duncan, Charles 
Olson, Robert Creeley, Amiri Baraka, John Ashbery, James Schuyler and John Wieners in the 
post-WWII period, leading ultimately to a contemporary field of poets writing from the late 
twentieth century to the present. It wasn’t until later that I would understand the way that field 
was divided among dominant schools of affiliation and association, each laying different kinds of 
claims to the lineage I’d studied: The New York School, the Language poets, Black Mountain 
Poets, and so on; whose differences had largely to do with whether they invested in or critiqued 
“the Lyric ‘I’”—a reduction I would later have to parse, as reflected in the pages to follow. 
However, it was our fiction faculty—the novelist, David Kress—who introduced me to the work 
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of Nathaniel Mackey by taking a small group of us to the 2009 &Now conference in Buffalo, NY 
where Mackey was a keynote reader. There, Mackey read from From a Broken Bottle Traces of 
Perfume Still Emanate. It was the highlight of the conference for me, which I left pleasantly 
haunted by the novel’s protagonist N.’s sketch of B’Loon that Mackey shared with the audience 
during his reading. I returned to campus to check out all of his books, none of which I was 
prepared at the time to read—I couldn’t find a way in. I went on to begin my PhD at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and coincidentally, the following year, Nathaniel 
Mackey joined the faculty in the English Department at Duke University, in the town where I 
lived, Durham, NC. I checked out all of his books again and began reading From a Broken 
Bottle. This time, I was ready: I couldn’t put the book down. As soon as possible, I enrolled in 
Mackey’s graduate courses. It was there that I first encountered the work of Ed Roberson in the 
book Mackey assigned, Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In. From that point forward, Mackey and 
Roberson’s works were always in my hands—the books that I read outside of the many assigned 
readings that I was working through as a graduate student.   
Meanwhile, My Emily Dickinson was a first step toward finding the thing so many of us 
need when we are moving through worlds that don’t seem to have a place for us in them: 
permission.1 Like Candace Jo Stockton-Bleakley writes in the introduction to her 2003 
                                                 
1 Case, “Introduction,” np; Wilkinson, “Out of Bounds,” 270-1; Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 
451. I am not alone in this experience of Howe’s work. Kristen Case shares in her introduction to 
Howe’s 2014 lecture at Harvard: “In making relations—especially normally suppressed or 
marginalized relations, private relations—not only the subject of her writing but also a governing 
principle of its construction, Howe invites us into the making of the poem. The constellations we 
make in her pages will be at least in part our own, drawn from our own marginalia, our own life 
somewhere else. This permission, the permission to enter the space of the poem as one of the 
terms of its networks of relation, was for me an event that changed the meaning of reading and 
writing, and made possible my own work.” Jessica L. Wilkinson acknowledges in her study of 
Howe’s Melville’s Marginalia, a certain permission she is given by Howe to break academic 
convention: “In what follows, I embrace the spirit of Howe’s work, at times digressing and 
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dissertation on Howe… “I have lived so long with Susan Howe’s work that it is really almost 
impossible for me to remember when I first ‘found’ her.”2 This is how I feel about My Emily 
Dickinson, a book that defined and determined my path through the PhD at the same time that it 
buoyed my resolve to stay in it, yet I can’t remember how it ended up in my hands. It must have 
been through my reading of Emily Dickinson when I was trying to fit myself into being a 
nineteenth-century Americanist scholar at a time when I’d run into a dead-end finding faculty to 
support a late twentieth-century poetry dissertation. I learned how this unconventional book by 
an experimental poet had found an unusually large reception in conventional Dickinson 
scholarship because she was doing work that the field needed and recognized: a strange anomaly. 
I don’t remember if the book immediately meant to me what it eventually would—that there was 
a way to do literary scholarship that didn’t feel wrong the way nearly every other form of literary 
scholarship I was encountering did; an option I needed to know existed when I found myself 
bucking against the scholarly form I was being asked to emulate. When I tried my hand at a more 
lyrical form—which I admit was not very successful—the first feedback I received was: “You’re 
not Susan Howe.” What I understood this comment to be communicating was, “You’re not 
allowed to do this;” that what Howe was able to do was singular and rare; and, that hers wasn’t a 
path just anyone could set out to follow. This feedback seemed to confirm a dominant belief 
about intellectual and creative work being a product of (masculine and/or mad) genius: a gift that 
calls on you or doesn’t—and in my case, it had not called on me. As I decided whether or not I 
                                                                                                                                                             
diverging from the pure content of her poems as I negotiate a path through this ‘open’ textual 
field. Whilst I acknowledge that the inclusion of personal literary encounters is not a 
conventional addition to an academic essay, I believe that this reflects Howe’s purpose—she has 
stated her wish for texts to ‘keep living,’ and this is achieved by way of her readers.” Katrina 
Harack points out that Howe found similar source of permission from Dickinson: “Howe’s 
affiliation with Dickinson’s exploration of unintelligibility gives her permission to do the same.” 
 
2 Stockton-Bleakley, The Feminist Imaginary, 5. 
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should stay in the PhD program, given what was coming to seem like an imperfect fit, I kept that 
book tucked under my arm. I read it again. I taught it in in my classes. I read The Birth-mark. I 
learned that while I was not Susan Howe, perhaps her work was not an anomaly either, but part 
of a tradition in which I could find my own place. Through the guidance of bibliographies and 
reading recommendations by trusted mentors, I learned Howe’s work was indeed in the tradition 
of the poet-critic, and began compiling my own reading list of creative-critical works, including 
Mackey’s Discrepant Engagement and Paracritical Hinge. 
The poet-critic provided a model with which I could forge my own path through the PhD. 
I had spent over a year working on Emily Dickinson, so I thought I would continue that work 
moving forward. In one of the first meetings with my new advisor, Tyler Curtain, he asked me 
what I wanted to do with Dickinson’s work, and I said I wanted to discover something. He 
challenged me to think carefully about the language I used to describe my project. “Is ‘discover’ 
really the right word?” he asked, “Because I don’t think it is.” He was right. I was not interested 
in “discovering” Dickinson as if I were a European colonial explorer of the “New World.” I 
thought about the filmmaking course I had taken a few years earlier with the experimental 
documentary filmmaker Travis Wilkerson who had titled his course, “Excavation Filmmaking.” 
It was Wilkerson’s first semester teaching at CU-Boulder, whose mascot is the buffalo—an 
animal native to the region whose extinction was the result of the violence and destruction of the 
westward expansion of European settlers in the nineteenth century. Wilkerson framed the class 
around the question, “What happened to the buffalo?” and helped us understand that the answer 
would require an excavation, not a discovery. In recalling this memory, I recognized that 
“excavation” was the better word for what I wanted to do in my literary scholarship. I continued 
digging in the nineteenth century only to find myself back in the twentieth century, as 
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Dickinson’s poetry kept leading me to those works that I was most engaged in—Howe, Mackey, 
and Roberson’s. The statement for the final project I made for Wilkerson’s class was titled 
“Infinite Approach,” which is also the title of my chapter in this dissertation dedicated to 
Mackey’s work. The concept of the “infinite approach” in the Calculus had always fascinated 
me, and Mackey’s invocation of the asymptote was one of the affinities that drew me to his 
work. How far back does our preparation to encounter the texts that will mean something to us 
reach? I could go further, I am sure. When it came time for me to choose finally a dissertation 
topic, I decided to write about the books that I would most want to spend time reading and re-
reading—my desert island books. The books I study in this dissertation are them. 
In the early stages of reading for the dissertation and framing my study, I began to 
wonder how it is that the works of these three writers would mean so much to me. I was born in 
1978, toward the beginning of their careers as major poets. Roberson’s first book When Thy King 
Is a Boy was published in 1970, Howe’s Hinge Picture in 1974, Mackey’s Four for Trane in 
1978. My choice to focus on the works they published in the 1980s-90s reflects on the one hand 
a certain moment of momentum in their careers, and on the other, it marks the years of my 
childhood: the world that is the background against which their words were put into print is the 
world which formed my imagination. I became interested in this coincidence, and what it might 
suggest we share in common in the landscapes of our imaginations. This led eventually to my 
perception of the post-1968 period as a crucial element of all of our stories, as they intersect in 
this project. 
I’ve offered a personal history of how these three writers came to be in this dissertation 
together, but it is a public history as well. The people, institutions and resources that led me to 
these writers are caught up in the histories that I have briefly excavated in this preface and 
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throughout the chapters that follow. Lines of affiliation have led me away from certain writers, 
movements, and moments of literary history and toward others. I am writing about these writers 
because they each meant something crucial to me in my studies as a graduate student of U.S. 
literature. It was by studying them together that the significance of their relations emerged, 
provoking me to reconsider how we should read the tradition of liberatory poetics in the post-
1968 period of U.S. literary history. 
In My Emily Dickinson, Howe writes, “My voice formed from my life belongs to no one 
else. What I put into words is no longer my possession. Possibility has opened.”3 The professor 
who told me I was not Susan Howe was correct. By studying Howe’s work closely I learned that 
I would need to develop my own methodologies in response to my own historical moment—the 
pressures and the resources at hand. We each have to find our own voice. Part of graduate 
training—like training in any craft—involves trying on the strategies and voices of others, 
imitating what speaks to you, on your way to finding a voice that speaks with and back to them. 
In the end, our own voice emerges, carrying the traces of its formation under the influence of 
others. The voice I write in today is formed by Susan Howe’s, as well as by Nathaniel Mackey’s, 
Ed Roberson’s, and every author and authority whose words have struck at the heart. We find 
our voice in order to let it go, to be apart, to be a part of the world. I put the words down here to 
follow their own path through the world with you. 
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INTRODUCTION: RESONANCE OVER RESOLUTION AND RESISTING 
DEFINITION IN POST-1968 LIBERATORY POETICS 
 
Overview and Chapter Summaries 
 
 In this dissertation on contemporary Anglophone North American literature, I situate the 
poetry of Susan Howe, Nathaniel Mackey, and Ed Roberson within leftist liberatory projects that 
developed in the post-1968 period of U.S. cultural, intellectual, and literary history. As I will 
discuss in more detail below, I am marking the period of cultural production over the past fifty 
years by the term “post-1968” in order to evoke the popular imagination of “the sixties” as a time 
of revolutionary action that came to both real and imagined conclusions in 1968—a year that 
marks a number of major national and international revolutionary ends in the U.S., France, 
China, Mexico, and elsewhere. In response, I argue, post-1968 writers developed a poetics based 
in cautiousness—the need to study the history, construction, and operations of the status quo we 
seek to overcome, and a recognition of the double-edged danger of the tools we deploy toward 
social transformation, that if we are not careful, they may be turned against us. By doing so, I 
insist that their move from direct action to study represents a continuation, rather than a 
departure, from the liberatory projects that precede (and succeed) them, even as their political-
aesthetic strategies shift from the certainty of resolute political visions toward the uncertainty of 
a politics of plurality. By reconsidering the dominant literary, intellectual, and cultural histories 
of the period, my study of post-1968 liberatory poetics further intervenes in the wider field of 
U.S., American, and European Anglophone literary histories of nineteenth-century, modernist, 
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and post-45 literature, as well as recently emerging social, cultural and intellectual histories of 
the 1970s-1990s. 
I argue that if U.S. leftist strategies of “the sixties” were characterized by direct action, 
dogmatic ideological programs, and militancy, the strategic shift that takes place post-1968 is 
marked by a commitment to study, dialectical ideological debate, and hesitancy. While this 
movement has often been interpreted as a retreat from praxis to theory—i.e., a retreat from the 
frontlines of political action to the safety of academic contemplation, or as an acquiescence to the 
conservative backlash that defined post-1968 hegemony—my readings of Howe, Mackey, and 
Roberson, whose bodies of work span from 1970 to the present, demonstrate how careful study 
emerges as necessary action in an era of cultural spectacle, political duplicity, and passive 
consumerism. By focusing primarily on works published between 1985-1995, through the rise of 
Reaganism, neoliberalism, and globalization, I draw out their common commitment to resonance 
over resolution—to keeping open what is otherwise concluded—as a counter-action to the closed 
structures of the dominant ideology. 
In particular, I look at how their approach to U.S. history and historical consciousness 
shares in contemporaneous cultural and intellectual movements that critiqued those hegemonic 
narratives that universalize the dominant subject by operating in binary oppositions and erasing 
difference. Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s counter-hegemonic methodologies commit instead to 
the particular over the universal, to complexity and contradiction over black-and-white 
renderings of the world that refuse to admit the possibility of error or the potential of errancy. As 
poet-critics, they excavate how words carry and circulate social meaning in complicated and 
unexpected ways. But they approach these topics carefully—in the various meanings the word 
“careful” denotes and connotes, i.e., with wariness, love, thoughtfulness, and a sense of 
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responsibility—aware that the tools they are engaging are as capable of destruction and 
oppression as they are of resuscitation and liberation, without acquiescing to pessimism. As 
Jessica Eileen Jones puts it in her meditation on the works of Roberson and other twentieth-
century American writers and artists, they help us see that ”books and poems and words and 
artworks are not only dangerous things that further the project of colonial capitalism when used 
in the project of the objectification of the world and people, but that they can also be used in 
poiesis to write the world in the making of meaning otherwise.”4 
 My dissertation is the first study of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson that puts the three 
poets’ works in direct relation to one another, demonstrating how they independently developed 
similar poetic strategies to respond to questions and problems they commonly identified as 
essential to their historical moment. In the critical scholarship on their work, Mackey and 
Roberson are sometimes mentioned in relation to one another, most often as exemplars of 
contemporary African American innovative writing who share a set of formal techniques and 
literary influences.5 Similarly, Mackey and Howe have appeared in numerous monographs on 
contemporary innovative poetry, 6 though in separate chapters whose analysis rarely brings the 
                                                 
4Jessica Eileen Jones, “Feeling America Otherwise: Ground as an Earth That Quakes,” 54. 
 
5Cf. Edwards, “Black Serial Poetics,” 621-637; Donahue, “Metaphysical Shivers,” 700–718; 
Nielsen, “Face to Face with the Blues,” 719-727; Nielsen, Black Chant; Edward Foster, “Poetry 
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,” American Book Review 17. 3 (1996): 4; Zamsky, “The 
Umbilicate Ear,” 683–699. 
 
6Cf. Norman Finkelstein, On Mount Vision: Forms of the Sacred in Contemporary American 
Poetry; Naylor, Poetic Investigations; Geoffrey O’Brien, Bardic Deadlines: Reviewing Poetry, 
1984-95 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); John P. Craig, “Generous 
Constructions: Gift Exchange and Mentoring in Radical Modernist Poetics” PhD diss. (The 




two poets work into direct relation to one another.7 Mackey, as a triangulating figure, has 
appeared in anthologies and been invited to read alongside both Howe and Roberson, on various 
occasions.8  By reading Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s works through the framework of post-
1968 liberatory poetics, I show how their engagement with history and language—which I argue 
is characterized by “resisting definition”—takes up the challenge of what kind of liberatory 
poetics is called for after the era of Civil Rights, Black Power, SDS, etcetera, in which the 
writers of the New American Poetry, Black Mountain Poetry, Beat Poetry, et al, practiced a 
significantly different form of resistance. As Elda María Román offers in her essay, “‘Post’ 
Ethnic Form,” “[W]hile theories of ‘posts’ emphasize what is past, they also prompt us to 
consider what has not yet been reconciled and what remains to be worked through.”9 In this 
sense, their post-1968 liberatory poetics builds off the preceding generation’s “open form” 
poetics to address new circumstances.  
In the following sections of this introduction, I further contextualize the literary-historical 
moment in which Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s careers developed, and offer definitions of the 
key terms and concepts of the dissertation: “post-1968,” “liberatory poetics,” “resonance over 
resolution,” and “resisting definition.”  
In the chapters that follow, I excavate the ways Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s post-
1968 poetics tends to pursue resonance over resolution, resisting definition at every turn. 
Drawing on diverse cultural traditions, I argue they document American experience in ways that 
                                                 
7At least one exception is Elizabeth Willis’ contribution to Telling It Slant, “The Arena in the 
Garden: Some Thoughts on the Late Lyric,” in which she writes that “the critical prose of both 
Nathaniel Mackey and Susan Howe articulates the phenomenal aspects of the lyric and suggests 
the widely various traditions from which contemporary lyric poetry draws” (228). 
8The only book in which all three poets appear all at once, I believe, is in Paul Hoover, ed., 
Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton Anthology (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013).  
 
9Elda María Román,“‘Post’ Ethnic Form,” 18. 
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challenge formal convention—in their use of diction, syntax, and narrative, as well as 
historiography, literary study, and critical argument—while allowing multiple and often 
contradictory meanings to resonate with one another in cross-cultural relation, rather than resolve 
into single definitions that privilege one culture of meaning over another. Furthermore, by 
practicing a liberatory poetics with historical consciousness, they re-vision the American 
landscape as one haunted by the history of global capitalism, colonialism, and slavery during an 
age in which this history was increasingly obscured by the rise of commodity culture, 
conservative policy, and the normalization of political duplicity. 
In chapter one, I further develop the major themes I’ll introduce below—in particular, the 
recovery of historical consciousness and the imperative to pursue resonance over resolution by 
resisting definition—through close readings of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work. By 
looking at their work in conjunction, we will begin to see how these three writers developed 
similar formal innovations and approaches to the common problems they faced as poets whose 
careers developed after “the sixties.” We’ll see how they recover historical consciousness from 
the threat of postmodernist amnesia and re-vision the U.S. and world-historical social, cultural, 
and political map through acoustic-linguistic resonance and creative etymology. I’ll move from 
there to three single-author chapters focused on works they published between 1985-1995: Ed 
Roberson’s Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In (1985-1995); Nathaniel Mackey’s From A Broken 
Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate (1986-present); and Susan Howe’s My Emily Dickinson 
(1985) and The Birth-mark: unsettling the wilderness in American literary history (1993). 
In chapter two, “Floating Without Bottom in That Earth: The Myth of Daedalus and 
Icarus in Ed Roberson’s Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In,” I study what I call Roberson’s 
“historicopoetics” of the landscape—the way he teaches the reader how to perceive world history 
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in the words and images of everyday life, by putting them under poetic investigation, re-
visioning the American landscape as one defined by social conflict that goes otherwise unseen, 
“because you don’t want to see it / at all when it comes down / to it.”10 Focusing on his 1995 
book, Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In, I look at how Roberson’s figurations of Daedalus and 
Icarus underscores the book’s major themes: flight and fugitivity; the danger of the sun and the 
safety of night; the elemental relationships between sky, sea, and earth in cycles of death and 
renewal; the double-edged potential of language to liberate and oppress; and the paradoxes of 
creation in a destructive world. Specifically, I argue that in Roberson’s re-presentation of the 
classical myth in relation to black experience in America, it is neither Icarus’s carelessness nor 
his hubris that causes his downfall, but the narrow parameters of success he is offered, 
emphasizing how the structure in which he is asked to survive is set up explicitly against his 
survival. At the same time, I argue that by recasting Icarus as a Flying African (after the popular 
antebellum folktale), Roberson shows Icarus to be a figure of renewal and continuity, as the 
water of the Icarian sea, or the Atlantic Ocean of Middle Passage, returns to land in water’s 
elemental cycles.  
In chapter three, “Infinite Approach: Nathaniel Mackey’s Asymptotic Poetics in From a 
Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate,” I study Mackey’s serial epistolary novel (five 
volumes published between 1986-2017), in which the protagonist N. meditates on topics ranging 
from American jazz and West African myth, to billboard advertisements and broken hearts, to 
the history of slavery in the New World and contemporary world politics. I argue that by never 
resolving into definitive conclusions, N.’s boundless commentary demonstrates a commitment to 
productive contradiction as the best strategy for escaping the centripetal force of ideology. The 
                                                 
10Roberson, Atmosphere Conditions, 16.  
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asymptote—a figure Mackey consistently references throughout the novel to express the notion 
of infinite approach—is mathematically defined as a line, as on an algebraic x-y grid, that a 
given curve infinitely approaches but never meets, a figure for pushing at those limits that 
continually recede from one’s advances. 
 
Figure 1 – Horizontal and Vertical Asymptote 
I argue that every aspect of From a Broken Bottle’s form and structure—its neverfinishedness as 
an ongoing serial work; its epistolary form; its dialectic sentence structures; its multiplicative 
work with words—is pushing at the limits of language’s signifying function. Not in order to say 
or suggest that signification doesn’t work—i.e., limit as failure—but to draw out its asymptotic 
nature, which moves toward impossibility—that is, limit as imaginative possibility. 
In chapter four, “Candor Is the Only Wile: Contradiction and Communion in Susan 
Howe’s My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark,” I study Howe’s engagement with the 
contradictions embedded in liberatory projects that rely on the tools of dominant ideology to 
correct its oppressions. In her two major creative-critical works, My Emily Dickinson (1985) and 
The Birth-mark: unsettling the wilderness in American literary history (1993), Howe excavates 
the language of American writers from the seventeenth-to-nineteenth centuries whose voices 
have been suppressed, distorted or otherwise rendered inaudible/illegible in the course of 
archiving, publishing and canonization, arguing that the choices that archivists, editors, and 
critics make about what is valuable actively leave out those experiences that don’t serve 
dominant religious and scientific beliefs—such as love, uncertainty, and religious fervor, which 
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are necessarily coded to minoritarian subject positions as feminine, savage, and crazy. I turn 
attention to Howe’s own practice as archivist, editor, and critic—the ways in which she both 
seeks to counter the practices she critiques and knows she cannot help but reproduce them. To 
address this conflict, Howe often redirects her critique inward, constantly reflecting on the way 
her own methodologies are in various ways complicit in the institutional practices she seeks to 
correct. I argue that this mode of self-examination is exemplary of a post-1968 trend among 
writers of the left who understand that the enemy is not always external, an implicit critique of 
the previous generation for not studying carefully enough the enemy within. Accordingly, I 
argue, Howe develops a poetics of personal accounting amid literary-historical reckoning by 
weaving autobiographical and social narratives within a temporal fabric that brings voices from 
the archive into conversation with the present to meditate on a common liberatory project in 
conflict. 
Together, these chapters show how language conditions the political imagination by 
drawing the boundaries of thought as expressed in writing. By developing a poetics that 
articulates the resonance between words, images, and narratives whose relation is not otherwise 
transparent, Howe, Mackey and Roberson seek to give readers the tools to study the social world 
and reinvigorate public discourse in a post-1968 period that they diagnose as in need of such 
correction. In my conclusion, I reflect on how Resonance Over Resolution: Resisting Definition 
in Susan Howe, Nathaniel Mackey and Ed Roberson’s Post-1968 Poetics contributes to 
emerging scholarly reconsiderations of dominant narratives of twentieth-century North American 
poetry and poetics. In particular, by defining the postmodern period as an era marked foremost 
by the failed promise of revolution in the 1960s and the correlated rise of a passive consumer 
culture in the 1980s, I provide a necessary account of post-1968 poets’ commitment to 
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multiplicity as a formal and political strategy resistant to dogmatic binary positions that 
reproduce structures of inequality. Furthermore, by drawing a boundary around this period that 
has otherwise been understood as continuous with our own, i.e., “contemporary,” I construct a 
much-needed critical distance from which we can read the works of the late twentieth century as 
anchored in a historical moment which is similar to but not the same as our own in the twenty-
first century, giving us the ability to read these works critically in relation to the particular 
pressures we face today. Reframing the post-1968 period within the larger history of twentieth-
century U.S. cultural production offers a point of departure for new readings of literary, 
intellectual, and cultural history from the nineteenth century to the present. 
Literary Historical Context: The Politics of Poetic Form 
 
In his preface to the 1989 collection The Politics of Poetic Form: Poetry and Public 
Policy, poet and critic Charles Bernstein declared that “the decline of public discourse in the 
United States is an urgent matter best not left to the politicians and academics,”11 but better left 
to avant-garde12 poets. In his view, poets committed to formal innovation call critical attention to 
the very structure of public discourse itself—showing through rhetorical analysis how 
conventions and authorities of meaning are reproduced and reinforced to legitimate power by 
closing off multiple interpretative possibilities. That is, while politicians and academics—
entrenched in those institutions Althusser called ideological state apparatuses—provide us with 
simple dichotomies that maintain capitalist hegemony, contemporary avant-garde poets teach us 
how to hold multiple ideas in equal relation to one another, providing a complex understanding 
                                                 
11 Bernstein, “Preface,” vii. 
 
12I use the term “avant-garde” here to immediately signal to the general reader that Bernstein is 
promoting poetry that is politically leftist and formally innovative. Below, I will discard this 
term, among other alternatives—"innovative,” “experimental,” “oppositional”—for what I argue 
is a more inclusive term, “liberatory poetics.” 
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of political disputes from which we can make meaningful action. Bernstein’s belief that poetry 
moves us past dogmatic binary positions initiated his call for a poetics that would shake its 
reading public out of the political inertia that characterized consumer culture in the 1980s, 
leading the way toward social transformation. 
With contributions from many writers associated with the journal L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
from whose title the “Language poetry”13 takes its name—including Susan Howe—as well as 
those who were not—including Nathaniel Mackey—The Politics of Poetic Form sought not only 
to make a case for how poetry can and must intervene in public discourse, but also to stake a 
claim within internecine debates about the politics of form versus content, or style versus subject 
matter, in poetry concerned with social transformation. Theoretically, the debate centered around 
parallel questions like: Can a poem whose content speaks against an oppressive dominant culture 
be radical if it reproduces dominant aesthetic forms whose conventions contain and are contained 
by the status quo? Can a poem that claims to break away from an oppressive dominant culture by 
breaking formal conventions be radical if it doesn’t explicitly address the social content of the 
culture it claims to challenge? Theoretically, it is fairly easy to understand that a radical leftist 
poetics—like any poetics—will likely consider both form and content, style and subject matter; 
and more importantly, that the choice to focus more or less on one or the other will depend on 
                                                 
13While “Language poetry” is largely considered a proper poetry movement of the post-1968 
period, concentrated mostly around San Francisco and New York City, the terms of its style and 
themes has come to be used to describe any work that draws special attention to language, 
particularly when deployed in poetry considered avant-garde, experimental, innovation or 
oppositional, and to extend beyond poetry to other genres, producing terms like “language-based 
writing.” While the label “Language poetry” usually denotes work by a poet who was published 
in the journal L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E from 1978-1981, or other journals or publications edited 
by writers published in that journal, the label “language poetry” with a lower-case “l” is more 
widely applied to those poetries that call attention to and play with the social, historical, and 
political functions and structures of language, especially when their approach cab to some degree 




the context of the poem’s writing, its intended audience, its rhetorical situation, its immediate 
political goals, and so forth.14 The Politics of Poetic Form, however, wasn’t entering a 
theoretical debate, but a social and historical one, as different schools of poetry, and groups of 
people, and cultural institutions responded to the pressures of the moment, including a sense of 
urgency: Poetry needed to figure out how it was going to function on the cultural front against an 
increasingly formidable enemy—neoliberalism and globalized capitalism, rising social 
conservatism, and a consumer culture that was detaching mainstream daily life from civic 
engagement.15   
At this historical conjuncture, Bernstein’s brief preface to the collection puts on display 
the terms and stakes of both debates. He makes an argument for why in general poetry matters to 
                                                 
14Predictably then, these binary oppositions—form versus content; style versus subject matter—
always invite correction. Cf. Caroline Levine, “Strategic Formalism: Toward a New Method in 
Cultural Studies,” Victorian Studies 48.4 (Summer 2006): 625-657; Stephen Cushman, “On 
Middlebrow Formalism, or the Fallacy of Imitative Form Revisited,” Southwest Review 99.4 
(2014): 507-530; David Caplan, “Prosody after the Poetry Wars” The Antioch Review 62.1, 
(Winter, 2004): 122-130; Joseph Lease, “‘Progressive Lit.’: Amiri Baraka, Bruce Andrews, and 
the Politics of the Lyric ‘I,’” African American Review 37.2/3, (Summer-Autumn 2003): 389-
398; Joseph Lease, “Oppositional American Poetry, 1950-1995” PhD diss. (1997).  
 
15Zooming out to see the larger picture beyond internecine disputes, an important part of the 
story is the “the poetry wars” between Language poetry and the New Formalism, as the New 
Formalism argued for a return to traditional poetic forms accompanied by what was considered a 
socially conservative agenda, setting the stage for anyone who was associated with the aesthetic 
values of the New Formalism to be accused of political conservatism. For contemporary and 
recent accounts and critical commentary: Cf. William F. Walsh, “Loose Talk and Literary 
History: Language Poetry, New Formalism, and the Construction of Taste in Contemporary 
American Poetry” PhD diss. (1994); David Caplan, “Prosody after the Poetry Wars”; Stephen 
Cushman, "On Middlebrow Formalism, or the Fallacy of Imitative Form Revisited," Southwest 
Review 99.4 (Fall 2014): 507-530; Nicholas Birns, “The Distribution Of Argument: New 
Formalism Of/On The Contemporary,” Pennsylvania Literary Journal 4.1 (2012): 7-17. To read 
a compelling argument for a kind of formalism (specifically, “constructive postmodernism”) 
from “the other side,” see Kevin Walzer’s—who was, as Kevin Bezner introduces him in the 
preface, “trained in English departments during the worst years of the poetry wars,” earning his 
PhD in 1996—The Resurgence of Traditional Poetic Form and the Current Status of Poetry’s 




politics: “Poetry can be conceived,” he writes, “as an active arena for exploring basic questions 
about political thought and action.”16 And at the same time, he argues that formally innovative 
poetry can do that work better than the two kinds of poetry from which it is distinguished: poems 
that “express personal emotions,” i.e., confessional poems that lead with the lyric “I”; and poems 
that state political positions that are “already expounded elsewhere,” i.e., didactic poems that fall 
back on conventional forms to deliver political content. In Bernstein’s view, the former is 
deficient for being an institutionalized form with a conservative politics that merely reproduces 
the status quo, and the latter makes an insufficient case for poetry by privileging the prosaic over 
the poetic. For Bernstein, both kinds of poetry fail to investigate the political implications of 
aesthetic choices, whereas formally innovate poetry, i.e., Language poetry, asks the crucial 
question: “In what way do choices of grammar, vocabulary, syntax, and narrative reflect 
ideology?”17  
If, like me, you have been trained as a poet or scholar of poetry in the twenty-first 
century, you are likely familiar with narratives about poetry in the 1980-90s that suggest that 
there was an antagonism between “Language poetry” and “confessional poetry” that The Politics 
of Poetic Form seems to confirm.18 In those narratives, Language poets were concerned with the 
                                                 
16Bernstein, “Preface,” vii. 
 
17Bernstein, “Preface,” vii. 
 
18Lazer, Opposing Poetries, 30, 9. For a contemporary account of the field of U.S. American 
poetry of the 1980s-90s, see Hank Lazer’s Opposing Poetries, Volume 1: Issues and Institutions, 
published in 1990. While Lazer’s affiliation with and preference for the Language poets informs 
his account of the various critical perspectives of the period, he does more than most to represent 
opposing views in good faith, thus leaving a useful record of the “issues and institutions” of the 
moment while displaying many of the characteristic concerns I’ve suggested preoccupy post-
1968 liberatory poetics—a need to define an efficacious “avant-garde” in the face of its 
institutionalization, or as Lazer puts it, “the poetic revolution of the late fifties and early sixties 
has ceased to invigorate the writing of poetry […] its institutionalized form is both terminally ill 
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way social, historical, economic and political forces, i.e., ideology, expressed itself through 
language and thus were skeptical of poetry that was invested in “the lyric ‘I,’” since to imagine 
language could express the personal emotions and experiences of an individual presupposed the 
autonomy of individual subjects and the transparency of language to mean what any individual 
wants it to mean. Such poetry, we are told the Language poets believed, could only reproduce the 
logic of capitalist hegemony.19 For this reason, they further argued, confessional poetry found 
                                                                                                                                                             
and well-entrenched”; the “debate over the transparency versus the materiality of the word”; the 
“self” or subject as ideological trap; the politics of form;  and so on. 
 
19White, Lyric Shame, 4, 22, 35. While in my view this divide between the self-proclaimed 
“avant-garde” and “lyric” poetry is waning, both in practice and in narrative representations of 
liberatory poetics, its terms continue to be conveniently deployed in both the academy and the 
internal politics of leftist poetry communities—i.e., those poets who consider themselves to be 
engaged in a liberatory poetics. Gillian White’s 2014 book, Lyric Shame, for example, is 
motivated “to explore the sources, dynamics, and consequences of that ambience of lyric shame 
[…] given that ‘expressive lyric’ is the chief abjection of a powerful and increasingly canonical 
avant-garde antilyricism now forty years in the making.” White’s defense of lyricism partakes in 
this divide, lamenting “how powerfully ‘innovative’ functions in today’s academic culture, not 
just as an accolade of taste and potential success on the poetry market (which it is) but, 
moreover, as an index of the poet’s maturity and good politics. Conversely, to feel caught having 
not known, and thus be identified by [Ron Silliman’s] term ‘School of Quietude,’ is potentially 
shame inducing because the term is meant to implicate not just one’s literary tastes but one’s 
politics and social attitudes. Though few other poets or bloggers commit to this binary divide in 
poetics with quite Silliman’s fervor, his rhetoric has been quite effective, baiting many poets and 
critics into defensive postures and provoking years of debate, often vitriolic, on his blog’s 
comment thread.” While Language poet Silliman does wield a significant amount of cultural 
capital as a gatekeeper of a niche market of innovative U.S. liberatory poetics, I’m not sure that 
White is correct in asserting that to be recognized as “innovative” puts a contemporary poet on 
the path to academic and poetry market success. While “mainstream” poetry may have moved a 
bit in that direction over the past forty years—such that today poets like Claudia Rankine and 
Maggie Nelson, for example, can publish books that make the bestsellers list of The New York 
Times—I think there is still more that unites than divides those of us practicing and invested in 
liberatory poetics against a dominant ideology that we do battle against in various forms. Which 
is not to say that “lyric shame” is not a real phenomenon—I agree that it is, and that it is 
something many of us still have to navigate as we encounter this tradition as poets and scholars: I 
too have felt lyric shame. But I think there are also plenty of other narratives and practices that 
don’t partake in lyric shame or a form/content divide between “innovation” and “the lyric ‘I’” 
that remind us, as White has already pointed out, that poets like Silliman are actually the rarer 
type. This reveals to me that what is most at stake in White’s complaint is how one’s “maturity 
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comfortable homes in academia (specifically, English departments) and mainstream publishing, 
as an establishment art form that didn’t challenge the status quo. In other words, in terms of a 
leftist project, in their view, Language poetry was radical and confessional poetry was 
conservative. Meanwhile, those writers who considered themselves part of a radical leftist 
project who also continued to employ a lyrical form and subject, and/or to use language in a 
“transparent” mode, especially those who identified with marginalized subject positions—by 
race, gender, sexuality, class, etc.—accused Language poetry of being a largely white 
heterosexual male endeavor that could blithely dismiss “subjectivity”—as represented by “the 
lyric ‘I’” or in prosaic statements of identity-based social concerns—as a theoretical construct 
because they had no stakes in that game. In turn, Language poetry was accused of being a 
conservative guard protecting the cultural capital of its predominantly white practitioners from 
the diversifying demographics of multiculturalism.  
Thus, the form/content debate was mapped onto racial and political division, wherein, for 
example, African American writers could either be embraced for their formal innovations as 
primary over expressions of politicized blackness; or excluded categorically from the avant-
garde by ignoring their formal innovations over their valorization of black identity. As Harryette 
Mullen would write in her contribution to Telling It Slant: Avant-Garde Poetics of the 1990s: 
“‘Formally innovative minority poets,’ when visible at all, are not likely to be perceived either as 
                                                                                                                                                             
and good politics” is judged—but by whom? White proposes, “Rather than claiming ourselves 
‘lyric’ or not, can we recognize ourselves as all in a lyric-reading culture together, one marked 
by shame?” I appreciate this move to a cultural diagnosis but continue to worry that it is 
motivated by insider-outsider social conflicts that—while they are no doubt tied to larger 
structures of cultural and economic power—ultimately reproduce the logic of scarcity and 




typical of a racial/ethnic group or as representative of an aesthetic movement,”20 such that even 
as gestures—whether sincere or tokening—of inclusion operate according to the ongoing 
assumption “that ‘avant-garde’ poetry is not ‘black’ and that ‘black’ poetry, however singular its 
‘voice,’ is not ‘formally innovative.’”21 In “Expanding the Repertoire,” originally published in 
2001, Mackey recounts: “When I was looking for a publisher for my book Discrepant 
Engagement, which deals with experimental writing by African American authors, white 
American authors, and Caribbean authors, I was told by one university press that the book’s 
‘problem’ is that it’s not really one book but potentially three: a book on experimental writing, a 
book on African American writing, and a book on Caribbean writing. I eventually found a 
publisher for the book, but this made it clear that the investment in segregated categories dies 
hard, that it’s still not quite done dying.”22 As evidence, Kathleen Crown, Evie Shockley, and 
Tyrone Williams are called upon to demonstrate the false divide between experimentalism and 
multiculturalism, for example, in their essays on Ed Roberson’s poetry.23 
This division maps as well onto contemporary institutional battles—within the university, 
and other centers of knowledge and cultural production—between “theory” and 
“multiculturalism,” i.e., between knowledge and cultural production that privileged European 
philosophical and literary canons versus those that centered “third-world” and minoritarian 
                                                 
20Marks, Telling It Slant, 28 
 
21Marks, Telling It Slant, 30 
 
22Mackey, PH, 241. 
 
23Kathleen Crown, “Reading the 'Lucid Interval': Race, Trauma, and Literacy in the Poetry of Ed 
Roberson,” Poetics Today 21.1 (2000): 187-220; Evie Shockley, “On the Nature of Ed 
Roberson’s Poetry,” Callaloo 33.3 (2000): 728 – 747; Tyrone Williams, “The Authenticity of 




philosophies and literatures.24 Scholars of the former group perceived themselves—for both real 
and imagined reasons—under threat of being displaced by the latter, leading to a culture of 
territorial division.25 Given the real and perceived alliance between Language poetry and theory, 
Language poets were in turn accused of being academics who practiced theory with no praxis—
the worst thing you could be accused of as a leftist in the post-1968 period. But if you weren’t 
there in the 1980s for the debates as they were unfolding, and all you have to judge by is the 
poetry of the period, it is often hard to discern precisely why some poets are associated with 
Language poetry or not, given what these narratives suggest about who and what kind of poetry 
should qualify as such. Furthermore, with very few exceptions, most poets of this period, across 
a spectrum of styles and affiliations, and subject positions, were concerned with all of these 
things—language, form, identity, and expression—in a common commitment to social 
                                                 
24Lubiano, “Shuckin' off the African-American Native Other,” 149-50. For a contemporary 
example of how this tension appeared in the discourse, see Wahneema Lubiano, “Shuckin' off 
the African-American Native Other: What's ‘Po-Mo’ Got to Do with It?” in which she writes, 
"First, a polemic: in this moment, postmodern or not, African-American literature and cultural 
production are being read, consumed, and criticized against a cacophony of voices, from various 
points of the U.S. academy's political spectrum, bleating 'theory,' 'postmodernism,' and 'critiques 
of race, gender, and sexuality' (subtract class from the Left version of this complaint) have gone 
too far. I've tried to understand what such disparate voices might have in common, and it seems 
to me that what I've been hearing is some version of old narratives (from the Right and the Left) 
that delimit the discursive or material space available for particular concerns which are held not 
to matter by the speakers compared to other concerns that just as obviously do matter. Those 
speaking, I presume, know who (or what) at any moment has ‘gone too far.' And who (or that 
which) has gone too far is always some variety of the marginalized, unwilling to stay out of the 
'center,' who transgresses, who 'goes too far,' who behaves, in this moment, as though she or he 
has a right to lay claim to a place in the discursive spotlight." 
 
25Parmar, Liberating the Canon, 25. In regards the “canon wars” of the 1980s-90s, Nissa Parmar 
reminds us of the gatekeeper stances of critics like Helen Vendler and Harold Bloom, who 
argued that “due to the growing influence of multiculturalism, ‘English departments will shrink 
to the dimension s of our current Classics departments, ceding their grosser functions to the 
legions of Cultural Studies.’ Bloom’s assertions demonstrate both the social/aesthetic and 
poetry/ethnicity binaries and are quite clearly intended to defend a Eurocentric canon and 
therefore preserve America’s monoculture”  
17 
 
transformation in a period of political and social inequality under conservative national 
leadership. When one looks back at the kind of conversations poets were having during this 
period, it becomes clear in ways that the narratives received perhaps took for granted, that these 
debates and divisions were a direct response to this political pressure. 
Given this context, when we return to Bernstein’s opening remarks, we can perceive that 
his primary exigency is to make a case for why poetry matters in the late twentieth century, 
specifically in terms of what role it can play in leftist politics. To whom is he making the case? 
The audiences may be multiple, but I think the primary audience of his appeal is those people 
who identify both as poets and socially engaged members of the North American political left, 
including Bernstein himself. His appeal begins from the presumption, which he considers widely 
held, that poetry in fact may not have any role to play at all. Since he believes otherwise, he then 
needs to explain why the larger public holds this mistaken view of poetry. His answer is that 
dominant forms of poetry are to blame—namely, poetry that is confessional or whose politics is 
prosaically content-based. Under the pressure to justify poetry’s political relevance, we see then 
why it is important for Bernstein, and others, to pinpoint what it is about these dominant forms 
that make them politically inefficacious. In other words, if it seems like poetry doesn’t have a 
role to play on the cultural front, it is merely a matter of the wrong kind of poetry being 
represented as such. It is imperative then to distinguish a third way—not unlike calls for a third 
political party—a radical alternative that will make it clear why poetry is an insurgent art form 
necessary to the leftist struggles of the late twentieth century.  
In recounting the language versus lyric narrative and the language versus identity of late 
twentieth-century poetry that underlies my reading of The Politics of Poetic Form, I have been 
faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, I don’t want to contribute to the continual reproduction 
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of this narrative, as though it represents all that was happening at the time—because it doesn’t—
or as if it is the most important development within leftist poetry of the period—because it isn’t. 
On the other hand, it is important to interrogate the significance of this narrative’s stronghold on 
literary history, to figure out why it is repeated so often and why people who were there still talk 
about it today, without always mentioning the other things that were happening on the scene. 
Part of the answer to that question is that the Language poets, and thus Language poetry, did 
achieve a certain hegemony in the academic discourse and in academic and other institutional 
positions.26 Hegemony is not achieved by democratic process and therefore is not representative 
of the cultural field. There were indeed other things going on. For example, developments within 
the Black Arts Movement27 and the New Black Aesthetic28 fall outside this narrative, as does the 
development of the New College of California Poetics Program started by Robert Duncan in the 
1980s to continue the poetics of the San Francisco Renaissance and Black Mountain, the 
founding of the Before Columbus Foundation in 1976 by Ishmael Reed with Victor Hernandez, 
Shawn Wong, and Rudolfo Anaya to promote multicultural literature, the development of 
ethnopoetics, including the first publication in 1970 of the journal Alcheringa: A Journal of 
Ethnopoetics founded by Jerome Rothenberg and Dennis Tedlock, and the founding in 1975 of 
The New World Journal edited by Bob Callahan, which as it announces in its first issue was 
“published by Turtle Island for the Nezahaulcoyotl Historical Society, a non-profit corporation 
engaged in the study of the history and literature of the New World.”29 None of this poetic 
                                                 
26 See the conclusion chapter of this dissertation for more on this topic. 
 
27 Cf. Larry Neal, “The Black Arts Movement,” The Drama Review 12.4 (Summer 1968): 28-39. 
 
28 Cf. Trey Ellis, “The New Black Aesthetic,” Callaloo 38 (Winter 1989): 233-243. 
 
29 New World Journal 1, (Fall 1975): 10. 
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activity easily maps onto one side or the other of the language/lyric or innovation/identity 
divides. It is telling that my own training and reading in the field of contemporary U.S. poetry in 
which Howe, Mackey, and Roberson have been placed—in terms of scholarship and academic 
literary history—has foregrounded the hegemonic narrative, though given what I wrote above, it 
should come as no surprise. At the same time, I’ve only scratched the surface of institutional, 
interpersonal, and inter-communal rifts, rivalries, and reckonings. An oral history is called for—
perhaps a next project. Nonetheless, in this project, by retracing post-1968 poets through the 
framework of liberatory poetics, the language/lyric, innovation/identity divisions fall away as the 
terms of the liberatory impulse create a common ground for the formal and thematic innovations 
poets developed in response to their common post-1968 situation. 
Periodization: “Post-1968” 
 
The essays that follow Bernstein’s preface, which began as talks given either at the New 
School for Social Research or The Poetry Project in New York in a series curated by Bernstein 
(many of them including transcripts of the live discussions that followed), are wide-ranging in 
their approach to the politics of poetic form. Not all of the contributors are primarily concerned 
with making a case for poetry’s political efficacy.30 In fact, some explicitly push back against 
being called to answer that concern. Yet in my view they do all share two common concerns: 
one, how texts make meaning given the limits, power, and pitfalls of language as a medium of 
cultural production; two, the necessity of critical inquiry, self-examination, and some version of 
pluralism, in terms of cultural production as well as social and political organization. These 
                                                 
30 Unsurprisingly, the amount of anxiety each contributor displays around the question of 
poetry’s relevance maps rather predictably onto their subject positions. The straight white men 
exhibit the most worry about the standing of poetry while those writing from marginalized 
subject positions seem to just go on to get the work done. I would conjecture that this uneven 
display of anxiety is related to the theory vs. multiculturalism divide that I describe above.  
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characteristics are not particular to the discipline of poetry and poetics; they are, in fact, the 
hallmark features of much creative, intellectual, and political thought of the post-1968 period. 
I am marking this last quarter+ of the twentieth century as “post-1968” for multiple 
reasons. I mean for it to register intuitively at the same time that it points to particular historical 
events and event-horizons. I mean to play, first of all, on the cultural imagination of “the sixties” 
in the U.S.—a term that conjures the counter-culture—beatniks, hippies, psychedelic drug 
culture, and Woodstock—as well as the social movements—Civil Rights, SDS, Black Power, 
protests against the war in Vietnam, and second wave feminism—all forms of social and political 
engagement with variously defined revolutionary goals, or revolutionary spirit. By conjuring the 
specific date, “1968,” I further focus that imagination to a boundary or end of “the sixties” 
marked in the U.S. by the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, and 
the nomination and election of Richard Nixon (1968-9), and internationally by the student and 
worker strikes in France (May 1968) and the end of the cultural revolution in China (1969), a 
moment when the revolutionary promises of “the sixties” began to dissolve, forcing everyone to 
regroup and reassess the shifting circumstances of leftist struggle.31 In the term “post-1968,” that 
is, I want to conjure a popular nostalgia for “the sixties,” and the corresponding nihilism about 
what came after, held by those who lived through the transition. I mean to connect this general 
ethos with a history of the cultural, intellectual, and literary left of the post-1968 period, which I 
argue was shaped by their collective sense that “1968” marked the end of a revolutionary leftist 
politics. In other words, the “post-ness” of the term post-1968 represents a sense that the next 
                                                 
31I am more interested in “1968” as an idea than a calendar date, such that events that occurred 
chronologically before or after 1968 can become part of the image of “1968.” 
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generation32 of activity had of coming “after” the movements of the 1960s.33 This sense of post-
ness registers a feeling of loss for the apparent failures of the 1960s as well as mourning the fate 
of picking up the pieces in the proceeding period of conservative backlash, widespread 
commodity culture, and the normalization of political duplicity. In this new world, the dogmatic 
political programs of the 1960s no longer had traction. In the ruins, the post-1968 response that 
the next generation constructs is characterized, I’ll argue, by openness, multiculturalism and 
poststructuralism. Post-1968 liberatory poetics participates in this shift through a preference for 
resonance over resolution by adapting the open form and open field poetics of the previous 
generation to the new state of affairs that come after 1968.34 
                                                 
32I apply the word “generation” to bodies of work and their dates of publication rather than to 
people themselves based on dates of birth. 
 
33Wyatt, “Introduction,” 1. In his introduction to American Literature in Transition: 1960-1970, 
David Wyatt sets the literary-intellectual scene of the late 1960s with a lecture from Frank 
Kermode’s 1967 The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction to: “Kermode begins 
with the question of where we find ourselves in time. Are we nearing its promised end? The 
‘growing sense of apocalypse in American life’ of which Norman Mailer writes in The Armies 
of the Night (1968) is not properly Kermode’s subject, but he does deal with the history of the 
idea of apocalypse and our many related ‘fictions of the End.’ Within this tradition Kermode 
discerns a shift away from fictions imagining a literal end of the world and toward a suspicion of 
any paradigm proposing to impose such a shape on time. As mid-twentieth-century persons, 
Kermode maintains, we live in ‘the middest,’ at best, perhaps, in an epoch ‘of transition,’ and 
because ‘we move from transition to transition, we may suppose that we exist in no intelligible 
relation to the past, and no predictable relation to the future.’” 
 
34 Wyatt, “Introduction,” 6. For similar accounts of the “the sixties” that support a “post-1968” 
periodization, cf. Bruce J. Schulman, “Introduction: The Sixties and the Postwar Legacy,” The 
Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Free Press, 
2001); Fredric Jameson, “Periodizing the 60s”; David Wyatt, “Introduction,” American 
Literature in Transition: 1960-197. Wyatt points to the sixties as a literary turning point, which 
can similarly be folded into my post-1968 periodization: “By the end of the sixties,” he writes, 
“the great moderns, except for Marianne Moore and Ezra Pound, had departed the scene. 
Hemingway and Loy died in 1961, Faulkner in 1962, Frost and Williams in 1963, Eliot in 1965, 
and Hughes and Toomer in 1967. Even the word ‘modern’ itself experienced a kind of death. 
While working toward my Ph.D. at UC Berkeley, I befriended a fellow graduate student who 
devoted considerable effort searching for a term with which to label the new writing by Barth, 
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In the phrases “open form” and “open field,” I have evoked one of the twentieth-century 
literary traditions with which the poets of Bernstein’s The Politics of Poetics Form and the 
subjects of my dissertation—Susan Howe, Nathaniel Mackey, and Ed Roberson—are often 
identified. Similar to the way the term “free verse” functioned for modernist poets, for poets of 
the second half of the twentieth century, “open form” refers both to the formal structure of 
poems and to the ideological position of the poet. Practicing open form means not being 
restricted to conventional rules of meter or rhyme, nor of grammar, syntax and diction; it also 
means staying open to chance and challenge, being “open minded” in one’s creative process—
letting things come into the poem from “the outside,” things that are not predetermined or 
precluded by the poet’s assumptions or intentions. “Open form” is a phrase that describes many 
of the more experimental poetics of the post-WWII period—beat poetry, San Francisco 
Renaissance, Black Mountain, and The New York School—associated especially with the poetry 
published in Donald Allen’s 1960 anthology The New American Poetry 1945-1960.  Allen 
published The New American Poetry as an alternative or challenge to what was considered the 
more mainstream or establishment 1957 anthology New Poets of England and America, edited 
by Donald Hall, Robert Pack and Louis Simpson. In turn, the New American Poetry would 
become a name used to designate those poets who practiced some kind of open form poetics in 
the avant-garde tradition of Ezra Pound, Williams Carlos Williams, and H.D. “Open field,” on 
the other hand, is a phrase that points more specifically to Charles Olson’s influential 1950 
essay, “Projective Verse”—in which he calls for a new poetry that privileges movement, process 
                                                                                                                                                             
Barthelme, Heller, Pynchon, and Vonnegut. She decided to go with ‘black humor.’ It would be a 
decade before work combining extreme verbal effects with flattened affect became widely 
spoken of as ‘postmodern.’” 
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and form,35 produced by what he calls “composition by field”—and to Robert Duncan’s 1960 
book The Opening of the Field and his “field poems” that similarly promote process over final 
product. Both Olson and Duncan composed serial works—ongoing poetic series with no ending 
or conclusion.  
“Liberatory Poetics” Versus “Avant-Garde,” “Experimental,” “Innovative,” and 
“Oppositional” 
 
Open form and open field poetics are part of a general category of poetic practice that I 
term “liberatory poetics,” to signal those poetries that are explicitly or implicitly tied to a leftist 
politics aimed at social and economic transformation, by moving away from centers of 
ideologies of dominance. Throughout the dissertation, I use the term “liberatory” in place of the 
most common terms used to describe this kind of poetry: “avant-garde,” “innovative,” 
“experimental,” and “oppositional.”36 These four terms appeared throughout the twentieth 
century and are still used today—often interchangeably, and ambivalently, as they each present 
difficulty in terms of their historical associations and their inability to include and/or exclude the 
                                                 
35Olson, Projective Verse, 2.  In relation to the form vs. content debates above, in “Projective 
Verse,” Olson writes that “FORM IS NEVER MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF 
CONTENT.” 
 
36McHale, Obligation toward the Difficult Whole, 1. Interestingly, Brian McHale observes that 
discussions of postmodern art have not included poetry and/or conversely, that discussions of 
poetry produced in the postmodern period have tended to be named by other terms. This seems 
correct: as I’ll discuss, among the terms that are used and/or debated to name poetry in the 
postmodernist period—avant-garde, experimental, innovative, oppositional, New American, 
open field, et al—“postmodern” is not a prominent contender. The most significant exceptions in 
my readings include: Aldon Lynn Nielsen, Black Chant: Languages of African-American 
Postmodernism, Mutlu Konuk Blasing, Politics and Form in Postmodern Poetry: O’Hara, 
Bishop, Ashbery, and Merrill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Joseph Conte, 
Unending Design: The Forms of Postmodern Poetry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); 
and in anthologies aimed at a wide market such as Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton 
Anthology, Ed. Paul Hoover (New York: Norton, 1994) and Poems for the Millennium: The 
University of California Book of Modern & Postmodern Poetry, Eds. Pierre Joris and Jerome 
Rothenberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
24 
 
right or wrong poets or poetries.37 The term “avant-garde” is defined by each of the other terms, 
and in that sense is a kind of ur-name to which they all return—that is, the avant-garde is 
characterized by formal innovation, committed to experimentation and motivated by opposition 
to the status quo. But in current usage, “avant-garde” is laden with histories of affiliation and 
exclusion that often get in the way of what one wants to otherwise signal. Generally, the term is 
interpreted as an historical reference to modernist experimentations, applied particularly to artists 
in Western Europe and extending to North America. After the modernist period, “the avant-
garde” is increasingly a matter of academic categorization—the province of scholarly concern 
wherein academia, and the culture industry more broadly, determine who and what qualifies or is 
recognized as avant-garde—rather than a term that serves as a rally call to artists to take up 
cultural arms against the status-quo and State power. So that while many of us are drawn to the 
militant overtones of the term, which suggest a cultural front that must work in tandem with any 
                                                 
37Waider, Liberating the Canon, 10, 7. Nearly every critical work written on this subject 
struggles with these interchangeable yet not quite satisfactory names, which the author qualifies, 
complains about and struggles to choose between, if they aren’t interested in introducing an 
alternative. To take one example: In her introduction to Liberating the Canon: An Anthology of 
Innovative Literature, published in 2018, Isabel Waidner struggles with naming the work being 
anthologized—in this case in the British context. In her critique of diversity in the publishing 
industry, she writes, “But if literary publishing is bad, innovation (or experimental, or avant-
garde) publishing is worse.” Throughout the introduction, she uses the terms—innovative, 
experimental, and avant-garde—interchangeably, according to the discourses in which her 
commentary seeks to intervene. For the title, she settles on “innovative,” but is restless about its 
institutionalization. She opens by describing the book as “capturing the contemporary emergence 
of nonconforming and radically innovative literatures in the UK and beyond. Historically, 
sociopolitical marginalisation and avant-garde aesthetics have not come together in UK 
literature, counterintuitively divorcing outsider experience and formal innovation. Bringing 
together intersectionality and literary innovation, Liberating the Canon is designed as an 
intervention against the normativity of literary publishing contexts and the institution ‘Innovative 
Literature’ as such.” Notice the familiar values and terms—nonconformity, radically innovation, 




armed front of revolutionary struggle, it comes with cultural baggage.38 In current usage, the 
term “avant-garde” elicits elitist overtones, particularly in relation to Language poetry in the 
post-1968 period and conceptual poetry in the contemporary period; and/or it refers more 
generally to a membership class of artists, the purpose of which is to stake a claim on and 
determine who qualifies as the avant-garde in order to benefit from whatever cultural capital 
such membership entails. Accordingly, in the post-1968 period, there is a sense that the very 
notion of an avant-garde, as it was conceived in the early twentieth century, has lost its viability 
in an era of mass consumerism and political skepticism.39 
For these reasons as well as the shifting historical context of cultural production, in the 
post-WWII period, the terms “innovative” and “experimental” poetry became a popular 
alternative to “avant-garde,” at a time when the majority of North Americans and Europeans did 
not consider the world to be at war, and thus the sense of “vanguard” forces did not have the 
same resonance. While the sense of an oppositional politics remains in both the terms 
                                                 
38Bohn, The Avant-Garde Imperative, 3. On the other hand, in The Avant-Garde Imperative: The 
Visionary Quest for a New Language, Willard Bohn argues that not only should “the avant-
garde” be decoupled from modernity and modernism, it should also be understood, in its military 
metaphor, to be “concerned not with death and destruction [… but rather with search and 
discovery.” He makes the interesting point that as opposed to the idea of the avant-garde as an 
aggressive frontline that confronts the enemy in battle, “historically, the military vanguard 
consisted of a small group of soldiers who preceded the main body of the army in order to find 
out what lay ahead. Despite occasional skirmishes, their mission was devoted to gathering 
information about the strength and disposition of enemy forces.” While this correction makes a 
good case for the ongoing relevance of the term “avant-garde,” one has to ask if it is worth 
having to contend with the baggage it continues to carry with it.  
 
39Alex Houen, Powers of Possibility, 11. Houen, who defines the “historical avant-garde” in 
Renato Pogglioli’s terms as characterized by “turning art into praxis (agonism); opposing social 
conventions and mores (antagonism); and constantly overturning the movements’ own beliefs 
(nihilism),” offers that “those who argue that since the sixties all three of those characteristics 
have become moribund do so mostly on the basis of believing that postmodernism has made 
avant-gardism neither culturally nor stylistically viable” due to the commodification of all 
aspects of cultural production and innovation. 
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“innovative” and “experimental,” the stakes of the poetics moved more immediately toward its 
aesthetic goals. Such that in Donald Allen’s preface to The New American Poetry, for example, 
he writes about the poets included in the anthology: 
They are our avant-garde, the true continuers of the modern movement in American 
poetry. Through their work many are closely allied to modern jazz and abstract 
expressionist painting, today recognized throughout the world to be America’s greatest 
achievements in contemporary culture. This anthology makes the same claim for the new 
American poetry, now becoming the dominant movement in the second phase of our 
twentieth-century literature and already exerting a strong influence abroad.40  
 
Allen’s emphasis on cultural “achievement” and worldwide recognition41 and influence makes 
formal innovation—in the legacy of Pound’s “make it new”—the primary focus of avant-
gardism. The term “experimental” opens up a lineage that extends beyond the modernist avant-
garde to a longer history of literary experimentation in various historical contexts—from 
Chaucer to Sterne and Diderot to Whitman and Dickinson—as well as creates a link between 
scientific and literary experimentation, i.e., the writing workshop as laboratory. 42 Though in 
                                                 
40Allen, The New American Poetry, xi. 
 
41Cf. Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). This emphasis further ties Allen’s project to 
Cold War deployments of American Jazz used to persuade the international community that 
racial inequality had been overcome in the U.S. as a selling point of capitalist democracy over 
communism. Starting in 1956, the U.S. State Department “Jazz Ambassadors” program sent 
Louis Armstrong, Dave Brubeck, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie, and Benny Goodman on tour 
to Poland, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and other Cold War regions of the world. 
 
42In their introduction to The Routledge Companion to Experimental Literature, published in 
2012, the editors make this link an explicit part of their choice of terminology in the context of 
the 21st century “crisis in the humanities” in which literature has been delegitimated, as a way of 
reclaiming literature’s value in the university and other institutions of knowledge production: “In 
the chapters that follow, the modifier experimental is used more or less interchangeably with 
avant-garde, and sometimes innovative. Though the terms function roughly synonymously, there 
are important nuances of difference in connotation, especially between experimental and avant-
garde. Avant-garde begins its career in the military context, but then migrates to the political 
sphere, where the avant-garde is the faction that takes the lead ahead of the rest of a political 
movement. Consequently, aesthetic avant-gardism continues to be allied with political radicalism 
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Alex Houen’s documentation of debates between the terms “innovative” and “experimental” to 
describe US writing since the 1960s, he makes the case that “experimentalism” is tied to avant-
gardism, and thus the term “innovative” frees the literature in question from that affiliation while 
offering a more inclusive term for a variety of “literary orientations.”43 Similarly, in the 
introduction to Renegade Poetics: Black Aesthetics and Formal Innovation in African American 
Poetry, Evie Shockley explains her preference for the term “innovative,” following Harryette 
Mullen’s definition of “innovation as explorative and interrogative, an open-ended investigation 
into the possibilities of language, the aesthetic and expressive, intellectual and transformative 
possibilities of language,” to which she adds, 
I distinguish ‘innovative’ work from ‘avant-garde’ work on the grounds that the latter 
term most usefully signifies people working in the context of a movement or a visible 
collectivity seeking not simply to push their work individually, but to shift the whole 
discussion around poetics away from current norms. Thus, all avant-garde poetry is 
innovative (or aspires to be!), but not all innovative work is created within the context of 
an avant-garde. I prefer ‘innovative’ to ‘experimental’ in order to respect the fact that 
poets working within a wide range of aesthetics undertake experimentation in their efforts 
to achieve their desired effects. And, finally, I use ‘innovative’ rather than ‘modernist’ or 
‘postmodern’ […] because I am treating poets who collectively span the twentieth 
century.44 
 
While what aspects of the poetics each term denotes and connotes are actively debated, we 
nonetheless see throughout the postwar period, as well as today, the terms “avant-garde,” 
“innovative” and “experimental” used interchangeably.  
                                                                                                                                                             
in a number of twentieth- and twenty-first-century artistic and literary movements. 
Experimentalism's connotations, by contrast, are scientific. Experiment promises to extend the 
boundaries of knowledge, or in this case, of artistic practice. Strongly associated with modernity, 
it implies rejection of hide-bound traditions, values and forms. To call literature experimental is 
in some sense to aspire to compete with science—challenging science's privileged status in 
modernity and reclaiming some of the prestige ceded by literature to science since the nineteenth 
century.” 
 
43Houen, Powers of Possibility, 14. 
 
44Shockley, Renegade Poetics, 10-11. 
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“Oppositional” poetics, on the other hand, is a particularly post-1968 term, appearing in 
the 1970s-90s and then falling out of usage at the turn of the century, a term that returns the 
revolutionary political aims of the poetry to the forefront of its naming. Similar to the way 
“experimentalism” opens up the practice to a longer tradition, “oppositional” poetics opens up a 
connection to nineteenth century American nonconformists like Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman 
and Dickinson. In fact, “opposition” is an interesting but potentially problematic concept with 
which to describe this politics—for while it is suggestive of a more overt political program or 
stance, its association with nonconformity runs the risk of emphasizing opposition as a moral 
value rather than a politics. I believe its rhetorical appeal in the post-1968 period was, as I’ve 
suggested above in my discussion of The Politics of Poetic Form, consistent with the anti-
institutional, anti-establishment ethos that poets of the left staked out during a period in which 
the consolidation of cultural, social, and economic power in university English departments and 
writing programs seemed to threaten the possibility of an avant-garde that could amount to 
anything more than an aesthetic gesture—dovetailing with contemporary theory-praxis debates. 
Against this background, emphasizing “opposition” in the innovative/experimental practice of 
leftist poets was essential.45 Furthermore, “oppositional” poetics was a formally inclusive term. 
While one could interpret its opposition to be a formal one—as in, a practice that opposes, or 
rejects, conventional form—one could likewise interpret its opposition to be based in the content, 
message, or aim of the poetry, regardless of the form it might take. In Erica Hunt’s widely cited 
contribution to The Politics of Poetic Form, “Notes for an Oppositional Poetics,” she argues for 
the urgent need to correct the way the that “oppositional projects replicate the stratification of the 
                                                 
45Lazer, Opposing Poetries, 1-2. In the introduction to Opposing Poetries, for example, Hank 
Lazer defines "opposing poetries" as "poetries that critique and contest assumptions and practices 
of more mainstream poetries." 
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culture at large” 46 by participating in internecine divisions that pit different communities and 
practices against one another as Bernstein’s introduction does. She excoriates her audience, who 
would be primarily Language poets, or language poets, that  
there is nothing inherent in language centered projects that gives them immunity from 
partiality that reproduces the controlling ideas of dominant culture. […] There are also 
serious shortcomings in any opposition that asserts its technical victories and removes 
itself from other oppositional projects on the grounds of pursuing new consciousness. 
The fetishization of the new is well advanced in our society, and borrows from dominant 
culture that culture’s authority: it feeds our collective amnesia.47  
 
She appeals to her audience then to consider how to bridge the existing divides among 
oppositional groups, arguing, “While all critical projects begin with simple negation, all advance 
when any of them advances.”48  
  Today, in 2019, people don’t speak much about “oppositional” poetics. I think one of 
the primary reasons for this is that those practices that were defined in opposition to institutions 
like the university, for example, were in the end enfolded into the university.49 For that reason, 
terms like “fugitive” poetics have taken its place. The terms “experimental” and “innovative,” 
and to a lesser degree “avant-garde,” continue to be widely circulated synonyms to describe 
poetry that is invested to some degree in a leftist project for social and economic transformation 
and that is considered non-mainstream, niche or esoteric (even if it shows up on university 
syllabi). While these terms are useful in characterizing an important feature of the poetics I study 
in this dissertation, they are each, at once, too vague and too exclusive. Vague insofar as they do 
                                                 
46Hunt, Notes for an Oppositional Poetics, 203. 
 
47Hunt, “Notes for an Oppositional Poetics,” 204. 
 
48Hunt, “Notes for an Oppositional Poetics,” 204. 
 
49See my conclusion for more on this institutional history and its relevance to liberatory poetics 
in the post-1968 period and today. 
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not themselves suggest the liberatory politics in which I believe post-1968 poets were invested. 
Experiment and innovation are not in themselves necessarily liberatory practices. And those who 
experiment or innovate poetic form are not necessarily interested in a specifically leftist 
liberatory project, as experiment and innovation are tools used across the political spectrum.50 
On the other hand, it may be the case that all liberatory poetics is experimental and innovative, 
since any act of liberation is preceded by an act of imagination—i.e., we cannot leave the status 
quo without imagining something otherwise. But in this case, if “experimental” and “innovative” 
are used to suggest that formal innovation is primary to a poetics that has a politics, those terms 
then become too exclusive for the tradition I am tracing, by reintroducing the form versus 
content and style versus subject matter debates that create divisions among the varied practices 
of liberatory poetics. This latter problem is the same one that the term “oppositional” poetics 
sought to overcome. For these reasons, I use “liberatory poetics”51 as term that, regardless of 
                                                 
50Mackey, PH, 240-1; Schultz, A Poetics of Impasse, 6-7. In “Expanding the Repertoire,” 
Mackey reminds us that “the term innovation is a relative one, that it’s haunted by the question, 
Compared to what?” and further reminds us that “Racialized dichotomies between content and 
form, accessibility and difficult, conventionality and innovation, and the like rest on a division of 
cultural labor black experimental writing has to contest and overcome.” Similarly, Susan M. 
Schultz points out in the lineated introduction to her book, A Poetics of Impasse in Modern and 
Contemporary American Poetry: “experimental” is a relative term: “What might be experimental 
in Sydney is not one / In San Francisco; what is avant-garde in Los Angeles / May be retro in 
Honolulu and vice versa. Alan / Sondheim’s recent web experiments with writing / In Hawaiian 
(see ‘Colonialism and Theology’ on / The poetics list, June, 2003), which he considers / 
Liberatory (the language is, after all written by / Hawaiians) would be considered colonial here 
[Hawaii] / (The language was, after all, stolen by a white guy / From the North American 
continent).” 
 
51I am not invested in the term “liberatory poetics” being widely adopted as much as what it 
describes to be recognized. In wanting to have one term that I can consistently use throughout 
the dissertation, it is the best placeholder I have imagined for a poetics that faces such difficulty 
being named. The problem of naming points to a larger problem of identity that would be worth 
exploring further. What is at stake in the naming? What and/or who is it that we want to 
distinguish this poetry and poetics from? The multiple answers to these questions, as they relate 
to the various spheres of literary production—publication, education, social community, political 
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affiliation, qualification, or status, describes work that is avant-garde, experimental, innovative, 
and oppositional, insofar as it challenges the status-quo in order to imagine a socially and 
economically transformed world in which all people are liberated from structures of 
domination—ideological, social, governmental, economic, and otherwise. The “open field” of 
open field poetics is a space of liberation52—cultivated by and cultivating open form, open 
                                                                                                                                                             
activism, cultural export, ambassadorship, etc.—tend to complicate the issue. It may be that the 
same problem faces the literary community that faces the political left in the U.S.—a lack of 
unity required to name itself a party or a movement. Or, it may be that the desire to distinguish 
poets from one another is a distraction from or a matter of compensation for our uncertainty 
about the role poetry has to play in political pursuits of liberation, and the bold move would be to 
lose the modifiers altogether, to simply talk of “poetry and poetics,” and let the writing 
distinguish itself based on what it does. 
 
52Maria O’Malley, “Dickinson’s Liberatory Poetics,” The Emily Dickinson Journal 18.2 (2009): 
63-76; Reed, Freedom Time, 9-10; Parmar, Ed, Liberating the Canon, vii-viii; Keller, Writing 
Plural Worlds in Contemporary U.S. Poetry; Dani Spinoza, Anarchists in the Academy, xix-xx); 
Houen, Powers of Possibility, 16. I am not alone in turning to language of “liberation” and 
“freedom” to describe this poetics. Cf.. Maria O’Malley similarly argues for a reconsideration of 
the rhetoric of liberation, despite skepticism about its U.S. American and European associations 
with ideologies of individual freedom and sovereignty that have underwritten the violence of 
colonization, settler-colonialism, wars of intervention, etc. While Anthony Reed argues, “The 
disappearance of the term ‘freedom’ (or ‘liberation’) from the common language of black 
politics should be mourned, especially as this disappearance marks ‘the disappearance’ of the 
pursuit of Freedom as an element of black vernacular culture’ in the overdeveloped world. 
Reclaiming the term ‘freedom’ is especially urgent at a time when the Right and neoliberal 
regimes have conspicuously co-opted ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ as bywords for the erosion of the 
welfare state and complicity with capital’s demands as a response to the threat of 
‘totalitarianism.’  Part of my ambition is to resituate the thinking of freedom in the field of recent 
literature. Privileging that address to a future anterior audience, I understand the literary text to 
reach beyond its time to a place that is always just out of reach and way from view until the 
advent of genuine human freedom.” Nissa Parmar invokes the similarly sullied/contested term, 
“democracy” as a productive term in her preface to Multicultural Poetics: Re-visioning the 
American (2018), when she defines her study’s poetic lineage of American poetry as one that 
“represents a (r)evolutionary tradition of democractic forms and content that present a national 
identity that does not compromise but explores, celebrates, and critiques individual and 
community identities.” Dani Spinosa, in her 2018 volume Anarchists in the Academy also takes 
up the rhetoric of democratic egalitarianism in defining “experimental” poetry in order to counter 
the overtones of exclusion and elitism that “avant-garde” holds for her: “Experimental art […] 
while sharing many of the same aesthetic and formal concerns as the avant-garde, actively works 
against the linear narratives of influence and closed, filiative communities upheld by 
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imagination, and open social relations—a space open to resonance over resolution, to be filled 
with multiple voices sounding their relations, rather than resolving into a single tone. 
“Resonance Over Resolution” 
 
The title of my dissertation, “Resonance Over Resolution” comes from Nathaniel 
Mackey’s ongoing, serial epistolary novel, From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still 
Emanate (1986-present), from a phrase that Mackey’s protagonist, N.—a horn player in an L.A.-
based experimental jazz band in the 1970s-80s—writes to his mysterious correspondent who the 
reader only knows as Angel of Dust: “I tend to pursue resonance rather than resolution.”53 
Mackey invokes multiple discourses in this statement. In “Western” tonal systems, music should 
move from dissonance to consonance, “resolving” on the tonic note or chord, what is otherwise 
considered a tonal “center” to which the notes must always return. In non-Western or atonal 
systems, notes do not move toward any center or tonic resolution; the relationships among notes 
in a composition are decentralized—in that sense, the entire field of sonic resonance is at play. 
Extending this distinction to fiction, a preference for resonance over resolution similarly forgoes 
a sense of narrative progression that moves from tension to resolution, but instead conjures a web 
of relationships among narrative elements that don’t necessarily move toward any plot point that 
could be called center or end. Likewise, in poetry, words, like notes, do not move toward 
definitive meanings but produce a network of meanings. And in criticism, rather than moving 
                                                                                                                                                             
vanguardism. […] The experimental verse I focus on […] avoid[s] vanguardism’s hierarchical 
nature in favour of a more egalitarian relationship between the reader and the writer—and 
between texts themselves.” Alex Houen, revives another disputed concept, “potentiality,” as the 
term that brings all of the contested words in union, as the title of his book, Powers of 
Possibility, means to invoke. I am sympathetic to this move, as I, too, turn to the discourse of 
possibility, and impossibility to define liberatory poetics, though I find the rhetoric of 
“potentiality” to be too much tied up in capitalist logics, despite the compelling arguments 
Houen makes for reclaiming potentiality to the liberatory project. 
 
53Mackey, FBB, 17. 
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from thesis to conclusion, to pursue resonance over resolution means drawing out the multiple 
dimensions of a problem, letting contradictions and complications coexist in relation to one 
another. In various fields of social, political, and creative life in the post-1968 period, resonance 
is privileged over resolution. 
Liberatory poets of “the sixties”—e.g., Allen Ginsberg, Robert Duncan, Denise Levertov, 
Amiri Baraka—in their commitment to immediate revolution, produced a poetics aimed at 
political resolution. For post-1968 poets like Howe, Mackey, and Roberson, a preference for 
resonance over resolution is expressed as a commitment to study over immediate action. A 
poetics of study means taking the time and the care to get a thorough picture of the field. It 
means staying open to what you don’t yet know and listening for the resonances among 
apparently contradictory or complicated ideas and relationships. Post-1968 poets recognized that 
in order to successfully transform the world, we need a better understanding of history—which 
requires developing the tools with which to see what has been obscured or to see past the 
ideology that obscures it. Study, in its noun form, as a rough draft or sketch, further emphasizes 
the poet’s recognition that poetics, like politics, must undergo a series of trials as it reaches 
toward liberation.  
By emphasizing resonance over resolution, I aim to correct a popular narrative of the 
post-1968 period as one in which the revolutionary energy of the U.S. American left retreated 
into academia with a lack of committed praxis. I would instead describe the period as one 
characterized by a strategic cautiousness. It’s as if this generation comes out the other side of the 
1960s saying, “Let’s slow down and hone our analysis.” Black-and-white readings of the 
political field that may have served the calls to action and programs for change in the era of Civil 
Rights, Black Power, SDS, come to seem counterproductive if not misguided and misleading, as 
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they seem to have failed—a perception buoyed by the landslide re-election of Nixon in 1972 and 
the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981.54 Dogmatism is dangerous, they insist: the 
complexity of things must be teased out—implication, complication, complicity, are all at play in 
dialectical readings of the social, cultural, and political moment, as revolutionary work is 
                                                 
54Luter, “In the Shadow of the 1960s,” 23, 35. Matthew Luter, in his essay on U.S. American 
literature of the 1970s, reflects that in relation to the popular imagination of “the sixties,” “[t]he 
overshadowed 1970s, conversely, are rarely associated with a particular set of cohesive signifiers 
– at least not ones not either instantly dismissed or ironically celebrated as kitsch. For many who 
experienced them firsthand, the 1970s felt incoherent and fragmented first and foremost because 
the era seemed so much less vital and eventful than its predecessor, its energies sputtering and 
waning instead of churning.” He adds, however: “The end of the 1960s (whether literal, political, 
or spiritual) is neither uniformly mourned nor celebrated in American texts of the 1970s. If a 
commonality in the decade’s varied literary and cinematic responses to the preceding era exists, 
it is confusion – sometimes at the disorder unveiled by the political conflict of the times, 
sometimes at how disappointingly the optimism of the age faded away. While a broad historical 
view can help contextualize the decade’s conflicts, it does not neutralize those conflicts. As a 
result, writing of the 1970s that reflects on the 1960s registers the earlier decade as a site of 
contention (and often defines the period thusly), but this body of texts is too heterogeneous to 
characterize solely as a literature of disillusionment.” What I think is most interesting about these 
narratives of the 1970s is the way they choose to dwell on those aspects that create a break from 
rather than continuity with the 1960s, though both are possible. Some of our most important 
literary works of liberatory poetics are produced in the 1970s, themselves suggesting the vibrant 
creative communities that cultivated them. Recent cultural histories shift the narrative to a 
continuity between the 1960s-1970s (into the present) in the work toward social transformation 
in both the North American and global context. Cf. M. J. Rymsza-Pawlowska, History Comes 
Alive: Public History and Popular Culture in the 1970s (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, May 24, 2018); Sarah Colvin and Katharina Karcher, Eds., Gender, 
Emancipation, and Political Violence (London: Routledge, 2019); Martin Halliwell and Nick 
Witham, Eds., Reframing 1968: American Politics, Protest and Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2018); Enrique Ochoa and Jaime M Pensado, Eds., México beyond 1968: 
Revolutionaries, Radicals, and Repression during the Global Sixties and Subversive Seventies 
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2018); Will Kaufman, “Rethinking the 1970s,” 
American Culture in the 1970s (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Peter N Carroll, 
It Seemed like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy and Promise of America in the 1970s (New 
York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982); Stephen Paul Miller,The Seventies Now: Culture 
as Surveillance. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Routledge Global Sixties; Gender, 
Emancipation, and Political Violence: Rethinking the Legacy of 1968, Edited by Sarah Colvin 
and Katharina Karcher. 
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constantly under threat of cooption by the very ideology it seeks to overthrow.55 As N. warns in 
the 1993 volume of Nathaniel Mackey’s From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate: 
“revelation” can quickly turn into “recuperation.”56 Or as he puts it in the 1986 volume: 
[S]imple inversion finds itself invested in the very assumptions it sets out to subvert. [. . . 
] Unless revolution, as well as taking an upward turn, makes for a lateral displacement (a 
stepping aside from whatever one thought “upward” and “downward” meant), the road 
ahead doesn’t seem to hold much in store beyond running in place. In other words, what 
Earl Zero says it true: “Where there’s a wheel there’s a turn.” But until we get dizzy with 
it, dervishly and devilishly dizzy, we’ll forever be stuck in the same old rut.57 
 
                                                 
55 Tietchen, Technomodernism, 15; Nichols, Radical Affections, 254; Quartermain, Disjunctive 
Poetics, 4-5. Todd F. Tietchen, in his study of the post-WWII literary avant-garde as 
practitioners of “technomodernism,” implicitly marks the post-1968 shift in ethos: “As early as 
the 1960s the poet [John Ashbery] was concerned that the coteries or scenes organizing the New 
American Poetry had merely come to serve as a mode of marketing and branding, a concern that 
continues to resonate with the performative aspects of selfhood within the networked social 
spaces of cybercapitalism. As much as those dissident networks imagined by the postwar avant-
garde might be viewed (both positively and negatively) as the precursors to the niche-based 
social and commercial forms on which algocracy [rule by algorithm] feeds, Ashbery’s work 
declares the liberatory networks imagined by the New American Poetry to be self-defeating.” 
Miriam Nichol’s, in her chapter on Howe in Radical Affections: Essays on the Poetics of the 
Outside, characterizes the post-1968 period as such: “During the 1970s and ‘80s while this 
picture [“the millennial vision of the world as a dynamic nexus of relations, complex beyond the 
imagination’s capacity to grasp in an image”] was still forming in the work of postmodern 
philosophers and poets, it was generally conceived as liberating the mind from whatever 
absolutisms it had managed to retain after modernism.” Peter Quartermain names a particular 
line of the tradition in which he places Howe (and would place Mackey, and possibly Roberson 
as well) “disjunctive poetics,” which he characterizes as “recalcitrant to description, ambiguous, 
highly wrought, apparently disjointed and even vacant (which is to say, seemingly ‘about’ 
nothing at all). Yet it is identifiably a passionate and extremely concentrated act of attention to a 
tangible (i.e., perceived) world whose most salient characteristics (multiplicity and uncertainty) 
are aspects of its inexplicableness.” He further observes, “The pattern, in which hierarchies break 
down to be replaced by pluralities and polyvalencies, and certainty is supplanted (usurped) by 
indeterminacy, is repeated in all branches of human knowledge. Among the writers discussed in 
this book it takes the form of an oppositional poetics which embraces as energy source and 
material the very subversion and deracination which so distressed writers like T.S. Eliot.” 
 
56Mackey, FBB, 255. 
 




All sides of the matter must be investigated; binary analyses will necessarily eclipse the lie that 
two-faced deceptions hide, which only a multifaceted approach undercuts. In the post-1968 
period, multiplicity rises as a value and a strategy in order to thwart duplicity. Or one of the 
major writers of period, Fredric Jameson58 puts it, 
How one gets out of the binary opposition can, however, never be predicted in advance; 
the solutions are always concrete and unique to a specific historical or formal situation, 
itself always unique. […] The prospects change somewhat when we understand that 
getting out of binary oppositions may often mean, not so much doing away with them, as 
multiplying them and using the initial ideological starting point as the beginning of a 
more complicated construction which is at the same time a more complex diagnosis.59 
 
In response to the exigency to escape the binary trap, poet’s “centrifugal work”60—that is, work 
that is concerned with moving or tending to move away from centers of what Mackey calls 
“ideologies of dominance”61—develops a poetics invested in drawing out multiplicities of 
meaning. The figure of resonance for this poetics stresses that drawing out multiplicities is about 
defining a field of complexity and plurality, not chaos or “mere noise.”62 
Resonance over resolution is also a figure for the preference for open versus closed 
forms. But, as I’ll discuss in the following chapter, = as a development of various “open form” 
poetics of the generation that precedes them, the “open field” is haunted by the uneven successes 
                                                 
58 I say Jameson is a “major writer” of the period, because of the wide reach his work had across 
various disciplines in the 1980s-90s, particularly The Political Unconscious, published in 1981, 
and Postmodernism, published in 1990. For that reason, Jameson in some ways appears as a 
fourth figure in my study of the post-1968 period of cultural and literary production.  
 
59Jameson, The Modernist Papers, xiii. 
 
60Mackey, PH, 239. 
 
61Mackey, DE, 262. 
 
62I put “mere noise” in scare quotes, since, as we will see in chapter three, “noise” is not only a 
relative term, it is also one historically deployed to police and cordon off those sounds that 
disrupt the social, cultural and political status quo.  
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and sharp failures of the revolutionary programs of the 1960s—in which what appears an 
opening might in fact be yet another closing, or as Susan Howe writes, “rungs of escape and 
enclosure are compelling and confusing”63—while the stakes of this poetics in the late twentieth-
century U.S. becomes more explicitly located at the level of the word—both what words disclose 




Because of the power that words wield in the post-1968 period, one of the tools with 
which, I argue, Howe, Mackey and Roberson pursue resonance over resolution is by resisting 
definition. The phrase “resisting definition” in my subtitle is intended to signal several ideas. The 
gerund verb form of “resisting” is a key trope of the poetics I explicate in this dissertation—the 
“ing” suggesting continuity and process, becoming over being, the potential of verbs over nouns 
to both represent and enact a poetics, politics, and world view that these writers argue is 
necessary for social transformation. At the same time, the corresponding noun, “resistance,” is a 
word that signals a liberatory project, a rallying concept for leftist struggle against the dominant 
social order. More broadly, “resistance” suggests counter-action and contradiction, which not 
only has social and political applications, but intellectual, linguistic, and poetic ones as well.64 
                                                 
63Howe, TBM, 46. 
 
64DuPlessis, Objectivist, 1, 6. The first sentence of Rachel Blau DuPlessis and Peter 
Quartermain’s introduction to The Objectivist Nexus (1999) opens, “Resistant to definition, 
‘Objectivist,’ uppercase, with or without quotation marks, is a notably unstable term.” During the 
1990s-2000s, DuPlessis and Quartermain, among other scholars and poet-critics, became 
invested in “the Objectivists,” and Oppen in particular, as the predecessors of a lineage of 
liberatory poetics defined by outsider status and commitment to a leftist project who produce 
“writing as aware of its own historical contingency and situatedness, and Objectivist poetics as a 
site of complexity, contentions, interrogation, and disagreement”—the terms by which post-1968 
poets defined their own practice and commitments. 
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Resistance as contra-diction—saying otherwise—in relation to “definition” works likewise on 
three registers—culturally, theoretically, and linguistically. At the level of culture, resisting 
definition means resisting the confinement of social categorization and containment that 
definition can be deployed to produce and protect. A preference not only for resonance over 
resolution but for uncertainty over certainty. Theoretically, resisting definition means refusing 
binary logics and investing instead in the multiplicity produced by particularities in relation. 
Finally, at the level of the word, resisting definition means engaging critically with the 
dictionary. In this case, I don’t mean resistance to mean refusal,65 or not only that, as the poets 
I’m writing about engage rigorously and enthrallingly with dictionary definitions of words. In 
that sense, the subtitle might be misleading—Howe, Mackey, and Roberson love definitions! But 
on a meta-level, it is precisely its potential wrongness that makes “resisting” the right word, as 
post-1968 resistance prefers productive contradiction over clear-cut categorization. 
Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work challenges hegemonic narratives of American 
history and social relations, and compels their readers to perceive the weight of history, and its 
silences, in the present. Poetry is well-positioned to take up history in this manner through its 
engagement with language. For example, the way Ed Roberson in a poem like “Properties” 
makes visible in a contemporary northern landscape of snow-covered land the image of an 
antebellum southern cotton field offers a critical intervention in the discipline of American 
history by re-visioning the American landscape.66 As Roberson says in an interview with 
                                                 
65Fisher, Writing Not Writing, 5. Though Tom Fisher, in Writing Not Writing: Poetry, Crisis, and 
Responsibility, goes even farther in this direction by considering those instances where poets in 
this tradition have refused to write at all. 
 
66Edwards, “Black Serial Poetics,” 625, 631.  Brent Hayes Edwards similarly offers: "The unique 
challenges of his [Roberson’s] writing, then, are less a matter of heuristics—much less free 
play—than of critique (a poetry that provides a 'reading' of what has been 'dishonestly read'). 
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Raymond Bianchi: “I’m trying to get a fully honest, and open emotional and psychological 
reading of the language that’s already there, but dishonestly read.”67 Paul Naylor, in Poetics 
Investigations: Singing the Holes in History, argues that Howe and Mackey, among other poets, 
achieve this “authenticity” by “writing history poetically,” by producing “contemporary 
investigative poetry in order to explore the linguistic, historical, and political conditions of 
contemporary culture.”68 Howe, Mackey, and Roberson map these conditions on the page by 
picking up on the acoustic and visual resonance among words and the images they evoke, while 
attending to the bass note, “eliciting low notes in otherwise or ostensibly high places.”69 As 
Mackey suggests in his introduction to Paracritical Hinge, “The low note or bass note is a 
discrepant note, a complicating play of endowment and disavowal, annunciative noise in deep 
league with silence.”70 
Resisting definition also bears on the way post-1968 writers defy generic categorization. 
The boundaries between poetry, fiction and criticism are unfixed in their work—as these labels 
that were once used to delineate a taxonomy of literary production become instead an assortment 
                                                                                                                                                             
Roberson’s poetics is thus also a politics of disinterring or bringing back to light 'certain levels of 
words' in the language, and the histories and experiences carried at those frequencies." “It would 
not be an exaggeration,” Edwards writes, “to call this a deconstructive poetics: it strives not to 
allow the reader access to some previously unsuspected romantic plenitude, but instead to attune 
a critical sensibility that recognizes the constitutive role of absence and forgetting in the national 
imaginary—that recognizes that 'we deny not the unknown / but the willfully not.'" 
 
67Qtd in Edwards, “Black Serial Poetics,” 625. 
 
68Paul Naylor, Poetics Investigations, 9. 
 
69Mackey, PH, 4. 
 
70Mackey, PH, 4. 
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of tools with which to build a liberatory poetics that engages in words and fabrication71 with that 
critical distance that Jameson warned is necessary to historical consciousness. One of the 
obsolete but relevant definitions of poetry in the OED is “Imaginative or creative literature in 
general; fable, fiction.” Jack Spicer wrote in After Lorca—a book that likewise blurs the 
boundaries between poetry, fiction and criticism—that “prose invents: poetry discloses.” 
Invention, in this formula, is antithetical to poetry because it is a process of adding rather than 
stripping away, but the two in fact work in concert; the process of disclosing truth requires both 
invention and poetry, a building up in order to strip away, a covering in order to uncover, a 
weaving in which loose ends are left loose. As Howe puts it: "I think a lot of my work is about 
breaking free: starting free and being captured and breaking free and being captured again.”72 
We recall Mackey’s Dogon “Creaking of the Word,” about which N. comments: “The sense I get 
from this is that a) we can’t help but be involved in fabrication, b) a case can be made for leaving 
loose ends loose, and c) we find ourselves caught in a rickety confession no matter what.” In the 
chapters that follow, I focus on Roberson’s poetry, Mackey’s fiction, and Howe’s creative-
criticism, in part to illustrate the way their liberatory poetics is enacted in each of these genres, 
insofar as we still recognize them as such.  
In the next chapter, I’ll further develop these key terms, "resonance over resolution” and 
“resisting definition,” as well as their historical exigency, as they emerge in the formal and 
                                                 
71Brown, The Limits of Fabrication: Materials Science, Materialist Poetics, 13, 34. Nathan 
Brown stakes his argument on the way the word “fabrication” “conjoins poiesis (making) and 
techne (skill),” emphasizing the two OED definitions of to fabricate to mean both “to form […] 
into the shape required for a finished product” and “to ‘make up’; to frame or invent (a legend, 
lie, etc.); to forge (a document),” in order “to demonstrate that the texts [he studies] traverse the 
opposition of open field poetics and procedural poetics” as well as to argue for a materialist base 
of these poetics unified under the umbrella of “fabrication.” 
 
72Howe, TBM, 166. 
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thematic operations of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work, particularly through their 




CHAPTER ONE: WORKING IN THE OPEN FIELD AFTER “THE SIXTIES”: HOWE, 
MACKEY, AND ROBERSON’S POST-1968 POETICS  
 
Recovering Historical Consciousness from the Perpetual Present 
 
Post-1968 poets who follow the open form and open field tradition of liberatory 
poetics—including Howe, Mackey, and Roberson—of the previous generation—including the 
Beats, Black Mountain, San Francisco Renaissance, New York School, et al—continue to be 
concerned with openness, generally, and with movement, process, and form-as-an-extension-of-
content, specifically. Many of them engage in seriality and other versions of the long poem that 
do not conform to conventional spaces of publication—the single poem that can be published in 
a journal or collected in an anthology, the bound book as a complete unit of composition (though 
their work may be published as such). But post-1968 poets’ relationship to these “open form” 
and “open field” practices are necessarily complicated by the particular historical pressures under 
which they are writing, as the values and tactics of revolutionary work, including those of 
liberatory poetics, are coopted by the capitalist institutions and ideologies of dominance that they 
seek to unsettle.73 The challenge then is how to compose in an open field whose openness can be 
                                                 
73Tietchen, Technomodern Poetics, 6, 9. In his recent reconsideration of the post-WWII U.S. 
literary avant-garde in terms of their relationship to emergent computing and communication 
technologies in “postwar information culture,” Todd F. Tietchen argues that the anti-
institutionalism of the New American Poetry is best explained as a response to the shifting 
technological landscape, in which “many of the seminal figures […] longed for an informatics of 
liberation while remaining leery of an informatics of control, prefiguring tensions that continue 
to be of concern,” arguing for example that Olson theorized “projective verse as an informatics 
of liberation—a newly inclusive and dynamic outlier network for the demos—while leaving him 
deeply troubled about the potential of electrified media and postwar information science to be 
absorbed into neofascist projects or aims.” While Tietchen’s reframing helps elucidate the social 
and cultural background of the New American Poetry, his application of a post-1968 
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exploited. For while the ongoingness of the open field, seriality, and process would seem to resist 
the closures that ideologies of domination require, in the post-1968 era of rising globalized 
neoliberal capitalism, the ongoingness of a perpetual present is the perfect ground from which to 
cultivate consumer-citizens without historical consciousness. 
In the preface to his 1990 Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
Jameson defined “the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in 
an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place."74 Following contemporary 
theories of the death of the subject, and what Jameson theorizes as a shift in consciousness from 
a temporal organization of the world to a spatial one, he argued, "If, indeed, the subject has lost 
its capacity […] to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult 
enough to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but ‘heaps 
of fragments’ and in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the 
aleatory."75 The potential consequence, in Jameson’s view, is endless co-option by 
“multinational,” or what today we call globalized capital:    
What the burden of our preceding demonstration suggests, however, is that distance in 
general (including “critical distance” in particular) has very precisely been abolished in 
the new space of postmodernism. We are submerged in its henceforth filled and suffused 
volumes to the point where our now postmodern bodies are bereft of spatial coordinates 
and practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation; meanwhile, it has 
already been observed how the prodigious new expansion of multinational capital ends 
up penetrating and colonizing those very pre-capitalist enclaves (Nature and the 
Unconscious) which offered extraterritorial and Archimedean footholds for critical 
effectivity. The shorthand language of co-optation is for this reason omnipresent on the 
left, but would now seem to offer a most inadequate theoretical basis for understanding a 
situation in which we all, in one way or another, dimly feel that not only punctual and 
local counter-culture forms of cultural resistance and guerrilla warfare but also even 
                                                                                                                                                             
perspective—in which every positive claim is haunted by its opposite—distorts the ethos of the 
period. 
74Jameson, Postmodernism, ix. 
 
75Jameson, Postmodernism, 25-26. 
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overtly political interventions like those of The Clash are all somehow secretly disarmed 
and reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves might well be considered a part, 
since they can achieve no distance from it.76 
 
The loss of distance, which is also a loss of difference, undermines the radical potential of 
attending to the local and particular, as the relations among them cannot be perceived or 
cultivated under such circumstances. In turn, post-1968 poets—including Howe, Mackey, and 
Roberson—develop a liberatory poetics that is concerned with the way historical time bears on 
the open field and serial forms in which they work. To demonstrate this difference, I’ll look now 
at how Howe relies on coincidence in her work with archives, Mackey’s revisions of the 
processual in his formal innovations, and Roberson’s attention to the interval as a unit of 
composition. 
Excavating History by Co-Incidence: Susan Howe’s Telepathy 
 
In her creative-critical works, My Emily Dickinson (1985) and The Birth-mark: unsettling 
the wilderness in American literary history (1993), and throughout her larger body of work, 
Howe engages with the archives of seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century American literary history, 
wherein she looks to the margins for those voices that have been overlooked and otherwise left 
out of the critical documentation, reproduction, circulation, and reception of literary texts. The 
margin, for Howe, is a multifaceted term: The margin of the page, where one finds marginal 
notes and markings that document a reader’s or writer’s process of engagement with the text; 
marginalized people, ideas, and stories that have been actively excluded; and the edges of literary 
texts, extratextual material and the materiality of textual objects themselves. From the traces of 
the marginalized, Howe excavates histories that complicate the received histories that were built 
                                                 
76Jameson, Postmodernism, 48-9. 
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upon such exclusions. This work resonates both with the fields of microhistory77 and new 
historicism78 of the same period, which were concerned with developing historical 
methodologies that countered the grand narratives and universal truths produced by dominant 
historical practices complicit in ideologies of dominance. But, as Peter Nicholls points out, 
Howe’s project diverges from new historicism insofar as she is not interested in recuperating lost 
voices into the existing canon nor proposing a new official history, “[f]or while Howe shared the 
new interest in recovering lost and marginalized voices, her own research was already motivated 
by a passionate commitment to forms of unintelligibility and disruption which ran counter to the 
totalizing concern with hegemony and consensus that characterized some leading examples of 
the New Historicism.”79 This difference points to a tension between micro- and macro-analysis 
that bears on the representation of historical time80 in the post-1968 period, as microanalysis 
risks becoming lost in a solipsistic present and macroanalysis risks reproducing grand narratives. 
Howe’s attention precisely to those stumbling blocks that disrupt the historian’s march to 
historical certainty, and the way she writes that stumbling into her writing as a stammer,81 
                                                 
77Cf. Ginzburg, Carlo, John Tedeschi and Anne C. Tedeschi. “Microhistory: Two or Things I 
Know About It.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20.1, Autumn 1993): 10-35. 
 





80 By historical time, I don’t mean necessarily the chronicle—that is, a linear chronology of 
recorded events—and its attending teleological narrative, predetermined and only in need of 
discovery. By historical time I mean the ability to perceive change and movement in time, in all 
the dynamic relationships that past, present, and future form, including the gaps, silences, and 
confusions such movements produce. 
 
81Howe, “Encloser,” 192. Howe writes, “This tradition that I hope I am part of has involved 
breaking boundaries of all sorts. It involves a fracturing of discourse, a stammering even. 
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reflects her development of open field poetics for the post-1968 context. Or as Paul Naylor puts 
it, “This lack of assurance, this hesitancy, in Howe’s work is a direct result, I believe, of the 
inclusion of history in the otherwise purely linguistic landscape of her poetry.”82 That is, Howe 
brings historical consciousness into the open field that might otherwise be read as a “purely 
linguistic landscape,” that is, a field of aesthetic play autonomous from the world of political 
praxis.83 
One of the ways that Howe challenges the totality of historical narratives while engaging 
in historical work is through her commitment to chance and coincidence as historiographical 
methodology. This approach to knowledge production is less willful and less pre-determined 
than dominant approaches that act as if historical study is always deliberate, objective, and 
certain. Acknowledging and working with the role that chance84 and coincidence plays in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Interruption and hesitation used as a force. A recognition that there is another voice, an attempt 
to hear and speak it. It’s this brokenness that interests me.” 
 
82Naylor, Poetic Investigation, 62. 
 
83Howe’s relationship to history and historiography is widely discussed in scholarly studies of 
her work. Cf. Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 435; Nichols, “Unsettling the Wilderness,” 597; 
Palatella, “And End of Abstraction,” np; Nichols, “Tensing the Difference,” 41; Quartermain, 
Disjunctive Poetics, 194. Katrina Harack: “Howe and Olson see the past as open for use—the 
artistic and historical expressions of the past provide a basis for the opening of possibilities in the 
present and future.” Peter Nicholls: “To write in this way [toward 
unintelligibility/untranslatability] is to jettison historical narrative at the same time that it is 
somehow a refusal to let go of the past, to give it up to ‘discourse.’” John Palatella: “[F]or Howe 
the end of abstract indeterminacy is a pragmatics of art that locates the means of historical 
understanding in a process of linguistic and rhetorical play that sounds out identity through the 
language world (and language of the world) surrounding it.” Miriam Nichols: “As she writes it, 
the alterity of the past mobilizes ethical and emotional demands that move us beyond the judging 
of what has been done socially or politically to a meditation on the act of judging itself.” Peter 
Quartermain: “Howe is, more than any American writer I can think of except perhaps Melville or 
Henry Adams, burdened by history.” 
 
84Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 436. Katrina Harack frames her study of Howe’s engagement 
with history in terms of philosopher Elizabeth Grosz’s theory of historical time: “[W]e must 
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writing of history is a way of being open: prepared to listen for what you don’t yet know, to what 
lies “outside,” that which is the immanent knowledge of history itself. That is, while colloquially, 
we talk about coincidence as a matter of accident, and therefore not a category of rigorous 
historical study, Howe reminds us that historical determination is part of coincidence—co-
incident, occurring together. How do you happen to be reading a particular text? It doesn’t fall 
out of heaven. A series of events caught up in historical forces leads you to be holding the book 
in your hand. Furthermore, these events and forces intersect with other series of events caught up 
in other historical forces that leads to the book being legible to you, to its meaning something to 
you. The event of the book’s existence and the event of you reading it are coincident, and in that 
meeting, different temporalities are brought into relation to one another. As the title of her later 
work, Spontaneous Particulars: The Telepathy of Archives, suggests, chance and coincidence—
encounters with the materials that happen to cross our paths—intersect with circumstance and 
context to produce history and historical consciousness. While modernist and post-war poets 
worked with chance—such as the chance operations of surrealism and Dada as a way to free the 
creative imagination, and the “permissiveness to whatever might enter the poem”85 of Duncan 
and Olson’s composition by field —Howe’s practice is more overtly concerned with a 
fundamental relationship between chance and historiography. She produces a form of poetic 
exposition in which a multidirectional grammar itself registers historical consciousness, while 
rendering transparent the operations of the production of historical knowledge as a product of 
                                                                                                                                                             
allow for what she [Elizabeth Grosz] calls ‘chance’ in our conceptions of time. According to 
Grosz, ‘Chance is that which signals the openness of the future, its relative connection to but also 
its relative freedom from the past, the possibilities of paths of development, temporal trajectories 
uncontained by the present.’” 
 
85Catherine Martin, “The Gift of the Poem: Mallarmé and Robert Duncan’s ‘Ground Work: 
Before the War,’” The Modern Language Review 103. 2 (April 1, 2008): 364. 
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chance and choice, crucially admitting that historical narratives86 are not only subjective, but 
personal. Underwriting this poetics is an understanding of the past and present as co-constitutive. 
In The Birth-mark, Howe writes, “In the eye of the present, fragments of past presents. 
                                                 
86Ma, “Poetry as History Revised,” 194; Howe, “Encloser,” 194; Howe, TBM, 164. Ma writes 
about Howe’s conflation of “history and fiction” to show that history is a fiction: “Howe's use of 
history departs radically from that of other poets, past and present, in several ways. What 
distinguishes Howe especially in this respect is the poet's unremitting insistence upon the fusion 
of ‘history and fiction.’ In contrast to the modernist ‘poetry including history,’ which still 
demarcates truth from untruth, Howe's fusion of ‘history and fiction’ not only erases that 
boundary but also, by extension, calls our attention to the artificiality of such a distinction. Thus 
engendered, then, is a critical perspective which insists that ‘what we were given of tradition is 
what we must break off, examine, fabricate’ [DuPlessis].” I think this is the case to a degree, but 
I would further argue that Howe’s destabilization of both genres—history and fiction—creates a 
dynamic historical consciousness that doesn’t suggest merely that history is a fiction, or that 
fictions are histories, but that the dynamic relationship between texts and the people who 
compose and read them exposes a co-constitutive relationship. She consistently pushes back 
pretty hard against suggestions that everything is a fiction, that history is only a construction, etc. 
In the Q&A following her lecture, collected in The Politics of Poetic Form, Howe replies to an 
audience question: “Of course I can’t really bring back a particular time. That’s true. Or it’s true 
if you think of time as moving in a particular direction—forward you say. But what if then is 
now. I hope my work here and elsewhere demonstrates something about the mystery of time. 
And I do not believe you never encountered a real even. Come on. That sounds so theoretical! 
Have you ever been really hungry? Did the dentist ever hit a nerve when he was giving you a 
filling? Have you ever had someone you love die? Did the Holocaust never really happen? Did 
we never really drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima?” In her 1989 interview with Edward Foster, 
Howe comments on editing the proofs of that exchange: “I’ve recently been editing the question-
from-the-audience section. […] Someone in the audience said, ‘Is anything real? I personally 
don’t know if anything is real.’ In the text, in the printed bracket, there is the word laughter. 
During the real event, the audience must have laughed, and I was too preoccupied at the time to 
notice. When I saw laughter in brackets, it made me angry. There is real suffering on this little 
planet. I mean we can discuss whether the Hittites believed in chronology and history before 
Herodotus, and in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, this month, a young African-American man was 
murdered by a gang of Italian-American teenagers. Where did the poison of racial hatred in 
America begin? Will it ever end? Why are we such a violent nation? Whey do we have such 
contempt for powerlessness? I feel compelled in my work to be back, not to the Hittites but to 
the invasion or settling, or whatever the current practice calls it, of this place. I am trying to 
understand what went wrong when the first Europeans stepped on shore here. They came here 
for a reason, something pushed them. What pushed them? Isn’t it bitterly ironic that many of 
them were fleeing devastation caused by enclosure laws in Britain, and the first thing they did 
here was to put up fences? Racism is by no means unique to America. There are things that must 
never be forgotten. It’s not a laughing matter.” 
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My presence keeps a promise to past meanings.”87 Her figuration of the entwined and multi-
directional relation between past and present is complex in this formulation. “In the eye” 
suggests perception—as in “from the perspective of the present”—but it also suggests location, 
like the eye of the storm—as in, “from the center of the present.” The former invokes the idea of 
(hind) sight—looking backward to the past from the present, while the latter conjures an 
ontological field in which past and present are coexistent. The second half of this first sentence—
in which the verb is elided, as in “in the eye of the present, [there are] fragments of past 
presents”—suggests we conceive history as a series of “now’s.” “Now,” like first- and second-
person pronouns, acts as a shifter. “Now” denotes a location in time that shifts according to who 
utters it. My “now” and your “now” can refer to two different temporal locations that meet in the 
common experience of now-ness. We are brought into immediate presence of one another via the 
shared experience of “now.” The words you write in your now in 1862 are the same words I read 
in my now in 2019. The technology of writing makes this telepathy possible, provoking the 
insight that the past is always present both because it is present to itself and because of its 
ongoing presence in our present. The homonym between “presents” and “presence” emphasizes 
this aspect of Howe’s assertion. Howe, that is, registers the presence of past presents in our own 
ongoing present. Howe writes in The Birth-mark: Unsettling the Wilderness in American 
Literary History, “When we move through the positivism of literary canons and master 
narratives, we consign ourselves to the legitimation of power, chains of inertia, an apparatus of 
capture.”88 Howe works rigorously to escape or sidestep the “apparatus of capture” by writing 
with the selections of texts she studies, bringing those “past presents” into temporal relation to 
                                                 
87Howe, TBM, 54. 
 
88 TBM 45-6. 
50 
 
“present presents.” In doing so, her work responds to what Michel-Rolph Trouillot in Silencing 
the Past writes about historical “authenticity”: “Cascardi suggests that ‘authenticity is not a type 
or degree of knowledge, but a relationship to what is known.’ To say that ‘what is known’ must 
include the present will seem self-evident, but it may be less obvious that historical authenticity 
resides not in the fidelity to an alleged past but in an honesty vis-à-vis the present as it re-
presents the past.”89 
Fragmentation is key in this grammatically-fragmented statement: “In the eye of the 
present, fragments of past presents.” “Fragments of past” suggest incompleteness, the small 
detail rather than the whole of which it is a part. But the incompleteness of the smallest detail has 
the potential to expand, boundlessly, in relation. This is not only the gambit of post-1968 
liberatory poetics, microhistory and new historicism; an interest in the detail and the particular is 
widespread in contemporary philosophical and intellectual discourses, as well. To give two brief 
examples: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write in 1980 about becoming-minoritarian: “We 
can be thrown into becoming by anything at all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of 
things. You don’t deviate from the majority unless there is a little detail that starts to swell and 
carries you off.”90 Similarly, Édouard Glissant writes in 1990, in Poetics of Relation, “Every 
expression of the humanities opens onto the fluctuating complexity of the world. Here poetic 
thought safeguards the particular, since only the totality of truly secure particulars guarantees the 
energy of Diversity.91 But in every instance this particular sets about Relation in a completely 
                                                 
89Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 148. 
 
90Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, 292. 
 
91Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 98. “Diversity, which is neither chaos nor sterility, means the 
human spirit’s striving for a cross-cultural relationship, without universalist transcendence. 
Diversity needs the presence of peoples, no longer as objects to be swallowed up, but with the 
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intransitive manner, relating, that is, with the finally realized totality of all possible 
particulars.”92 In Howe’s work, the fragment, the detail, the particular is valued on its own terms. 
A single word, or fragment of a word, or trace of absent words, is a valid object of study for 
Howe—reflected in the subject matter she studies as well as in the form of her composition. As 
Paul Naylor argues, “She unsettles history by disrupting the sequential narrative style of 
traditional historiography with a highly paratactic and elliptical form of writing that frustrates the 
desire to uncover the ‘original’ version of the story.”93 In her poetry, for example, Naylor 
demonstrates, “the hierarchical grammar and syntax that would organize [thematic hints] is 
absent, unrepresented.”94  A non-hierarchical grammar disrupts the assumed linear arrangement 
of the sentence—that it contains before’s and after’s that come one after another. Non-
hierarchization, or parataxis, instead posits a grammar arranged, like history, as a series of 
“now’s.” 
A third slant homonymic word, “prescience,” is also brought into play by the second part 
of the statement I’ve cited, “My presence keeps a promise to past meanings.” Howe emphasizes 
                                                                                                                                                             
intention of creating a new relationship. Sameness required fixed Being, Diversity establishes 
Becoming. Just as Sameness began with expansionist plunder in the West, Diversity came to 
light through the political and armed resistance of peoples. As Sameness rises within the 
fascination with the individual, Diversity is spread through the dynamism of communities. As 
the Other is a source of temptation of Sameness, Wholeness is the demand of Diversity. You 
cannot become Trinidadian or Quebecois, if you are not; but it is from now on true that if 
Trinidad and Quebec did not exist as accepted components of Diversity, something would be 
missing from the body of world culture—that today we would feel that loss. In other words, if it 
was necessary for Sameness to be revealed in the solitude of individual Being, it is now 
imperative that Diversity should “pass” through whole communities and peoples. Sameness is 
sublimated difference; Diversity is accepted difference.” 
 
92Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 32. 
 
93Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 12. 
 
94Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 13. 
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the relation of co-constitution that the continuous co-presence that the ongoing accumulation of 
“past presents” inaugurates: the relation works in both directions, temporally. There is no 
chronology-based hierarchy between past, present, and future “now’s.” The most straightforward 
reading of the line might be that the living keeps the dead alive by remembering them, carrying 
on their words and meanings, where “the promise” is a covenant of generations’ responsibility to 
one another through a commitment to tradition or maintaining the tale of the tribe. On the level 
of linguistic-philosophical poetics, there’s a complex temporality at play that suggests that the 
present is a fulfillment of meanings projected from the past to the future—the way that the reader 
is always in a future relation to the writer; the writer is always writing to a future reader. 
Following the sentence prior, we can read “my presence”—that is, the reader-as-writer, the 
author who is writing as author of “my presents,” which are brought into co-presence with the 
reader’s present. The author is conjured as present in the space-time of the reader. As Howe 
reads and writes about her reading of Emily Dickinson’s lexicon, for example, past meanings are 
present95—this is the telepathy of archives, feeling across the distance of space and time that the 
text itself constantly archives. 
But as Howe writes her version of American literary history, she keeps active the sense 
these narratives represent a confluence of both chance and choice in their telling. As writers, 
coincidence brings certain materials to our attention, but the narratives we build around those 
materials are products of the choices we make. As I’ll discuss in more detail in a following 
chapter, Howe is constantly documenting the role that chance and choice play in the literary 
histories she and others have written, rendering transparent the operations of scholarship at the 
same time that she documents its opacity. One of the ways she does this is by writing herself into 
                                                 
95This will bear on my comments below regarding etymology. 
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the histories she composes in unexpected and uncertain ways. In one passage of The Birth-mark, 
for example, in an essay about the manuscript autobiography of seventeenth-century American 
minister Thomas Shepard, she writes, “In 1819, James Blake Howe turned the book upside 
down, probably to conform with the direction of the Autobiography, and inscribed his own name, 
place of residence, and the date on the same page.”96 She says no more about who James Blake 
Howe is and his name doesn’t come up again. Is James Blake Howe a relative of Howe’s? Is she 
studying a copy of the book that she encountered in her family library? Or is James Blake 
Howe’s book one she found in the public archive, drawn to a person who by chance shared her 
last name without any known relation? An internet search turns up a record of a James Howe, b. 
1659, one of six children of Elizabeth Howe (née Jackson; c. 1635–July 19, 1692), executed on 
July 19, 1692 in the Salem Witch Trials.97 If nothing else, we understand that Howe’s father’s 
family name is a Puritan one, implicating her personal history in the public history she excavates. 
David Arnold, in his essay-review of Howe’s The Birth-mark, writing under the influence of 
Howe’s prose, shares: “Susan Howe’s mother’s maiden name was Mary Manning. My mother’s 
maiden name was Diana Mary Manning. This is a coincidence but it means a lot. It is part of the 
attraction, a felt element in this kinship of words. An inflammation of the heart.”98 These 
openings of personal history onto public history, of feeling across the distance and difference of 
textuality by “an inflammation of the heart,” create resonances rather than resolutions in the open 
field of history without giving up the particularity of historical difference. Howe’s poetics in turn 
continues in the tradition of modernist and post-war open form poetics that attend to the 
                                                 
96Howe, TBM, 63. 
 
97“Elizabeth Howe,” Revolvy, accessed 28 Feb. 2019, https://www.revolvy.com/page/Elizabeth-
Howe. 
 
98Howe, TBM, 131. 
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particular, at the same time that it addresses post-1968 anxieties about historical consciousness 
disappearing in the ever-unfolding presence of microanalysis. 
Revising the Processual: Nathaniel Mackey’s Serial Form 
 
A similar concern emerges for the serial form, whose emphasis on process over product 
threatens to collapse historical distance and difference into a perpetual present. With this 
problem in mind, I’ll turn now to Mackey’s work to study the way his serial compositions depart 
in important ways from the open field poetics of his predecessors. In common with Mackey’s 
similarly ongoing serial poems—“Mu” and Song of the Andoumboulou—the nature of From a 
Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanates’ never-finishedness is not merely about a lack of 
an ending, but a lack of closure—five volumes have been published to date—Bedouin Hornbook 
(1983), Djbot Baghostus’s Run (1993), Atet A.D. (2001), Bass Cathedral (2008), and Late 
Arcade (2017)—with no reason to doubt a sixth is forthcoming. The nature of the epistolary form 
that structures From a Broken Bottle lends itself to Mackey’s asymptotic aesthetic, to his 
privileging of circular over straight linear narrative techniques and his modified Socratic 
dialogue around various issues: he is constantly posing questions that lead to hypotheses, 
speculations, interpretations; and then revisiting those questions, revising his hypotheses; and, so 
on, indefinitely.99 The epistolary form, that is, lends itself to the aesthetic form with which 
                                                 
99Another word for circular here might be repetition, or repetition with a difference. Cf. Edwards, 
“Notes on Poetics,” 582; Hock, “‘A Need to Mourn Abandonment in Advance,’” 546, 536. 
Edwards writes that Mackey’s work is characterized by “a poetics of the serial form […] that 
turns less on meaning than on moving, that strains against its own continuation, but keeps ‘not 
being done’ with itself.” Edwards calls this process one of “revisitation with a difference.” 
Which he further relates to the reprise in jazz as a similar practice of ongoingness and 
revisitation: saying it again, differently, in perpetuity, there is no final iteration. In Hock’s 
framing of Mackey’s work in terms of the collective/intergenerational trauma of the Middle 
Passage for African American and African diasporic people, he argues that Mackey treats the 
themes of loss and mourning with a poetics of repetition, to be understood in the psychoanalytic 
terms of repetition-compulsion in which compulsion is replaced by “strategic choice.” In this 
55 
 
Mackey’s work is most often categorized and which Mackey champions in his own critical 
writing on poetry: serial poetics.  
The serial poem is a long-poem form that is particularly associated with The New 
American Poetry lineage of “open field poetics” with which Mackey is aligned,100 characterized 
not only by length—a single poem or sequence sustained over many pages—but by a general 
ongoingness. There are various takes on the serial poem and what holds it together as a single 
poem. For example, while the book form bound the serial works of Spicer and Olson, Duncan’s 
approach was more radically open—his series leapt between and across books. In his serial 
poems “Mu” and Song of the Andoumboulou (the latter of which is cited in The Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics in the entry for “serial form”), Mackey follows Duncan’s 
approach. While in From a Broken Bottle, it would seem that the serial work is bounded within 
discrete books dedicated to the project, that boundary is broken from the beginning of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
context, Hock quotes Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s work on “signifying” in black creative expression 
which, similar to Edwards,’ Gates calls “revisitation with a difference”: “Signifyin(g) in jazz 
performances and in the play of black language games is a mode of formal revision, it depends 
for its effects on troping, it is often characterized by pastiche, and, most crucially, it turns on 
repetition of formal structures and their differences. […] Repetition, with a signal difference, is 
fundamental to the nature of Signifyin(g).” Hock then shows that Mackey is doubly engaged 
with Signifyin(g) as with Freudian psychoanalysis, particularly through his interest in dream as a 
source From a Broken Bottle’s content and formal structure. Ultimately, he argues that Mackey 
“offers a model of repetition as a generative means of responding to trauma, one in which 
repetition operates no longer as a compulsion but rather as strategic choice. The characters in 
Mackey’s series harness repetition as a way of looking forward, as if it to forestall trauma before 
it happens.” Both of these analyses would bear in productive ways on Mackey’s relationship to 
historical time, though I do not take them up here. 
 
100 Mackey’s 1975 PhD dissertation, completed at Stanford under the direction of Albert Gelpi, 
titled “Call Me Tantra: Open Field Poetics as Muse,” takes up the work of Charles Olson and 
Robert Duncan—as well as their nineteenth-century and modernist predecessors, Whitman, 
Williams, H.D. and Pound—poets who Mackey continues to study and reference in his critical 
writing and lectures and to teach in graduate seminars, and who are commonly invoked in studies 
of Mackey’s work. 
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project: the first publication of letters to the Angel of Dust, for example, appear as prose poems 
in the Song of the Andoumboulou.101  
Historically, the serial poem is understood to privilege “process” over product—another 
iteration of resonance over resolution—that asks the reader to enter the time of composition, in 
order to experience its unfolding.102 But, one way in which the processual is complicated103 in 
                                                 
101Mackey, Eroding Witness. 1985. “Song of the Andoumboulou: 6” and “Song of the 
Andoumboulou: 7” in Eroding Witness. 
 
102Kress, “Middle Voices,” 778; O’Leary, “Deep Trouble/Deep Treble,” 531; Edwards, “Notes 
on Poetics,” 583. Along with serial form, “process” is another term with which critics often write 
about Mackey’s work. David Kress argues that in Mackey’s verb-ing poetics and in his approach 
to narrative as neither having a beginning nor an ending, “process itself is placed in the forefront, 
with direction or heading relegated to secondary status, a status which only emerges from within 
the process.” Kress argues, that is, that novel’s narrative movement immanent—“the novel’s 
beginning(s) and ending(s) are dispersed into the unfolding of the novel itself. In other words, 
the traditional reference points signifying the limits of a novel [. . .] are delayed and deferred as 
things and made over into process by the process of the novel proceeding as it does.” Writing 
about Mackey’s “fixation on transformation” in the terms of alchemy, Peter O’Leary suggests 
that Mackey “has transmuted the traditional goal of alchemy”—to produce more valuable 
products out of less valuable ones (e.g. gold out of lead)—“into an aptitude, indeed a gnosis, for 
the process itself.” For Brent Hayes Edwards, Mackey’s “process” is related to a poetics of 
fugitivity rather than presence—“a poetics of the serial form […] that turns less on meaning than 
on moving, that strains against its own continuation, but keeps ‘not being done’ with itself.” 
Edwards calls this process one of “revisitation with a difference.” Which he further relates to the 
reprise in jazz as similar practice of ongoingness and revisitation: saying it again, differently, in 
perpetuity, there is no final iteration. 
 
103Kress, “Middle Voices,” 776; Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 575. I am not the first scholar to 
note the ways Mackey departs from previous iterations of open and serial forms that privilege 
process. David Kress places From a Broken Bottle within a history of avant-garde writing in 
which writers have challenged the necessity of beginning or endings through various means: 
circular form (e.g. Finnegan’s Wake), chaos or randomness (e.g. Burrough’s cut-ups), and 
motionless or “running in place” (e.g. Robbe-Grillet’s fiction). In contradistinction, Kress argues, 
Mackey’s “endlessness is fully moving, yet shattered or broken, progressive and imperfect—
literally.” Brent Haye Edwards argues that the differences that distinguish Mackey’s work from 
Pound, Olson, Duncan, and Spicer’s “cluster most prominently around the ways Spicer and 
Mackey understand the serial poem to be based in different kinds of musical allusions.” Robin 
Blaser, writing about Spicer’s work, suggested there was an analogical relation between serial 
poetry and serial music, describing the serial poem as “like a series of rooms where the lights go 
and on off.” By contrast, Edwards writes, “This compartmentalized definition of the serial form 
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From a Broken Bottle is by the book’s meta-seriality, which necessarily takes us out of the time 
of composition to consider the time of reading, revision, and reconsideration—thereby 
reintroducing the critical distance that Jameson worries is lost in postmodern aesthetics.104  
We find this to be the case most pointedly in the novel’s recurring “lecture/libretto” titled 
“The Creaking of the Word,” a serial composition within the serial composition whose various 
iterations N. encloses in letters to Angel of Dust. Such that, in addition to reading in those letters 
about N.’s process of composing the lecture, we read every revised version in full, whose content 
shifts and changes, and even whose title transforms and accumulates more naming—“April in 
Paris,” “In Walked Pen,” “So Dja Seh,” “Door Peep (Shall Not Enter),” and so on. Yet the sense 
of the composition of the lecture/libretto as a “process” is not registered in the writing itself as 
much as in tracing the mechanics of transformation between the versions, while maintaining a 
                                                                                                                                                             
wouldn’t’ appear to apply to Mackey’s interwoven, backtracking Song, so overrun with echoes 
and premonitions, revisitations and retractions. Moreover, western twentieth-century serial 
composition might not be the appropriate musical reference point,” arguing instead “Mackey’s 
work finds its particular interlocutor in black music […] as a figure for a pursuit of voice that 
questions, and is questioned by, the very limits of its expressive capacity.”  
 
104O’Leary, “Deep Trouble/Deep Treble” 527; Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 575. O’Leary 
offers: “[W]e never sense in Mackey’s efforts the articulation of a transcendent eternal-time that 
appears throughout Pound’s Cantos, nor the process-oriented holism one finds in Duncan’s later 
poems. Mackey’s cross-culturality is in conflict. [. . . ] Mackey’s notion of the world-poem can 
be said to derive from Duncan’s ideas of the same that he articulates in ‘Rites of Participation,” 
one of the chapters of his H.D. Book.” Edwards writes: “The self-reflexity, the emphasis on 
process so evident in Song of the Andoumboulou, might find a more instructive model [than post-
WWII Olson, Duncan, Blaser, and Spicer] in the work of William Carlos Williams—not only 
due to his interest in black music, but also in the ways he thinks serially without Blaser’s 
insistence on the linear progress of the poetic ego.” Instead, Williams’ poetics emphasizes, like 
Mackeys “the necessary question of how to proceed” Edwards’ observation raises an interesting 
question for me about what how Williams’ modernist moment circa the 1910s-30s resonates with 
Mackey’s 1970s-90s in ways that mid-century 1940s-60s ideas/poetics don’t. The “necessary 
question of how to proceed” seems the key to the historical differences. Both Williams and 
Mackey are writing at historical moments that register as times of disaster, while Blaser, Spicer, 
and Duncan, et al, are writing during a time of active hope—the disaster is underway but there is 
a sense that it may be stopped. 
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sense that it is the same thing: one thing that is at the same time multiple.105 To call the 
versioning of “The Creaking of the Word” a progression doesn’t quite fit—its movement is not 
directional in that sense; it does not support such teleological conceptions of history or art. Yet it 
has a destination: out106 of the structuring principles of identity that hold a composition together 
as such. One composition becomes many, or many compositions become one, such that the 
principle of multiplicity outweighs that of singularity in determining the identity of the text. Out 
of many, one, or is it out of one, many? “Out” in this formula has less to do with production and 
more to do with escape—uncapturability and incompleteness. Glissant’s Poetics of Relation is 
again pertinent: “[T]he poetics of Relation remains forever conjectural and presupposes no 
ideological stability. It is against the comfortable assurances linked to the supposed excellence of 
a language. A poetics that is latent, open, multilingual in intention, directly in contact with 
everything possible. Theoretician thought, focused on the basic and fundamental, and allying 
these with what is true, shies away from these uncertain paths.”107 N’s lecture/libretto is always 
in-process and the possibilities of what it becomes next are endlessly open and uncertain, not 
because it privileges dwelling endlessly in “the now” but because reconsideration and revision 
are critical to its liberatory project. In his 1995 interview with Christopher Funkhouser—in 
                                                 
105Hock, “A Need to Mourn,” 535. Stephen Hock, who frames Mackey’s work in terms of the 
collective/intergenerational trauma of the Middle Passage for African American and African 
diasporic people, arguing that Mackey treats the themes of loss and mourning with a poetics of 
repetition, to be understood in the psychoanalytic terms of repetition-compulsion but with a 
twist, in which repetition functions “in the series not as a pattern one must follow compulsive but 
rather as a strategic tool for addressing trauma creatively,” points out that the serial form itself 
could be understood as a repetition, both in terms of its publication as multiple volumes of the 
same book and the serial nature of the narratives within the book, particularly the constant 
revision of the lecture/libretto. 
 
106Cf. Mackey, “Destination Out,” PH. 
 
107Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 32. 
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which Mackey discusses his “commitment to process” in terms of “openness”—Mackey 
comments that serial form 
invites you to think about work that you’ve already done as incomplete and open to 
further articulation or modification, variation, which is a lot of what improvisation is, 
working out the suggestions that reside within a previous statement, a musical line or 
whatever. You start pulling things out of it that you didn't know were there. […] [W]hen 
something is apparently closed, you can break it open and pull further implications and 
explications out of it. That’s the process that I work with, in both verse and prose. Often 
writing is a form of re-reading for me, just going back and seeing things in something I've 
written that I didn't see before. So much writing comes out of reading anyway, reading 
other people, so why shouldn't it come out of reading yourself?108  
 
Brent Hayes Edwards’ formula that “things close in order to open” in Mackey’s poetics further 
helps us connect Mackey’s particular kind of “processual” work to a temporality that is not about 
the presence of being in-process but the dynamic movement (and manipulation) of historical 
time that his serial form inaugurates.109 
To the extent that processual work makes the present a never-ending unit of time, it could 
be said to be asymptotic—a recurring adjective throughout Mackey’s novel that I will study in 
more detail in a following chapter—in the same way the serial work is: the asymptote is a line 
that continually approaches a given curve but never meets it; mathematically a limit that a 
function infinitely approaches, conceptually a figure of infinite deferral that might suggest we 
never reach the end of possibility. But the term “processual” has different significance and 
implications for mid-century work than it does for post-1968 poets, which require us to fine-tune 
the distinction between the processual and the asymptotic. The focus on process that we 
associate with the avant-garde of the 1960s, for example, makes an argument for the process of 
                                                 
108Mackey, PH, 329. 
 
109Howe, TBM, 166; Roberson, VCO, 81. “Things close in order to open” also echoes Howe’s 
statement: “"I think a lot of my work is about breaking free: starting free and being captured and 
breaking free and being captured again” and Roberson’s poem, “Waterfowl Landing” It Lifts to 
Close,” which I will look at below. 
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making art to be recognized in-itself as art, that to read or witness the process of a work’s 
unfolding, without a determined telos, has aesthetic value; and that to recognize this is to resist 
dominant ideologies built on and reinforced by teleologies of history and art. In contrast, as a 
work whose composition begins roughly in the 1980s, the form of From a Broken Bottle must be 
read in the context of postmodernity’s flattening of historical time, where the perpetual present 
becomes a temporality of ideological entrapment, such as I discussed above. Such that seriality 
like Mackey’s that foregrounds the present as asymptotic limit, as a line the curve of historical 
time infinitely approaches, but never reaches, gives the work a movement that runs counter to an 
infinite present celebrated by the process-oriented work of the previous generation. This revised 
sense of the processual goes beyond a focus on the presentness of composition, to one that 
considers the relationship of the present to the past and future of compositional time. 
Such that if to foreground process is usually understood as an emphasis on presence—in 
the unfolding of the composition in the present—this temporal sense of process is complicated 
by Mackey’s treatment of time in language as unstable and multi-directional. Two of Mackey’s 
distinctive compound word-making techniques—“would-be x” and “after-the-fact y”—trouble 
the time of articulation in this way. For example, N.’s first retitling of “The Creaking of the 
Word” modifies the subtitle from “A metalecture to be delivered at the symposium ‘Locus and 
Locomotivity in Postcontemporary Music’” to “An after-the-fact lecture/libretto from the 
symposium ‘Locus and Locomotivity in Postcontemporary Music,’” where “after-the-fact” 
communicates that the present composition is to be presented in the past, that its composition 
comes after its presentation. Furthermore, at one point, N. explains that he calls it “after-the-fact 
… to admit that what it does has already been done,”110 both to assert “there are no new ideas”111 
                                                 
110Mackey, FBB, 332. 
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and to recognize that one is part of an historical lineage—i.e., to foreground artistic and 
intellectual historical consciousness. 
“Would-be x” comes at the matter from the other side: the word that “would be,” the 
word conditionally speculated to be, suggests a current absence that in the future would be 
present. Or as N. describes it: “every would-be equation of the available with the inevitable,”112 a 
meta-proposition that the words that we supply to make meaning are over-determined; or are 
they? The “would-be” makes the proposition a question, leaves “the loose ends [of composition] 
loose.”113 The meaning will be determined in the future, such that to foreground the process of 
composition is at the same time to foreground its futurity. N.’s thoughts will not be pinned 
down—there are always other possibilities to consider.114 In this sense, Mackey’s processual 
aesthetic at once emphasizes deferral on one end of the temporal spectrum and historical re-
                                                                                                                                                             
111Audre Lorde, “Poetry is Not a Luxury,” Sister Outsider (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 2007): 38. 
 
112Mackey, FBB, 156. 
 
113Mackey, FBB, 108. 
 
114Johnston, “Nathaniel Mackey and Lost Time,” 563; Edwards, “Black Serial Poetics,” 573, 
578. In “Nathaniel Mackey and Lost Time: ‘The Phantom Light of All Our Day,’” Devin 
Johnston offers another layer to this discussion by distinguishing between jazz time and 
mathematically divided clock time. “As Nathaniel Mackey has shown us, the fundamental 
experience of music and jazz in particular involves its own time, distinct from the mathematical 
subdivisions of the clock.  […] If music itself has the ability to transform present time, writing 
follows the fact of music.” Writing, which involves language, Johnston argues, involves a 
fundamental psychoanalytic loss or cut, quoting Kristeva that “language is acquired in childhood 
after the loss of a primal object.” “Writing,” Johnston argues, “is thus haunted […] The relation 
drawn here between language and fallen time is […] a pervasive concern in Mackey’s work.” 
Similarly, Brent Hayes Edwards offers: “Black music expression foreground ‘methodological 
fissures’ not just in terms of broken or doubled voices, however, but also in terms of time—in 
the way it espouses polyrhythm and the subtle syncopated propulsion signaled by the word 
‘swing.’” He continues, “It is unclear whether and how the language in Song of the 
Andoumboulou: 10 and the language of this section, displaced but echoing the Song, are related 
to time,” demonstrating through a closer reading of the poem the way time of composition, 
narration, and reading is perpetually ambiguated and thrown. 
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vision on the other—each of which determine the meaning of the present more than the present 
itself does, making the present not perpetual but perpetually out of reach. In this way, historical 
time—which doesn’t simply mean events of the past, but rather the recognition of the dynamic 
movement between past, present and future—is recovered from the presentism of postmodernist 
ideologies of dominance.115 
Generating the Serial Form: Ed Roberson’s Interval 
 
In Ed Roberson’s Lucid Interval as Integral Music, a book of poems originally published 
in 1984 and republished in 1995 with The Aerialist Narratives in Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In, 
the relationship between pre-1968 and post-1968 perspectives is more literally figured as 
generational, in the relationship between the poet and his young daughter, Lena, whose presence 
in-forms the book’s form and themes. Both Lucid Interval and The Aerialist Narratives have 
been called “serial poems,” though like Mackey, Roberson’s approach to the serial form departs 
in important ways from the serial poetics of the previous generation. As Brent Hayes Edwards 
helpfully distinguishes,  
Interestingly, Roberson has said that the impulse to long-form composition for him is 
rooted not so much in a commitment to indeterminacy or openness, as in an ambition of 
universality. At first he 'didn’t think of it as seriality’; instead, it started with his reaction 
to the ways that ‘readers didn’t read black poetry with any depth, it wasn’t read with any 
universality. […] We could say black and it only meant Harlem or certain streets in 
                                                 
115Jessen, Writing in Real Time, 36; Keller, Writing Plural Worlds, 107-134. Paul Jessen argues 
that in Mackey’s work “each element […] creates a new distinction or space of possibility, 
visible on the level of the line, the page, or the book. At the same time, these distinctions are 
structurally coupled to one another, with each text engaged in its own process of ongoing, 
improvisatory writing. These formal practices have profound cultural consequences, as Mackey 
turns the resources of emergent poetics to the unfolding consequences of postcolonial history. 
Mackey’s work offers a model of ‘post-expectant futurity’ as a humble hermeneutic in the 
tradition of Walter Benjamin, an alternative to Frederic Jameson’s influential claims about 
modernist utopianism and postmodern ‘flat time.’” See also James Keller’s chapter “Nathaniel 
Mackey's Agnostic History And ‘The Creaking Of The Wheel’” in which he studies Mackey’s 
relationship to history and historiography in the face of post-1968 cooptability of leftist strategies 
to which his poetics responds, particularly through the figure of the “what-sayer.” 
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Pittsburgh, but it would never have a sense of us as humans, or a sense of the whole 
world.’ So Roberson began to try to write ‘poems that tried to put the depth in there. You 
take a word and it means layers and layers of things that resonate through all human 
experience. […] You put your arms around half the world with certain poems. Nobody 
treated Black poetry like that, particularly during the Black Arts movement. So, I wanted 
to write poems that have layer upon layer, circles upon circles of universality. […] And I 
began to play with that: not putting them together as finished poems, but noting how they 
string each other up, layer upon layer of meaning, getting it in there.’ The ‘radical 
incompleteness’ of those layers is not an end in itself, but a means to compel the reader to 
discover points of connection and resonance, what in the first interview with Kathleen 
Crown he calls ‘keys or cues or wormholes or chutes.’116  
 
I take Roberson’s interest in “universality” to be an interest in historical consciousness—as 
opposed to the “universality” of the transhistorical, transcendental subject. One of the ways that 
Roberson animates those “circles upon circles of universality” is by developing a poetic form in 
which semantic meaning and temporal directionality is multiplicative while he addresses history 
and historical time both formally and thematically.  To demonstrate, I’ll look now at the opening 
section of Lucid Interval to highlight the way generational time provides a sense of historical 
time that is multidirectional without collapsing into the ahistoricity of postmodern presentism.  
Lucid Interval as Integral Music is comprised of three parts, or movements. The opening 
movement, “The Form,” introduces, as the title suggests, the form of the poem: that is, it 
announces the problem the poetry’s form is a response to, providing a key of sorts, however 
unstable, to its formal and thematic characteristics. It is comprised of three pages with a hard line 
running through the upper third of each page. On the first page there is a poem above the line, 
what I’ll call an “upper” poem, while the poems on the second and third pages appear below the 
dividing line, as “lower” poems. In the second movement, “This Week’s Concert’s” the page is 
split again by a hard line, this time dividing the page in half, and running through the entirety of 
the section. The relationship between upper and lower poems in this section includes a numeric 
                                                 
116Edwards, “Black Serial Poetics,” 627. 
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one, where the upper poems are numbered with Arabic numerals, the lower poems with Roman. 
One must note, however, that there are numerous irregularities to this pattern. For example, 
sometimes the lower poem will run across two pages; sometimes there is no lower poem, only 
the white space of the page. In the third movement, “Interval and Final Day’s Concerts,” the 
dividing line falls away, and each page features a poem numbered with Roman numerals.  
The numbering of poems is a prominent feature of the book, suggesting seriality as a 
feature of its aesthetic. But the numbering pattern, and the dividing line between upper and lower 
poems, as well as the irregularities to these patterns, produce a hermeneutic problem for the 
reader—as there are no clear instructions, only hints and suggestions, about how to read this 
book, what order to read it in, how to follow its chronology. You can read all of the upper poems 
in sequence, and then flip back to the beginning to read the lower poems, or you can read the 
upper and lower poems as corresponding to one another, reading vertically each page in full. Or, 
the repetition of the opening of the second poem on the first two pages might suggest one should 
read each flip-of-the-page not as a page break but as a continuous scroll. But then one can’t be 
certain if the scroll is vertical, or horizontal, or both. None of these possibilities is foreclosed, 
and so the direction in which the poem unfolds is multiple, open to multiple iterations. The 
chronological time of reading, and by implication, of composition, is unstable and malleable. Yet 
it is anything but flat, nor does it produce a sensation of instability in the reader; rather, one is 
invited to visit and revisit the event—the event of reading and the historical event(s) the poem 
documents—from multiple temporal positions. Upon each revisiting, multiple iterations of the 
poems proliferate as meaning accumulates in and across them.117 
                                                 
117Crown, “Reading the 'Lucid Interval,'” 210, 212; Donahue, “Metaphysical Shivers,” 702; 
Edwards, “Black Serial Poetics,” 631. Crown reads the "lower voice" of the poems beneath the 
line as "evok[ing] a range of ‘noises’ that skirt the edges of music and speech, beginning with the 
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To generate this full and dynamic relation to time’s movement, Roberson structures the 
book with a sense of historical time, both at the formal level—through the use of verb tenses, 
narrative sequencing, repetition and memory—and at the thematic level—through historical 
record and historical memory, both personal and social, as subject matter of the poems, and as 
part of its poetics. The first part, or movement, “The Form,” is comprised of a single poem, titled 
“Picking up the Tune, The Universe and Planets,” continuing the book title’s suggestion of 
musical form (Lucid Interval as Integral Music), and adding the universal and planetary 
dimension, giving both a grand and at the same time childlike weight to the poem: how one 
learns about what the world is, its size and dimension.  
this form is the lena 
after my daughter 
here she is I will have to 
hold     on a minute tell you her line. 
 
a scribble 
the universe and planets holes and scribbles 
pure 
interruption she gets     her changing 
 
she is the only music     she gives 
                                                                                                                                                             
infant’s incoherent screams and ending with ‘the storm, the jazz.’ Moreover, this under voice is 
described as ‘autonomic’—in both of its conflicting senses as ‘autonomous’ and ‘involuntary.’ 
Urged on by somewhat involuntary bodily rhythms and desires, the bottom voice nonetheless 
remains independent, beginning earlier and going on longer than the upper voice, standing alone 
in the opening and closing sections as 'the reflection prior to its face.'" As an expression of 
double-consiousness, Crown argues that Lucid Interval is “ a ‘double-minded’ poem whose 
bottom voice articulates traumatic memories that are latent in or forgotten by the upper voice, 
remembering them more completely and, often, more painfully (e.g., as such injurious words as 
nigger and tar baby are less likely to be repressed)." Joseph Donahue comments on the 
relationship between the poems above and below the line: "The reader of Lucid Interval as 
Integral Music must constantly ask how the two halves of the page are to be construed as one. 
Each page offers a fresh interpretive challenge. A blank on the top half: a flash of Pascalian 
terror. A blank below: a dizzying Orphic abyss. Given Roberson’s debt to Renaissance 
Hermeticism, each turn of the page tests what the Emerald tablet said: As above, so below." 
Brent Hayes Edwards reads the formal structure of relationship between the lines above and 




in which it is written. 
she is 
 
back she only wanted me to pick her up to say so. 
 
The opening line, “this form is the lena / after my daughter,”118 makes multiple announcements: 
it says “this poem has a form,” one you, the reader may not be familiar with and thus need help 
to recognize. Further, this form has a name, “the lena.” “After my daughter” means that the form 
shares his daughter’s name, but also recognizes that his daughter influences the poem’s form, not 
merely as inspiration, or muse, but as an active agent, she shapes the form, in a very material 
sense.119 
Lena shapes the form by her presence in the process of composition, as an interruption in 
the time and space of writing: “here she is I will have to / hold     on a minute to tell you her 
line.”120 “I will have to hold” meaning at once that he will have to pause the writing—a temporal 
interruption—and that he will have to pick her up—a spatial interruption. But by calling it a 
form, Roberson suggests that his young daughter’s presence is not a break in the continuity of 
writing—as the word interruption otherwise implies—but is the shape of that line, “her line,” “a 
scribble.” In other words, he makes an implicit argument that aesthetic form is an historical 
                                                 
118Roberson, VCO, 5. 
 
119Zamsky, “The Umbilicate Ear,” 691. Zamsky’s close reading of the line is that it “both 
indicat[es] a temporal sequence and impl[ies] an order of authority,” though “the economy of 
power in this poem intricately traces the interconnectedness of father and daughter as it 
constructs the poem as the space where their mutual needs and allowances are met.” 
 
120Roberson, VCO, 5. 
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occurrence, and furthermore, that the daily and the domestic are historical forces that shape 
aesthetic form.121 
In the third stanza, “she is the only music” sounds like a statement of love, the kind of 
line spoken about the beloved—as in, “there is only you”—suggesting the speaker can only hear 
her music; that her music drowns out the music of all others. But the proceeding lines show that 
it isn’t just because he loves her that she is the only music; it is because “she gives / the intervals 
/ in which it is written.” This shifts the meaning of “she is the only music” from a romantic to a 
material relation—her physical presence and demands on her father’s attention set the rhythm of 
the music, dictate the time between phrases, the pauses which define rhythm; and dictate the 
space between things, the interval: the difference in pitch between two sounds, the space between 
two dots on sheet music, like the space between planets that chart the universe—“holes and 
scribbles.” 
The final line, “she is // back she only wanted me to pick her up to say so,” evokes the 
image of the father putting down his pen or lifting his hands from his typewriter, in order to pick 
up his young daughter who wants to tell him “her line”: the poetic line—what gets on the page, 
its diction, its meter, its size and shape, and her words—what she has to say, which is that she is 
here, “she is // back she only wanted me to pick her up to say so.” The phrase “pick her up” 
repeats the words of the title of the poem, “Picking Up the Tune, the Universe and the Planets,” 
                                                 
121Shockley, “On Ed Roberson,” 737. As Evie Shockley offers in her reading of the poem: “The 
phenomenon Roberson focuses on—his baby’s cyclical needs—is of a different magnitude than 
the geological movements that Hillman registers in her poems, but of the same general type. In 
both cases, the rhythm is dictated by what we might call ‘natural law’: human intervention 
cannot control, but only negotiate—or, at best, influence—the tempo at which these phenomena 
operate. As if to emphasize how little power he has over his daughter’s biology, Roberson casts 
her metaphorically in cosmic terms. […] ‘[H]er line,’ he warns us, is ‘a scribble’—which is to 
say, non-linear—but not necessarily a diminutive one. The next line of the poem resituates her 
scribble from the intimacy of the poet’s desk in the domestic space to the infinite reaches of 
outer space, where entities like black holes possess a gravitational pull not unlike a baby’s.”  
68 
 
reinforcing an image of parenting and of writing as a form of listening,122 and listening as a 
matter of being shaped by what we hear.123 
The back-and-forth of listening is suggestive of dialogic and dialectical poetics that 
require the creation of a distance, or interval, across which exchange or movement of thought, 
feeling, language or knowledge can take place. Again, Roberson’s approach is formal and 
thematic. In the lower poem of “Picking up the Tune, the Universe and Planets,” the repetition of 
the opening four words “still autonomic / still as,” on both the bottom of the first and top of the 
second pages of this opening three-page poem, appears like bread crumbs for the reader to 
follow, encouraging a link between the poems above and below the dividing lines. But it also 
suggests a movement between the upper and lower poems; as if the dividing line marks a turn in 
the speaker’s thought. The mirror image that the dividing line makes, as if the relationship 
between the upper and lower poems is one of reflection, suggests they are inverse images of one 
another. Those opening four words with the repetition of “still” suggesting the still waters in 
which reflections of the upper world appear upside down in the lower, as in a later lower poem in 
the series reflects: 
                                                 
122Zamsky, “The Umbilicate Ear,” 685-686. In Robert Zamsky’s essay on "audition" in the 
poetics of Lucid Interval as Integral Music, he writes, "Roberson refashions lyric voice largely 
by attending to its prerequisite, listening. Unlike merely hearing, listening involves the volition 
of an attentive and affected subject; it also, therefore, implies someone or something else, some 
other, expecting, asking, demanding to be attended to in this way. [..] These are voices shaped by 
listening—listening to an infant daughter, listening to history for the lessons it will carry for that 
daughter, listening to music—and by a sense of responsibility for constructing a voice with 
which to (re)tell what has been heard. This is the economy of audition." 
 
123Crown, “Reading the 'Lucid Interval,'” 209-210. Crown reads the tone of these lines somewhat 
differently than I do, in part to support her sense of fragment as a product of trauma in 
Roberson's poetry. She writes, "The infant daughter does violence to verse—breaking it with her 
needy demands and ‘'her [diaper] changing’—yet she is the tune he picks up. [...] How you feel 
about this kind of verse fragment or serial form depends, according to the poem, on ‘how you 
feel about leaving / a three-month-old unattended.'" 
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the surface of the water reflects what is 
        Under the umbrella of such leaves 
                Even stone leaps to the surface 
The stones on the bottom are mistaken for the bottom 
        of a hanging 
                black man’s feet on the surface124 
 
Similar to the upper poem on the first page, the lower poem on the second and third pages 
appears as a meditation on the poet’s young child. But the tone of the poem is more subdued, 
dark, more uncertain and wary, with words and phrases like “inchoate,” “helpless,” “brought to  
his knees,” “fear,” “terror,” “disorder,” “meaninglessness,” “screaming,” “incoherently.” The 
contrast in tone between the upper and lower poems establishes at least two voices in the book, 
two perspectives, and two locations for the writing. Further, it creates two temporalities. The 
upper poem is formed by the temporality of the child, not only the intervals her daily life marks 
out, but also generationally, her historical time, a child of the 1980s—the present—underscoring 
the interval between her and her father, who is an adult at this same historical moment. A 
generation is an interval.125 
The child is both a hope and a haunting, future-looking and past-reflecting. The child re-
makes the world, introducing a new form, “the lena,” and re-makes her father, whose work is 
changed by her. But at the same time, she is a perpetuation of the old, a reflection of her father, 
                                                 
124Roberson, VCO, 14. 
 
125Crown, “Reading the 'Lucid Interval,'” 189-190. Kathleen Crown argues, “For Roberson, the 
term interval most often indicates the chaotic but productive space between sign and sound, and 
between the visual and aural—a space he insists on rendering lucid, as in fully visible, readable, 
and accessible to reason and the intellect. The term interval also suggests for Roberson the 
breaks in historical consciousness produced by traumatic events such as the Middle Passage—
those nearly unreadable intervals that symptomatically reenact the original trauma and, at the 
same time, bear witness to a culture's ability to survive, adapt, and innovate. […] Roberson's 
writing centers on this conflict between the chaotic, even injurious, nature of the linguistic and 
historical interval and its beneficial status as repository for a culture's knowledges and 
technologies for survival as he constantly seeks new strategies for making audible and legible the 
'templet noise / between each word.'" 
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shaped by the world that precedes her—its language, its images, its violence, and its 
contradictions.126 But in order for father and child to make music together, we have to hear the 
interval that a generation marks, which is to say, we have to perceive history. 
 The way historical time moves through the poems of Roberson’s book is not as easy or 
formulaic as the lower poem responds to the upper poem—everything I’ve just presented 
immediately expands in complexity as the book proceeds, but what remains is a push and pull 
between the present, the past, and the future, between inevitability and possibility, with attention 
to how historical time is implicated in our perceptions of and reflections on life’s unfolding. In 
Stephen Ratcliffe’s contribution to the 1990 special issue of Talisman dedicated to Howe’s work, 
he asks: "What happens when history enters the work the poet makes as if that work and history 
were images of one another, synonymous, the poet (present, subjective) and history (past, an 
'object' one knows of through other written texts) coincident insofar as the one takes the other 
other's 'facts' as somehow reflective, assumes its otherness to mark out the interior currents one's 
life unfold daily, from time to time.”127 In Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In, Roberson makes the 
reflective relationship between the present and the past—between intervals of time, 
generation(s), and composition—palpable in the book’s form and themes.  
Resonance Over Resolution: Opening the Acoustic-Linguistic Field 
 
In their commitment to resonance over resolution, Howe, Mackey, and Roberson further 
engage history by putting pressure at the joints128 of language to crack open the history of forces 
                                                 
126See Zamsky, “The Umbilicate Ear,” 683-699. For another reader’s extended close reading of 
the opening poems of Lucid Interval. 
 
127Ratcliffe, “Writing Ghost Writing,” 112. 
 
128Cf. Edwards, “Notes on Poetics” 579. See Brent Hayes Edwards’s essay on voice and form in 
Song of the Andoumboulou (in the 2000 Callaloo special issue on Mackey’s work) in which he 
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that joins word to meaning. In My Emily Dickinson, Howe writes, “Words open to the names 
inside them, course through thought in precarious play of double-enchantment, distance.”129 
Howe, Mackey, and Roberson work with words—and the definitions of words, “the names inside 
them”—is central to their post-1968 poetics. All three writers’ work with language maps a 
complex acoustic-linguistic field of relations and associations that complicate our understanding 
of the relationship between word and world, by making audible the acoustic resonances among 
words. 
For example, if we look at the following sentence as an example of the musicality of 
Mackey’s writing, we might see how the accumulative nature of language, its fabrication upon a 
rickety frame, creates openings for resonances that disclose meanings seemingly beyond the 
reach of our usual reading habits: 
What I’m getting at might go something like this: caressive haunted by corrosive imprint; 
imprint haunted by implicated hand; implicated haunted by complicated haunted by 
complicitous, evaporative embrace; evaporative embrace haunted by vertiginous 
imbalance . . .130 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
discusses Mackey’s “linguistic and formal joint-work” in terms of the way “the poems exert 
great pressure on their own joints.” If the joints are what make articulation possible, in 
Edwards’s analysis, Mackey’s joint-work “continuously undoes, endlessly challenges, the bodily 
rhetoric inherent in our understanding of expression—the connotative link between joint and 
articulation” by testing and breaking the limits of legibility of words and poetic form, in this case 
the serial form. Edwards views this joint-work as part of the self-reflexivity characteristic of 
Mackey’s work, his commitment to “impediment as a condition of inception” in work that “turns 
less on meaning than on moving, that strains against its own continuation, but keeps ‘not being 
done’ with itself.”  I turn to another aspect of joint-work in Mackey’s and Roberson’s, as well as 
Howe’s work. By focusing on their work’s double-jointedness, I address a different area of 
pressure their poetics applies to language and form, one that exposes the troubled histories and 
troubling duplicity of the linguistic and formal tools we work with in projects aimed at liberatory 
ends—whether they be revolutionary, fugitive, or otherwise. 
 
129Howe, MED, 82. 
 
130Mackey, FBB, 103. 
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That words are haunted by other words is a way of saying that the sonic resonance between 
words otherwise not conventionally understood to be related, etymologically nor semantically, 
creates a relation of meaning between them. The sonic resemblance between two words, the 
memory of one as we speak the other, leaves its trace in the word. When we hear or see the word 
“caressive,” we hear or see, obliquely, the trace, or ghost, of the word “corrosive.” That is just on 
the aural and visual level. But once the resonance or resemblance is perceived, the meaning of 
the second word begins to haunt the first. 
“Caressive” denotes touch, the stroking of a hand over a surface; it connotes love, 
warmth, comfort, tenderness. A mother caresses her child’s back to calm them; a lover caresses 
her beloved’s body to express affection; and so on. Overall, the word associates to positive 
images, experiences, emotions.  “Corrosive” suggests something less pleasurable and 
comforting. It connotes destructiveness, wearing down, weakening through touch. An “imprint” 
is an impression or mark left on a surface or pressed into a body of some kind. “Corrosive 
imprint” brings to mind, for example, the way human touch can corrode artifacts that we are 
trying to preserve: paintings, books, sculpture, coral reefs, ancient ruins, and so forth. One might 
think as well about how water corrodes objects by running over them, caressing them. So we 
begin to see how a caress can corrode. To imprint, to leave a mark, we can also understand as 
leaving a memory, the way a person or idea or feeling can imprint on one’s mind: a lover’s 
caress that once brought comfort, can, as a memory after loss, corrode.  
That “caressive” is “haunted by corrosive imprint” proposes or supports an argument 
about the tangled relationship between love and loss, care and destruction—two sides of the 
same coin. The desire or drive to “leave a mark” has its up- and down-sides. This dialectic, two-
sidedness, is everywhere in Mackey’s work. But this is only the beginning of the sentence, a 
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sentence that for the reader is dizzying, reflecting N.’s dizzy spells that have put him in the 
hospital following his guest performance with the Crossroads Choir. N. comments on the 
paragraph: “The circularity of some such vicious equation, I’m increasingly convinced, accounts 
for the dizziness I’m visited by.” As we’ll see: it is only by “getting dizzy with it,” that one 
escapes the “simple inversion,” the mere flipping back and forth between dialectical oppositions, 
that one conjures the “out” we are after.  
The next part of the equation reads: “Imprint haunted by implicated hand.” Picking up on 
the image of “handprint” and “fingerprint” that “imprint” evokes associates to its use in the 
matter of criminal investigation, a hand implicated in a crime. We are reminded of the trial that 
“graspability” leads to, among other scenes of possible or impossible crime, which recur, as if 
their occurrence is inevitable from having been thought into being upon their first mention. 
Words do things in the world: they conjure, they invoke. N. will end up in jail at some point, and 
his recounting of the events that lead to his imprisonment suggest that his very reflections 
themselves—his perception, observations and thoughts—lead him there. As if the police are 
merely following the orders of his perceptions, summoned by their invocation. 
“Imprint” is sonically haunted by “implicated,” visually haunted by “hand,” semantically 
haunted by “fingerprint,” conceptually haunted by “crime.” The game of association goes on: 
“implicated haunted by complicated haunted by complicitous, evaporative embrace.” The hand 
that is implicated is complicated; and/or, the implication that haunts imprint is complicated—the 
matter at hand is complicated. But complication is haunted by complicity. Again, we hear and 
see the aural resonance between the words, and they do share a root that has to do with placing 
things beside each other, as in comparing. But an embrace is not only an expression of love or 
care, it is also what one does to steady oneself: hold tight onto something that appears solid in 
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order remain standing. In that sense, the fleetingness or chimerical nature of “evaporative 
embrace” rhymes affectively for N. with “vertiginous imbalance.” In one’s dizziness, one 
reaches out to grab hold of something that is already disappearing. The run ends on this 
dizziness, with an ellipsis suggesting this “equation” could go on indefinitely. The dizzy spells 
are caused in part by how overwhelming the history of words are, the weight of that history 
causes the words to creak, or to quake, like the beginning of an earthquake, unearthing a 
magnitude (or magma) too great for human conception to survive in tact. It serves as a useful 
example of much of Mackey’s musings in From a Broken Bottle and elsewhere, a stubborn 
commitment to leaving things unresolved, while at the same time leaving a path of evidence of 
the problems that are produced by the open inquiry: a path of resonances, without resolution. I 
relate this to the never-finishedness of Mackey’s works. Mackey constantly challenge the 
assumptions that seemingly casual speech rests upon, as well as his own desire to know the 
answer to the questions words put forth, or even his desire to not know it. The musicality of 
language makes it possible to register epistemologies uniquely audible in the medium of music, 
such that Mackey makes words do what only music is supposed to do. At the same time, he 
makes music do what only words are supposed to. 
The mystery of where words come from is a constant source of energy in the book, as 
throughout the novel Mackey engages in what I call creative etymologies that attend to cultural, 
historical, and poetic resonances between and among words that traditional or literal etymologies 
fail to register or account for; words are haunted, words are scams, words are harbingers, words 
say more than they say, or say less; words are invested with all of these things—truth, lies, 
judgment, history, dream, imagination—and Mackey is invested in words. Words name things, 
which is also to say that names mediate our relationship to things—our relationship to the words 
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that name things is part of our relationship to the things named. N.’s creative etymological work 
often traces a history of name changes. N., along with his bandmates, is constantly playing with 
words—cracking them open, engaging in word association, and spinning out tales that start from 
a word’s plurality. And part of the play is involved in interpretation: deconstructing, decoding, 
engaging in exegesis. 
Resisting Definition: Dictionary Work and Creative Etymology 
 
As such, I want to dwell now on the sense of resisting definition in terms of word 
definitions—with all its productive contradictions—in relation to Howe, Mackey, and 
Roberson’s historicity that I discussed above, by looking at their common interest in etymology 
and the way words accumulate meaning. In their work, to study the dictionary and to engage in 
creative etymological work is a liberatory act. They liberate words and the relationships among 
words from those dictionary definitions that would cut them off from one another and obscure 
the larger cross-cultural histories of which they are a part. 
In a parenthetical comment, N. writes to Angel of Dust: “Forgive me for resorting to 
etymologies again, but therein, I’m convinced, lie the root of coincidence.”131 Mackey’s pun on 
“root” drives the point, suggesting a co-constitutive relationship between etymology and 
coincidence: etymology as both the etymological and the conceptual root of coincidence. That is, 
etymology, defined as the study of the origin and social history of words, i.e., the hermeneutics 
of the word, is the study of intersections of historical chance: the history of language is the 
history of encounter. Etymological work is an expression of coincidence’s most fundamental 
truth that things are deeply connected, entwined in social, historical and cross-cultural relations 
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whose threads can be traced.132 We can further pick up on the homophony of “lie” that produces 
a second pun: “lie” as in position and “lie” as in false, i.e., discrepant. In the introduction to 
Mackey’s 1993 book of criticism, Discrepant Engagement: Dissonance, Cross-Culturality, and 
Experimental Writing, he explains: 
Recalling the derivation of the word discrepant from a root meaning “to rattle, creak,” I 
relate discrepant engagement to the name the Dogon of West Africa give their weaving 
block, the base on which the loom they weave upon sits. They call it the ‘creaking of the 
word.’ It is the noise upon which the world is based, the discrepant foundation of all 
coherence and articulation, of the purchase upon the world fabrication affords. Discrepant 
engagement, rather than suppressing or seeking to silence that noise, acknowledges it. In 
its anti-foundational acknowledgment of founding noise, discrepant engagement sings 
‘base,’ voicing reminders of the axiomatic exclusions upon which positings of identity 
and meaning depend.133 
 
Fabrication is a creative act: a weaving, a lie, a fiction, a poem. A fabrication is a construction 
whose deconstruction—e.g., interpretation—reveals something fundamentally true. As it turns 
out, the word “etymology” does in fact predate “coincidence,” confirming N.’s intuition that the 
former lies at “the root” of the latter. “Etymology’s” first cited use in English is 1398. 
“Coincidence” appears in the seventeenth century, and coincidentally, one of its obsolete usages. 
as it reads in the OED, suggests fabrication: 
†6. Falling together, conjunction blending. Obsolete. 
 
                                                 
132Burge, “Music, Mysticism, and Experience,” 284, 277. S.R. Burge comments: “For N., 
etymology signifies ‘coincidence’—of being in the same place at the same time—or what 
Mackey has described as nonsonance, a definition that itself incorporates nonce, nonsense, and 
resonance.” For Burge, who characterizes Mackey’s deconstruction as a form of Sufi 
mysticism—“For Sufi’s, words, particularly those of the Qur’an, have particular importance by 
the fact that they carry two meanings. The first is the outward, exoteric meaning; but parallel to 
this, every word can have an inward, secret, esoteric meaning, known only to those who have 
had an intimate experience of the divine”—“Mackey’s constant deconstruction of language in 
Bedouin Hornbook echoes this, with N.’s reinterpretation of language being used as a means for 
gaining understanding or gnosis (ma’rifa).” 
 
133Mackey, DE, 19. 
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1647   J. Howell New Vol. of Lett. 175   The Latine tongue with the coincidence of the 
Goths language, and other Northern peple. 
Threads fall together, co-incident, blending and conjoining, to weave a fabric. The way words 
are woven by encounter and coincidence, producing etymological histories, as the 1647 example 
of usage suggests. In Spontaneous Particulars, Howe writes, beneath a full color reproduction of 
a tapestry printed at a quality so that one can make out the texture of the weaving: 
The English word “text” comes from the Medieval Latin textus “style or texture of a 
work,” literally “thing woven,” from the past participle stem of textere: “to weave, to 
join, fit together, construct.”134  
Howe goes on to quote a passage from Gertrude Stein’s notebooks, “Sentences,” in which she 
offers a series of definitions of what a sentence “is,” including: “It is partly.” In one lecture 
version of the book,135 Howe pauses to comment that this is the perfect definition of a sentence: 
“It is partly.” The adverbial form, “partly,” implies verbing, the process of the sentence being-as-
in-becoming a sentence—i.e., incomplete but in process. “Partly” is also suggestive of the 
opening that remains between what is woven together—in parts. Two strands joined together do 
not become one—they asymptotically entwine toward oneness but remain separate as two—
apart. The lack of closure of “partly” recalls as well the imperative to openness of open field 
poetics: closure is a feature of conservative and bad poetry, whereas good poetry is partly. Like 
Mackey, Howe is fascinated with etymology and her poetics suggests that she would agree that 
etymologies lie at the root of coincidence. In My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark Howe is 
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particularly interested in how definitions from Noah Webster’s nineteenth-century An American 
Dictionary of the English Language both reflected and produced an American etymological 
history and web of relations among texts in which the same words appear—bringing into critical 
relation texts and passages of texts that might not otherwise meet. “Connections between 
unconnected things,” she writes, “are the unreal reality of Poetry.”136 In My Emily Dickinson, for 
example, Howe’s investigation of Dickinson’s antique spelling of “Sovreign” in “My Life had 
stood – a Loaded Gun” leads her to a host of other texts in which the word appears, including 
Webster’s dictionary, the writing of John Adams, J.S. Mill, and Jonathan Edwards in the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century U.S., and of Edmund Spencer and William Shakespeare in 
sixteenth-century Britain, to excavate the word’s ideological imbrications in the world history of 
liberation and ruling over others and how the two apparently-opposite actions meet in one word 
meaning both things: “Janus-faced, Sovereign, signifying liberty and submission, is infinitely 
beguiling.”137 In her reading of Dickinson’s poem, Howe brings this larger history into relation 
with what “sovereignty” variously means to unmarried women, to white women, to the 
American indigenous population, to enslaved Africans, to antinomians, to marginalized poets in 
the history of U.S. American national sovereignty.138 
“Creative etymology” is a term I developed to talk about the way Mackey, like Howe, 
invents his own method of finding and telling the story of words—which is not bound by 
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138The collective anxiety about Janus-faced duplicity all the way down to the level of the word is 
in high circulation in the post-1968 period. This cautious relationship to language becomes a 
truism of the period: we cannot take for granted that the means we engage toward liberation are 
not the same means toward our oppression. This becomes the paradox that almost every analysis 




traditional etymology nor traditional chronology. It is cross-cultural, temporally multidirectional, 
and accidental.139 In his second letter to Angel of Dust in From a Broken Bottle, N. recounts his 
band’s recent performance—their first “gig,” as N. self-consciously reports, “as they say in the 
business”—a recording of which he has sent to Angel of Dust. N. explains: 
The other composition you asked about I’ve since titled “Third Leg of the Sun.” I wrote it 
a couple of weeks before the concert. You’re right to detect “a certain Egypto-Mayan, 
Meso-Haitian air” about it. It actually grew out of a passage I’d read in Maya Deren’s 
book on vodoun, a passage I might as well quote for you. “Legba,” she writes, “who 
knows the divine language and through whom one might seek recourse from destiny, is 
himself the destined answer to the riddle of the Sphinx: he was once the new-born infant 
sun, lived through the fertile prime of his noon, and is no the old sun, walking with a 
cane—the ‘third leg’—in the afternoon of life.” 
 This gave rise to the following question, which I more or less tried to de-clench in 
that composition: Couldn’t Ba have cut itself off from Legba and made the journey back 
to Egypt, have ridden out there like Stesichorus’s Helen, a phantom link calling itself 
“Ram” and at other times “Soul”? Couldn’t Leg have followed suit, have introduced itself 
as “Thigh,” the Great Bear of the northern heavens, then almost immediately have left 
Egypt for Guatemala, calling itself “Huracan,” and have come to be known there as 
“Heart of Heaven?” Couldn’t the memory of Leg have merged that of Set back in Egypt, 
Horus having wounded Set in the thigh when he swallowed the moon? If not, why else 
would 1) Huracan, the Quiche Maya stormgod whose name sound like “hurricane,” be 
described as a huge thigh coming out of the clouds, 2) Set go by an alternate name of 
Typhon, and 3) Typhon be what the Greeks called the hurricane buried in Tartaros? 
                                                 
139Nielsen, “N + 1: Before-the-Fact Reading,” 799; Burge, “Music, Mysticism, and Experience,” 
284; O’Leary, “Deep Trouble/Deep Treble,” 521. Other scholars comment on Mackey’s 
etymological work. Nielsen offers: “[O]ne might indeed say that N. hears all words as 
exponentially archival, as unfolding themselves in a geometrically progressing multiplication of 
soundings and sensings.” Burge characterizes Mackey’s deconstruction as a form of Sufi 
mysticism: “For Sufi’s, words, particularly those of the Qur’an, have particular importance by 
the fact that they carry two meanings. The first is the outward, exoteric meaning; but parallel to 
this, every word can have an inward, secret, esoteric meaning, known only to those who have 
had an intimate experience of the divine.” O’Leary, who also focuses on the mystical and gnostic 
in Mackey’s work, argues that readers “are initiated” into Mackey’s text, suggesting a parallel to 
biblical/Qur’anic hermeneutics. Burge continues, “Mackey’s constant deconstruction of language 
in Bedouin Hornbook echoes this, with N.’s reinterpretation of language being used as a means 
for gaining understanding or gnosis (ma’rifa). […] N. has a special knowledge of, or at least a 
special insight into, language and recognizes its potential for developing meaning. […]Words—




 More some other time.140 
No traditional etymological dictionary will confirm Mackey’s etymological propositions, yet the 
case he makes is a compelling one. His creative etymological methodology depends on chance 
and coincidence. It begins with a textual encounter, reading the American experimental and 
poetic filmmaker Maya Deren’s 1953 book Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti, which 
documents her ethnographic study of Haitian Voudo rituals from which she planned to make a 
documentary film (completed posthumously). N’s “declension” of Legba, which the musical 
composition ostensibly expresses, animates the proper noun’s linguistic parts. Ba in ancient 
Egypt, pictured in hieroglyphics as a bird with a human head, signifies one’s “soul,” more or 
less. Back in Egypt then, we encounter another text—the ancient Greek poet Stesichorus who 
wrote lyrics on Helen of Troy.  Meanwhile Leg finds its own meaning in Egpyt as “’Thigh,” or 
“Phad/Phecda” the name of Ursa Major, “Great Bear of the northern heavens, but when it travels 
to Guatemala, “thigh” as singular “phantom limb” becomes “one-leg” which translates to 
“Huracan” which is the name of the one-legged Mayan god of the wind and sky, also known as 
“Heart of Heaven,” who created the Earth. Mackey then goes on to connect the Leg of Legba to 
Egyptian Set—the god of storms—by way of his being wounded in the thigh by Horus. The 
significance of these cross-cultural connections and co-incidences is etymological—it provides, 
Mackey suggests, an account of the linguistic and semantic resemblances and resonances among 
a set of words from various languages: “If not, why else would 1) Huracan, the Quiche Maya 
stormgod whose name sound like “hurricane,” be described as a huge thigh coming out of the 
clouds, 2) Set go by an alternate name of Typhon, and 3) Typhon be what the Greeks called the 
hurricane buried in Tartaros?” 
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In her dissertation on twentieth-century etymological poetry, Mia Gaudern offers an 
important history of the discipline of etymology after structuralism and the establishment of the 
OED. In the twentieth century, modernist linguists considered etymology a largely inert 
discipline that catalogued obsolescent definitions with no active relation to the contemporary 
language at the same time that modernist poets “showed a new fascination with the 
transformative light that obsolete forms and meanings shed on current words.”141 Etymology as 
obsolescence with an active force142—recognizing the dynamic presence of the past in the 
present—resonates with Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s creative etymological commitments 
and the way they engage the past as an active force in the present. In a recent interview, 
Roberson shares, “They used to laugh at me because of my dictionaries. August Wilson used to 
laugh at me because of my dictionaries. I always had a bunch of dictionaries and they were 
always laughing at me, ‘You only need one dictionary!’ But you don’t, you know? Some of them 
have etymological stuff in them and they have other stuff in them. […] When I came to Chicago, 
I wasn’t expecting to stay in Chicago, so I didn’t bring the twenty volumes. […] I just brought 
the little compact two volume one. But the big one is sitting at home and I miss it. You can really 
get in there and track things down. I do use dictionaries just to get the music of the words and the 
history of the words all sort of playing at the same time.”143 
Words themselves are openings that reveal the discrepant foundation from which the 
material of poetry, i.e., language, is fabricated. Ed Roberson’s poetry, for example, is 
consistently concerned with what words disclose and what they hide:  
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in the folds in the lattice 
     of meanings that a wing stirs 
          the overlay fixes 
one of a combinant of likenesses wch each 
    manifoldly persist         beyond 
  its analogous moment        miscreant chimerical144 
 
Image, word, phrase “stirs” meanings and histories of meanings in the language for which the 
poet must account. The dictionary is an important tool in this excavation 
In Roberson’s poem “Heron Riddle Flashback,” in which the lines above appear, the 
image of a dragonfly entwines with that of a helicopter, a heroin spoon, and a heron—a series of 
visual and sonic “overlays” ignited by the casual observation of the silhouette of a great heron 
passing overhead one summer evening in New Jersey. 
 
Figure 2 – Silhouettes of Heron, Dragonfly, Spoon, and Helicopter 
The series of images, sounds, and words, that the “riddle” of the silhouette gives rise to, the 
“answer” that begins with such singular assurance—“But I could tell what it / was by the 
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silhouette / I knew the answer // to this shape     great heron” (102)—gets complicated, as the 
knowledge of “what it is” speaks not only to the ability to name that shape, but to recognize the 
histories that shapes carry. Roberson’s poetics suggests knowledge, like language, is historically 
contingent and political, not ideal or categorical. As Brent Hayes Edwards puts it: “[T]he 
historicist critique at the core of this poetics is aimed at the ways that English has been 
implicated in the modalities of American racist oppression, the ways that the language itself 
carries not only the residue of real violence, but also the traces of the everyday operations meant 
to bring about the forgetting of that violence.145 “[I]n the folds […] of meanings” and “in the 
lattice of meanings”; that is, in the meanings that emerge in-between things, and in their 
entanglement, in meanings agitated by a shape that recalls other shapes, we might recognize a 
series of “likenesses,” which supersede one another, yet linger: “persist     beyond / its analogous 
moment.” As dragonfly supersedes helicopter, which superseded heroin spoon, which 
superseded heron, each of these words/images maintain their own particular networks of 
meaning, which are excavated throughout the poem along their own lines of poetic inquiry, 
rather than collapsing merely into a chain of linguistic or visual referents. 
What is it? The repetition of the question, stated without a question mark—“what it was,” 
“what is it”—throughout the poem, raises an ontological riddle that can only be answered with 
an historical analysis, by placing the question, the words, the sounds, and the images within an 
historical context: what history is it? “But I could tell what it / was by the silhouette / I knew the 
answer”; “what is it . . . The silhouette     of the bug / helicopter collects / behind the spoon”; “ 
What is it     imagery of     any longer”; “what is it // when craziness you saw far off as / human 
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gets”; “What is it     collecting behind / the files collected on / everybody.”146 How we recognize 
what things are, how we know them, is not just a matter of abstract “likenesses” that objects or 
shapes or words share in mimetic relation, but the ghosts of historical knowledge their likeness 
traces. Words are haunted. Images are memories. When the silhouette of a heron looks like a 
spoon, that spoon becomes a heroin spoon when these shapes appear flying overhead like 
helicopters, provoking an historical memory of military helicopters engaged in the drug trade—
“on weekend / maneuvers”147—the CIA distributing crack cocaine to black communities in the 
1980s in order to subdue their revolutionary potential—“government     heroin flying in”148— 
the deafening sound of helicopter blades mixing with the screaming guitar of Jimi Hendrix and 
the sound of bombs going off in churches. As Joseph Donahue writes of this poem: “These 
objects reveal not only their sonic and visual links to each other, but the whole socio-political 
landscape of the nation.”149 In My Emily Dickinson, Howe offers: “Complex correspondences 
exist and kindred definitions. Unknown harbinger of sensuous phenomena, Sound has come to us 
unknown.”150 
Resisting definition in these poets’ work is like placing a sluice gate in front of a word, 
letting the troubled waters of history accumulate behind it until the gates are opened and the field 
is flooded with meanings otherwise obscured in the daily operations of language. Resistance as 
obstruction is also a key trope and tool of this poetics. As Mackey writes in Paracritical Hinge, 
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“Obstruction and the stutter it occasions are germinal, generative.”151 And as Susan Howe 
comments, “There you have Charles Olson at his wisest. ‘The stutter is the plot.’ It's the stutter in 
American literature that interests me. I hear the stutter as a sounding of uncertainty. What is 
silenced or not quite silenced. All the broken dreams. […] History has happened. The narrator is 
disobedient. A return is necessary, a way for women to go. Because we are in the stutter. […] 
We have come on to the stage stammering.”152 Their poetics performs a recognition of what gets 
in the way of speech and writing—as obstruction, stutter, stammer, impediment—and uses that 
resistance as a point of departure for their liberatory poetics. In all three poets’ work—Howe, 
Mackey, and Roberson’s—we see this relationship to words and their iteration enacted through 
grammatical and syntactic complexities that cause the reader to hesitate, trip or stop. In making 
sense of what we have read, the relations blossom. A stutter is considered a speech impediment, 
not because it impedes communication but because it slows it down. Only in a value system in 
which time equals money would a stuttering speech be met with the impatience and non-
accommodation to which those who stutter are subjected. This is not writing that one can skim 
with much pleasure. As in the way the line breaks in Roberson’s short poem “Waterfowl 
Landing: It Lifts to Close (for Ron)” requires the reader to track and backtrack the grammatical 
parts of the poem: 
The hundred wings float down the furrowed air 
to the lake,   come in motionless as seed 
and make the surface bloom 
that way 
that drops of fattened summer rain 
open against the pavement 
tulips’ petals 
                                                 
151Mackey, PH, 45. 
 
152Howe, TBM, 181. 
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like wings lift to close on landing153 
 
The fourth line, “that way,” attaches grammatically to both the line above and below it, creating 
two separate yet resonant images: “and make the surface bloom that way” and “that way that 
drops of fattened summer rain / open against the pavement.” The reader has to pause to read the 
different combinations—the payoff is the accumulation of rich metaphors to describe/perceive a 
“waterfowl landing.” The seventh line, “tulips’ petals” would seem to break suddenly from the 
line before—obstructing the reader’s otherwise smooth transition through the previous three line 
breaks. But if one stops to consider what is happening, one finds that Roberson has offered a 
third grammatical attachment to the “that way” of the fourth line: “that way […] tulips’ petals / 
like wings lift to close.” When one then reads through the rest of the line, “on landing,” the 
reader finds the poem having come full circle in its metaphoric flight—landing back on the 
image that began the string of associations, fulfilling the proposition of the poem’s title: 
“Waterfowl Landing: It Lifts to Close.” 
 Each of the next three chapters will be devoted to one of these three poets. As I dedicate 
the space of each chapter to close readings of the individual author’s formal and thematic 
concerns, the reader should begin to see the common liberatory impulse—shaped in the post-
1968 by a preference for resonance over resolution and resisting definition—that moves through 
Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work alike. Additionally, the poetic techniques and figures that 
each of the three chapters documents will resonate across chapters, as all three poets continue to 
be concerned with historical re-vision and linguistic inquiry in the open field.  
 
  
                                                 
153Roberson, VCO, 81. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FLOATING WITHOUT BOTTOM IN THAT EARTH: THE MYTH 
OF DAEDALUS AND ICARUS IN ED ROBERSON’S VOICES CAST OUT TO TALK US 
IN 
 
Re-Visioning the American Landscape 
 
In 1995, the University of Iowa Press published Ed Roberson’s third book, Voices Cast 
Out To Talk Us In. It is a collection of two books in conversation: Lucid Interval as Integral 
Music, which was originally published as a chapbook in 1984 and The Aerialist Narratives. Both 
books are composed in serial form, split each into three parts, or “chapters” in the case of The 
Aerialist Narratives, in the compositional unit of a “book.” While individual poems may stand 
on their own, they are all in conversation with one another, not only thematically, but narratively 
as well. In broad strokes, the book is about seeing, about “opening our eyes”154 to what there is 
to see. The book begins with Roberson’s infant daughter whose presence shapes both the form 
and content of Lucid Interval. It ends with the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and how 
the country’s lies shape the form and content of the U.S. This dynamic movement between daily 
preoccupations and world history, between the personal and the social, and the relationship of the 
present to the past and the future, propels the book through its documentation and critical 
analysis of U.S. American culture, history, and language. 
In this chapter, I pick up on the appearance of the classical myth of Daedalus and Icarus 
in Voices Cast Out To Talk Us In, and its relation to the antebellum myth of the Flying Africans, 
as an occasion to read what I call Roberson’s “historicopoetics” of the landscape—the way he 
                                                 
154Crown, “‘Down Break Drum,’” 682. Opening one’s eyes is a recurring motif in Roberson’s 
work. “Because,” as he puts it, “I think people need to open their eyes a lot more.” 
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teaches us how to perceive world history in the words and images of everyday life, by putting 
them under poetic investigation,155 re-visioning the American landscape as one haunted by the 
history of global capitalism and slavery during a period in which this history was increasingly 
and systematically obscured. Specifically, I look at how Roberson’s figurations of Daedalus and 
Icarus underscores the book’s major themes of flight and fugitivity; the danger of the sun and the 
safety of night; the elemental relationships between sky, sea, and earth in cycles of death and 
renewal; the double-edged potential of language to liberate and oppress; and the paradoxes of 
creation—of poetry, and of life (having children)—in a destructive world.  
Icarus as Hover-Flier: (F)light of Icarus in Post-1968 Literature: 
 
The myth of Daedalus and Icarus is a significant motif in Voices Cast Out, offering a 
productive narrative frame to guide our reading of Roberson’s post-1968 poetics. Specifically, I 
historicize this reading of the myth as particular to the post-1968 context and its attending 
discourses of mutliplicty, plurality, and fugitivity. I am also asking what this historicized reading 
offers to a reading of the myth in our current moment, what we take as instructive, what we 
perceive as up for critique, as a point of departure for our own take on the same, and new, 
problems as they present themselves to us in our moment at the close of the second decade of the 
twenty-first century. 
                                                 
155Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 38. Paul Naylor’s 1999 book Poetic Investigations: Singing the 
Holes in History, which includes chapters on Howe and Mackey and other post-1968 liberatory 
poets, offers a similar theory of “writing history poetically.” However, our approach differs 
insofar as Naylor’s analysis is prescriptive. As a post-1968 contemporary, Naylor argues that 
“given the complexity of contemporary culture, with its ‘plural and multifarious’ social struggles 
being fought on the terrains of race and gender (to name two of the more prominent sites) as we 
as class, I believe we need forms of poetry that engage rather than simplify this complexity.” By 
contrast, I am interested in the way post-1968 poets engage in complexity with their own 
uncertainty about the political efficacy of their liberatory projects. 
89 
 
Icarus’s first explicit appearance in Voices Cast Out occurs in the title poem of the 
second book, The Aerialist Narratives: 
I. Aerialist Narrative 
 
Written into     the drip accomplished  
form     of action painting       the lyric  
for people who walk on strings  
 
There are photos of people standing 
on the canvas 
in mid-air      a line ahead of the painting.  
 
Of what happens, 
lines of that      are gone, 
not simply missing  
 
Those lines of how those 
lines that are there      got there  
the line in mid-air  
 
from the can to the surface 
its moment like a line written 
in that falling hand of the northern lights.  
 
But what can anyone have read, 
supposing it was night, 
by the light of Icarus or any of us escaping?156  
 
Throughout this chapter, I will work through different parts of the poem, but in order to excavate 
the layers of meaning in its final stanza, I will begin by asking: Who is Icarus? 
In the classical myth, the architect and inventor Daedalus and his son Icarus are 
imprisoned by King Minos in the labyrinth that Daedalus himself built for the king to trap the 
minotaur who had seduced his wife. Various reasons for his punishment are offered in different 
iterations of the tale, but in each version Daedalus and Icarus find themselves unable to escape 
by foot because the labyrinth’s architecture is too complex; nor if they knew the way, could they 
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escape by sea, because the shores are too heavily guarded; such that the only remaining route of 
escape is by air. Daedalus fashions wings made of deposited bird feathers and beeswax. As they 
prepare to take flight, he warns Icarus that the wings are tenuously held together, and so he must 
fly a narrow path: 
When he had put the last touches to what he had begun, the artificer balanced his own 
body between the two wings and hovered in the moving air. He instructed the boy as 
well, saying ‘Let me warn you, Icarus, to take the middle way, in case the moisture 
weighs down your wings, if you fly too low, or if you go too high, the sun scorches them. 
Travel between the extremes. And I order you not to aim towards Bootes, the Herdsman, 
or Helice, the Great Bear, or towards the drawn sword of Orion: take the course I show 
you!’ At the same time as he laid down the rules of flight, he fitted the newly created 
wings on the boy’s shoulders. While he worked and issued his warnings the ageing man’s 
cheeks were wet with tears: the father’s hands trembled.157 
 
But Icarus flies too close to the sun, the wax melts, the wings fall apart, and he falls to his death 
in the sea Icaria, named after him by his mourning father.  
The dominant reading of the myth of Icarus is “a daring flight up towards the light 
followed by a ruinous fall.”158 That is, it is a cautionary tale about the dangers of “flying too 
high.” In this interpretation, Icarus the out-of-control and over-confident child fails to follow the 
careful instructions of his father Daedalus. Therefore, the common admonition, when someone 
seems to have overshot their goal, by being too ambitious or too headstrong, we say that they 
“flew too close to the sun.” Or, as the rhetoric of “the daring flight” implies, the cost of flying 
too high is the cost of genius—those whose talents and darings enrich the culture or improve 
society, but whose super-human heat of genius harms the all-too-human shell that houses it. As 
such, the myth is submitted to capitalist ideology, its attending moralism, and contradictions: an 
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158 Robert Luchetti, “John F. Nash, Jr: The Myth of Icarus,” Mathematical Lives: Protagonists of 
the Twentieth Century From Hilbert to Wiles (Berlin: Springer, 2011): 139. The author of this 




ethos of individualism, which at the same time requires conformism; the exploitation of 
individuals’ labor-value that at the same time holds the individual responsible for the eventual 
exhaustion of that value.  
 Indeed, the history of interpretations of the myth is a history of ideology.159 If you look, 
for example, at the various poems that have been written about the myth—by W.H. Auden, 
William Carlos Williams, Anne Sexton, Muriel Rukeyser, among others—you will observe how 
the meaning and lesson of the story varies depending on the political assumptions and goals of 
each writer. Roberson’s as well. And my own reading included. 
Icarus makes an appearance across African American writing in the period of Roberson’s 
own career, from the 1970s-present: In addition to Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In, we find Icarus 
in Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon,160 Ralph Ellison’s unfinished novel Three Days Before the 
Shooting, Faith Ringgold’s Tar Beach, Christopher Myers’ children’s book Wings. The 
appearance of the myth in these works provoke us to consider the meaning of black mythic flight 
in this particular period. 
                                                 
159Cf. Eva-Marie Kroller,“Fear of Flying? The Myth of Daedalus and Icarus in Canadian 
Culture," Journal of Canadian Studies 28, no. 4 (Winter 1993). Kroller offers a short gloss of 
interpretations of the myth in order to argue that in Canada “the story of Daedulus and Icarus 
becomes part of the extensive and intricate use of the family metaphor which makes it 
‘unnatural’ for a colony to take flight into independence from the parent nation." In order to 
figure Britain and the United States as a “two-headed” Daedalus, father to a “daring” son, 
Kroller argues, Canadian artists and writers since 1960 “resurrected, knowingly or not, several 
details of the myth that are usually suppressed.” Kroller’s historically and nationally-specific 
analysis demonstrates a critical question we must ask when thinking about how myth, as a 
vehicle of ideology, is circulated: What has to be left out of “the original” story in order to make 
the myth work in the ways different interpretations make it work? How is the context distorted, 
ignored, or otherwise manipulated in order to make it work as such? 
 
160Toni Morrison, Conversations with Toni Morrison (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
1994): 122. See Morrison’s comments, however, in response to readers’ interpretation of 
Milkman as Icarus: “If it means Icarus to some readers, fine; I want to take credit for that. But 
my meaning is specific: it is about black people who could fly.” 
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 In her analysis of African American picture books of the 1990s and 2000s, Melissa 
Jenkins offers a useful term, “hover-flying,” that she derives from the artist Faith Ringgold, to 
describe a kind of flight that on the one hand rises above the ground, but on the other hand does 
not transcend it—that is, to hover-fly is not to escape one’s conditions but to gain an aerial 
view.161   
 
Figure 3 - from Tar Beach by Faith Ringgold (1991) 
To adopt Jenkins’ term, I am arguing in this dissertation that my writers are hover-fliers, that 
hover-flying is a particularly post-1968 response to the oppressive order of things, that what I 
have called cautiousness might also be understood as a kind of hovering in order to see the whole 
field. 
                                                 
161Melissa Jenkins, "'The next thing you know you’re flying among the stars': Nostalgia, 
Heterotopia, and Mapping the City in African American Picture Books," Children's Literature 




 The aerialist might be a figure for hover-flying—walking not flying, imitating flight, with 
a tenuous ground beneath her feet—a string. 
Written into    the drop accomplished 
form    of action painting       the lyric 
for people who walk on strings 
Icarus, too, is an aerialist, a hover-flier. Born into enslavement, he flies toward freedom—in the 
air, in the sea, in the bottomless earth. Roberson asks, 
But what can anyone have read, 
supposing it was night, 
by the light of Icarus or any of us escaping? 
 
The rhetorical question, “what can anyone have read” suggests that no one has read anything, at 
least not “supposing it was night,” in other words, supposing we are in darkness, deprived of the 
light to read by, or deprived of the text itself, because it is missing from the narrative, or gone. 
But what is it that we are reading, or not reading? 
The relationship between reading and survival is well-rehearsed in the history of African 
American literature—particularly in the genre of the slave narrative. But perhaps in the lines 
quoted above there is an implicit critique of the myth of integration and upward mobility that 
most abolition-era slave narratives endorsed, in which literacy, as part of the European 
enlightenment project, is promoted as a solution to the ills of slavery and racism. The kind of 
reading that such a liberal project produces is put under inquiry by Roberson: “But what can 
anyone have read” the poet asks, suggesting skepticism that anyone has read anything at all.  As 
the inquiry continues into the next line, the “supposing” of “supposing it was night” asks us to 
reconsider the conditions under which we understand or imagine reading to take place. If to read 
at night means reading in the darkness that provides the cover for escape, then a particular 
method of reading must be cultivated, one which reads by another kind of light, “the light of 
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Icarus.” But what is “the light of Icarus,” what is the light of people “escaping” that otherwise 
illuminates or makes legible whatever it is we are reading—the text of a page, or that of a 
landscape? 
If we interpret the question as a proposition that to read by the light of Icarus is to read 
from the position of Icarus—or of any of us escaping along the impossibly narrow route marked 
“safe,” whose parameters evoke the predominance of danger—then Roberson seems to be 
suggesting a kind of re-visionist reading of the American landscape that excavates history 
through the images and languages out of which it is constructed. In other words, he attends both 
to the way our reading has been limited, but also to the ways we might learn to read better under 
such conditions. If the light of Icarus is the light of the sun that melts the wax holding together 
the wings of his escape, the implication is that we must account for the conditions under which 
we read. But what is Icarus reading, and for what purpose? One answer might be that he is 
reading the landscape in order to find his flight path. His fall, then, might be caused not by his 
failure to read due to hubris, nor by misreading due to carelessness or ignorance, but rather the 
consequence of the way the American landscape has been cast in the shadow of the sun, 
ostensible knowledge that covers over the truth, a country that lies. As Roberson writes in 
“Heading: The Landing”—another poem about flight, in this case documenting the view from an 
airplane as it approaches its landing strip162: 
The beacon fires,    the hidden fears; 
the runway lights,    their nature’s lies, 




                                                 
162Donahue, “Metaphysical Shivers,” 704. Joseph Donahue comments on this poem: “No sudden 
plunge is more than a thought away, especially if you are black in America. Roberson renders us 
a race-conscious proprioception. Take a trip on a plane, why don’t you.” 
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What if in the final  
minutes of your heavying  
descending  
 
the landing strip kept lying  
changing you back  
into the air    the way a white  
 
backs away in anger when you approach with the directions  
you've been asked?163 
 
“The country’s lies” is one of the central themes of the book, and of Roberson’s poetics, which 
emerges in this question about Icarus and reading, “Because,” as Roberson says in an interview 
with Kathleen Crown, “I think people need to open their eyes a lot more.” The Country lies and 
its citizens know it, yet the majority choose not to know it. 
But what are we (mis)reading? If we zoom out briefly to consider the poem in full, in 
order to draw out more clearly the context of Icarus’s (f)light in the poem and the two books of 
Voices Cast Out To Talk Us In, one answer might be that what we are (mis)reading is history—
both the history on record and the history that escapes record: as the narratives of aerialists—
people who balance in the air or walk on strings—are illegible to the tools of capture and the 
sources of illumination with which the official record is constructed.  
The opening stanza of “Aerialist Narrative” suggests that this is a poem about writing and 
painting, and about form and the lyric. An aerialist might be a trapeze artist or tightrope walker, 
or a writer or a painter, or it might be another name for the position of precarity occupied by 
people who find themselves walking through life as if on a wire, where one misstep can mean 
disaster. 
Further, the opening poem introduces a question about the relationship between seeing 
and reading, between image and word—the question of how to read, as a matter both of 
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interpretation and of accessibility. Sometimes what we need to read is not visible to us, because 
we don’t have the hermeneutic tools to see it, or because it is literally unavailable, erased or 
otherwise “gone, / not simply missing.”  
The second stanza introduces a concrete image, seemingly purely descriptive of an 
artifact: 
There are photos of people standing 
on the canvas 
in mid-air      a line ahead of the painting.  
 




Figure 4 – Jackson Pollock (1950) 
 
The photographs of action painters in action serve as a point of departure for a meditation on 
historical absence, as the third stanza makes a decisive turn: “Of what happens, / lines of that     
are gone, / not simply missing.” If language is a vehicle of dominant ideology, the ideology 
through which capital-H History is written, and thus made legible, this dominant history remains 
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haunted by the illegibility of the story of how what is written got written—not simply missing 
from the historical account, but gone. Missing suggests a project of recovery or recuperation: 
history filling its gaps. In contrast, what is gone remains gone, unrecoverable to dominant 
History, yet able to be read or heard, by one who has learned to see in the dark—as Howe looks 
to the margins, or as Mackey hears in the silence the bass note164 rising—“Those lines of how 
those lines / that are there got there / the line in mid-air.” If history is generally understood to 
explain how we “got here,” Roberson suggests that there is an unrecorded line that is the pre-
history or pre-condition of the lines we perceive as traceable. Absence—“the line in mid-air”—is 
also a trace, one not subject to photographic/historical capture, except as a blur, yet clearly part 
of the story.165 
In the fifth and penultimate stanza, the image of action painting gives way to the image of 
                                                 
164Mackey, PH, 4. 
 
165Crown, “‘Reading the 'Lucid Interval,'” 211-212; Donahue, “Metaphysical Shivers,” 703, 705. 
Crown argues that the “gaps in the text contain the ‘disappeared’ of history, the dead who are 
seized out of life: ‘people as [an] air pocket.’ Their ghosts have been absorbed into the 
‘expensive white quiet,’ so that each one of the ‘silently white’ pages that interrupts the poem (or 
appears in the place of a poem) gestures toward these absences. Only traces, or afterimages, 
remain. […] In trauma according to [Cathy] Caruth, ‘the outside has gone inside without any 
mediation.’ In Lucid Interval, this traumatic movement inward of people ‘into inside’ leaves a 
collection of afterimages or ghost memories. […]  If institutionally taken ‘steps’ have moved 
persons into the privatized space of individual memory, the poem picks up on the fragment—the 
memory fragment, or trauma fragment—as a device or empirical method for recovering these 
presences and reinserting them in public memory.” The “gap” or “fragment” in Roberson’s 
poetics has an analogue in the “margin” and “fragment” in Howe’s poetics which activates a 
similar movement from the private to the public, as I will discuss in chapter four, dedicated to 
her work. Crown believes that these movements lead ultimately to a resolution, asserting that 
“the very contagion of trauma’s memory fragments makes possible the transmission of a new 
and healing historical knowledge.” While I believe Roberson’s project is a cautiously hopeful 
one, the disource of historical healing and reconciliation is, in my view, too strong a promise and 
not one that Roberson makes. Perhaps bridging the gap between Crown’s and my reading, 
Donahue offers that Roberson is “heroically committed to certainty, but the world remains 
powerfully uncertain,” pointing out that in Roberson won’t say for sure whether we will 




northern lights, moving our perception from the ostensibly domestic space of the painting studio, 
closed in by walls and a ceiling, to the wide open space of the clear night sky; shifting our 
perspective from one of looking down upon the canvas on the floor to eyes lifted upward toward 
a phenomenon of light in the sky.  
from the can to the surface 
its moment like a line written 
in that falling hand of the northern lights. 
 
But this light is not the sunlight of exposure, which impedes escape—but a northern light 
suggestive of the northern star, guiding light out of the antebellum south, escaping at night 
toward freedom. This suggestion is made more explicit in the final stanza we’ve already studied: 
“But what can anyone have read, / supposing it was night, / by the light of Icarus or any of us 
escaping?” In Mackey’s terms, Roberson “others”166 darkness: the darkness of night that 
impedes sight is at the same time the darkness that makes escape possible. Doing what Mackey 
writes of Kamau Braithwaite’s oppositional speech: “His otherings accent fugitive spirit and 
impediment as well as the predicaments that bring fugitive spirit into being.”167  
Darkness, in these lines, draws on the hegemonic imaginary, in which darkness contrasts 
illumination, a visual metaphor for knowledge. Within such a static, or captured, sense of what 
darkness means, Roberson turns such meaning on its head by suggesting that what we want is 
not to illuminate darkness, but instead to learn to read by the light that is the darkness of escape. 
At the same time, by imagining darkness as the cover that makes escape possible, darkness is 
endowed with power, implying a symbolic or metaphorical order that is antithetical to the 
                                                 
166Mackey, DE, 265. “Artistic othering has to do with innovation, invention, and change, upon 
which cultural health and diversity depend and thrive. Social othering has to do with power, 
exclusion and privilege, the centralizing norm against which otherness is measured, meted out, 
marginalized.” 
 
167Mackey, DE, 273. 
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standardized English imaginary’s association of darkness with inhibited sight as metaphor for 
ignorance and of illumination with clear sight, including a sense of “insight” that reinforces the 
individual as autonomous, rather than collective and part of history. Clarity of sight is re-
visioned as an opening of one’s eyes to the real conditions of history-in-the-present that we read. 
Roberson both counters and adds to this imaginary with the “internal sight / on our darkness” 
that guides escaping slaves across the river at night, opening up darkness and light to other 
worlds of meaning, all of which continue to resonate with one another. Darkness appears in the 
final lines of “Aerialist Narrative” as the darkness of night that impedes one’s ability to read the 
“lyric / for people who walk on strings,” the voices and stories and imaginaries that are “not 
missing” from history but are “gone”—the gaps, the silences, the darkness, that we must learn to 
read otherwise than by dominant History, by a historicopoetics. 
As Icarus enters the poem in the final stanza, we connect Icarus to the figure of the 
aerialist, a hover-flier, from whose aerial view we are situated to perceive the history and 
language of the landscape below, as we balance on a wire, under the threat of the sun above, the 
sea below, trying to escape rather than go missing. Yet, as an inter-textual allusion, the 
appearance of Icarus might also suggest that what we are reading is the landscape itself. For 
readers of innovative U.S. American poetry, Icarus’s appearance will immediately recall those 
modernist ekphrastic interpretations of Brueghel’s painting, Landscape with the Fall of Icarus.168  
                                                 
168Yeazel, “The Power of Name,” 114-115. The history of the name and attribution of this 
painting is actually contested. In “The Power of Name: In Bruegel’s Icarus, for Instance,” Ruth 
Bernard Yeazell argues that the painting is “an exemplary case of a painting whose title has 
proved crucial in determining how viewers see it,” citing the art critic and philosopher Arthur C. 
Danto’s influential commentary on the painting that establishes the reading of it we see reflected 
in the ekphrastic poetry examples I’ve given by assuming the title, Landscape with the Fall of 
Icarus is an essential aspect of the work. Yeazell points out: “Taking the words of the title as an 
instruction issued by the painter himself, Danto sees that dab of white paint as paradoxically 





Figure 5 - Pieter Bruegel the Elder (maybe), Landscape with the Fall of Icarus (maybe), 1560s (maybe)  
 
 
William Carlos Williams’s poem titled after the painting—well known and cited in the tradition 
of liberatory poetics that Roberson follows—uses the title to emphasize that the painting, and 
thus the poem, is a “landscape.” 
Landscape With the Fall of Icarus 
 
According to Brueghel 
when Icarus fell 
it was spring 
 
a farmer was ploughing 
his field 
the whole pageantry 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
work simply as The Fall of Icarus. As he oddly fails to recognize, however, neither the picture’s 
full title, nor its abbreviated one can be attributed to Bruegel. What the philosopher takes as 
evidence of artistic intention is instead the work of middle-men—a label applied centuries after 
the fact by persons who were themselves engaged not in making the picture but in interpreting 
it.” Yeazell argues, in fact, that that “the history of this particular painting and the names 
associated with it are even more vexed than usual”—a history she documents in the article, all of 
which has a bearing on how the figure of Icarus arrives to us in Roberson’s and our own time. 
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sweating in the sun 
that melted 
the wings' wax 
 
unsignificantly 
off the coast 
there was 
 




Williams’s reading of the landscape insists that Brueghel’s depiction of Icarus falling 
foregrounds the everydayness of the moment, in which Icarus’s story is only a small detail, 
represented in the lower right corner of the composition, as two legs going under. “Icarus 
drowning.” The painting then is an occasion for Williams to practice his own poetic 
commitments to the everyday American landscape and its vernacular language, as part of the 
larger modernist project to challenge received notions of what counts as poetic language and 
subject matter. Williams is widely recognized as a central figure in the poetic tradition of which 
Roberson is a part, one that is often said to begin with Whitman’s similarly vernacular 
meditation on the American landscape, as an expression of Democratic ideals, extending to 
Charles Olson and Robert Duncan in the post-WWII period, and to various schools of 
“innovative poetry” in the later twentieth century to the present. The relationship between 
landscape, language and history is strong in this tradition, though its practitioners are responding 
                                                 
169William Carlos Williams, The Collected Poems of William Carlos Williams, Volume II: 1939-
1962 (New York: New Directions, 2001): 385-6.  
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to different social and political forces at each period of its practice. If in Williams’ moment, the 
landscape is an occasion to meditate on what is “American” about the U.S. and what in that 
sense will make it whole (as a typical modernist project), in Roberson’s poetics, learning to read 
the American landscape means learning to read its fractures and holes.170 “Of what happens / 
lines of that,     are gone / not simply missing // Those lines of how those / lines that are there     
got there / the line in mid-air.” 
In Roberson’s poetics, the landscape is always an historical occasion. As in the poem  
“Taking the Print,” the second poem of The Aerialist Narratives. The poem begins with a visual 
perception of the sun’s reflection on a body of water, the way the brightness of the sun will make 
the water surrounding it appear darker, evoking a nighttime scene in the full brightness of day: 
“See night in the sunlight’s starry reflection / off the water     darkening the water / by 
contrast.”171 It is a beautiful description of a natural phenomenon, which in the following lines 
evokes the history of U.S. American slavery: “The dark hiding in the water / also hid us in the 
river at night / Our crossing guided by the internal sight / on our darkness.”172 Roberson teaches 
us here how to read history in the landscape—not only because the history is in the land, but 
                                                 
170Crown, “Reading the ‘Lucid Interval,’” 189, 218. Crown’s analysis of Roberson’s poetry 
points as well to the questions of historical literacy: “In gaining access to such traumatic histories 
as the African diaspora, the poetic avant-garde must enter into shock and deformation in order to 
articulate new structures, forms, and trajectories. The critical question for the avant-garde thus 
becomes one of readability: How do we read histories that are fragmented and nearly lost? […] 
What literacies are available after shock and rupture? What is the relationship between trauma 
and literacy? Where and under what conditions do alternative literacies become available?” 
Crown concludes that Roberson’s work “attempts, rather, to ‘take the print’ of history—to seize 
by strategies of sign and fragment the ‘afterimages’ of those who are invisible or disappeared 
and to transmit these images to the reader by means of a visual graph or sign, a musical score, or 
an exploded fragment. If we read well, we are imprinted with these patterns, but we can decipher 
them only by learning to read differently.” 
 
171Roberson, VCO, 78. 
 
172Roberson, VCO, 78. 
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because it is within our visual and linguistic imaginary, as well. Visual phenomena, our 
perception of them, both contain and disclose these stories, voicing them:  
                                    see in the river the ripples' 
picture on the surface of the wind the lifting of the image  
has taken at the deeper face  
                                                         the starry freedom  
written in the milky rivery line that pours  
the brilliance of that image from a depth only black  
night fleeing across this land  
                                                                    has to voice.173  
 
Returning to the final stanza of “Aerialist Narrative”—“But what can anyone have read, / 
supposing it was night / by the light of Icarus or any of us escaping?”—we are provoked then to 
ask, what kind of light casts out to talk us in to this re-vision of the everyday world? A question 
that suggests we have to read the light itself: i.e., we have to understand the sun that melts the 
wings’ wax is a life-giving force that takes life; a fiery source that both illuminates and cast 
darkness on the world we are reading. 
Such that the rhetorical question “what can anyone have read” transforms, as the series of 
subordinate clauses modifies and develops the condition of night, as a darkness that illuminates, 
producing an alternative question, “what can anyone have read […] by the light of Icarus?” But 
what then is the light of Icarus—i.e., what light does Icarus carry, emit, or otherwise make 
available to read by, without or despite the light of the sun?  
The light of Icarus in flight might be the light obstructed by his body, the shadow his 
figure casts upon the ground—upon the surface of the sea—blocking out the light of the 
powerful sun; the light of Icarus falling might be the energy generated by his free fall to the sea, 
a fire sparked to match the fire of the sun that sends him downward; the light of Icarus drowning 
might be the light of the sun reflected in the water that swallows him, turning the day to night. 
                                                 
173Roberson, VCO, 78. 
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And yet these hypotactic lines generate another iteration of the question: “What can anyone have 
read by the light of […] any of escaping?” This version of the question emphasizes Icarus’s 
flight as flight out of captivity. What light do those escaping carry, emit, or otherwise manifest? 
Here we might return to the “internal sight” of “Taking the Print” that Roberson suggests guided 
enslaved people out of the plantation south: “The dark hiding in the water / also hid us in the 
river at night / Our crossing guided by the internal sight / on our darkness.” Such that this final 
stanza of “Aerialist Narrative” turns in multiple directions of meaning, suggesting both loss and 
hope, by representing the light of Icarus as one of failure and death, and the light of any of us 
escaping as a necessary alternative to the light of the sun, one that potentially leads to liberation.  
At the same time, the “light of Icarus” is one missing letter and a rhyme away from 
“flight of Icarus.” Modifying Williams-via-Bruegel, Fall of Icarus becomes Flight of Icarus. Is 
Icarus falling or flying? 
Any of Us Escaping: Icarus and the Myth of the Flying Africans 
 
The myth of the flying Africans began circulating outside of local communities when 
American ethnographers of the U.S. south started collecting folk tales narrated by native 
informants in the 1940s, as part of the Federal Writer’s Project. The story, attributed to the 
Gullah people of the Georgia Sea Islands, was first published in Drums and Shadows in 1940, 
and then again in Langston Hughes and Arna Bontemp’s 1958 Book of Negro Folklore, where it 
is titled “All God’s Chillen Had Wings,” which version is reprinted in The Norton Anthology of 
African-American Literature. The story, in short, is that a group of enslaved Africans in the 
plantation south, collapsing under a cruel master and overseer, get tired of their treatment and 
decide it is time to leave. An elder among them remembers the old ways of flying. The narrator 
tells us: “Once all Africans could fly like birds.” He incants the old words and one by one, they 
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all take flight, flying away, presumably, back to Africa. Floating and flying; sinking and falling: 
the fallen body transforms into a flying one. Unlike Icarus, however, the Africans do not need 
any apparatus of invention to escape, they only need to remember the knowledge and the words 
that have been suppressed. 
 There are various interpretations of the myth. Some believe it is a metaphor for mass 
suicide, 174 citing a particular case in which it is reported that a group of Igbo people brought to 
St. Simon’s Island, Georgia, committed mass suicide in defiance of being enslaved. Or the myth 
is interpreted as a metaphor for those in captivity to talk safely about runaway slaves in case their 
overseers were to overhear them. Others read the myth not as a document of any particular event 
but as a rally for psychological hope. 175 Still others argue that we should understand the story 
not as a myth but as documentation of literal flights that “western” culture simply does not 
possess the epistemology to understand. 176 In a recent article on the development of the myth in 
African American literature, Katherine Thornstein argues that the myth is not one that carried 
directly from Africa to the plantation south, but that it is a story particularly suited to and created 
in the New World. She makes an interesting observation that “[s]urprisingly, representations of 
human flight are extremely rare within West African mythology, leading many to consider this 
myth unique to areas of the black Atlantic with a history of institutional slavery. Whereas West 
African folklore is rich with the correlated themes of spirit flight and human transformation, it 
                                                 
174Cf. Soyica Diggs Colbert, “Black Movements: Flying Africans in Spaceships,” Black 
Performance Theory, ed. Thomas DeFrantz and Anita Gonzalez (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2014). 
 
175Cf. Yusef Komunyakaa, “Sorrow Songs and Flying Away: Religious Influence on Black 
Poetry.” Cross Currents 57.2 (Summer 2007) 281-308. 
 
176Cf. Young, Jason R. “All God’s Children Had Wings: The Flying African in History, 
Literature, and Lore.” Journal of Africana Studies, Vol. 5.1 (2017): 50-70. 
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was only in the New World that this tradition incorporated human powers of flight.”177 
Thornstein’s argument that flight as a figure of escape has a particular historical meaning located 
in the New World bears on how the myth of Icarus enters the African American literary canon in 
the late twentieth century, perhaps as a further development of the myth of the Flying 
Africans.178 
One of the major differences we might perceive between these two myths is the outcomes 
they portray—the classical myth ends in Icarus’s death and Dedalus’s mourning of his lost son, 
while the myth of the Flying Africans ends with an ostensibly successful escape. That is, whether 
one believes that escape to be a literal return to Africa, or a metaphorical one in which death 
offers a return home, it is interpreted as successful, celebratory, and hope-giving. It is this 
inflection of the meaning or moral of the story that shows up in Roberson’s re-vision of Icarus 
not as a figure of tragedy but of survival. 
For, as Roberson describes in a recent interview,179 Icarus is also a figure of renewal and 
continuity, as the water of the Icarian sea, or the Atlantic ocean of Middle Passage, returns to 
land in the poem “Properties,” in which water cycles through its various forms.180 Northeastern 
snow becomes southern cotton field; tropical mists become the tears of the ancestors, in which 
transformation is constant, both historical and essential: As Roberson puts it in a previously 
unpublished poem recently collected in a special edition of The Chicago Review, “don’t you 
                                                 
177Thornstein, “From Escape to Ascension,” 261. 
 
178There is a line of inquiry to follow here regarding the figure of flight after the invention of the 
airplane in regards to Icarus and the Flying Africans, which there is evidence of scholarly interest 
in.  
 
179Ed Roberson interviewed by Adra Raine at the author’s home, Chicago, IL, November 9, 
2017. 
 
180Roberson, VCO, 82. 
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know black people always thought / we were continuous in any form.” Throughout Voices Cast 
Out, we hear the voices of the ancients screaming or singing in the burning city lights, laughing 
in the water’s rapids; we taste their tears in the many migrations ice makes home to water. 
Black with the roads' dusts, 
       the atmosphere,    solid, on the ground  
turns into a pool, the  
       ground's mirror,  
and picks up the sky again.181 
 
We might read Icarus then as a figure of qualified hope,182 in the way that all children are—as 
they carry our past with them into the future, and, like Daedalus, we take on the impossible task 
of providing them with the tools they will need to navigate an uncertain present, shaped by a 
destructive past, toward a possibly better future. Though the path of flight is a narrow one. 
Icarus dies, but he doesn’t only die. Roberson’s poetics is not reactive; it isn’t set on 
defining its practice in strict opposition to something, politically or aesthetically, but is multiple 
and continuous. It is dialectal—Icarus dies and he doesn’t die, insofar as the dialectic is a 
movement that produces always more. Is this a hopeful vision? It is future oriented, which 
doesn’t mean it believes the future is all right but neither does it believe that it isn’t. 
Yet what these myths share in common, in addition to being stories about taking literal 
flight from unjust captivity, is a generational perspective. I use the word generation in multiple 
senses. In my reading of the myth of Daedalus and Icarus in Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In, I take 
                                                 
181Roberson, VCO, 83. 
 
182Huehls, Qualified Hope, 6. I borrow this phrase from Mitchum Huehls to signal a 
characteristically post-1968, or what Huehls calls “postmodern” investment in contingency, 
wherein “maybe” is as hopeful as one can get, but it also might be enough. Huehls’ larger 
argument that postmodern literature’s “formal innovations represent the need to rethink, but not 
reject, the political value of time,” including a chapter on Mackey’s work, bears on my own 
analysis of Roberson’s—as well as Mackey’s and Howe’s—resuscitation of historical 
consciousness in the post-1968 period. 
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Daedalus as the dominant figure in the first half of the book, that of Lucid Interval As Integral 
Music, a serial work about parenting, and about history, telling the story from the ground, from 
within the maze, setting the stage for the aerial view of the second serial work of the collection, 
The Aerialist Narratives, where Icarus appears in the opening poem, as the guiding figure for a 
work that focuses on the aerial view, hover-flying. The relationship between air, sea, and earth, 
however, is an imbricated one, both because they are constantly mirroring or reflecting one 
another, and because of the way these spaces are haunted by the history of the transatlantic slave 
trade, as the beginning of one of many violent chapters of the history of the American landscape. 
We may picture Icarus “floating without bottom in that earth,” where his location is constantly 
on the move between air, water, and earth, as we will see in close readings of selected poems 
below.  
The theme of generation, a word whose multiple meanings I will draw out in my 
analysis—as in the production of things, like poems and wings; stages of filiation; and, the 
periodization of a people born at the same time within a collective body—recurs as well, 
highlighting that history is both personal/local and collective/world-historical. Brent Hayes 
Edwards on Roberson’s serial poetics writes, 
But the intuited totality of serial form ‘makes you linger’ in that ‘generative space.’ 
Roberson’s name for it is the ‘lucid interval.’ It is a space of vulnerability as much as 
epiphany, a brief respite between bouts of insanity (‘the currency of exchange between is 
madness’s // equipoise’). The space is generative not only due to the connections and 
associations it forces one to see, but also, as Moten adds, because it is the site of 
‘ensemble,’ in the paradoxical sense that collectivity leaves its trace only through its 
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fugitivity: ‘You have to believe you breathe / every black breath ever into you / it takes 
you the song / Says I’m gone I’m gone oh long, I’m gone.’183  
The relationship between the generative and the ensemble is in that sense of generation as 
intervals of filiation—such that Roberson moves between the individual family history and the 
larger social history as stories about generations. 
Generation is a noun and a verb: generation as a marker of time; generation as 
production. There is both distance and simultaneity between generations. They generate together 
something common, shared, and continuous. The relationship between continuities is located in 
the present, as an intersection that is also a division—intersection implying a cut: like the line 
through the middle of the page that is a formal feature of Lucid Interval as Integral Music. 
Generation of sentences out of words, and generation of ideas out of language, generation of 
meaning out of images: the relationship between units and what they add up to, are a part of, are 
as the units of generations of people that make up a social body. These multiple senses of 
generation, multiple fields upon which generation is working, is central to Roberson’s double-
jointed184 poetics, at both the grammatical and thematic levels. 
                                                 
183Moten, “Blackness and Nothingness,” 628. 
 
184Roberson, To See the Earth, jacket blurb by Nathaniel Mackey; Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 
579. Nathaniel Mackey observation of Ed Roberson’s “labyrinthine, syntactically double-jointed 
lines,” I apply to Mackey’s double-jointed diction in his prose. Both are grammatical responses 
to ideological struggle in post-1968 American literary practice. Putting pressure at the joints of 
language cracks open the history of forces that joins word to meaning, grammar to sense, as well 
as joins language practices aimed at liberation and domination alike, troubling the project of 
liberatory poetics that I argue each author’s work is engaged in. Brent Hayes Edwards discusses 
Mackey’s “linguistic and formal joint-work” in terms of the way “the poems exert great pressure 
on their own joints.” If the joints are what make articulation possible, in Edwards’s analysis, 
Mackey’s joint-work “continuously undoes, endlessly challenges, the bodily rhetoric inherent in 
our understanding of expression—the connotative link between joint and articulation” by testing 
and breaking the limits of legibility of words and poetic form, in this case the serial form. 
Edwards views this joint-work as part of the self-reflexivity characteristic of Mackey’s work, his 
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One of the generational relationships that emerges in situations of captivity is that new 
generations are born into a state of capture. In the case of Icarus on the island of Crete and the 
children of enslaved Africans in the southern U.S., this generational inheritance is literal. In the 
twentieth century, the terms of captivity for the later generations of children of enslaved Africans 
evolve through Reconstruction, Jim Crow, Civil Rights, and what is commonly being recognized 
as the New Jim Crow.185 Under capitalism and colonialism more generally, we find all of our 
children born into a world we’d like to be otherwise. We often think of generation as a line of 
inheritance. The multiple sense of “line” spins out in various ways in the book. The string of the 
tightrope walk in “Aerialist Narrative” conjures the thread that leads Theseus out of the labyrinth 
that Daedalus built to trap the minotaur, re-curs, or pre-curs at the beginning of Lucid Interval in 
the line “string in a labyrinth”186—a poem we will return to below—which later becomes a game 
of knot-tying that conjures the cat o’ nine tails and slave ships,187 before becoming again a figure 
of escape and entanglement.188  
We’ve discussed Icarus at some length, but meanwhile Daedalus, who wants to free 
Icarus from the unjust imprisonment he inherits, is forced to put his child in danger in order to 
                                                                                                                                                             
commitment to “impediment as a condition of inception” in work that “turns less on meaning 
than on moving, that strains against its own continuation, but keeps ‘not being done’ with itself.”  
I would add that we can point to another aspect of joint-work in Mackey’s and Roberson’s work, 
its double-jointedness, in order to address a different area of pressure their poetics applies to 
language and form, one that exposes the troubled histories and troubling duplicity of the 
linguistic and formal tools we work with in projects aimed at liberatory ends—whether they be 
revolutionary, fugitive, or otherwise. 
 
185Cf. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 
(New York: Perseus, 2012).  
 
186Roberson, VCO, 13. 
 
187Roberson, VCO, 52. 
 
188Roberson, VCO, 53. 
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protect him, a reflection of the paradox of protection and harm that Roberson draws out in poems 
addressed to his infant daughter in Lucid Interval As Integral Music, in what we might use 
Roberson’s own words to describe as a “lyric…for people who walk on strings.” This first book 
of Voices Cast Out is continuously reflecting on this trouble, as in the ninth poem of the final 
section of Lucid Interval as Integral Music: 
Ours is a foolish fire 
we bring you  
into        , children. The light 
clouded with all these each others’ weather 
 
of that fire itself        weathered 
safely or not, ultimately not. The light, you see, 
is of kind, is 
of way        Ours is a foolish fire    done 
 
out into air          with mirrors even still going out. 
I look 
like my father  you look like me My father 
ashes over in his lungs colder to cancer 
 
I heard him say god how I love them to us under his breath189 
 
The poem recalls Gwendolyn Brooks’ “Children of the Poor,” 
 
People who have no children can be hard: 
Attain a mail of ice and insolence: 
Need not pause in the fire, and in no sense 
Hesitate in the hurricane to guard. 
And when wide world is bitten and bewarred 
They perish purely, waving their spirits hence 
Without a trace of grace or of offense 
To laugh or fail, diffident, wonder-starred. 
While through a throttling dark we others hear 
The little lifting helplessness, the queer 
Whimper-whine; whose unridiculous 
Lost softness softly makes a trap for us. 
And makes a curse. And makes a sugar of 
The malocclusions, the inconditions of love.190 
                                                 
189Roberson, VCO, 70. 
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Like Daedalus, the poet-parent understands the danger of the world, how we are all tied up in it, 
but the tenderness of a parent’s love provokes one to hope, to struggle on, foolishly, as all 
parents have done and will continue to do: “I look / like my father you look like me My father / 
ashes over in his lungs colder to cancer // I heard him say god how I love them to us under his 
breath.191 
As post-1968 writers know: tools of emancipation can quickly become tools of 
oppression. Daedalus becomes trapped, with his son, within the maze of his own making. We 
have to be careful about what we create. This part of the myth is a political lesson, not an 
existential one. As we’ve established, Icarus, who inherits his enslavement, is given a precarious 
means of escape. His narrow path of flight is a symbol of black life in America, always trying to 
escape oppression, from slavery to the present. As Roberson puts it in another poem about the 
precarious flight of black people in America: “Ours is a particularly hard landing always / trying 
to correct to an abandoned position / You run out of the fuel for holding / back.”192 
The explicit evocation of the myth in The Aerialist Narratives, which makes up the 
second half of Voices Cast Out provokes one to read the myth working in Lucid Interval in ways 
that may not have been immediately perceptible in its initial publication, casting the first book as 
that of the father Daedalus. Such that we are now attuned to hear the myth in lines like these 
from untitled “XXXVIII”  in the second section of Lucid Interval, “This Week’s Concerts,” 
which feature essential elements of the myth—wax, flight, and suns/sons: 
but it's the elevators who're anonymous. 
                                                                                                                                                             
190Brooks, “Children of the Poor,” Selected Poems (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Classics, 2006). 
 
191Roberson, VCO, 70. 
 
192Roberson, VCO, 80. 
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whose wings regard the earn and the cross fictions  
as as early as wax 
and ringing ears in sophistication  
 
of screw in this aural flight at suns turned out.193  
 
And the appearance of labyrinths, first in untitled “III”  in This Week’s Concerts: 
string in a labyrinth. 
no giving away 
is the look out 
commanding the entire face 
 
floating without bottom in that earth194 
 
And again untitled “IV” in the final section “Interval and Final Day’s Concerts”: “labyrinth is a 
real route, / densest in the middle of the floor.”195 
These allusions to the myth of Daedalus and Icarus might be at times accidental, rather 
than intentionally conceived by Roberson. Yet their accident is not incidental. Which is to say 
that because the themes of the book are constructing a world of relations, as myths do, we should 
not be surprised to find this resonance. 
Daedalus in the Labyrinth: Lucid Interval as Integral Music 
 
 I will look now at a selection of poems from the first book of Voices Cast Out that 
introduce the problems parenthood poses in historical reckoning, drawing out the themes of 
language and history, trial and confession, and the contradictions and complexities of the 
labyrinth in which Daedalus as poet-parent figures for a poetics committed to reading the 
American landscape. 
                                                 
193Roberson, VCO, 50. 
 
194Roberson, VCO, 13. 
 
195Roberson, VCO, 65. 
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 In my introductory chapter, I looked at the upper half of the opening poem of Lucid 
Interval, “Picking Up the Tune, the Universe and the Planets,” which establishes the influence 
that Roberson’s infant daughter, Lena, has on the book’s forms and themes. Now, we will turn to 
the lower poem, which re-starts on the opposite page, picking up the tune set by the upper poem, 
and establishing questions about the way language inaugurates us into histories that precede us—
as words spoken, or sung, lovingly and protectively by parents, inscribe meanings that precede 
and exceed their first occasions. The concept and image of reflection in the first three stanzas 
establishes multiple senses of generational relation. 
I. still autonomic 
         still as unspeeched as conception’s 
                about what now-breathed message 
   reflection prior to its face 
         should carry you 
                                     at seeing, 
 
   about what you claim as 
         – if I am the lake you take your face from – 
   a reflection 
   at the sight of me, 
                                     I crawled 
 
   as far back in as I could to you, 
          into the water’s trouble,196   
 
That is, it bears on relations of communication production (“message reflection”), filial 
generation (“ – If I am the lake you take your face from – / a reflection / at the sight of me”), and 
historical generation (“I crawled / as far back in as I could to you / into the water’s trouble”). It 
also establishes a dialogic relationship between language-users as well as between generations: 
the way history is carried forward in language by generational communication, the words take on 
new meanings while carrying their previous ones.  
                                                 
196Roberson, VCO, 6. 
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In this relation, the child is both a hope and a haunting, future-looking and past-
reflecting, such that fathers, in facing their children, “have to re-face / meaninglessness, // 
clutching infants who / haven’t yet words.” This opening movement of the book then sets up a 
series of questions about form and formlessness, and the process of forming; generational 
inheritance and historical haunting.  
At the same time, this is a story about how we come into language. As language use 
forms, it brings with it concepts and stories the parent wants to shield their child from. As 
expressed in the second set of poems of the next section, “This Week’s Concerts,” whose 
opening lines “songs without words / scenes of infants,” echoes the lines, “clutching infants who 
/ haven’t yet words.”197 Roberson associates this wordless state with a kind of terror of 
responsibility, and of the eventual “filling” in that language will supply – “helpless as any later 
meanings … / … The father has // always been brought to his knees / by this.” 
clutching infants who 
      haven’t yet words, 
 
screaming for them 
              their protective songs 
      incoherently.198 
 
Such that, alongside a story or argument or question about history in that large sense of 
collective history, the poem also attends to the intimate details of the immediate experience of 
parenting—all of the emotions, joys and fears, of bringing a child into this collective story, the 
way it attunes you to danger in a new way, recalibrates your relationship to fear. You find your 
new (pre)occupation is to protect this child, but that the tools you are provided for this job are 
precariously matched to the world of danger you are set against to protect her from. Failure is 
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198Roberson, VCO, 7. 
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inevitable: You will not protect her. You sing protective songs to infants who haven’t yet words 
to understand, yet the words precede them, inaugurate them into meanings that will harm them, 
no matter what you do.199 
In the post-1968 era, everyone knows this: that the force of language is historically and 
culturally determined. This is the given upon which all else begins: the linguistic turn in the 
humanities. Poem “II” invokes one of the problems the book faces: how to tell this story with the 
tools at hand. Like Daedalus trapped on the island of Crete, whose only tools were feathers and 
wax put together by imagination, invention, and hope, Roberson has only these inherited words 
with which to write his songs.200 
In the final section of Lucid Interval, “Interval and Final Day’s Concerts,” the poem titled 
“I. 12.b.obs.OED,” addresses the trouble of words and their meanings— i.e., definitions—
directly, the title coming from an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary: an obsolete definition 
of an unnamed word which is ostensibly defined, in parentheses, as “(to know or to be read in).” 
When I attempted to discover what word Roberson was defining, I circled around words like 
“verse” or “fluent,” but couldn’t land. Kathleen Crown provides the source word: “to read.”201 
But the point is not to know the source word as much as it is to consider where meanings come 
from: the opening line, “suppose you read in” prefiguring The Aerialist Narratives’ “What can 
anyone have read, / supposing it was night…”—supposition perhaps being a fundamental 
                                                 
199Zamsky, “The Umbilicate Ear,” 694. Zamsky similarly reflects: “This sense of the parent and 
the poet bearing the perhaps impossible responsibility of making sense of history fuels the 
process of aligning historical and personal events, a process that is sometimes deemed 
impossible.” 
 
200Another name for this is the blues. 
 




operation of language use, and language exchange—the space or interval between what I mean 
and what you mean, what I want to mean and what the word means despite me, always activating 
the motion and commotion of discourse.202 The space in between is the air we fly or fall in. The 
poem ends with a question, offered as a thirteenth definition,  
I.13 suppose to read is as to study          divination.203 
The setting off of “divination” from the rest of the line allows two possible readings: “suppose to 
read is as to study divination,” in which divination is the subject of study; or “suppose to read is 
as to study: divination” where “to study” is a form of “divination.” We are not forced to choose, 
but I think the second iteration is the provocative one, insofar as it suggests that the work of 
divination—auguring the future—as another word for visionary work, is not the work of 
supernatural or exceptional powers, but a clarity of sight arrived at through the work of study, 
through reading thoroughly. It is yet another iteration of the book’s injunction: to read the 
American landscape, to really see it, by practicing a poetics that attends to the relationship 
between history and language, and attends to the contradictions, the commotion of the space in 
between meanings, that don’t resolve, but do flutter. To study the motion of the wings in 
(com)motion… 
in the folds in the lattice 
     of meanings that a wing stirs 
          the overlay fixes 
one of a combinant of likenesses wch each 
                                                 
202Crown, “Reading the ‘Lucid Interval,’” 189-190. Crown asserts that “For Roberson, the term 
interval most often indicates the chaotic but productive space between sign and sound, and 
between the visual and aural—a space he insists on rendering lucid, as in fully visible, readable, 
and accessible to reason and the intellect. The term interval also suggests for Roberson the 
breaks in historical consciousness produced by traumatic events such as the Middle Passage—
those nearly unreadable intervals that symptomatically reenact the original trauma and, at the 
same time, bear witness to a culture’s ability to survive, adapt, and innovate.” 
 
203Roberson, VCO, 62. 
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    manifoldly persist         beyond 
  its analogous moment        miscreant chimerical204 
 
But this is no easy task, for the language we excavate through study is tricky.  
The section, “This Week’s Concerts,” referenced in “I. 12.b.obs.OED,” takes its title 
from the New York Times’ listings of concerts played on the classical and jazz radio stations that 
Roberson would read from Pittsburgh. He says he would use the names of the concerts as 
prompts or points of departure for the poems: “I’d wonder what those words would do. I’d circle 
them and play games with the sound.”205 For example, “corsair” in the title of one concert 
becomes “coarse air” in the opening poem of the section. Or, in poem XIX,206 the word 
“mariner” is a point of departure for a poem about being out at sea. Roberson discloses, “That’s 
Neville Mariner—don’t tell anybody! It might have been Mariner conducting the fireworks 
music. In that sense I would tempt the chaos, taking words that were nonsense words, that had 
some emotional catch in them, and begin to play with them.”207 
The classical and jazz concerts whose names Roberson reads in the paper are “songs 
without words,” naming a problem or question about instrumental music’s relation to worded 
language, and echoing those lines, “infants who / haven’t yet words.” While instrumental music 
can convey themes and moods, it is harder to achieve lyrical expression—to locate the themes 
and moods as belonging to an individual voice or place, to a particular point of view. The “solo” 
becomes the exception, an opportunity for the listener not only to hear what is being expressed, 
but to hear it expressed by a particular voice; for example, when Louis Armstrong plays a battle 
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cry, we aren’t cued only to think of a battle scene, but to think, Louis Armstrong is saying 
something about battle. An author is speaking. Without words, without an anchor in the 
particular, we get only generalities the music evokes, scenes that have their established “sounds”: 
Church worship (“o sing unto the lord”), Birdsong (“good mornings as birds”), Liturgy (“tribute 
to the saintly”), Animal kingdom (“endangered animals”): “this is all,” i.e., nothing more is 
communicated. Without words, “i don’t know where / from” these “songs” come, who is singing 
and why, what are the stakes, and to whom these messages are addressed. Like a quotation out of 
context or without attribute (“i don’t know where / from … it’s …  quoted without these 
words”), these stories can mean anything, can fulfill or sustain any ideological agenda. History 
unanchored in the particular faces this same dilemma, moves toward universalism, as an 
exclusionary ideology of dominance. 
Such that returning to the poem, “songs without words,” we understand that the question 
of how to communicate without words is at the same time a question about how to communicate 
without the words given to us: “I don’t know where / from     it’s caused     or filled / or quoted 
without these words.” How do we access the history that has brought us here without the words 
that carry that history? But then, how do we use those words without unleashing the oppressive 
force of the history that produced them? These questions are destabilizing: “I am shaken.” 
 In the lower poem, “2. I might have screamed,” the question is restated, but differently, 
invoking a different set of problems: “I might have screamed / the wrong spell, the wrong 
words.”208 Even when you find the words, even if you’ve been careful and thoughtful in your 
selection, words can betray you. Words invoke worlds—but what world are you invoking? This 
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is both the utopic potential and the dystopic danger of words. In From a Broken Bottle, N. 
asserts, “new word, new world,”209 but not every new world is a better one. 
I might have screamed 
       the wrong spell, the wrong words 
the wrong defiance thrown the property 
       against the specie for, 
for love 
       written a senseless draft and wasted 
myself at war, like my age, 
       remembering the more complete 
for bottoming out means 
       human 
to even sit down and eat beside another 
       to ride on a bus or go to school 
to recall any chance at all of an even 
       hand     free of the holding 
                                             class.210 
 
The history of segregation and desegregation are invoked without the promise of “an even hand” 
or the end of ruling class hierarchies from which we cannot protect our children from suffering. 
There’s no guarantee that whatever spells of safety and justice we sing to them at home, along 
with whatever resistance (“defiance,” “war”) we’ve fought there out there, were the right ones. 
Screaming the wrong spell can have disastrous consequences—you might just make things 
worse. A poem that wonders about the double-edgedness of expression relates to a common 
interpretation of the Icarus myth that it is a story about the limits of art to transcend whatever 
boundaries it seeks to fly beyond. What if I write the wrong words? What if the words that I 
thought were liberatory lead only to more subjugation? How do we know or how can we come to 
recognize the difference? Or what if liberation is possible, but I forget the words, lost or 
otherwise taken from me? 
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In the fourth line, the word “specie” appears following the appearance of the word 
“property.” One definition of “specie” is “money in the form of coins rather than notes.” At the 
same time, in legal discourse, “in specie” means “in the real, precise, or actual form specified.” 
The word derives from Latin, entering the English lexicon in the mid-sixteenth century, i.e. 
during the European Renaissance, with the phrase “in specie” to mean “in the actual form,” from 
species, “form, kind.” The word “specie” recurs again in another poem, in the line “Chance is 
specie our daughter our mind.”211 Crown offer a reading of “specie” as “a term that evokes both 
the transmission of a biological continuity (father/daughter in this poem) and transactions of 
coin, currency, and exchange. In several places in Lucid Interval, the capture of the disappeared 
(those persons who ‘moved out of themselves’) is described in terms of a kind of afterimage, 
visible form, and tangible coinage. Like biological succession, coins circulate throughout 
communities and nations and are infinitely reproducible and exchangeable. Their somewhat 
random movement resembles the transmission of traumatic knowledge or ecstatic experiences, 
which are also exchanged between persons and bodies.”212 Throughout the book, we find these 
discourses of parenthood and of survival brought into relation with discourses of property and 
money, as well as law and trial. It as is as though in the persistent questions about reckoning and 
accounting that a historical analysis involves, Roberson recognizes that these words, too, 
circulate in multiple discourses that must come to bear on the matter at hand. The theme of 
trial—as legal or moral arbitration of right and wrong; as an attempt, or “draft”; and as trying, or 
tiresome—takes on an essential role in the book. 
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As a matter of legal trial, Roberson concludes the poem with a meditation on “rightness.” 
Expanding the question of the right or wrong word to other fields in which right/wrong, 
correct/incorrect, good/bad, protective/harmful are relevant, he writes, 
       […] in different. we 
are right only 
 to what we give birth to, anyhow, 
we are correct only within 
 what we create, 
only  
 the examination we make 
up out of each 
 last hour’s erasures marks us right.213 
 
These lines offer three distinct takes on rightness, representative of the concerns of the book: 
protection, parenthood, historical reckoning, and poetic language. 
The first three lines of the stanza, “we / are right only / to what we give birth to, 
anyhow,” suggest that our children confer omnipotence upon us such that in their eyes, and in 
their eyes alone (“only”), we are always right. In fact, it will come as a great shock to them to 
learn otherwise. “Right” in this context means at once correct, in terms of what we know; 
acceptable, in terms of being worthy of love; and, righteous, in terms of our world view. To be 
placed in such a position in relation to another person is frightening, given all the wrongness we 
suspect and/or know ourselves to be given to.  
Alternatively, the next two lines, “we are correct only within / what we create,” observe 
that when we create something, when we are the architect of its design, we get to set the rules 
according to which it is judged correct or incorrect. For example, the poet may assume authority 
to determine his own system of rules for where lines break or justify. Otherwise, one is working 
within the rules of correctness, and correction, established by convention or some external arbiter 
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of taste. One could interpret this freedom of the maker as possessing a liberatory potential on the 
one hand, or as a solipsistic challenge to collective relation on the other: there is an ambivalence, 
if not suspicion, about the word “correct” here, which the repetition of word “only” suggests. 
The final four lines, “only / the examinations we make / up out of each / last hour’s 
erasures mark us right,” represent a third take on rightness as one that emerges out of 
“examination,” or what we might call study, of history and its silences: “last hour’s erasures.” 
Here, the word “only” repeats, but in a different grammatical position, suggesting not that this 
form of rightness is limited, but that it is itself singular. Examination suggests a different kind of 
rightness that is not assumed by another person (e.g., your child) or by one’s self (e.g., the 
author), as the way the former two senses of “right” and “correct "are given and/or taken in the 
first five lines.  Rather, rightness is earned through the labor of study—the study “we make / up 
out of” the history we examine is one that necessarily involves fabrication—critique is a mode of 
imagining—is “made up” as a fiction, and that also “makes up for” the erasures that history 
makes. Is this study as divination? Only the effectiveness of our critique, what it produces, 
“marks us right,” judges as “right,” in all senses of the word. 
The theme repeats in the lower poem, “41. this is about songs”:  
  
this is about songs 
about when they happen about 
pieces and absences 
of connection about for no reason 
 
this is about practicing 
any gap any short for the jump 
this is about going about 
years with the live fragment 
 
singing it over 
and over for years learning its meaning 
only as accuracy        not an aesthetic 




maybe empirically correct song214 
 
What does it mean live with a fragment? Perhaps it means to live with only part of the story of 
who you are, and how you got here. But rather than fill in what is missing, rather than piece 
together what is fragmented, here the poet suggests that singing the fragment over and over, one 
learns its meaning, as a whole thing because it is materially the case, i.e. “empirically correct”—
a voice that casts out to let us in. 
In untitled “III,” the upper right lena of this quadrant of poems, the lines, “to mention the 
soldiers / is to state it to death” continues the critique of how words fail, but also registers how 
dominant narratives of history erase not only by omission and distortion, but also counter-
intuitively by the operation of naming, the way noise creates or sustains what Roberson calls in 
the next line “a souvenir silence.”  
the rice care 
is left in the frog harp. 
several early songs 
hurt the farmers’ heart 
 
after nightfall. 
to mention the soliders  
is to state itto death. 
a souvenir silence.215 
 
To state something to death is to render it meaningless through repetition, like when one repeats 
a word over and over until it is emptied of its signification, becomes a strange sound, an empty 
container, an empty jar. The soldiers, whose appearance invokes the threat of death, bloody 
battlefields, and the human cost of war, become souvenirs in a tourist’s visit through history, in 
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which one watches from a safe distance, and fails to see oneself, or to see the present of which 
one is a part, fails to see history as present. One vacates the present to visit the past, thus 
distorting if not erasing the relationship between the past, present and future. 
The poem’s opening line “the     rice care,” immediately invokes Vietnam, a war still 
resonant in the collective imaginary of the 1980s-90s, before its images were superseded by the 
post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, et al. Such that “souvenir,” in relation to soldiers, at the 
same time brings to mind those widely circulated stories of American soldiers gone mad, 
wearing gruesome necklaces of their victims’ ears, as famously represented in 1979’s 
Apocalypse Now, further evoked in the next line: “string in a labyrinth,” alluding perhaps to the 
string of a necklace. At the same time, Daedalus appears most explicitly in this line, “string in 
the labyrinth” suggesting a string of escape—the ball of string Daedalus made for Ariadne to 
help guide Theseus out of the labyrinth after he slayed the minotaur: 
string in a labyrinth. 
no giving away 
is the look out 
commanding the entire face 
 
floating without bottom in that earth216 
 
The “look out” in the third line of this stanza might refer to the job of the soldier, or person 
escaping, who is on watch, but is suggestive as well of the tower in which Daedalus and Icarus 
were placed in confinement by King Minos, "floating” evocative of Icarus’s flight and fall, 
“without bottom” suggestive both of the groundlessness of flight and the abysmal deep of the 
ocean in which he fell, like so many enslaved people thrown or jumping overboard during the 
transatlantic slave trade, “that earth” that is the floorbed of the sea. The final line, “floating 
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without bottom in that earth” brings all of these images of air and sea back to the ground of the 
labyrinth, and the ground of history in which the story takes place. 
 Explicit war returns in the final section of Lucid Interval, in untitled poem “XXXVII,” in 
the opening stanza, “The notebooks are where the foot / soldiers are buried beneath / where the 
war is won.”217 Here, the earth is a grave in which what is buried is missing, in part because it 
has been transformed: “the flower yard you will have / to go down among and find / gone.” 
You are not kept up either. 
 
Grave out of which inspiration were 
to raise 
your figure is cast on that very field 
ground reverse and lives are opinion 
 
changes which do not occur in space.218 
 
By now the verb “to raise,” emphasized here by appearing in its own short line, evokes the act of 
raising a child, in addition to the growth of flowers and the raising of the dead. To cast one’s 
figure, as a shadow produced by the sun—raising, rising, or setting—is a temporal act, grounded 
in time and place. “Opinions,” i.e., interpretations, reflect or produce meaning, and “change” is a 
fact not easily recorded as a material one “in space,” though it has material consequences, as 
“opinion change,” as ideology shifts. Ideas, and ideology, shape the contours of the world as we 
imagine and experience it, motivating and justifying actions and outcomes within it. The image 
of Icarus, or of any of us escaping, “floating without bottom in that earth” is an image of a grave, 
but is also an image of renewal, where bottomless earth might be another name for the sky, or the 
sea, or the way matter cycles eternally between them. Poetic language registers these essential 
metamorphoses, while grounding them in words that register change at the social-historical level. 
                                                 
217Roberson, VCO, 49. 
 
218Roberson, VCO, 49. 
127 
 
If these poems foreground language as a force of history, the opening lena of the second 
section of Lucid Interval, untitled “I.,” foregrounds history itself, and its accounting—
announcing another major theme that develops over the course of Lucid Interval and into The 
Aerialist Narratives: 219 
because the final 
confessions of a coarse air 
bail the fire out 
we are innocent of adduction. 
 
taking the body down 
we thought was a solo for fuel. 
shoving it in for warmth 
we cracked 
 
our perpetual jar of things 
to a more  
naked jarring blast. 
the crimes wch you wear my body for 
 
I myself committed.220 
 
This poem sets up the series as one of historical accounting, beginning at the end—at “the final 
confessions”—as if the time of its composition is a looking back. Whose confession? Both the 
individual and the public collective are invoked by the pronouns “we,” “you,” and “I” circulating 
in the poem. Specifically, the pronouns move from the plural to the individual, marking a 
perceptual or scopic movement from the collective to the individual, from the world historical to 
the individual life account, necessarily imbricated in one another. 
The penultimate line and the closing monostitch return us to the language of confession 
that opens the poem: “the crimes wch you wear my body for / I myself committed.” And, as the 
opening poem of this section continues the sense of address to Lena (“you”) that the first section 
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set up for the book, these final lines reinforce the drama of generational address, and the double-
edged sword of inheritance: the future we look toward to redress the past carries that past with it, 
is another iteration of the past. The form reproduces itself. It is here that Daedalus enters the 
poem: the crimes wch you wear my body for / I myself committed.” 
There’s something here too about how, before becoming a parent, whatever confusion 
one had about one’s complicity in world history, is resolved in the externalization of matters that 
a child inaugurates: you literally see yourself in your child, see your form reproduced in their 
form—shaped by whatever common biological and/or social material you share. At the same 
time, you see the world that is not you perpetuated in that form—its history, culture, and 
ideology. The entanglement is impossible not to see. In an interview, Roberson offers: 
Underlying the first poem of “This Week’s Concerts” is a famous flamenco in which the 
father has been beaten up by the police for something the son has done. The son says, 
“The crimes which you killed my father for, I myself committed.” And I’m saying this 
here to my daughter.221 
 
Roberson’s variation on the intergenerational web of crime and punishment reveals his sense 
both of culpability and helplessness in his relation to his daughter, in the desire to pass on and 
protect.  
Returning to the beginning of the poem, we see immediately how it is multitasking 
various and variable meanings. In the opening stanza, “confessions” on the one hand refers to an 
individual sacrament of reconciliation—suggested by “final confessions”—and on the other to a 
legal statement that admits to a crime. This double sense offers a complication regarding 
historical accounts, complicity, and individual versus structural responsibility, as well as the 
ideologies of particular institutions—e.g., the Church, the Law, the Family. To what authority do 
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we turn in trying to reconcile histories of harm? When we name these acts—by calling them 
“crimes,” for example—what institutions of authority do we invoke?  
“Coarse air,” “bail,” “fire,” and “adduction” evoke a scene of earthly elements in conflict. 
The image of trying to put out a fire, as “coarse air” might be smoke or ash-filled air, and “bail” 
denotes scooping water, as on a sinking boat. At the same time, “bail out the fire” is syntactically 
rearranged as “bail the fire out,” introducing a crosswise image of another elemental disaster of a 
sinking boat or a burning house; while “adduction” produces an image of arms flapping, moving 
the air like a bellows, unavoidably stoking the fire while trying to escape by flight. With these 
senses of the words at hand, we may understand “the final confessions” to be recorded in the 
ashes the fire leaves behind. Those ashes pronounce one is both innocent and guilty of flaming 
the fire. The ashes of history tell the story, and disclose the crime. Such that one is compelled to 
ask, is it after-the-fact,222 after the fire is “bailed out,” that we come to face the past that is only 
available in the ashes of the event? But as we consider this possibility, other senses of these 
words come into play to complicate our reading, to complicate the story we are reading. 
“Bail out,” as a legal term that denotes temporary release while one awaits trial, suggests 
the crime we are charged with, submitting a confession of guilt or innocence that is determined 
ultimately by verdict, based on evidence and argument. “Adduction” as a derivative of “adduce,” 
meaning to cite evidence, supports the linguistic registering of legal court discourse. To be found 
innocent based on the citation of evidence suggests something like getting off on a technicality. 
Such that “the final / confessions of a coarse air” are as the testimony that determined the 
outcome of the trial, bailing out the defendant. But if the syntax of the lines suggests that the 
ashes of the fire bail the fire out, grant it temporary release, and postpone the trial that would 
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hold it accountable for its destruction, then it is by the fire’s temporary release that “we” are 
bailed out, saved from the accusation that we fanned the flames, released from confronting what 
we had to do with the fire, what role we had to play.   
“Bail out” as a colloquial phrase meaning to escape or jump ship is also brought into 
play: the fire bails out, jumps ship, fire putting itself out in water. Or is it that the ghost of that 
sense of “bail out” introduces the image of jumping into the scene—jumping out of the building 
to escape a home on fire, jumping overboard to escape enslavement, jumping out of the tower to 
fly on wings held together by wax, flapping one’s arms like a bellows. 
The first line of the second stanza—"taking the body down”—picks up on this image of 
jumping, falling, or flying—or what might otherwise be read as pushing, or fighting:  
taking the body down 
we thought was a solo for fuel. 
shoving it in for warmth 
we cracked223 
 
where “shoving it in” pictures “the body” as if a log of wood shoved into the fire, “cracked” 
echoing the sound of “crackling” wood. “Solo for fuel” is an enigmatic phrase, hard to make 
sense of. The image of flying a body down combined with the words “solo” and “fuel” evoke 
airplane flight, suggesting a landing to refuel, or a sudden plummet due to running out of fuel. 
“Solo’s” near homophone “silo” reinforces this image of a container or tank, while calling to 
mind its other senses of isolation on the one hand, and weaponry on the other. Or we might think 
of the fall of Icarus, where the “we” in the poem is as the “we” who are those on the ground—as, 
ostensibly, in the painting by Breughel—who are witnessing the flight of Daedalus and Icarus, 
those observers who took father and son for gods only to learn as Icarus fell that their flight was 
the precarious flight of human invention, not the god-given flight of birds, nor the superhuman 
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flight of gods. The other sense of “solo” as a musical term, resonating with the musical theme of 
the book and the title of this section, “This Week’s Concerts,” renders “the body” that of a 
musical instrument, the downward movement the body of the performer and their instrument 
might make as the musician bends over to hit the notes of their solo. Fuel then might be 
interpreted as breath—as in the image of a reed player straining against the breath running out in 
an ambitious solo, bending the body, taking it down, to squeeze out the last bit of breath fueling 
the sound. The last breath of wind that keeps Icarus in flight. In a recorded reading of the poem, 
Roberson pronounces the word “fuel” as “fool,” offering an aural hint at another register of 
meaning in the line, the sense of mistake that “we thought” suggests—we thought it was this, but 
we were wrong. We misinterpreted the meaning of the falling body. Is a flying body that falls 
free or unfree? Is Icarus falling or flying? 
This sense of strain is further developed in the “shoving” that opens the third line of the 
stanza, setting up the “crack” not as crackling wood but as shattering form: 
shoving it in for warmth 
we cracked 
 
our perpetual jar of things 
to a more  
naked jarring blast.224 
 
In the “perpetual jar of things,” which Andrew Welsh in his introduction to Voices Cast Out 
pictures as the ceramic pot made by and gifted to him by the poet, likening the “jar” to the book 
which is “given—first to the poet’s daughter, then to the rest of us—to look into, to wonder at, 
and to watch it fill with meaning”—the perpetualness of this jar suggests its capaciousness: a 
bottomless cup, and its infinite repetition, as yet another iteration of the form known as jar. But 
                                                 




the phrase also suggests the verb-sense of “to jar,” as in to shake, shock, jolt, strike. History as a 
perpetual jarring: “we cracked // our perpetual jar of things /to a more / naked jarring blast.”225 
Such that we are shown the double-sidedness of this word, “jar,” the inside and outside of this jar 
as a container of things that are jarring. There is a sense than that as we seek comfort—shoving it 
in for warmth—trying to shelter ourselves and our loved ones from the jarring blasts of violence 
that Roberson documents throughout this book, we fail to escape it,” and instead face “a more 
naked / jarring blast.” In the end, we have to confront the world, it will always catch up to us.226 
As jar transforms to jarring, our various senses of fire transform to explosion. House on 
fire, fire on board, and fire as fuel, to fire of explosion. The popping sound of a ceramic pot 
breaking in the kiln is evoked simultaneously with that of dynamite opening up the earth, bombs 
exploding in churches, missiles launched from aircraft—all of the jarring blasts that the 
historically expansive perspective of a “we” accounts for. The ways this poem opens the section, 
teaching us how to juggle these multiple narratives and images, multiple denotations, 
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connotations, and evocations, primes the reader for the narratives, images, and word play that 
unfolds through the proceeding pages of both Lucid Interval and The Aerialist Narratives. 
 I will close my discussion of Lucid Interval with one more poem from the series, a short 
lower poem from “This Week’s Concerts,” numbered “26”: 
The step, within itself         isn’t difficult 
a lake, at one point, 
of understandable stillness,       at full. 
 
The footprint on the water, filling. 
 
Often you don’t even notice the steps, 
that is that each 
is bridged by the falling body to the next, 
 
discontinuous through the ground. 227 
 
The image of water filling the depression made by a footprint—stepping through a flooding 
river, trying to make it across, the “flash flood” appears in the poem above to provide this 
context—acts as a metaphor for historical absences produced by the constant movement that 
history requires, the way that history is not a ground which records each step, but rather is 
continuously being covered over by flood waters, as we race across it, surviving. The “lake…of 
understandable stillness” recalls the first lower poem of the book, in which the poet speaks to his 
daughter, “If I am the lake you take your face from,” creating a connection between the lake as 
reflective surface and the lake as flooded earth, both images that recur throughout the series, 
iterations of “floating without bottom in that earth.”  
Icarus as Aerialist: The Aerialist Narratives 
 
 The second series of Voices Cast Out to Talk Us In leaves the ground of the labyrinth to 
consider the view from above in The Aerialist Narratives. The opening and title poem, “Aerialist 
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Narrative” which we considered at the beginning of this chapter, establishes a relationship 
between ground and air as one mediated by the hover-flier. The painting on the art studio floor 
and the escape of Icarus in the sky are both produced by an aerialist: a person in the air (the 
painter hovering above the canvas, Icarus flying), giving way to the aerialist as “any of us 
escaping,” where all routes are marked as an aerialist’s walk on a narrow string—whether the 
path one walks is on earth, water, air, or fire. 
 The second poem of the series, “Taking the Print,”228 which we also looked at above, 
begins with a reflection of the sun in the water to narrate the story of enslaved people escaping 
across the river at night, while the third poem, “Heading: The Landing”229 returns us to the air, to 
the view from an airplane approaching a runway, to tell a contemporary story about racism in 
America—"the country’s lies” and “the way a white // backs away in anger when you approach 
with directions / you’ve been asked.” This movement between the ground and the air and of 
figures that move between the two, the movement between being grounded and taking flight is a 
consistent dynamic of the book: “Whether the vengeful one were the ground or the sun.”230 We 
continue to ask: What is the difference between falling and flying? How does one discern it? 
IV. Waterfowl Landing: It Lifts to Close 
(for Ron) 
 
The hundred wings float down the furrowed air 
to the lake,    come in motionless as seed 
and make the surface bloom 
that way 
that drops of fattened summer rain 
open against the pavement 
tulips’ petals 
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like wings lift to close on landing231 
,      
The way birds lift their wings to soften their landing on the water, like rain drops exploding as 
they hit the ground, flying back up in to the air from which they fell, is an image that will repeat 
violently later in the book in “Heron Riddle Flashback,”232 as an image of the Birmingham 
church bombing where “little bird-leg children” explode like blossoming flowers,” 233 like “the 
surface bloom” of the waterfowl landing. Flying or falling then gives way to other ambiguities: 
landing or crashing, blooming or dying. The perception cannot resolve, because first one has to 
see it—and we haven’t seen it yet.  
Icarus returns in the second poem of the book, “Properties,” which begins with a 
perception of snow, or what Roberson calls in the opening stanza, “fallen sky,” turning brown: 
“it really looked / like a kind of earth.” Fallen sky becomes earth—the two collapsing into one 
another. The transformation of snow to earth, and then eventually to water, which will return to 
the sea, turn back into rain, and then to snow and ice again—what Roberson calls a “migration” 
of water across its many forms—the properties of a substance undergoing change. The image of 
a white-covered landscape moves it location from the north where it snows, to the antebellum 
South’s “plantations’ white glacial field” of cotton, and another migration, from south to north, 
“toward a north star     state to state / of matter.” Such that the word “properties” resounds its 
multiple meanings, related both to states of matter as well as that of ownership, and escaping 
ownership, objectification, material stasis: “how many migrations / has ice made home / to 
water?” 
                                                 
231Roberson, VCO, 81. 
 
232See my discussion of this poem in chapter one. 
 
233Roberson, VCO, 104. 
136 
 
Another thread in the poem emerges from the word “coins,” likewise spinning off 
multiple denotations: the coining of words, the coining of currency (recall my analysis of the 
word “specie” above), as well as stamping, pressing, printing (recalling “Taking the Print”) as 
acts of claim-making, naming, and commemoration—“spun tales.” Such that, again, words and 
images are story-tellers, carrying history like “genes—/ whatever,     ours, like water’s / is not 
material fatigue.” The persistence of surviving: “Up and down time after time / how many 
migrations / has ice made home to water?” : “state to state / of matter / pressed upon us / our 
material does not fail / the strict coinage.” Escape through transformation recalls the myth of the 
Flying Africans, brought here into relation to Icarus, in a set of lines that could be a commentary 
on the Breughel painting: 
the strict coinage       It would be different 
       if the investigation team had overlooked 
a piece of the wreckage in the staring face 
       of Icarus234 
 
I read these lines as an evocation of the scene of an airplane crash—the kinds of “wreckages” for 
which “investigation teams” show up to recover the debris and dead bodies, but the appearance 
of Icarus recalls a fact that Roberson may not have known, but that is impossible for me not to 
register here: the contested title and subject of Breughel’s painting that I described above. What 
if the interpreters who came after Brueghel’s untitled painting had not identified those white 
splashes as belonging to Icarus, had in turn not identified the scene as inspired by Ovid’s 
rendering of the myth? What meanings might the painting then produce? Perhaps in the poem 
Roberson is suggesting something similar about the different conclusions that follow evidence 
found, and evidence missing. If the escaping boy’s body were not recovered, would we know if 
Icarus was falling or flying?   
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 The final poem of The Aerialist Narratives, and thus of Voices Cast Out, returns us to the 
sun, shadows, and light in regards to reading the American landscape: 
XI. In Light of Dream 
 
the American is a peculiar light 
since then     the dark 
extending from its balconies 
really is 
 
the country’s shadow diving 
out of the way 
writhing to get King of out of the line of fire 
of that sun’s sight 
 
across the face 
of buildings           coast to coast 
 
a dial trying 
to set back that weight 
 
… something … 
or die away into the night lying.235 
 
The title plays with the double sense of “in light,” referring at once to the light that appears in 
dream, or even the light by which one dreams, and “in light of,” as in “in consideration of” 
dream. Further the title alludes to Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have A Dream” speech, as the 
central figure of the poem is revealed to be King’s assassination: his murder a shadow cast on the 
American landscape, “coast to coast.” Here the sun appears again as a figure of danger, as “the 
American” who watches from the balconies, casting a dark shadow that oversees King’s murder, 
while at the same time trying not to see it: “writhing to get King out of the line of fire / of that 
sun’s sight.” Here “sun’s sight” rhymes with the suggested “gun’s sight”—the lens through 
which the shooter takes aim. The aerial view of the balcony represents both King’s view from 
the balcony on which he was shot and fell, and the view from which shots are fired. The balcony 
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reminds us as well of Lincoln’s assassination, often read as another violent resistance to the 
struggle for black equality. The “peculiarity” of American light—which recalls the epithet for 
slavery: “that peculiar institution”—writhing to get out of the way of its sights, is an extension of 
the American propensity to lie (“the country’s lies”236), to deny, to want to turn back time in 
order to erase King’s murder, rather than to face its reality, “a dial trying / to set back that 
weight”—the long shadow of this event—King’s murder, American slavery—like the shadow of 
a sun dial that tells the time. It’s as if the poem is asking, “Do you know what time it is?” Or 
would you rather “die away into the night lying?” 
 The poem is only one of two center-justified poems in the book—each of the two is the 
eleventh and final poem of chapters two and three of The Aerialist Narratives. At the close of the 
second chapter, “Onze,” “eleven” in French and Portuguese, is a poem of pause, a temporary 
hold on violence, a break from the violence of history that the book has documented, hovering in 
silent waiting before the violence of “In Light of Dream” that closes the next and final chapter—
the quiet that comes over a cold place during a storm of heavy snow fall: 
XI. Onze 
 
Not birds touching down, 
no petals falling. 
 





Moon disintegrated in light, 
countless escape ships of invasion 
 
lands its image 
on each branch, each lawn, 
all the roads 
                                                 





closed.           Snow.237  
 
Here in the darkness of night, moonlight spreads over the landscape as stars light up the sky, 
painting the landscape with a story of “countless escape ships of invasion,” creating a syntactic 
and narrative confusion—are the ships vehicles of escape or invasion? Are they a means of flight 
or captivity? And with “all the roads closed,” what difference does it make, since they aren’t 
going anywhere? Is the snow a fallen earth or a cotton field? I think this moment of unresolved 
confusion, or dialectical relationship, is essential to Roberson’s poetics: to read by the light of 
Icarus might then be to learn how to hold these ambiguities at once. It is the sun that melts the 
wings’ wax, but we still aren’t sure if Icarus is flying or falling, floating without bottom in that 
earth. 
Daedalus as Mapmaker: The New Wing of the Labyrinth 
 
I have argued that the story of Icarus resonates with the story of American slavery as the 
story of black life in the “New World” and the treacherousness of the path to freedom we 
continue to pursue. If “trouble acts as a threshold,”238 Icarus’ flight is trouble that signals the 
narrow path of escape post-1968 liberatory tools must negotiate. As Susan Howe writes in her 
1993 study of American literary history, The Birth-mark, “Rungs between escape and enclosure 
are confusing and compelling.”239 We are often stuck inside the logic that traps us, even as we 
seek to escape it, because what other tools do we have but those that surround us in that trapped 
space? Icarus’s father, Daedalus is condemned to die in the maze of his own making. To escape 
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he could only make wings out of the fallen feathers of the birds around the island, could only 
bind them together with the wax at his disposal. Icarus’s wings are only held together by wax 
found within the maze, and they bring him down. We are warned to remember what our escape 
tools are made of and what their weaknesses are, to remember that the things we build to 
overcome our enemies can always be turned against ourselves, perhaps always are. We may say 
this about Language, too, and what we attempt to do with the language we are given, the 
language that we are given into, to see that it is only wax holding it together. As Eric Weinstein 
observes in his review of The New Wing of the Labyrinth, a later book to which I will turn below: 
“To be constantly searching for an exit from a maze that is constantly rebuilding and remodeling 
itself is a powerful metaphor for suffering diaspora in one’s own native land.”240 
But what if there are other lessons encoded in the Icarus myth that might point toward 
another out, “a lateral displacement,”241 as Mackey’s N. puts it in From a Broken Bottle, that 
might move us out of the binary rut between “trapped” and “free” in which we seem to be stuck? 
What if what the birds had to offer wasn’t their discarded feathers, which are no longer fit for 
flight, but their flight itself? The birds do not seek to escape the island, though they have the 
wings to do so—the wings that Daedalus thinks he needs in order to achieve freedom. What 
sustains the birds? Why is the island a home to them but a hell to Daedalus and Icarus? What if 
Daedalus dug below the island, rather than collecting materials at its surface. Might there be 
hidden resources (echo Wilson Harris242) buried beneath the earth that would offer an answer to 
the first question? What alternative tools do the birds flying above Crete offer? Could it be 
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possible that what Daedalus thought was a prison was actually a home? Here we might turn to 
the maroon colony and theories of fugitivity. If they could find a way to sustain that life, would it 
be a tragic or happy end? We’d have to revisit a lot of assumptions about what being trapped and 
what being free means. But that’s exactly where questions about language and culture and 
history lead us: destination out “begins with good-bye, wants to bid all givens good-bye.”243 
We would first need to take an account of our situation, understand our relationship to the 
signs and symbols that we read—in language, in landscape, in history—i.e., in the architectures 
of the imagination from which choice and action springs. We would need to be hover-fliers, 
taking to the skies above Crete not to escape the island but to study it, map its terrain. Eventually 
to return to earth, knowing whether, when, and where to dig. In his reading of The Aerialist 
Narratives, Joseph Donahue reminds us that Daedalus is a mapmaker: “In The Aerialist 
Narratives, images are coordinates. By them we know the confines of our prison. How else, the 
Daedalus in each of us might ask, could flight be possible? […] The poems in The Aerialist 
Narratives are consecrated to extremes of height and depth and distance, to all that Icarus, much 
to his dismay, discovered.”244 Like Daedalus, Roberson is a mapmaker, trying to make sense of 
what he sees as he moves through the world, trying to get a picture of the whole, taking note of 
how the map changes based on the position from which one views it.  
Daedalus’ labyrinth returns in Roberson’s 2009 book, The New Wing of The Labyrinth, a 
book that document the poet’s experience of suicidal depression. In this work, the labyrinth 
operates metaphorically as an architectural feature of the inner landscape of the depressive mind, 
as well as a perceptual structure through which the external world is viewed as a series of 
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potential sites of suicidal flight, and, as in all of his books, a historical landscape that holds both 
our individual and public stories at once. Daedalus’ tower is an observation tower, a point of 
departure for escape—whether by successful flight to life or death—such that the failure of flight 
and the failure of suicide are brought into an ambivalent relation to one another in The New 
Wing, registering more palpably the tenuousness hope one holds in potential paths of escape. 
Tyrone Williams, in his mini-review of the book, similarly observes: “As the title poem and 
cover photo suggests, this is a record of failure, a grounded Daedalus, a rescued Icarus. […] It is 
a riveting testimony to the price of not dying, to living on, for a while.”245 The images of flight in 
this book about depression, suicide, waking death, and impossible life are more embodied than 
Voices Cast Out, trained on the point of view that the final poem of The Aerialist Narratives 
leaves us with—from the balcony on which King is assassinated and falls. 
Crown observes that in Lucid Interval, “Many of the poems […] are concerned with the 
dangerously suspended or falling body as the forgotten condition and risk of any movement. A 
constituent element of every step, writing, or fragment is the body’s edging off into loss.”246 For 
Crown, however, the figure of falling, or the figure falling, is about language, and how loss of 
referentiality results from the historical amnesia of trauma:  
In Lucid Interval, the stepping (and thus falling) body is a figure for the steps and jumps 
of a sentence that has been commuted or fragmented. If there is no longer the possibility 
of straightforwardly referential language to refer to the traumatic historical past, the 
impact of that reference remains felt, precisely in the resistance of the sentence to 
conventional operations of metaphor and analogy. […] The key is to keep moving, to turn 
the falling into rising.247  
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In this view, fugitivity and deferral are methods of continuous movement enacted by the poetry, 
which in the terms of Crown’s metaphor, means to stand back up and keep one’s feet moving on 
the ground. Alternatively, I take up “hover-flying” as the image of turning “falling into rising” to 
mean literally rising into the air, not to fly away but to move in suspension above the ground in 
order to get the aerial view. 
Joseph Donahue offers, “We would be of the air again, we would return to ‘where we 
were.’ But first, our ignorance must end. First we must see and feel where we are. Exactly, the 
poet might say, ‘where we at.’ Then we must learn to walk through this world like a stone 
skipping across the water,”248 evoking the image and movement of “the skipping stone” that 
Roberson works out in poem “IV/4” of Lucid Interval and again in poem “IV” in the second 
chapter of The Aerialist Narratives—whose coincident numbering suggests narrative 
recursiveness or parallels. The refrain of the second poem, “the skipping stone stays out of the 
water,” is an image of survival—"The skipping stone stays out of the water / The standing up in 
the boat crossing / the Delaware”; “the skipping stone / stays out of the water / long enough to 
cross over”249 and the responsibility of the survivors to tell what is skipped over, i.e., left out of 
historical record: “an Osiris / the middle passage has brought home along  / what rivers deltas 
and mississippis mean to u.s. // But this is what is always skipped.”250 Roberson moves always 
upward to get the view from which the story can be told.  
In New Wing of the Labyrinth’s “Moving to Chicago and Exit from the Bardo,” for 
example, Roberson observes the visual difference between the view from the third floor and the 
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sixteenth-floor windows of a Chicago apartment building facing the lake—an occasion to 
meditate on the excesses of poetry, imagination and desire that both fuel our flight and lead to 
our “fall downwards to the world.” 
I should have taken the place with the blue line, 
with the blue line horizontally through the middle, 
 
the blue ellipsis,     extenuated line of sight 
to the other side of the lake held off 
 
by the curve of the earth,     the blue line 
of the water’s horizon 
 
through the windows of the place 
I should have taken. 
 
But my reaction was as always to that line, 
I wanted more,   which is to say over it, I wanted 
to see a higher floor.     Windows there 
 
also take in the city lights, though less 
simple sky lake. And this is how we always fall downwards 
to the world. This excess is, of course, the flight I take.251 
 
Observation, flight, and falling are the terms both of suicidal ideation and fugitive survival. In 
the poem “Violent Suicide,” Roberson meditates on how he has survived suicide by his training 
as a poet—by stopping to watch it happen, moving from actor to observer: “I was so surprised, I 
froze. I stopped / to watch it     so, it didn’t happen, so, I lived. / Observation was my practice so 
I live.”252 “Through.”253 Not to go through with it but to go through it, “without doing it.”254 
Roberson’s meditations on suicidal escape continually return to the earth. To go through the 
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ground, leave his skin there, in the damp moist earth: “He steps off / his shadow easily as // out 
of his skin; / the snake leaves what there is // of the dark beneath him / a waving track, // a 
writing, a signature.”255 If every flight returns us back to the ground beneath the labyrinth rather 
than away from the island, then Roberson commits to study it. The new wing of the labyrinth is 
an ambiguous proposition. Does it represent an ever-expanding maze, as Weinstein suggested, or 
a new way?  In a recent interview, Roberson comments, “The only way out of a labyrinth is up 
and over the wall, up into a different vista, a differently level of vistas. I often thought that you 
can build a new wing of a labyrinth, even an upper floor, but you can’t put any windows in it.”256 
For a poet for whom looking is essential, the windowless labyrinth is an apt metaphor for how 
the senses are dulled by depression. But there are still things to look at, to notice, and study, 
without leaving the labyrinth. New wing suggests an architectural extension, but also bird wing—
reminding us of the flight that is Daedalus’ original solution to the labyrinth. Perhaps the new 
wing points to a new form of flight—that of the hover-flier, whose purpose is to observe, study, 
and map the island—"to read” what nobody has been able or willing to read, “by the light of 
Icarus or any of us escaping.” 
 The work of Icarus as hover-flier and Daedalus as mapmaker to study the ever-expanding 
and contracting architecture of the labyrinth is refigured in Nathaniel Mackey’s epistolary novel, 
From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate as a response to the fugitive, asymptotic 
nature of transformative action. As I move into an analysis of Mackey’s asymptotic form and 
content, the tools with which we saw Roberson’s develop his historicopoetics will be instructive, 
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as we turn to contemporary work that is likewise concerned with improving our view of the 




CHAPTER THREE: INFINITE APPROACH: NATHANIEL MACKEY’S 





In this chapter, I build off Adalaide Morris’s reading of the asymptote in Mackey’s 
work257 as a figure of improvisation, discrepant engagement, and “generative ongoingness.” In 
her 2000 article on H.D. and Mackey,258 Morris takes up the mathematical figures that appear in 
both of the poets’ work—H.D.’s angle of incidence and Mackey’s asymptote. Morris frames her 
analysis in terms of a larger argument for a third way between “high modernism” and 
“poststructural postmodernism” that she calls “radical modernism” in which she places the poets 
of Mackey’s lineage—Stein, Williams, Pound, H.D., Duncan, et al. Morris frames her analysis in 
terms of a larger argument for a third way between “high modernism” and “poststructural 
postmodernism,” a third way that she calls “radical modernism” in which she places the poets of 
Mackey’s lineage. Consistent with consensus accounts of literary history, Morris characterizes 
high modernism as stuck in a search for capital-T Truth, ruled by a vision of wholeness that has 
been disrupted but nonetheless may be recovered; while postmodernism, assuming the world’s 
fundamentally fractured state, is chaotic, random, and constructionist. By contrast, Morris 
argues, “radical modernism” doesn’t give up on the world, as broken as it is, instead “insisting 
on a fit—albeit…a ‘rickety, imperfect fit, a ‘discrepant engagement’—between word and 
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world.”259 While Morris is keen to disavow “poststructuralist” postmodernism, her analysis of 
Mackey’s poetics, particularly through her reading of Djbot Baghostus’s Run highlights all the 
hallmarks of poststructuralist thought of the period: deferral,260 deconstruction,261 multiplicity,262 
and the rejection of binary oppositions.263 Yet Morris’s characterization of Mackey’s poetics as 
“a practice of extravagant, open-ended meaning-making”264 sounds squarely postmodern to my 
ear. To some degree, this discrepancy is historically-produced. If in the late twentieth century, 
the dominant version of postmodernism in the academy was flat, chaotic and random, then 
Morris’s rejection of that term makes sense. However, in the twenty-first century, 
“postmodernism” is a historical movement that we look back upon as a multifaceted 
phenomenon caught up in the pressures and struggles of its moment. Mackey shares Morris’s 
allergy to dominant “poststructural postmodernist” discourse, often poking fun at it. For 
example, in From a Broken Bottle, N. writes of the band’s first of many name changes: “We 
thought ‘Deconstructive Woodwind Chorus’ sounded maybe a little stilted, Euro-cerebral or 
(The word Penguin, our oboe player, uses) ‘deracinated,’ so we called ourselves the East Bay 
Dread Ensemble.”265 Any history of the post-1968 period involves documenting a good deal of 
such mocking. 
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In a Q&A session at the recent 2018 Contradictions conference at Duke University, 
Slavoj Žižek, in a passing comment, joked about a common tendency of the period, noting how 
book titles in the 1980s, instead of being called, as was the previous convention, “Aesthetic 
Theory,” for example, began to appear in the form, “Notes Toward an Aesthetic Theory.”266 
While Žižek’s poking fun at this trend may be an expression of his own methodological 
commitments, if not symptomatic of an intellectual and cultural divide within post-1968 
academia that he is squarely on one side of, such laughter nevertheless directs us to look 
backward at this moment with a critical distance, calling us to reconsider what happened and 
why, and what it means now.  
Looking back at academic publishing in the 1970s-90s, and at the larger social and 
intellectual culture of which academia is a part, one perceives how the development of the post-
structuralist philosophies of Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida, et al, as they appeared in the U.S. 
academy, was a direct response to a crisis in meaning and knowledge. This crisis seemed 
particularly caught up in issues of linguistic and visual representation, as language and image 
became ever-more consolidated tools of manipulation by corporations and politicians via various 
forms of advertisement—the commodification of representation itself—a la Guy Debord’s 
“society of the spectacle” 267—on its way to final realization, or reification. That is, the 
failures—both real and imagined—of the revolutions of the 1960s were marked not only by 
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conservative backlash but also by what proved to be the unstoppable triumph of spectacle. 268 In 
response, the new attack from the left was to push back against appearance sold as Truth in the 
form of impenetrable surfaces of meaning. A title like “Aesthetic Theory” would appear to be 
selling itself as transparent singular Truth, laying the competitors to rest—Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi: 
there can be only one. Such that “Notes Toward an Aesthetic Theory” is meant to wake us up 
from the delirium of the spectacle, to remind us that there are always other possibilities, we need 
not blindly accept the world as-it-is, or as-it-is-sold-to-us. “Notes” suggests this text is not 
conclusive but only a beginning draft269; “toward” suggests the book offers no final judgment to 
rest on but only a series of trials that keep us moving away from what is; and, “an” reminds us 
that there are always alternatives, this is just one option among many, and that truth is multiple 
and mutable. The emphasis on incompletion announces that contingency and historical 
particularity are always at play, reminding us that we are in historical relation, not at history’s 
end.  
  At the same time that “Notes Toward an X” appears in the work of post-structuralist 
theorists at whom I think Žižek is taking aim, it consistently appears in other discourses of the 
period as well. To give a few brief examples: the New Historicists developed historical 
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methodologies that countered grand narratives and universal truths that would suggest the 
infinitely meaningful impact of local events, while in the Caribbean, Édouard Glissant’s theories 
of particularity, opacity, and errancy showed how a non-totalizing philosophy of totality is 
essential to any account of the world that recognizes the long history of racialized oppression in 
the New World. Cultural Marxists meanwhile developed a form of never-finished dialectical 
analysis to systemically critique world-capitalist ideology while Third-wave feminism argued for 
the constructedness of gender such that identity is perpetually deferred by the flux of 
contingency and re-signification. “Notes Toward an X” further expresses recognition of the 
incompleteness of identity characteristic of the experience of minoritarian subjects.270 In 
Mackey’s most-cited critical essay, “Other: From Noun to Verb” (first published in 1992), 
Mackey articulates a theory of artistic othering, distinguished from social othering, as “a practice 
of the former by people subjected to the latter,”271 which emphasizes the productive ongoingness 
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‘fixed.’” In “The Case of Blackness,” Moten writes, “What is inadequate to blackness is already 
given ontologies. The lived experienced of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand 
for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence, a paraontology whose comportment will 
have been (toward) the ontic or existential field of things and events. That ontology will have 
had to have operated as a general critique of calculation even as it gathers diaspora as an open 
set—or as an openness disruptive of the very idea of set—of accumulative and unaccumulable 
differences, differings, departures without origin, leavings that continually defy the natal 
occasion in general even as they constantly bespeak the previous. This is a Nathaniel Mackey 
formulation whose full implications will have never been fully explorable. What Fanon’s 
pathological refusal of blackness leaves unclaimed is an irremediable homelessness common to 
the colonized, the enslaved, and the enclosed.” Moten adds a footnote: “For more on the relation 
between evasive perviousness and unavailable natality, consult Mackey’s multivolume epic 
From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate, especially the first installment, Bedouin 




of the gerund—from noun to verb—in black artistic production, particularly “black linguistic and 
musical practices that accent variance, variability—what reggae musicians call ‘versioning.’” 
Mackey argues: 
Such othering practices implicitly react against and reflect critically upon the different 
sort of othering to which their practitioners, denied agency in a society by which they’re 
designated other, have been subjected. The black speaker, writer, or musician whose 
practice privileges variation subjects the fixed equations which underwrite that denial 
(including the idea of fixity itself) to an alternative.272 
 
Nouns—fixed identities—are “subjected” (meta-articulated in that turn of phrase) to an undoing 
of fixity by the gerund “other-ing,” made variable and undetermined, always in process.273 
Mackey is engaged here with a “Notes Toward an X” imperative that defined these various 
critical discourses in the 1970s-90s. 
I place Mackey’s asymptotic poetics within this historical moment at which making 
declarative statements, reaching definitive conclusions, theorizing a totality of enclosure and 
positing universalizing notions of completeness, were inclinations to resist. Through close 
readings of Mackey’s ongoing serial work, From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still 
                                                 
272Mackey, DE, 265.  
 
273 Kress, “Middle Voice Moves,” 765; Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 581, 585. Kress builds off 
of Mackey’s (and Amiri Baraka’s) work to argue that Djbot Baghostus’s Run is characterized by 
“verb-thinking,” a linguistic practice “that runs verb-ing away from stabilizing relations to either 
subject or object—a way of verb-ing in which the verb speaks for itself, a way that uncovers a 
verb’s lost voice,” what Kress identifies as “the middle voice,” a verb tense historically lost in 
the English language that is suggestive of Mackey’s asymptotic poetics. “[T]he middle voice 
speaks neither of grasping nor resistance or (complete) escape, but of performance, flight, and 
motion.” In Edwards’ analysis of Mackey’s serial poems, he similarly observes: “A deep 
questioning of the modes of subjectivity itself is embedded in the syntax. Subject and object are 
commonly refracted to the point of what Mackey later terms ‘vatic scat’—but we might has as 
easily call his mode ‘phatic scat,’ to mark its resistance to the declarative, its avoidance of the 
simplest pronoun, its erosion of the subjective through obliquity. […] Note how few sentences in 
School of Udhra commence with the proposition of a subject. Almost always the attack is 
edgewise and edgy, as Mackey might put it, out from the unsettled anchor of a qualified object, 
sometimes without any subject/verb resolution at all.” Edwards calls this a “rich tense” 
characterized by “perpetual erosion and conditionality.” 
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Emanate, alongside readings of his critical essays and poetry, I draw out Mackey’s counter-
inclination toward multiplicity, incompleteness and (im)possibility as paradigmatic of a 
generation of poets working in the post-1968 U.S. liberatory tradition. My own analysis of 
Mackey’s asymptotic method moves itself along two axes, between macroanalysis at the level of 
theme and narrative form to microanalysis at level of the word and the sentence. While the 
novel’s form is asymptotic in its commitment to grammatical ongoingness, its thematic content is 
similarly invested in multiplicity and openness as guiding principles of social, political, and 
theoretical practices that counter the individualist and closed practices of the dominant ideology, 
or what Mackey otherwise refers to as “ideologies of dominance.”  
The phrase “ideologies of dominance” appears in a 1983 paper presented at “A 
Symposium of the Whole: Towards a Human Poetics” at USC, titled, “On Edge,” in which 
Mackey writes, “We cannot even begin to talk about the whole without observing that ideologies 
of dominance cuts us up and cuts us off.”274 Mackey’s turn of phrase, “ideologies of dominance” 
offers a more to-the-point alternative to “dominant ideology” when talking about ruling class 
ideology, as it describes what the ideology does from its dominant position: it dominates. Are all 
dominant ideologies, ideologies of dominance? We might say that the very choice, or necessity, 
of the word “dominant” to describe the hegemonic position already carries with(in) it the 
ideology of dominance; and in that sense, the language of dominance infuses the phrase 
“dominant ideology,” and the ideas or concepts, and the state of affairs, it communicates. One of 
the functions or effects of domination is that it “cuts us up and cuts us off.” In this lecture, 
Mackey argues that ideologies of dominance are at work in this way in language itself, quoting 
                                                 
274Mackey, DE, 262. 
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Blanchot, that “to stay within language is always to be already outside,”275 which I take to mean 
that language is a necessarily alienating system of identification that signifies cultural meaning 
beyond what we might otherwise hope to communicate with it, i.e., ideology speaks through the 
language we use, speaks through us. The language that circulates inside our thoughts and mouths 
carries with it the cultural outside that precedes us. Lacan called this “the cut” of language, a 
necessary inauguration into a history of cultural forces that determines the contours of our 
imagination before we have a chance to think or feel or experience the world otherwise. If 
“inside” suggests the comforts of “home,” a place of one’s “own,” language’s necessary 
outsideness disrupts and displaces that sense of home. Provoked by Edmond Jabé’s suggestion in 
his talk at the same conference that “there is something particularly tragic about Aime Césaire  
and Leopold Senghor writing in French rather than, presumably, an African language, a language 
‘of their own,’” Mackey insists: “If language is the subversive, unsettling force, the engine of 
displacement [Césaire] tells us it is, then none of us are at home in it and certainly no one owns 
it.”276 That is, if we are going to talk about the relationship between language and identity in 
relation to the European colonization of the New World, we shouldn’t valorize any so-called 
“native” or “native-born” language as somehow preceding culture and its effects, especially if we 
are going to talk about the potential of language to subvert cultural forces. 
The social world of the novel’s background emerges as one concerned with how 
ideologies of dominance maintain their supremacy: the role of consumer culture in projecting 
and reproducing hegemony, revisionary histories that weaken the revolutionary imagination, and 
a cultivated inability to read or interpret critically. On the more personal and existential plane, 
                                                 
275Mackey, DE, 263. 
 
276Mackey, DE, 262. 
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the book moves against a background in which love is involved in loss, and an ostensibly-
essential human desire for connection and connectivity is haunted by a sense of the impossibility 
of connection. In short, the book appears to be written against a background of great skepticism 
and dismay, but it doesn’t rest there: If what we desire is impossible, then we must invest in the 
impossible. In this formulation, possibility is merely a reflection of dominant ideology, 
conventional truth, and status quo reality: What is considered possible is measured by reasonable 
expectation based on evidence of past success. By contrast, to invest in impossibility requires the 
imagination to think outside of the given. Transformative action is fueled by impossibility.277 




                                                 
277This sense of possibility as impossibility is one that I associate with Emily Dickinson’s “I 
dwell in Possibility,” which connotes the potential of the not-known, locates not-knowing as the 
place of possibility as an investment in the impossible. As Dickinson’s “dwelling” defies the 
noun-form—house—as a closed structure by invoking its verb-form—to think, speak, or write at 
length about something—which lends itself to another iteration of dwelling in possibility: the 
serial work. The serial work as a dwelling structure for a work of literature has no clear 
beginning nor end, no boundaries, and no limits: “More numerous of Windows – / Superior – for 
Doors – // Of Chambers as the Cedars – / Impregnable of eye – / And for an everlasting Roof / 
The Gambrels of the Sky –.” Everything enters, passes through. From a Broken Bottle will not 
end. 
 
278Kress, “Middle Voice Moves,” 771; Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 581.“Fugitivity” is the term 
often invoked to express the political-aesthetic strategy available in the face of impossibility, 
when there is no apparent way out. Various inflections of fugitivity appear in the scholarship on 
Mackey’s work. Kress plays with the word “jam(ming)”—“that of the jam session and that of 
interfering with the smooth functioning of a machine”—to suggest that the middle voice verb-ing 
sense of “jamming-with” “uncovers the jamming of what is jammed—speaks simultaneously of 
an agency effected from within jamming and of the need to take note of the impossibility of 
escape from power.” Edwards offers: “Even as motion is troubled and rhetoric falls back on 
itself, the repeated refrain in the Song reminds us that the voices do go on, against all odds, 
finding a way out of no way.” 
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From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanates’ Asymptotic Poetics 
 
From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate is an ongoing, as in not-yet and 
ostensibly never finished, epistolary novel. Between 1986-2017, five volumes have been 
published—Bedouin Hornbook (1983), Djbot Baghostus’s Run (1993), Atet A.D. (2001), Bass 
Cathedral (2008), and Late Arcade (2017)—with a sixth on the horizon. The barest description 
of the book is that its protagonist N. is engaged in a correspondence of letters with an addressee 
known to us only as “Angel of Dust,” whose half of the correspondence is alluded to but never 
disclosed. In his letters, dated 1978-1984 (so far), N. describes and reflects on his experience 
composing and playing music with his L.A.-based experimental jazz band (variously named The 
Deconstructive Woodwind Chorus, The East Bay Dread Ensemble, The Mystic Horn Society, 
and Molimo m'Atet). Though the novel does not have a plot in the conventional sense, many 
things happen in this book, as N. recounts the band’s gigs up and down the west coast, band 
rehearsals, and the process of composing music and writing, as well as his experience of occult 
encounters, run-ins with the law, hospitalization, and cultural historical events. Much of the 
action, however, is in N.’s head, in the dynamic movement of his thought, as he reflects on 
themes related to music, language, culture, love, sex, world history, and myth; as well as the 
events of personal daily life—relationships, illness, dreams, and various encounters ranging from 
the mundane to the mystical. The action is also located on the page, in Mackey’s distinctive 
writing style that is dynamic, circumambulating, and endlessly self-reflective. 
In order to discuss the asymptotic aesthetic that I will argue structures Mackey’s novel 
both thematically and formally, I will begin with a brief introduction to the asymptote, 
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highlighting that aspect of the Calculus that Mackey mines for its metaphorical richness: the 
limit.279 
The asymptote—a mathematical figure defined as a line, as one would plot on an 
algebraic x-y grid, that a given curve infinitely approaches but never meets—is a recurring and 
structuring figure of Mackey’s poetics most explicitly articulated in his serial novel.280 
 
 
Figure 6 – Horizontal and Vertical Asymptotes 
The asymptote is visual expression of a function, which is a kind of factory that receives inputs 
that run through a given algebraic equation each producing distinct outputs. In the graphic below 
for the function f(x)=1/x, for example, as the inputs grow smaller and smaller on the x-axis, 
                                                 
279I base my explanations on a layman’s understanding of the Calculus. The complexities of this 
history, and of the mathematics itself, lays outside my own critical ability to understand or distill 
but I have picked up on those aspects of the mathematics that resonate with Mackey’s poetic 
inclination toward the figure of the asymptote. 
 
280 Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 572. While mathematics is not a subject of his essay, Edwards 
opens his “Notes on Poetics Regarding Mackey’s Song” with the claim that Mackey’s work 
builds off Louise Zukofsky’s “oft-repeated dictum that ‘poetry may be defined as an order of 
words that as movement and tone (rhythm and pitch) approaches in varying degrees the wordless 
art of music as a kind of mathematical limit.” Reminding us that the discourse of mathematics 
has had a long life in the aesthetic discourse of music, while the discourse of music has had a 
long life in the aesthetic discourse of poetry. Much work, in addition to Hayes, has attended to 
the role of music in Mackey’s writing, both formally and thematically. The Zukofsky line 
suggests that we could approach Mackey’s interest in mathematics through his engagement with 
music. At the same time, personal conversations with Mackey suggest that his interest in 
mathematics began in the mathematics classroom—math on its own terms. Nonetheless the 
intersection at which mathematics, music, and poetry meet historically would be a productive 
one to study in relation to Mackey’s poetics. 
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approaching zero (the y axis), the function produces infinitely larger and larger numbers, while 
as the inputs grow larger and larger on the x-axis, the function produces smaller and smaller 
numbers, which infinitely approach zero but never reach it. 
 
Figure 7 – Horizontal and Vertical Asymptotes on XY-Grid 
The concept of “infinite approach” is metaphorically rich for many of the problems of 
philosophy, theory, and poetics (among other disciplines of knowledge and types of human 
experience) of the late twentieth century, which is particularly concerned with limits: the limits 
of knowledge as rational and absolute after existentialism, the limits of language as a signifying 
system after post-structural critique, the limits of political action in the face of global hegemony, 
the limits of poetry to transform the imagination in a society of spectacle. 
If the curve of any mathematical function f(x)—a formula or rule which processes inputs 
to produce outputs—approaches a line that signifies the limit of that function—an output that the 
function tends toward but infinitely approaches; then, by analogy, we might say that grammars 
are formulas, in which words are input to produce significations that infinitely approach 
meaningfulness. Language is supposed to signify or index the world that it is in relation to, yet 
words themselves only ever approximate fulfilling this function: there is always a gap. Words 
never quite signify as precisely as they are supposed to: there are holes in which other meanings 
rush in, or intended meanings rush out. Divisibility as a characteristic of rational numbers is 
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analogous to rationality as a characteristic of human thought that is likewise divisible into 
calculable parts. The discipline of linguistics would confirm that language, as a medium of 
communication, is made of discrete units—the phoneme, the syllable, the word, and so forth, 
leading in the twentieth century to the same problems that faced physicists and linguists alike—
there is always something smaller than an atom, than a phoneme; there is always something that 
contradicts the formula: the quantum, the chora, ghostly ongoingness.281  
The asymptote itself is a convenient figure for this widespread phenomenon, as its 
abstraction as a mathematical concept and its visual representation makes its use flexible and its 
meaning graspable (despite the ungraspability of infinitude), unifying diverse fields of concern, 
agitation, or enthusiasm: the limit can be interpreted as an unsolvable problem or as a symbol of 
infinite possibility. In the Calculus, the limit at an asymptote is unreachable, the function moving 
toward an absence, an unrepresentable reality, a supreme fiction. Only by committing to 
impossibility is the world the Calculus imagines possible. Mackey’s poetics is invested in the 
impossible in just this sense: to say anyway what can’t be said, to think anyway what can’t be 
thought.282 
                                                 
281 Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 573. Edwards focuses on Mackey’s interest in limits in terms of 
the relation between music/sound and language: “In the poetry, the fiction, and the criticism, we 
consistently encounter examples of music straining towards speech, or embodying noise at the 
edges of articulate expression. Indeed, the convergence between a writing so obsessed by sound 
and music so drawn to speech might be best understood as a common concern with the limits of 
voice—its inception, its exhaustion. [. . .] Taking voice as a kind of prism to focus this 
convergence, it should be clear why issues of transcription, the ways the voice is ‘troubled’ in 
crossing over between media, seem to attract the most critical energy in Mackey’s work. Such 
trouble marks the ‘limits of sayable’; it indicates an insufficiency or dispossession native to 
language itself.” 
 
282Reed, Freedom Time, 22. In this formulation, I share in Anthony Reed’s taking up of the 
“slogan for experimental writing”: “saying the impossible”—which he derives from Robert 
Hayden’s comment that poetry is “the art of saying the impossible.” Reed writes: “The possible 
is a codification of the present and a calculation based on present knowledge that figures the 
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The asymptote is a figure for pushing at the limits of possibility, even as it continues to 
elude your approach: the limit you push toward is always moving farther away from your 
advances.283 Images and concepts of reaching and grasping, of reachability and graspability, are 
ever-present in From a Broken Bottle (and Mackey’s larger body of work) while every aspect of 
its form and structure—its neverfinishedness as an ongoing serial work; its epistolary form; its 
dialectic sentence structures; its multiplicative work with words—is pushing at the limits of 
language’s signifying function. Not in order to say or suggest that signification doesn’t work—
                                                                                                                                                             
future as a future present. To ‘say the impossible”’ is to produce a statement that interfere with 
the existing forms of thinking and knowing in a given moment. Experimental texts differ in and 
defer their own legibility, flaunting racial and literary conventions to produce sentences not yet 
heard before. Black experimental writing’s dense textual surfaces and surplus of meanings 
disrupt a politics of expression, stressing the contingent, textual nature of race and the different 
simultaneous meanings it can have or not have. It inscribes itself in the margins of the possible, 
invoking a now at once out of reach and immanent in the present, producing and destabilizing its 
own contexts for meaning.” 
 
283Huehls, Qualified Hope, 129. “In his interpretation of Wilson Harris’s Palace of the Peacock, 
Mackey notes that the crisis of representation—whether it be manifest as music’s attempt to 
represent heaven or prose’s attempt to represent music—requires that all assertion immediately 
qualify itself: ‘This is the ongoingness of an attempt that fails but is repeatedly undertaken to 
insist that what it fails to capture nonetheless exists.’ Here, the ‘ongoingness of the attempt’ 
distinguishes this process from the asymptotically limited trajectories of uncanny return and 
future-directed desire. Whereas asymptotes emerge whenever time is treated as an object or 
space that cannot be reached, these ‘repeated undertakings’ suggest a temporalized process that 
successfully personifies its goals. In his letters N. frequently describes such ongoing attempts to 
achieve wholeness and completion as ‘curves of articulation.’ As I have already discussed, the 
curve manages to move forward precisely to the extent that the cut makes wholeness 
unachievable and produces a temporalized qualification that resists the logic of contradiction, 
opposition, or negation. Mackey achieves the same effect in his prose, as the necessarily 
syntagmatic trajectory of each sentence ensures that no amount of qualification will keep the 
sentences from reaching their goal, while the qualifications ensure that the arrow never reaches 





i.e., limit as failure—but to draw out its asymptotic nature, which moves toward impossibility—
that is: limit as imaginative possibility.284  
If signification’s destination is not a dead end, but rather its destination is “out” of the 
system itself, then its limit is a boundary worth approaching, indefinitely. “Out” as a destination 
is both a poetic and political concept of Mackey’s that will be central to my discussion, as well 
as to our understanding of the asymptote to which I will return later. For now, we can think of 
“out” as what lies outside the given, outside the possible; mathematically, “out” is what lies 
outside the set, toward the infinity that Calculus brings into representable existence: off the 
Cartesian planes.285 
                                                 
284Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 572. Edwards frames his discussion of Mackey’s poetics within 
a larger field of black creative expression in literature and music, which he characterizes as 
driven by “an aesthetic imperative to test and break the limits of what can be said.” “This is not a 
poetics of transcendence, however,” he argues. “It is an inherently self-reflexive mode which is 
not unrelated to Mackey’s own description of Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s second trilogy, in 
that it ‘both announces the emergence of a new language and acknowledges the impediments to 
its emergence, going so far as to advance impediment as a constituent of the language’s 
newness.’” 
 
285Hreha and Hreha, “Nathaniel Mackey’s ‘Bedouin Hornbook,’” 328. “As a sort of 
philosophical justification for the departure from Western musical systemization, N. moves from 
an in-depth discussion of the impossibility of charting Moorish musical modes with Western 
scales to a techno-philosophical quote from the book Sound and Symbol: Music and the External 
World by Victor Zuckerkandl, which he relates to Sun Ra’s Space is the Place. […] N’s 
argument against a Cartesian concept of space (‘an oversimplified grid constituted by eye-based 
discriminations’) calls for a revamping on ‘imprecision.’ He implies that imprecision, by 
worrying of the precise—and therefore the structure that fix it—is actually more specific than the 
precise. The deconstruction of the oversimplified grid of Western musicology gives way to a 
need for a new musical theory (Moorish modes?) that cedes to Jude Tyson’s exhortation ‘There’s 
no limit to the things that you can do. ‘Space is the Place’ replaces places (defined by set 
boundaries, physical limits that are imposed from the outside) with space (defined by unfixed 
boundaries—the limit is derived from which it limits) verbally and musically. The overlapping 
voices with varied pitches which are arranged as a non-Cartesian round and the ‘doppleresque’ 
space organ, alongside the rest of the ensemble, create a nomadic soundscape with a centerless 




In From a Broken Bottle, the asymptote, the infinitely approached limit, points infinitely 
in one direction toward despair and in the other direction toward possibility. Which is it? Stuck 
in a binary relation, neither despair nor possibility (i.e., hope) will suffice. The impossibility of 
out—for example, escaping the binary relation—will have to be enacted somehow. The novel’s 
answer is to keep going—to reach toward conclusion without landing there. If there is an end to 
the novel, it is no end in sight, as it stretches before us infinitely and eternally: out. Will Mackey 
continue writing after he has left the earth? Outside the frame of the grid, outside the boundaries 
of perceptible, graphable space, into outer space?  
The mathematical limit, from which the asymptote derives, is a foundational concept for 
the modern Calculus. The story of the Calculus is itself a story about approaching limits, its 
themes resonating asymptotically with the themes of From a Broken Bottle. The language of the 
two stories, the naming they accumulate, brings them into a thematic, if not mathematical 
relationship.  
“Calculus” is Latin for “small pebble,” as in pebbles used for counting.286 Leibniz gave 
“the Calculus” its name, while Newton called it “the science of fluxions.” The Calculus has been 
                                                 
286Mackey, PH, 42-45. Resonance: Mackey on Kamau Brathwaite’s pebbles in Islands: 
“Brathwaite’s work both announces the emergence of a new language and acknowledges the 
impediments to its emergence, going as far as to advance impediment as a constituent of the 
language’s newness. This is one of the most distinctive features of the writing that Islands 
announces and inaugurates. The sense of an initiation into new orders of speech is in part what 
Brathwaite’s repeated references to pebbles imply, calling to mind the practice of speaking with 
pebbles in the mouth to improve pronunciation. [. . .] In the Caribbean, of course, the notion of 
linguistic propriety is marked by colonialism and cultural domination, rooted in imposed, 
metropolitan models and canons that obstruct and delegitimate alternate modes of speech, the 
very modes Brathwaite is committed to advancing. The pebble signifies the diminishment and 
denigration of those alternate modes by a colonizing norm, by the biases intrinsic to imperial 
notions of propriety and improvement. It also signifies a resistance to so-called proper speech, a 
resistance that in Brathwaite’s case is not, as in the conventional model of improvement, to be 
overcome, but rather encouraged, cultivated, carried farther. […] The pebble is characterized in 
part by what it’s up against, larger figures in stone that impede its emergence. […] His “return to 
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defined as “the mathematical study of continuous change,” known historically as “the calculus of 
infinitesimals.” In the eighteenth century, Bishop Berkeley called infinitesimals “the ghosts of 
departed quantities.” In later developments, “limit” supersedes “infinitesimals,” which is the 
word we use today to describe and account for the problem of infinity in relation to a 
mathematical understanding of the ostensibly calculable world. A problem that is not new 
(consider Zeno’s paradox,287 for example, from the fifth century BC) but that takes on new 
significance in the period of European Enlightenment when mathematics joins with the other 
disciplines in the pursuit of a scientifically objective representation of the world.288 
One of the most famous stories, and mysteries, of the Calculus is that Newton and 
Leibniz independently and concurrently “discovered” it in the seventeenth century. 
Melodramatically, it took some time for this conclusion to be reached, after reportedly petty 
                                                                                                                                                             
the pebble” primarily alerts us to the monumentality of language itself, the role played by notions 
of a stable, standard English in the maintenance of metropolitan norms. Returning to the smallest 
particles of language, syllables and letters, he assaults the apparent solidity and integrity of 
words, destabilizing them (showing them to be intrinsically unstable) by emphasizing the points 
at which they break, disassembling them and reassembling them in alternate spellings and 
neologistic coinages.” 
 
287The most widely circulated of Zeno’s paradoxes is derived from his “dichotomy paradox,” and 
goes something like this: To reach the other side of a room, you must first get halfway there. But 
before you can get halfway there, you must get one quarter of the way there. Yet before that, you 
have to get one-eighth of the way; and before that, one-sixteenth; and so on, continuing to divide 
the distance in half. But because every number can always be divided again, infinitely, you can 
never calculate the distance of the first step, and therefore you cannot move. The paradox is 
sometimes told in reverse, and goes like this: It seems logically true to state that to reach the 
other side of the room, you must first reach the point at which the distance is cut in half. So, go 
ahead and move halfway to the other side. Then, divide the remaining distance in half, and move 
that distance. Then divide the remaining distance in half and move that distance. This operation 
should, it seems, deliver you to your destination. However, as you continue dividing the 
remaining distance in half, you find you never quite reach the other side, as you move in 
infinitely smaller divisions of space. Both versions end in impossibility—the first in the 
impossibility of motion itself, and the second in the impossibility of getting anywhere. 
 
288Berlinski, A Tour of the Calculus, 9-10. 
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battles over who stole whose ideas ran their course—Newton accused Leibniz of plagiarism, and 
so forth. As far as the history of sciences goes, it stands out as an oddity that had to be conceded, 
that two mathematicians unaware of one another’s works, one in England and the other in 
Germany, made the same monumental discovery that would set the course for modern 
mathematics. What does it mean? Is this coincidence a sign of a collective consciousness? Or 
evidence of the cross-cultural roots spreading out across boundaries of sovereign national 
tradition, reminding us, as Wilson Harris does, that it is more notable that we have been 
persuaded not to recognize these shared roots than that they should from time to time become 
impossible to ignore?289 
The mathematical story of the Calculus and the limit centers around two key problems to 
which the Calculus supplied a solution: neither instantaneous speed nor the area under a curve 
appeared to be calculable. While these values could be approximated, they remained infinitely 
out of the reach of mathematical representation. First was the problem of “instantaneous speed,” 
a phrase which itself expresses a logical contradiction. Since speed is a ratio describing changes 
in space and time—distance traveled over time elapsed—you can never know how “fast” 
something is moving at one particular place or time, at one instant.290 Instantaneousness implies 
a moment at which nothing is changing. The function change-in-distance divided by change-in-
time always ever produces averages, a general description of how a thing moves. But the 
particularity of the present falls necessarily out of that equation—as soon as the change in time is 
zero, the mathematical function stops working. To come at the problem visually, a calculation of 
                                                 
289Wilson Harris, Selected Essays of Wilson Harris (New York: Routledge, 1999). See, 
especially, Harris’s discussion of lost cross-cultural roots in “Literacy and the Imagination.” 
 
290Mackey, FBB, 30. Resonance: "The point is that any insistence on locale must have long since 
given way to locus, that the rainbow bridge which makes for unrest ongoingly echoes what 
creaking the rickety bed of conception makes." 
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speed requires at least two points on the xy-grid be plugged into the equation. A single point 
means nothing on its own—it doesn’t produce any meaning outside itself. If an object is moving 
from point B to A (a measurable distance) in time x, then we can calculate the average speed that 
it is moving over that distance in that time. But observing an object at point C, with no further 
information about where it came from or where it is going or what that line of its movement 
looks like, we don’t know if it is moving at all and if it is moving, how fast it is moving. 
                              
Figure 8 – Plot Points on a Grid 
Enter the limit: One way out of the problem of the apparent incalculability of instantaneous 
speed is to make the change in time between B and A infinitely smaller and smaller, just as long 
as the distance between them doesn’t reach zero and become a single point at C. Doing so will 
produce a number that the function seems to be inching toward: asymptotic limit. Acceleration 
and inertia mingle here as the line on the graph reaches toward the asymptotic line—moving so 
imperceptibly that it appears motionless—an instant in time. As I’ll discuss in more detail below, 
Mackey’s investment in spinning motion has something to do with the incalculability of 
instantaneous speed, as time that cannot be captured opens up a liberatory potential—a time of 
action that is outside of Enlightenment rationality’s policing of time: an elusive maneuver. 
Second is the problem of calculating the area under a curve is a modern version of an 





(its beginning and end is indistinguishable) and of incalculability (its area cannot be measured 
except as an approximation) is a key figure of the asymptote’s story (and of Mackey’s novel). 
The pre-history of the Calculus begins in the third century BC with Archimedes’ method of 
exhaustion and in the third century AD with Liu Hui’s calculation pi. Both of which have to do, 
essentially, with the problem of how to calculate the area of a circle. The “method of exhaustion” 
was used by Archimedes in the 3rd century BC, and (like the Calculus) independently developed 
in China by Liu Hui in the 3rd century AD. The method of exhaustion prefigures the concept of 
infinitesimals, or limits, in the Calculus’s approach to the problem of finding the area under a 
curve.  
How do you find the area of a geometric figure? This is a question we can answer for 
uncurved geometric figures with angles. To find the area of a rectangle, multiply its length times 
its width (LxW). No problem—this equation always returns a calculable number. A triangle is 
half of that. And all of the shapes that involve angles can be divided into so many rectangles and 
triangles that all add up. But how do you find the area of a circle, which doesn’t have sides to 
multiply? Transposed onto the xy-grid, the question is rephrased: how do you calculate the area 
under a curve? One solution is to approximate the area by filling the curved figure with a series 
of rectangles whose area is calculable and then add those up.  
 
Figure 9 – Filling the Area of Circle 
But there will always be these little gaps left over, leaving the calculation incomplete. The 
slimmer the rectangles, the less area left over, so you draw ever and ever smaller rectangles, but 




Figure 10 – Filling the Area Under a Curve 
Using this method, your approximations might get closer and closer to what the area of the circle 
actually is, but you will never actually reach it. The limit emerges to represent the area of the 
circle—what it actually is—but the ghost of unrepresentability persists; those “ghosts of departed 
quantities” continue to haunt the story. If one considers calculation a form of capture—as a form 
of knowing the world and representing it—then the circle that captures, like a lasso, escapes 
capture itself. You want to know the circle, but you can only approximate knowing what it is, 
what it is made of, what it contains, what it holds.291 Even as your approximations qualify as the 
sound calculations upon which bridges are built, cities are erected, and roads are laid. The 
modern world is constructed by the Calculus’s impossibly real calculations. 
The circle is a prominent figure in From a Broken Bottle (and Mackey’s larger body of 
work) that expresses various discourses, ranging from the religious and esoteric to the social and 
political to the aesthetic and mystical.292 The figure of the circle itself as well as the practices 
                                                 
291Cf. Simon Eales, “The Ocean’s Tide: Parentheses in Kamau Brathwaite’s and Nathaniel 
Mackey’s Decolonial Poetics” Cordite Poetry Review (November 2017): np. “The parenthesis is 
a re-inscription of colonialism’s faux unity – represented by the circle – that shows where it has 
had part of its wall demolished.”  
 
292Hoover, “Pair of Figures for Eshu,” 740; Simpson, “Trickster Poetics,” 50; Moten, "Blackness 
and Nothingness,” 746. Hoover reads Mackey’s novel as engaged in a struggle to reconcile or 
otherwise acknowledge the multiple cultural sources that produce black consciousness, for which 
the circle is an important figure: “The two main structural patterns in the novel are circularity 
and coaxiality, the Ouroboric circle and the crossroads.” Simpson describes the temporality of 
Mackey’s serial poem Song of the Andoumboulou as circular: “[T]ime in the poem seems 
circular, folding back on itself rather than progressing linearly, further blurring the distinction 
between what was and what is: ‘Endless night now / ended, / rebegun.’ The circularity is 
seemingly doubled in this example, with ‘endless’ and ‘rebegun’ functioning simultaneously as 
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that refer to it—circularity, circulation, circumambulation, rotation, revolution— appear as 
articulations of the book’s major themes, particularly when considered in relation to one another 
and the infinite approach of the asymptote: the politics of center-periphery; the paradoxes of 
binary oppositions (inside/outside, candor/duplicity, authenticity/spectacle, free/unfree, 
individual/collective, private/public); fugitive flight in relation to the horizon and horizontality; 
and, the pursuit of non-hierarchical social structures figured as circles of collectivity. 
 We find the circle in a number of scenes in the novel that I will look at in this chapter. 
It’s in the movements of the band-as-many-footed-beast that members of N.’s band find 
themselves collectively transformed into, and the West African song N. later relates it to which is 
interested in the collective ethos of the circle. We find it in the image of the po and the spiral in 
Dogon cosmology that N. meditates on in relation to the creativity of musical collaboration. The 
circle as a symbol of social collectivity. The circle as an antidote to the straight line. The circle as 
an antidote to beginnings and endings. The horizon of a circle that is a planet, which brings the 
sea into it as well. Circling the wagons. The way the circle is an enclosure, or how the dominant 
ideology thinks the circle is an enclosure but forgets about the Calculus, how your calculations 
can only ever approach the total area of a circle. There will always remain a gap. An empty 
space. An opening. A way out. The circle never closes if you can’t calculate that last bit into the 
territorializing of its area. Traces of infinitude emanate. But also, the circle as repetition without 
                                                                                                                                                             
redundancy and contradiction.” Fred Moten: “Mackey, in the fantastic sear and burned, spurred 
overhearing of his preface to Splay Anthem, outlining the provenance and relationship between 
the book’s serial halves […], speaks of mu in relation to a circling or spiraling or ringing, this 
roundness or rondo linking beginning and end; the wailing that accompanies entrance into and 
expulsion from sociality; that makes you wonder if music, which is not only music, is mobilized 
in the service of an eccentricity, a centrifugal force, whose intimation Mackey also approaches, 
that mark’s sociality’s ecstatic existence beyond beginning and end, ends and means.” 
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a difference: the circle of the wheel in N.’s quotation of the Jamaican reggae singer Earl Zero 
who says, “where there’s a wheel there’s a turn”—a figure for the rut that binary logics produce. 
As I move now into the novel’s asymptotic forms and themes, we will have occasion to 
return to this history of the Calculus—the unrepresentable representation of instantaneous speed 
and the area of a circle—and how it bears on our reading of Mackey’s poetics. 
Asymptotic Form: Writing Toward the Compositional Limit  
 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I discussed the epistolary form’s asymptotic nature 
in terms of the novel’s serial form. The epistolary form is further sympathetic to Mackey’s 
asymptotic aesthetic as a correspondence in letters.293 Letter writing is inherently open-ended: 
each letter is written with the expectation of a response, in anticipation of further 
correspondence—producing a conversation characterized by continuity rather than closure and 
(re)consideration rather than conclusion. The personal letter is a compositional form that lends 
itself to stream of consciousness with tangents, parentheticals, and elliptical argumentation. The 
letter is a testing ground for new ideas, a place to sketch out theories, ask questions, propose 
hypotheses, and revisit them based on the response you receive. Operating from the presumption 
of a certain shared knowledge between the writer and addressee, many things are not explained 
or narrated: personal background, the details of shared experiences, allusions to shared areas of 
knowledge, require no explanation, 294 which leaves the novel’s reader in a situation where the 
                                                 
293For a discussion of “correspondence” in Mackey’s work, see the video recording of The 
Mackey Sessions, held September 20-22, 2019 at Duke University. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBXl-DyRwcg&feature=youtu.be 
 
294S.R. Burge, “Music, Mysticism, and Experience: Sufism and Spiritual Journeys in Nathaniel 
Mackey’s Bedouin Hornbook,” Contemporary Literature 54.2 (2013): 278. Burge points out, 
“The reader, too, is an eavesdropper on this communication, but it is difficult to gain a full 
understanding of the relationship between N. and the Angel of Dust: the reader does not even 
know their real names.” 
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hermeneutic work expands exponentially. In From a Broken Bottle, the sense of what is missing 
from our own knowledge is compounded by the fact that we only ever read one half of the 
correspondence—Angel of Dust’s letters and supplemental writings are referred to but we never 
read them ourselves.295 The openness and opacity of the epistolary form is not only about lack of 
a beginning or end, its asymptotic reach moves infinitely in all directions: the whole field of 
composition.  
But the asymptotic form of the novel extends down to its compositional parts as well. In 
the distinctive Mackey sentence—which one recognizes it in an instant for its cadence, 
vocabulary, and grammatical structure—the dialectical movement of his thought is expressed at 
the level of the sentence. Each sentence is constantly revising its own propositions. He deploys 
variations of rhetorical devices of repetition, most notably, a modified chiasmus, what we might 
call the Mackey chiastic structure, in which words and phrases occur in parallel and inverted 
parallel relation, weaving associative language play and creative etymologies296 into a rhetorical 
structure. The way words can mean more than one thing or evoke multiple images and scenes, by 
association and sonic resonance, becomes the engine of argument-making, even within sentences 
themselves. Observe for example in a sentence like the following: “Graspability is a self-
incriminating thirst utterly native to every hand, an indigenous court from which only the 
drowned hope to win an acquittal.”297 The noun “graspability” suggests the sentence is about a 
phenomenon: the ability to grasp. But at the same time the word invokes the concrete, physical 
                                                 
295Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 577. Edwards suggests: With “N’s letters to ‘Angel of Dust’ in 
the epistolary works, again the speaker encounters a dead, heavenly, or inaccessible interlocuter, 
is haunted by a voice from afar.” 
 
296See chapter one for my discussion of Mackey’s “creative etymology.” 
 
297Mackey, FBB, 41-42. 
171 
 
image of a hand—the hand that grasps. While “thirst” adds an overtone of longing to the 
definition of grasping as a reaching after something. “Self-incrimination” produces the image of 
“being caught red-handed” and introduces the images and discourse of legal “trial” into the 
sentence—“court,” “acquittal”—at the same time that “trial” resonates with “attempt,” picking 
up again on thirst: the longing to grasp is “indigenous” to the ability to grasp; crime and survival 
are ambiguously and ambivalently tied up. As one unpacks the words that make up the sentence 
and their relation to one another, an argument emerges. One sentence, that is, seems to say 
precisely what Mackey otherwise makes explicit in an interview with Peter O’Leary, when 
responding to a question about duende in Song of the Andoumboulou: 
Or it's finding out what you have but don't have. You have it in the form of a disposition 
but that disposition is not the same as the possession of it. So, you have it as a reaching-
toward-something. In many ways, you have it as a reaching-through-things, so that there's 
a way in which that reaching is not satisfied even when it does seize upon something. It 
goes on reaching. The phantom limb bespeaks that reach, which continues beyond the 
grasping of something. It speaks of loss, it speaks of lack, but it also speaks of an 
insufficiency that's indigenous to the very act of reaching. Reaching wants to go on, in 
some sense that's troubling to the things it does settle upon and take hold of. It's not that it 
empties those things. It simply finds that those things are in place in a certain way that the 
reaching wants to continue to be free of. 298 
 
Like the musical instruments in Mackey’s work, he shows us how to see and hear what words 
say—how even single words are participating in a dialogue. 
But Mackey doesn’t only rely on techniques of eliciting what can be heard or seen in 
words. At other times, he works the material more explicitly. For example, compounds abound in 
the text: “mixed-metaphorical,” “post-equivalent,” “quantum-qualitative,” “resigned-elegiac,” 
“funky-butt,” “cartoon-clear,” “grit-given,” and so on—demonstrating the exponential 
                                                 
298Peter O'Leary, Nathaniel Mackey, and Devin Johnston, "An Interview with Nathaniel 
Mackey," Chicago Review 43, no. 1 (1997): 38; Edwards, “Notes of Poetics.” Brent Hayes 
Edwards comments on this passage from the interview in relation to his analysis of the 
incompleteness of the serial form in Song of the Andoumboulou. 
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combinatory powers of the English language. Another common strategy is what I call Mackey’s 
“jellyroll” sentences, in which x, y, z are “rolled into one”—e.g., “The mute but audible web she 
secreted or spun further made for an ambiguous, mummylike bandaging effect—welcome relief, 
welcome resurrection, welcome-albeit-webbed embrace all rolled into one.”299 The anaphoric 
repetition of “welcome” in this jellyroll sentence is another prominent feature of the poetry of 
Mackey’s prose in From a Broken Bottle, that puts pressure on and provokes us to pay attention 
to words otherwise taken for granted, suggestive of the otherwise invisible “thought process” that 
produces speech and writing alike—as if N./Mackey is documenting his own consideration of 
what exactly it is that is welcome, as he realizes more is welcome than he may at first have 
assumed—always there is more. By jellyrolling the multiple iterations, hierarchization is 
avoided: you slice into the sentence and find them all rolled up together. 
One of the things that makes Mackey’s prose pleasurable where other so-called 
“difficult” writing is experienced as punishing is his combination of grammatical simplicity300—
that is, adherence to dominant convention—with semantic complexity. His sentences at once 
satisfy and defy convention. Conventional subject-verb-object constructions dominate. Sentences 
do not run on—even when the writing is on a run. One often has to re-read a sentence in order to 
make sense of the meaning of the words, but not in order to reconstruct the sentence’s 
grammatical parts into a semblance of a more familiar order. For example, let us consider the 
sentence: “Her voice, that is, on occasion seemed not to be coming from her—an elusiveness of 
                                                 
299Mackey, FBB, 112-113. 
 
300Edwards, “Notes of Poetics,” 579. This fact does not hold, however, for the verse, in which 
grammatical syntax is more radically put “out of joint” as Brent Hayes Edwards put it in his 
close reading of Mackey’s “linguistic and formal joint work” in Song of the Andoumboulou in 
“Notes on Poetics Regarding Mackey’s ‘Song.’” 
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source which created an illusion of sourcelessness,”301 which occurs amid a three-page 
explication of what N. hears listening to the American jazz singer Betty Carter sing. 
“Her voice … on occasion seemed not to be coming from her” is a straightforward 
enough proposition. A grammar police would be pleased by the placement of its grammatical 
parts. The qualification or further explication that follows the em-dash similarly follows the 
pattern: Subject (“an elusiveness of source”) + Verb (“which created”) + Object (“an illusion of 
sourcelessness”), but this is where we get messed up as readers, because the S-V-O construction 
is not delivering immediate understanding as we expect it to. Here we have poetic moves 
transposed to prose, undermining the prosaic legibility that following the grammatical rules is 
supposed to guarantee. “Elusiveness” rhymes with “illusion” + “sourcelessness” in a two-step 
process: ”Elu” rhymes with “illu,” while “siveness” rhymes with “sourcelessness,” which the “of 
source” kicks into action and reinforces. The aural rhymes are doubled in the conceptual 
rhyming of words describing three kinds of perception that are at odds with one another: 
“elusiveness” (hard to perceive), “illusion” (deceptive appearance) and “sourcelessness” 
(imperceptible). The sentence makes sense but we have to pause a moment to get what it means 
and why it needs to be articulated precisely this way.  
The significance of the relationships activated by these inner-rhymes is further developed 
by another characteristic of Mackey’s prose that is at play in this sentence: his tendency to linger 
over perception and articulation and to exhaust descriptive possibilities. A single articulation is 
not sufficient, because different articulations implicate different meanings, and we do not want to 
                                                 




close off the possibilities.302 It’s the reverse of Ginsberg’s “First thought, best thought.” Unless 
we read Mackey’s prose as a series of first thoughts—that is to say, a series of thoughts in no 
hierarchical order—paratactic. As N. listens and watches her perform, Betty Carter’s singing 
puts him, he says, “in mind of ventriloquism, for every now and then she achieved a throwing or 
a displacement of her voice.”303 The “that is” of the sentence we are looking at, signals that N. is 
building off and adding to a description of the same event in the sentence that occurs prior, about 
halfway up the page. Such that this sentence, which modifies its own statements, is at the same 
time modifying other statements in other sentences, as if in answer to an implicit question, 
“What do you mean by ‘ventriloquism?’” To which this particular sentence answers by trying 
again to put it this way: “Her voice … on occasion seemed not to be coming from her.” But, the 
em-dash argues that that’s not all there is to it, provoking a further implicit self-interrogation: 
“Why do you say it ‘seemed’ so?” The word “seemed” foregrounds perception, N.’s 
consciousness that what is happening appears one way, but is or might be another—i.e., the 
question of illusion has been raised by the word “seemed.” To address the issue that “seem” 
raises, N. proposes that a confusion of “source” is at play. The word he chooses to describe the 
confusion, “elusiveness,” assigns an activeness to the voice, a willfulness, which as N. puts it 
“created” (active verb) “an illusion.” But here, again as if answering yet another question (“But 
what is the illusion?”), N. clarifies: It’s not just that her voice is “not … coming from her,” but 
                                                 
302Megan Simpson, “Trickster Poetics,” 40. We might say that N. is a “what-sayer” like we find 
in Song of the Andoumboulou, who Simpson argues appears in Whatsaid Serif “as one ‘obsessed, 
asking what,’” which she links to this “keen interest in language and meaning, pointing always to 
the limitations of the first and the impossibility of the latter.” “The what-sayer trickster,” she 
writes, “is a kind of deconstructive angel, the one who continually challenges, thwarts assertion, 
perceives the gaps and artifice present in any description or expression, ‘insisting a story lay / 
behind the story he complained he / couldn’t begin to infer. The what-sayer’s task is never 
done.” 
 
303Mackey, FBB, 331. 
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that it appears altogether “sourceless.” This modification from “seemed not to be coming from 
her,” to “an illusion of sourcelessness” is of no small consequence. It moves the experience from 
one of mere games (the voice is really coming from somewhere else) to cosmic mystery (the 
voice is coming from nowhere). N. comments on his own insight: “It was eerie.”304 Eeriness 
describes the experience of witnessing the impossible—the limit brought into the 
representational field. 
Asymptotic Hermeneutics: Resonance Over Revolution  
 
N. hears the impossible in the world—instruments speak words, dreams communicate 
among friends, voices reach across geographical distances of separation. His endless run of 
commentary on what he hears, his continuous and non-linear explication that spreads out in all 
directions—that is, his asymptotic hermeneutics—is a strategy to outrun any recasting of the 
impossible back into the captured rationality of the possible. As the novel progresses, the image 
of outrunning the authorities, outrunning ideologies of dominance and the hegemony of the 
possible, becomes more and more a battle of hermeneutic wills. The battlefield is one of 
interpretation: one’s ability to read the difference between escape and enclosure is at stake in 
how we interpret the representations we are given in image, word, speech, as they come to us 
from varied sources—art and dream, advertisement and social convention, inner thought and 
collective making. 
                                                 
304Gysin, “’Liberating Voices,’” 514. Gysin analyzes this episode in his essay about “postmodern 
writers” who “problematize the dialogue of the Sister Arts by questioning, subverting, or 
dismantling the trope of the liberating voice, by undercutting the mediating function of voice in 
the transformation of music into language.” “In Mackey’s case,” he argues, “the elusiveness of 
the music is the goal of the transformation [of music into writing], the mediating elements 




The path to impossibility Mackey’s writing follows in From a Broken Bottle, the line of 
meaning that the curve of signification infinitely approaches, is set on a course for “destination 
out,” to use a phrase that comes out of Mackey’s own writing on oppositional poetics, or what he 
calls “black centrifugal writing.”305 “Out” is a direction as well as another name for what is 
desired in social and political revolution—revolution of the imagination, of social relations, of 
global economic systems—a desire to get outside of the dominant systems of social organization. 
Mackey brings this sense of “revolution” into linguistic and conceptual relation with 
“outness”—outness being a term that finds traction in a number of radical traditions in the post-
1968 period: jazz and poetry; black radical politics; and countercultural ideology. He does so by 
bringing revolution’s figurative sense of turning and spinning—an image of planets orbiting 
around a center that determines their circling path—into relation to the word “out” as the image 
of moving away from a center, leaving or escaping a point of origin: centrifugal. On the 
Toupouri Wind Ensemble recording to which I will return later in this chapter, N. writes: 
A commitment to pulling free of ceremonial stasis is there to be heard in the ostensibly 
centered yet in reality ripped, eccentric voice bled by the orbiting chorus of horns’ 
centrifugal flutter. A would-be hub overcome by wobble one might call it. What gets me 
is the way this loss of alignment throws and then retrieves voice, as though it installed or 
instituted a rift only in order to erase it. What it amounts to is a looped or ventriloquized 
harvesting by which the voice is no sooner flung than fetched. The orbit-induced 
hemorrhaging elicits an elliptical, precipitous halo—a poignant, protuberant illusoriness 
all the more stubborn for being under duress.306 
                                                 
305Mackey, PH, 239. 
 
306Mackey, FBB, 107. 
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Revolution as a continuous orbit around a center whose gravity determines its path would seem 
then to be an image of endless repetition of the same that doesn’t suggest transformation nor the 
possibility of tracing a new path.307  
 
Figure 11 – Planets in Orbit Around the Sun 
The planets’ accompanying rotations would similarly offer an image merely of wheels spinning 
in place—locked in a diurnal, which is to say binary opposition whose terms continuously trade 
positions without ever breaking free of the orbit that determine them. Revolution then doesn’t 
seem to lead us out of anything. 
But what other tools do we have for transformation other than revolution? There was 
supposed to be a revolution in the 1960s, but even in its successes it seems to have failed to 
transform the world, to move us out of the orbit of global racialized capitalism, exploitation and 
war, social alienation and increasing possessive individualism. So, if we still believe in 
revolution, what kinds of adjustments do we need to make in order to move forward from this 
failure? This is the question that I believe Mackey and his cohort of writers and intellectuals 
were asking in the post-1968 period. 
                                                 
307Reed, Freedom Time, 202. Reed similarly observes: “As with much of Mackey’s work, 
‘revolution’ retains another meaning: spinning and circling recur both as literal ambulatory 
circling and as figural recumbent appeal. […] An orphic turn, ‘turn’ being both a noun and a 
verb, finally, is the trope of musicality, related to the repeatability of performance, the 
modifiability of traditions even unto their transformation. It is that which in Mackey’s utopian 
poetics of the cut mediates fulfillment and transfiguration.” 
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In From a Broken Bottle, whose writing begins in the 1980s, and whose narrative begins 
in the late 1970s (though both in medias res such that “begins” should, in both cases, be qualified 
by scare quotes308), the answer is that the only way to break out of revolution’s orbit around the 
center from which we seek escape is to work with the binaries we are given as a point of 
departure, without mistaking their opposition as productive in itself—i.e., there is no easy out. If 
out is a destination impossibly, infinitely approached, how does revolutionary movement move 
in its direction? In From a Broken Bottle, Mackey offers the image of spinning as an answer.309 
That is, if we increase the speed of rotation, spin faster and faster until we break off, we might 
fly off center, out of the rut our revolution was stuck in, reaching uncapturable instantaneous 
speed, outrunning cooption. As we will see in the scenes I analyze below, this movement is on 
the one hand, a conceptual one—getting out of the ideological ruts that keep us from imagining 
anything outside the system we exist in. But on the other hand, it is also a social movement—a 
                                                 
308Kress, “Middle Voice,” 771. David Kress calls Djbot Baghostus’s Run, and by extension 
From a Broken Bottle, “a novel without end or beginning” (771): “As a commentary/description 
on absence, incompletion, and their traces or effects, the opening of the novel is just that, an 
opening (opening-to) rather than a beginning or a point of origin.  Obviously not a beginning, an 
opening is also not merely a start-up in the middle of a thing (in media res, which always gives 
the nod to beginning or origin—and to origin’s corollary, presence, which always speaks of 
unreconciled, nominal positions: to borrow a concept from Heidegger, static beings rather active 
Being).” 
 
309 Morris, “Angles of Incidence/Angels of Dust,” 585. Morris similarly analyzing the spiraling 
motion as one that moves outward from logics of enclosure, producing what she calls a “radical 
wobble.” “‘It's exactly here,’ N. tells the Angel of Dust, ‘that revelation and recuperation lock 
horns, the latter almost inevitably the victor.’ The binaries that stop the spin or abort the wobble 
are to interpreters of the last three decades of this century what scholasticism was to Pound and 
Fenollosa in the first two: a mark of the limits of Western logic that poetry bids to bypass. In the 
moment of recuperation, N. explains, ‘the potential breakthru, the asymmetrical fissure which 
begins to be glimpsed, is almost immediately closed off, almost immediately traded away for the 
consolations of a binary opposition.’” Recuperation, like resolution, is a way of maintaining the 
status quo, bringing whatever has been left outside in to the accepted order of things. In literary 
studies, recuperation is adding a minoritarian author to the canon, asking that they be recognized 
according the terms that excluded them in the first place. The more radical intervention is to 
challenge the values by which the canon is formed and reproduced in the first place. 
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reorganization of the way people relate to one another, a move from individualism to collectivity 
that requires a reconsideration of the relationship between the social binaries of private and 
public that also define “out” and “in” in terms of social exclusion and inclusion. 
“Out” is a word that also means revealing or making public. The definition of the public 
as an outside in relation to the interior and privacy of the individual bears on any project invested 
in collectivization, or how to live and create collectively—i.e., how to imagine together, make 
music together, make the world together. Mackey puts the desire for social collectivity under 
examination by interrogating the relationship between the individual and the collective, the 
private and the public. This relationship gives us another axis on which to place the asymptotic 
line: 
 
Figure 12 – Public/Collective and Private/Individual Asymptotes 
But, as we would expect, these relationships are not easy to map onto good/bad, 
liberatory/oppressive binaries. “Out” is a word that signifies exclusion, as well. To be in the 
margins is to be cut out of the dominant body, to be cut off from the resources of the center. This 
issue of outside and inside—as an ontological question and an epistemological one; or, as a 
matter of exclusion and inclusion; or further, as a consideration of public versus private 







Early in the novel’s first volume, Bedouin Hornbook, during an impromptu concert in 
Santa Cruz, N.’s recounting of the event leads him to meditate on the meaning of “inside” and 
“outside,” in relation to the private and the public, the individual and the crowd. The band travels 
north to the bougie white hippie town of Santa Cruz, where unsurprisingly, the turn out for their 
gig is low though otherwise a success. But before returning to L.A., they drop by an open-air 
mall called the Pacific Garden Mall where they are met by a scene of storefronts, shoppers, and 
street musicians. After the people did not come to the music—the low turnout to their gig the 
night before—the band decides maybe they can bring the music to the people: “Encouraged by 
the ovation we’d gotten last night, we were curious to see what kind of impact we could make, to 
see how many people were walking around out there not even suspecting that they might dig our 
music if only given the chance.”310 N.’s report suggests they are making an intervention in the 
conventional modes of distribution and circulation of musical production, in which audience-as-
consumers are daily reproduced according to their listening and purchasing habits. We listen to 
what is familiar, and are rarely “given the chance” to enjoy something unfamiliar. Consumer 
culture is so efficiently divided by established and predictable consumer “taste” that we end up 
in cultural silos.311 N.’s band sets out to work against this culture of listening by playing music 
for the ostensibly unsorted crowd.  
                                                 
310Mackey, FBB, 63. 
 
311Anthony Braxton, “Interview with Nate Wooley,” BOMB Magazine (April 7, 2014): np. 
https://bombmagazine.org/articles/anthony-braxton/. In a 2014 interview, the musician Anthony 
Braxton responds to a comment about how online communities don’t facilitate the kind of 
tension that cultivates change: “If you like polkas and you go to the Internet and find people who 
like polkas, you’re with a group that feels the same way you feel. The Internet, which is so 
incredible for all the possibilities it’s given us, also gives us the possibility to find kindred spirits 
in every domain. So, this concept of tension is really a wonderful way to talk about this. There’s 
no tension when everybody agrees.” 
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The figure of the crowd is a central one in From a Broken Bottle, and what happens at the 
mall sets in motion a question N. comes to ponder: how to cultivate the collective roar rather 
than the collective yawn of the crowd—collective action rather than public ennui—noting in a 
later letter how to a deaf observer, a roar and a yawn are identical: Picture, N. says, the open 
mouth.312 But who is, or where is the crowd on the Pacific Garden Mall?313 Is the crowd the 
                                                 
312Mackey, FBB, 108. 
 
313Simpson, “Trickster Poetics,” 39; Jenkins, “‘re:Source,’” 41; Hock, “A Need to Mourn 
Abandonment in Advance,” 541; Hrera and Hrera, “Nathaniel Mackey’s ‘Bedouin Hornbook,’” 
322; Hoover, “Pair of Figures for Eshu,” 739; Mackey, FBB 72. Many critics treat “collectivity” 
or “communality” as an ethos toward which Mackey’s work is reaching. Hoover. In her article 
on the figure of the trickster in Song of the Andoumboulou, Simpson puts forward that one of that 
serial-work’s “central concerns” is “the possibility of a collective subjectivity that might allow 
the poem’s explorers to partake of the ‘discrepant engagement’ necessary for the realization of a 
cross-cultural identity, neither essentialist nor assimilationist, but improvisational.” She further 
analyzes Mackey’s attempt to thwart or throw off first-person pronouns. Jenkins also points to 
the “collective wish” “to be we” in Mackey’s “Song of the Andoumboulou” and “Mu,” which 
Jenkins argues is “primarily an ethical wish” invested in the essential role of “the Other” as 
representative of “an unavoidable absence inherent in the very ‘texture of things.’ The absence 
and inconceivability that marks the Other for Mackey demands a response, a responsibility, an 
‘indebtedness.’” “For Mackey,” he writes, “collectivity is an experience of otherness in 
language, a nearing of what cannot be said (or ‘whatsaid’ to use Mackey’s neologism.)” Jenkins 
traces Mackey’s emphasis on “community” as deriving from African ethics, arguing “the one 
universal element of African belief upon which most scholars (including Mackey) agree is the 
centrality and primacy of notions of human collectivity.” Without footnotes, it is difficult to 
engage with Jenkin’s claim that “most scholars” agree on this point, but in any case it is worth 
noting here O’Leary’s suggestion that Mackey’s primary source material for African cultural 
practices is French anthropology. Nonetheless, I agree that Mackey’s poetics expresses a wish 
“to be we,” to make legible a collective protagonist against the grain of the possessive 
individualism that makes “collective protagonist” an oxymoronic figure of speech. Hock 
interprets Mackey’s interest in collectivity—expressed by N. as a “lifelong thirsting after tenuous 
kin”—as an expression of “the larger historical trauma of the loss of an entire history of family 
and cultural traditions as a result of the Middle Passage.” Commenting on N’s comments on 
Cecil Taylor’s “Streams,” Hreha and Hreha write, “It’s worth noting that musically, the effect 
[that of “building upwards until it reaches an ‘otherwise unavailable heaven’”] is dependent on 
the chorus’s reiteration of Taylor’s posited locus. This heaven is communal, not solitary, and in 
fact only exists as a result of the interplay between members of the group.” Paul Hoover 
summarizes, “Briefly, the plot [of Bedouin Hornbook] concerns the travels of a newly formed 
band that, through practice, finally learns to speak as one, or communally, in an ecstatic, literally 
earth-shaking performance of the song, ‘Bottomed Out.’” N. himself writes in Bedouin 
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people on the streets? Are the crowd shoppers? Is the crowd the audience who elects to listen? Is 
it a convening of musicians? What does it mean to take the music to the people, to take the music 
to the streets? 
The band sets up in front a stationary store.314 And from the beginning N. expresses a 
healthy skepticism about what they are getting into, as the mall offers more a simulacrum of 
“street,” “street people,” “street musicians” than what he seems to have in mind when he talks 
about “the street” elsewhere in the novel as a space of uncurated life, and other forms of 
outsideness or grit that “the street” is conventionally associated with, where the street isn’t 
necessarily designed by the powers-that-be for what people actually do with it nor how they end 
up there. By contrast “the streets” of the Pacific Garden Mall are tightly regulated in both their 
design and use. 
Before the band begins to play, we are already alert to features of the scene that will 
come to bear on N.’s reflection on what takes place: the mix of public and private economies that 
the mall itself embodies, a mix between on the one hand being a public space like a public park, 
or public garden, and on the other, belonging to the private sector, as a shopping mall. This 
tension, or ambiguity, between public and private space is already present in the name of the 
space: Pacific Garden Mall. Garden or mall? Garden and mall? “Pacific,” in addition to naming 
the specificity of this locale—Santa Cruz being on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean—carries 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hornbook: “[T]here’s a base meaning of ‘conspiracy” as a ‘breathing or blowing together.’ 
(Forgive me for resorting to etymologies again, but therein, I’m convinced, lie the roots of 
coincidence.) What I’m trying to explore is the extent to which the spectre of conspiracy, not so 
much an omen as a foregone conclusion, may well be indigenous to the notion of a band.” 
314The location of the stationary store is cleverly suggestive of the “blank page” from which they 
and their unsuspecting audience will begin their relationship, and offering a meta-image of 
Mackey’s epistolary conceit, the music they play will come to be written on the stationary paper 
of a letter addressed to Angel of Dust, and/or Mackey’s ekphrastic conceit that instruments 
inscribe language as a pen on paper. 
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with it the connotation of “peace” and “pacificism,” characteristics the folk of Santa Cruz would 
like to claim for their liberal bubble, but which N. has already criticized as depending on a 
whitewashing of politics for the sake of a pop sensibility regarding world affairs, the too easy 
“give peace a chance” stance that in the same breath says, “keep that black suffering out of my 
view.” In sum, The Pacific Garden Mall is full of contradictions. 
Upon Lambert’s suggestion, the band takes off their shoes and ties bells around their 
ankles, walking in a circle as they play. As they play N. perceives the ground beneath his feet 
turning liquid, “uterine,” and in their circular movement, the band comes to perceive itself as 
“band-as-many-footed-beast.” Both of these images or sensations seem to evoke an ethos of 
collectivity—one emerging from the ground of this mall that is not sure which ethos it belongs 
to—the collectivity of public space or the possessive and competitive individualism of private 
enterprise. Towards collectivity, the ground becomes sea, where we are all “in it together,” 
uterine suggesting our collective pre-history. The image of band-as-many-footed-beast emerges 
from the band’s inter-relations with one another, their continuous circular motion stirring up a 
new being. They are collective or many-footed (plural) beast (singular) insofar as every position 
along the line the circle draws is continuously occupied by each other, by another, i.e., each one 
position is inhabited by many.315 
                                                 
315Jenkins, “‘re: Source,’” 40; Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 584. Jenkins: “Although postmodern 
European theory—as the language of absence, arbitrariness, and lacunae suggest—influences 
Mackey, the primary source of his other-conscious ethics is African traditions. These traditions, 
as many recent studies have argued, share an ethics based on relations with others and the 
individual’s responsibility to others.” In Edwards formulation of “revisitation with a difference” 
in Mackey’s work—analogous in form to the reprise in jazz which practices “repetition that 
speaks differently” “gives a sense of how to go on beyond the end, beyond impediment,” i.e., 
out—Edwards further suggests that revisitation as a form of “spiritual re-possession” shows how 
the Other is necessary to this practice, quoting Mackey, who writes, “Possession means that 
something beyond your grasp of it grabs you, that something that gets away from you—another 
sense in which fugitivity comes in—gives you a voice.” In the terms of my own analysis, I 
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The shoppers pass by, mostly disinterested, but the longer the band plays, a small crowd 
begins to congregate around them. Their faint applause suggests they are not quite getting it, or 
not sure what to make of the music. With the weak exception of the white hippies who slowly 
nod with gratitude, mouthing “thank you,” N.’s poking fun at them suggesting that they seem to 
be performing a compulsory act of gratitude that will reassure them of their lifestyle politics, but 
that goes no deeper than that—were they even listening to the music? The position they occupy 
makes them suspect—on the mall, they may be merely consumers of identity politics. One 
bystander (can we really call them an “audience?”) complains that isn’t the music a little esoteric 
for such a public space? If a claim of esotericism suggests their music is somehow exclusionary, 
Aunt Nancy answers that inherent in the man’s remark is his own exclusionary assumption that 
just because he isn’t familiar with it, no one else is—as assumption reflective of white European 
presumption of being at the center of the world. Her remark echoes an earlier scene in the book 
at Rhino Records where the band holds a press conference answering to similar Eurocentric 
complaints that represent the kind of social othering that “has to do with power, exclusion and 
privilege, the centralizing norm against which otherness is measured, meted out, 
marginalized.”316 But Aunt Nancy doesn’t address directly the man’s concern about “public 
space”—his expectations and assumptions about what kind of music belongs in a public space—
a matter that will lead directly to the performance being abruptly shut down. The shop owners 
call the cops to complain about the noise the band is making, and the cops arrive to tell them they 
have to leave. 
                                                                                                                                                             
would interpret this quotation as suggesting that the Outside speaks to you, penetrating the 
enclosure (bounded circle) that you otherwise cannot get outside by your own devices. 
 
316Mackey, DE, 265. 
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This prohibition on sound brings some issues to light. The band, though ostensibly doing 
nothing different than what the other “street” musicians on the mall are doing—playing music—
has broken the codes of play on the mall that the other musicians abide by. The complaint is 
about the “noise” the band is making. On the face of it, we might interpret noise as the level of 
sound they are emitting—they are too loud. The mall wants its music to be discrete, contained, 
such that one band or individual’s music doesn’t “interfere” with the other—so that the open-air 
structure of the space, which naturally invites sounds to bleed into one another, to mix and 
mingle, is controlled such as to behave as a closed-air mall—i.e., invisible walls of discrete 
structures must be imagined and sustained by controlling the sound levels of musicians who are 
each inside an invisible structure. Structure must be applied to the structurelessness of the open-
air mall through a regulation of sound. 
But “noise” is a term used as well to refer to the content of the sound—noise is 
indecipherable, and thus meaningless sound.317 If one cannot make sense of the sound, it grates, 
                                                 
317Mackey, DE, 20; O’Leary, “Deep Trouble/Deep Treble,” 518, 520; Edwards, “Notes on 
Poetics” 572-573. Mackey on noise: Noise is “whatever the signifying system, in a particular 
situation, is not intended to transmit.” And also: “Open form (itself a discrepant, oxymoronic 
formulation, not unlike Williams’ ‘variable foot’) is a gesture in the direction of noise. Baraka’s 
valorization of ‘honking’ by rhythm and blues (R&B) saxophonists, Major’s ‘remarkable verb of 
/ things,’ Duncan’s invocation of ‘disturbance,’ Creeley’s bebop-influenced deviation from 
expected narrative accents, Olson’s insistence that things ‘keep their proper confusions,’ his 
advocacy of ‘shout’ as a corrective to discourse, Brathwaite’s ‘calibanisms,’ and Harris’s 
‘language as omen’ all in their distinct ways validate noise.” There is also Mackey’s recurring 
figure/phrase, “the creaking of the word,” which suggests language begins noisily, suggestive 
both of a Kristevan pre-linguistic stage of human consciousness/identity that is also pre-
individual, and of what Paul Naylor calls the “founding noise” of a poetics engaged in “singing 
the holes in history.” We could also look at Mackey’s various discussions of “stutter” and “rasp.” 
Both O’Leary and Edwards discuss Mackey’s interest in stutter and rasp as foundational to his 
poetics. O’Leary characterizes Mackey’s poetics as marked by “rasp” as expressive of 
“indeterminacy.” “Mackey himself is reluctant to let any tone or idea sit with an uncomplicated, 
isolated, or pure sense of itself. [. . .] It is interesting to speculate that what draws Mackey to this 
gruff, raspy sound has something to do with multiple meanings and with layering of sounds.” 
Edwards also studies Mackey’s interest in “rasp,” but places it within the tradition of black 
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is an affront to meaning, an assault on reason. “Noise” is “unpleasant” sound. The man’s 
complaint suggests that the band is not only playing too loud, but is also playing the wrong kind 
of music, making the wrong kind of sound. One man’s complaint turns into a collective 
indictment of the band by the shop owners, who, acting like the elected officials of the shoppers, 
call upon the cops to enforce the law that is there to protect their interests: people’s right to shop. 
The arrival of the police on the streets of the Pacific Garden Mall reminds us that when 
you take the music to the streets, you aren’t the only one with an eye on what occurs there, on the 
potential that the gathering of crowds in public or semi-public spaces might be—the State 
already knows, or thinks it knows, what that potential is, and has structures and mechanisms in 
place to manage it.318 Nonetheless, by the time the music is really taking off, a crowd of thirty or 
so people seem to have come around to the music, digging it enough to boo and hiss the cops 
when they tell the band to leave. Every time the band plays, N. feels the ground become a liquid 
beneath his feet. Provoked by the argument about elitism, they go into a section from Lambert’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
creative expression which recognizes “that necessary cohabitation of originality and flaw, 
mobility and limp, articulation and stammer” which produces the strained voice of Al Green’s 
falsetto, of flamenco singer’s duende, and of Mackey’s representation of “music straining toward 
speech, or embodying the noise at the edges of articulate expression.” 
 
318David Whitehouse, “Origin of the Police,” Libcom.org (December 24, 2014). 
https://libcom.org/history/origins-police-david-whitehouse: np. The arrival of the police to 
manage who can and cannot occupy this public/private space also calls up the history of street 
policing in the United States. In “Origin of the Police,” David Whitehouse shows how the 
nineteenth-century invention of the police in Britain was a response not to the threat of crime but 
the threat of crowds, the need to control the activity of the street, where crowds are at home: 
“The street was also simply where workers would spend their free time—because their homes 
were not comfortable. The street was a place where they could get friendship and free 
entertainment, and, depending on the place and time, they might engage in dissident religion or 
politics. British Marxist historian EP Thompson summed all this up when he wrote that 
nineteenth-century English police were impartial, attempting to sweep off the streets with an 
equable hand street traders, beggars, prostitutes, street-entertainers, pickets, children playing 
football and freethinking and socialist speakers alike. The pretext very often was that a complaint 
of interruption of trade had been received from a shopkeeper.” 
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“Aggravated Assent,” adding a vertical dimension to N.’s perception of what is happening on the 
ground horizontally. “On the ground” is the place where the “real” work is done by and with “the 
people,” i.e., the trenches. Further, we might say in anticipation of the cop’s arrival and the title 
of the song (“aggravated assent” a play on “aggravated assault”) that “on the ground” is where 
you are told to go when you are “caught” for a crime, whether you committed it or not. Assent as 
affirmation and its homonym “ascent,” rising up, suggest a musical and spiritual counter-
narrative or call-to-action, a call to ascend from the ground—to reach toward Heaven or holiness, 
or otherwise transcendent state or plane. Just before the cops arrive, N. describes the sensation of 
“an even more insistent vertical moisture” that “made for a helical escalator effect,” that is, a 
stairway to heaven. 
Stairway to heaven, or stairway to “the Upper Room,” as N. names it—a meeting place of 
fellowship in the New Testament, as the site of the last supper, and/or as a large, private meeting 
room for the gathering of the Disciples after Jesus’s Ascension. N. imagines the Upper Room as 
a “longshoremen’s loft,” connecting the religious discourse of fellowship to that of a labor union 
calling a union meeting. He becomes preoccupied with the question of whether the band is 
leading the crowd to the Upper Room, or the people are leading the musicians: “Had the crowd 
on the mall beaten us” there? As if they were engaged in a race, or a battle for leadership, N. is 
registering a tension between artist and public, performer and audience, individual leader and 
crowd. Is the band here to bring the music to the people, as in to offer them a knowledge or a 
direction that they are otherwise lacking as they walk up and down this consumer landscape? Or 
is the band there to be transformed by the knowledge and the direction of the crowd? Is the 
question itself merely a symptom of the ideologies of dominance the band is ostensibly seeking 
to outpace in their performance? But since the cops have shown up and put an end to the 
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experiment before we can answer or complicate the question, we are left only with speculations. 
In his letter to Angel of Dust, N. reflects on the episode: 
These matters, I find in the course of writing, have more to do with the question of public 
and private than I suspected at first. Though I haven’t the time to go into it now, I’m 
struck by the curious inversion implied by how we musicians use the terms “inside” and 
“outside”—the first applied to conventional respect for the changes and the latter to less 
traditional approaches. The thing worth noting is that the private or esoteric is referred to 
as “outside,” the public or exoteric as “inside.” It’s as though music were the ground on 
which one guts every fixed assumption, chants it down (like the Rastafarians say) by 
turning its insides out.319  
 
In social terms, we tend to think of the “private” as involving a select few: a family, clique or 
band defines a private realm of social life, and those who are part of our group are “inside,” are 
“insiders”—they get the “inside joke.” By contrast, the “public” involves the many, the crowd, a 
mingling of strangers; the public consists of the people who make up the social world “outside” 
of our private associations. To participate in this outside, to engage properly in the social codes 
of public sociality, one must respect the conventions meant to make a commons where no one is 
unable to participate in your inside jokes. Yet in music—or in art more generally—the terms 
“inside” and “outside” are applied in exactly the opposite sense. “Inside music” means widely 
accessible, popular, conventional, rule-abiding. Playing “inside the traditional changes” refers to 
the chord changes that in traditional jazz through bebop set the tonal boundaries within which the 
band performs together, in order for improvised play to maintain “harmony” in the “Western” 
musical tradition. To play “outside” the traditional changes is what the innovators of free jazz 
initiated, “freeing” their playing from fixed chord changes, producing what to conventionally-
tuned ears sounded unconventional, discordant, esoteric, niche, if not “noisy,” and otherwise 
“outside."  
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Thinking spatially or architecturally about the matter, the inside is the space of privacy 
and the home, while the outside is the space of the public and civic architecture. The inside 
privacy of home is also the space of private property, the outside the space that is not owned, or 
not-yet-owned, or “preserved” from private ownership for the sake of public enjoyment. Is a mall 
public or private? The history of the word “mall” to designate the shopping mall—its dominant 
connotation in 2016—actually comes into usage in the 1960s and 1970s, to denote the large, 
fully-enclosed shopping centers that were booming in post-WWII America derives from “The 
Mall,” the name given to a tree-lined street in the St. James area of London, referring to a pall-
mall alley, a high-end shopping area adapted from a pall-mall court in the eighteenth century. 
Prior to shopping malls, “mall” referred simply to a pedestrian space. The history of malls, 
through its various usages, suggests that they have always privileged private concerns over the 
public, have always been involved in the transformation of civic space into private space—a 
venture that can only succeed through the management of who uses the space and how, in order 
to bring inside logic to bear on outside circumstances. Is the Pacific Garden Mall inside or 
outside? It depends on your position—structurally and historically. What happens when you 
bring the outside inside the mall? 
N. suggests that music inverts our understanding of what inside and outside means: “It’s 
as though music were the ground on which one guts every fixed assumption, chants it down (like 
the Rastafarians say) by turning its insides out.” Destination out: The business of gutting fixed 
assumptions is what much revolutionary thought is built upon: “Centrifugal writing begins with 
goody-bye, wants to bid all givens good-bye.” N. continues in the same letter: 
Yet what happened on the mall, I think, shows that simple inversion finds itself invested 
in the very assumptions it sets out to subvert. Were the cops some occult way summoned 
by my own misgivings, my alarm at the concern I felt with who’d reach the Upper Room 
first? Unless revolution, as well as taking an upward turn, makes for a lateral 
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displacement (a stepping aside from whatever one thought “upward” and “downward” 
meant), the road ahead doesn’t seem to hold much in store beyond running in place. In 
other words, what Earl Zero says it true: “Where there’s a wheel there’s a turn.” But until 
we get dizzy with it, dervishly and devilishly dizzy, we’ll forever be stuck in the same old 
rut.320  
 
Here N. takes us back to that image of revolutionary rut—the planets just keep tracing that same 
circular movement—and the ways in which we sometimes, in our revolutionary pursuits, become 
stuck in the binaries that relations of power produce: master/slave, majoritarian/minoritarian, 
dominant/minor, center/periphery, and so forth. Such that by reversing the relation, we have only 
reproduced it, just replaced the players occupying each role. This business of flipping everything 
on its head can go on forever, back and forth, on infinite loop: a circle held together by 
centripetal force: “In other words, what Earl Zero says it true: ‘Where there’s a wheel there’s a 
turn.’” How does one get out of the “same old rut” that is carved by the circle that infinitely 
inverts the power relations one wants to leave behind altogether? N. says that in addition to 
“taking an upward turn” (toward loftiness, as in the loft of meeting in fellowship), revolution 
must “make for a lateral displacement, a stepping aside…,” a departure from the circle that mere 
inversion cuts, out of the model of ideologies of dominance that “cut us up, cut us out.”321 
I take the call “to get dizzy with it” to be one of the central themes or anthems of the 
book’s asymptotic commitments. Mackey solves the unrepresentability of instantaneous speed 
by embracing dizziness, suggesting the answer is to speed it up until we are going so fast that we 
are spinning—not moving on the linear grid, but gathering speed, getting ready to spin right 
outside of the Cartesian grid altogether. In contrast to the circular movement that “simple 
inversion” produces (tracing the same circle over and over again), N. evokes another kind of 
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turning, one that produces dizziness. Dizziness is another expression of losing the ground on 
which one’s assumptions are fixed. To become dizzy is to lose a sense of location: one’s 
proprioception is no longer trustworthy: nothing is where you expect it to be, such that if you try 
to walk, you will fall. You might just fall out of orbit. Or you might fall in the eyes of the Law, 
in the eyes of social convention, and so forth. You might fall in with the Devil (“devilishly 
dizzy”). You might have to fall in this way in order to fly elsewhere. It reminds me of the 
sequence in Djbot Baghostus’s Run, in the third iteration of N.’s lecture/libretto The Creaking of 
the Word, in which N.’s avatar, Jarred Bottle, is stopped at a red light in the middle of the night: 
Jarred Bottle let his right hand rest on his knee. With his left hand he went on gripping 
the steering wheel, waiting for the light to change. He brought his right hand up from his 
knee and touched his upper lip with his middle finger. There were no other cars in sight. 
The light had been green as he’d approached from a distance, turning yellow as he’d 
gotten closer and finally, just as he’d gotten to the intersection, red. He brought his right 
hand down from his upper lip and let it come to rest on his knee again. It seemed absurd 
to be sitting there. [. . .] At a quarter to three in the morning his was clearly the only car 
on the street. Still, he sat there, waiting for the light to change, deferring to the 
nonexistent traffic. He thought of a quip he’d heard once or twice: Revolution would 
never occur in a country whose people stop for traffic lights late at night when there’s no 
one else around.322 
 
The obedience with which one is expected to respond to the law, regardless of the particularity of 
context, is another example of being stuck in a rut, stuck in the status quo, unable to imagine and 
explore an alternative. Everyone recognizes that the band’s removal from the Pacific Garden 
Mall has nothing to do with Law in any truly civic sense. Such that it isn’t only the immediate 
threat of these particular cops’ authority, it is an internalized sense that there are Rules to 
follow—regardless of their relation to law, justice, or the welfare of the social whole—that 
expresses itself in these moments at the stoplight and on the mall alike. Were the band merely to 
defy the cops, to continue playing, perhaps face forcible removal or even arrest; if the crowd 
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were to join them in an act of civil disobedience, even then, they are merely reiterating the 
Rules—the only difference is that they have defied them rather than obeyed them. What then 
would a lateral displacement look like? 
 In the case of the stoplight sequence, Jarred Bottle decides a greater act of defiance than 
running the red light would be to continue sitting there once the light turned green: 
Turning his gaze to the left and looking out the windshield, he finally noticed that the 
light had turned green. He was surprised to find that he now felt no desire to move on. 
The green light wasn’t enough, wasn’t the go-ahead he’d been waiting for. By not 
moving he seemed to be insisting that the light had no authority over him, that he’d been 
sitting there for reasons other than its being red, that its turning green was equally beside 
the point. Green would get him neither to Paris nor to China. Green was irrelevant to the 
out he was after. [. . .] He was gratified to learn that sitting there could have an 
oppositional, rebellious aspect to it. The green light’s irrelevance prompted him to an 
even more extreme or extravagant out. He would sit there for quite some time, not 
moving. The light would go back to yellow, then red, turn green again, yellow, then red 
again, green and so forth. Finally a police car would pull up behind him and signal with 
its lights for him to pull over to the side. This he’d ignore as well, forcing the cops to get 
out of their car and come to him. [. . .] The cops would ask him had he been drinking, ask 
what was the idea of just sitting there. He’d tell them he was a Rastafarian, that he was 
waiting for the red, yellow, and green lights to come on at the same time. “All this time,” 
he’d explain, “I’ve been thinking about Paris and China, but it was Ethiopia I was 
actually headed for.” The cops would have no idea what he meant.323 
 
Jarred Bottle is reminded as he sits at the stoplight that “the out” we are after—the lateral 
displacement—often takes a dizzying spin to catch sight of; it takes a dizzying spin to catch sight 
of all the lights—green, yellow, red—coming on at once, the flag of Ethiopia waving above his 
head in the changed, charged air: the instantaneous speed of the light changing colors, movement 
across time/space collapsed into a single impossible moment. 
Resonating with the terms of the stoplight incident, Brent Hayes Edwards offers a 
compelling image-concept in his study of Mackey’s work in relation to black musical artists as 
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well as Dogon cosmology: “things close in order to open.”324 “This skewed temporality,” he 
suggests, reverses the dominant metaphysical narrative that something must be open before it can 
be closed—a narrative that fulfills ideological ends. He quotes the French ethnologist Genevieve 
Calame-Griaule: 
In Dogon, as in some other African languages, the terms expressing the notions of ‘to 
open’ and ‘to close’ come from a single root whose first meaning is ‘to close,’ and the 
derived form that of ‘to open,’ it seems legitimate to argue that the concept of closing 
precedes that of opening, and that one cannot, in Dogon logic, open a door until it has 
been previously closed. It seems that western logic proceeds more in the opposite sense, 
and considers that one closes that which is open, essentially in order to protect it.325  
 
The relationship between go and stop might be analogous to that of open and close. If “stop” is 
conventionally understood as an impediment to “go,” a regulation of go’s pilgrim’s progress, 
then N. turns this relation on its head. “Go” (the green light) becomes an impediment to “stop” 
which N. refuses, thereby opening up an otherwise black cosmology—he is able to perceive red, 
yellow, and green coming on all at once, disturbing the temporality of historical progress in the 
colors of the Ethiopian flag. Reed plays off of Edwards’ analysis of Mackey’s poetics to further 
suggests that Mackey’s serial form is a formal “cut” that is “a closure that reopens itself.”326 
Resonance over resolution. 
What does N. mean when he asks if his preoccupation with who would reach the Upper 
Room first—the band or the crowd—was an occult summoning of the cops? N. sets us up to 
perceive that his preoccupation with the relationship between inside and outside, public and 
private, leader and follower, is too stuck in a binary logic that itself produces these distinctions, 
such that we could say that the very idea of “inside” music which purports to be “public,” to be 
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“popular,” and not elitist, etc. is really the most insipid kind of elitism, insofar as it is really the 
conventions of the few announcing that they are for everyone; this is to say that the “inside” is a 
kind of clique, but one that everyone is expected to behave toward as if it belongs to everyone—
i.e., dominant, dominating. “Inside,” in this case, which purports to be “inclusive” is actually just 
more of the same exclusivity. The “public” is always left out, even of “inside” music. In other 
words, there isn’t a difference in the meaning, just in its deployment, and in who feels it the 
most. 
When N. says simple inversion finds us caught in the same assumptions we set out to 
subvert, he is suggesting that there isn’t a difference between “inside” and “outside” music, nor 
between “inside” and “outside” sociality—not in economies that distinguish between inside and 
outside as such. What we thought was inversion was actually just a repetition—the planets stuck 
in endless orbit around the sun’s inescapable gravity. But by speeding up the act of inversion—
exchanging what’s on top for what is on bottom, flipping between the two, if you do this quickly 
enough, you will perceive the same term (impossibly) occupying both positions at once, the way 
multiple images cells appear as one by spinning the zoetrope at the right speed. 
 
Figure 13 - Zoetrope 
All of the traffic lights come on at once, transporting us to an alternate order of relations. We 




In From a Broken Bottle, these transformative visions are shared in collective dreams, 
asleep and waking alike. The band dreams the same dreams. Instruments talk and their dialogue 
joins the conversation of the band members’ own speech. Audience members all confirm seeing 
the same word balloons emerge from the instruments. We are thus prepared to interpret Jarred 
Bottle’s vision of the red-yellow-green lights all coming on at once as a material phenomenon 
that could be witnessed by anyone brought to that intersection at three in the morning, rather than 
a hallucination only available in his individual imagination. The question is how to get us all 
there to see it—how to move the crowd, or how to move with the crowd; or, with the crowd, how 
to move the world. The novel might be interpreted as a series of experiments by N.’s band in 
pursuit of this question. Sometimes they stumble onto something promising, but there is always 
the specter of failure produced by recent history. N. asks: “To what extent does 
circumambulation tend to co-opt rather than cultivate a collective ‘roar’ whose weariness borders 
on revolution?”327 Is the circling movement reproducing the centripetal force of the rut, or is it 
gathering centrifugal momentum to spin off course? How do we recognize the difference, and 
when do we recognize it? One answer emerges at the end of Bedouin Hornbook in the band’s 
performance of “Bottomed Out,” which N. describes in the long and final letter of the first 
volume of From a Broken Bottle. 
Lateral Displacement: “Bottomed Out” 
 
N. describes the scene on Market Street in San Francisco, where the band walked prior to 
their performance of “Bottomed Out.” Both similar to, and unlike, the scene at the Pacific 
Garden Mall, street musicians are stationed all up and down Market, where N. observes, “[T]he 
latest thing seems to be to go out on the streets with a cheap guitar and amplifier setup and 
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perform.” The music—in which N. identifies the sound of Hendrix and Blood Ulmer: “frenetic, 
no let-up guitar runs” combined with vocals “mumbled, inarticulate”—makes a “noisy” sound in 
which N. hears “a loud critique of available options, a gruff dismissal of available conduits, no 
matter how ‘coherent,’ for admissible truth.”328 I.e., Noise as protest and revolutionary demand. 
N. is particularly taken by one blues singer whose lyrics N. can’t make out, except for one 
repeated word that he thinks he hears, or that at least sounds like, “jellyroll.” But N. proposes 
that hearing this one word as a “coherent” word punctuating incoherence is a way of hearing an 
“exchange between what [is] ‘known” and what would otherwise not be heard,” the implicit 
argument being that one cannot hear what one hasn’t already heard—the unfamiliar is perceived 
as noise or not perceived at all. On the flipside of this observation: If we can imagine it, it isn’t 
out enough. Once the new word is brought into the order of legibility, it loses the power of the 
impossible that we are after.329 
The performance of “Bottomed Out” finds its pre-history in the word “domination.” If we 
observe the word “nation” that is embedded within it, and thus speculate, in a Mackey-inspired, 
creative etymology, that the word “nation” derives in some sense from “domination,” we might 
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329Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 95. In Silencing the Past, in an analogical example, Michel-
Rolph Trouillot argues that “the chain of events that constitute the Haitian Revolution was 
unthinkable before these events happened.” Here we are again facing the classic paradox of 
revolution and of moving toward impossibility—it was unthinkable yet it happened. Trouillot 
makes a second point, however, that “the successive events [of the Revolution] [. . .] were 
systematically recast by many participants and observers to fit a world of possibilities. That is, 
they were made to enter into narratives that made sense to a majority of Western observers and 
readers,” and in turn the terms of the impossible revolution is “silenced by historians.” We are 
not only dealing with the problem of how to imagine an impossible future, but also the real 
danger that when the impossible occurs, ideologies of dominance immediately “recast” any 
achievements of the impossible as only reflections of the already-possible, coopting them back 
into the logos and topos of what is permissible to the hegemonic order of things, recasting what 
is incoherent as coherent, maintaining the “available options ... for admissible truth” that we 
want to refuse. 
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hear the word “dominion” lingering nearby, another word both for (sovereign) nation and for 
domination alike. From the Latin dominus, meaning “lord, master,” we see that the very notion 
of nation is built upon binary powers—master/slave, top/bottom. This is what Penguin sees in the 
billboard advertisement for whipped cream that the band happens upon while in Berkeley for a 
gig.330 The advertisement features a piece of chocolate cake topped with whipped cream and a 
cherry that reads, “Top your favorite bottom with real whipped cream.”331 Penguin points to the 
ad, agitated, and says, “Dammit. They’re at it again.”332 The other band members don’t right 
away see what he sees, so a conversation ensues, in which Penguin deconstructs the message of 
the ad until it is clear that what is really being sold to consumers is white supremacy. The 
top/bottom duality is suggestive of S/M domination, putting into play the analogous power 
relation master/slave, which is brought into a more historically specific meaning by the 
white/black arrangement: white whipped cream on top, black chocolate cake on the bottom. 
These scenes of “close reading” of cultural artifacts in the book are carried off by a convincing 
play between the humorous, the mystical, and the critical. The billboard analysis leaves us 
thinking about how, in a consumer culture, the words and images of commercial advertisements 
are inscriptions and illustrations of the values, beliefs, and fears of the dominant culture, how 
these values, beliefs, and fears are kept in circulation—i.e., enforced, through consumption of 
commodities. N. and his band kind of roll their eyes at Penguin’s analysis—eliciting a laugh 
from the reader. But they are brought around to understand that it isn’t a matter of conspiracy: 
The whipped cream company is selling us white supremacy because white supremacy sells.  
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During the band’s proceeding gig at the Scarab, they end their performance with an 
impromptu composition by Penguin, called “Bottomed Out,” which offers further reflections on 
the whipped cream ad that inspired it, while the band members struggle with and against such 
“available options […] for admissible truth.”333  
“Advertisement’s” rhyme with “admission” suggests that the former is always at the 
same time the latter—to sell something is to admit (or submit) its value or to admit what is at 
stake in the selling of it.  
Threaded into Penguin’s intro, that is, was an admission we hadn’t noticed in the ad. It 
was an admission he now brought to light, letting it serve as a witness at the trial or 
arraignment “Bottomed Out” was turning out to be. The intent of each precarious alto 
flight, we began to see, was to mimic and thereby expose the inversion built into the 
phrase “whipped cream.”334 
 
We see all of the familiar themes at play in Penguin’s analysis: “trial,” “out,” “flight,” 
“inversion,” suggesting even our most casual encounters on the street are occasions to engage in 
centrifugal work. To read the admission of the advertisement is to realize its implicit admonition: 
a reprimand and a warning: “[T]he inversion built into the phrase ‘whipped cream’” calls into 
question who is doing the whipping, and who is being whipped. Who is the victim of the crime? 
The dominant subject occupying “the top” position, the master position, is “whipped,” 
suggesting, as N. puts it, “an admission of weakness.”335 “Wasn’t ‘whipped cream’,” N. writes, 
“an occult way of owning up not so much to a loneliness as lameness at the top?” Penguin’s 
identification of lameness, of weakness at the top locates a crack in the door he’s pried open with 
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pointed out: Something terrible has happened to the white man who assaults his fellow citizen, 
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his critique, opens up an opportunity to get “a foot in the door for newly ascendant bottoms.” 
Aunt Nancy joins in shouting “a foot in the door [isn’t] enough, one [has] to kick it in.” And so, 
“Bottomed Out” begins as a discussion about best strategies for overthrowing the top—slow and 
steady, or fast and hard? It’s a call for revolutionary action as overthrow.  
But here Penguin and Aunt Nancy are still operating in the binary logic of top/bottom, 
proposing the simple inversion N. teaches us to be wary of after the Pacific Garden Mall ordeal: 
Ascension of bottoms, and descent of tops, is not going to get us out of that rut. We need a 
different kind of revolutionary action. N. overblows his horn, which like the musicians on 
Market Street expresses a playing that could be heard as N. describes it as “abstract and diffuse” 
on the one hand and “technical-ecstatic” on the other—i.e., loose and tight. A subtle disruption 
of the terms the evaluating “good” playing, the values that would earn one their place on top or 
bottom of the hierarchy.  
Lambert, in turn, meditates on how loneliness at the top gives way to a more general 
theme of loss and loneliness, interpreted in three recurring figures throughout the piece: sand, 
ash, and dust. Each figure suggests its own line of figuration. Sand suggests the desert, which 
resonates with the “dessert” of the ad, and the homonymic verb, “to desert,” that is, to abandon, 
reinforcing the theme of loneliness and loss, with subtle undertone of “to flee,” as in to take 
fugitive flight. Desert (the noun, the place) imagery comes into play, suggesting North Africa, 
thirst, geological time (the desert was once a sea). Ash suggests death, the grave, or ruin: the 
trace of destruction, by violence or by time. N. immediately associates dust to the frontier 
landscape of the nineteenth-century American west: “frontier justice,” the dusty saloon, “pioneer 
drift,” the unpaved streets of lightly held together towns. Ashes to ashes, dust to dust: death is 
nearby. What is buried in “Bottomed Out?” “’Broken ships,’ N. “tried to say thru the horn but 
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ended up whispering, ‘Note-bearing bottle, bits of scattered glass.’” A historical analysis is 
brought into play, as a map of world history begins to unfold. 
But the major turning point occurs when the audience takes on a larger role in response to 
Djamilaa’s voiceless song: “She sent her song into the world, but did so with the understanding 
that the conditions which would truly bring it into being had yet to be met.” You can’t hear what 
you don’t know. N. continues, “She went so far, in fact, to despair of their ever being met, as 
though she’d been deserted by the future she proposed. Without saying it she seemed to say that 
the future couldn’t help but be absconded with by this or that preemptive intervention.”336 Here 
Djamilaa is expressing what I’ve identified as Mackey’s wariness of revolutionary vision and the 
attending co-option of the impossible that one is endlessly outrunning.  
It is at this point that the crowd takes up the role it couldn’t at the Pacific Garden Mall: 
“As Djamilaa went on with her inaudible singing the audience grew louder and louder, more and 
more finding its voice in her loss of hers.”337 Djamilaa doesn’t have to know the revolutionary 
program; rather it is by voicing (voicelessly) her not-knowing that she opens the space for 
collective investigation. The audience affects “an amplified seashell’s roar, it seemed, with 
something of a seismic, decidedly street aspect or edge factored in as well.” What failed on “the 
streets” of the Pacific Garden Mall seems to be manifesting at the Scarab. The question of top 
versus bottom recedes: “no such ‘out’ as it proposed or appeared to posit had any reason to 
endlessly allude to the centrist ordeal from which it flew.”338 The performance changes direction 
toward destination out, “bidding what is known good-bye.” In response, Lambert sounds an 
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“unheard-of conception”339—suggestive of “new word, new world” 340 as well as of birth. 
Accordingly, Penguin falls on the floor, balled up in fetal position, and Lambert places a tiny 
horn, toy-like, in his hands, out of which floats the first bubbles that will become a major feature 
and evolving character of the novel over the proceeding volumes. The audience’s mouth is open, 
roaring not yawning: “The amplified seashell’s roar gave way to gurgly murmurs of delight as 
the audience made a children’s game of the bubbly, embryonic proportion which had come into 
play.”341 Whether or not this movement toward play is liberating or merely commercial pleasure, 
whether the bubbles should be read as revolutionary transformation or distraction and 
misdirection, is a question whose answer will only grow more complicated as the novel 
progresses. Yet, something has happened. 
What does it mean to say the music “moves you?” It could mean this: When the band 
comes out from the performance, they discover that the club has moved—literally—one block 
east.342 They immediately recognize that it was during “Bottomed Out” that this topographic 
transformation took place. A first step toward destination out. Things are moving. 
Asymptotic Conclusion: Mapping by Sonic-Linguistic Echolocation 
 
I’ve attributed the success of “Bottomed Out” to transform the world to two major 
components of the performance—conceptual critique and collectivity—which N.’s meditations 
suggest go hand in hand. In both cases, the band manifests what Glissant calls a “poetics of 
relation”—both in terms of the way the conversation among the musicians unfolds and in the 
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social relations that unfold between band and audience. “Relation is movement,” he writes.343 
Glissant’s interest in circularity, fluidity and inexhaustibility—returns us to the Calculus and the 
asymptote as a figure of infinite approach, deferral, and resistance to resolution, as it appears in 
the “Bottomed Out” episode. N. identifies a turning point in the performance that he describes as 
follows: 
The new proportion Djamilaa had brought into play tended to make for a tenuousness or 
a tangentiality, an elliptic, asymptotic wisp of theme whose ghostly ongoingness all but 
undid one’s need for an explicit, more expository take.344 
 
Here Mackey uses a series of mathematical figures—tangent, ellipse, asymptote—as metaphors 
for the “wisp of theme” that Djamilaa’s musical part—described with yet another mathematical 
figure as a “proportion,” i.e., ratio—makes in relation to the song’s ostensible argument 
regarding the meaning and implications of tops and bottoms, provoked by Penguins critical 
reading of the billboard advertisement. Mackey’s usage suggests these images—tangent, ellipse, 
asymptote—are synonymous or similar to “tenuousness,” characterized by fragility, haziness, 
lack of definition. Let’s review how each of these figures might be seen as such.  
 The tangent is a single point of intersection—where a line merely touches a curve but 
does not cross it. In this sense, the relationship between the line and the curve are tenuous, barely 
in relation at all except for the one fleeting moment at which they meet. The ellipse, as a curve 
on a geometric grid that extends in divergent yet proportionally equidistant directions from a root 
point, suggests oppositional split, but also infinite extendibility. The ellipse keeps going in either 
direction indefinitely toward a limit it never reaches, prefiguring the asymptote. But that other 
sense of ellipse as a figure of speech is also in play, an omission of words that creates the 
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rhetorical effect of signaling that what is not said should nonetheless be understood—
communication held tenuously together by assumption, if not presumption, that what is being 
suggested in ellipses is self-evident.345 Lastly, the tenuousness of the asymptote lies in its 
implication—the asymptote itself seems solid enough as a straight and solid, graphable line, but 
its destination is murky, a mark of the paradoxical evidence of impossibility: the real deployed to 
prove the existence of the unreal. Metaphorically, the asymptote might then point to the 
contradiction between the connotative precision and linguistic confusions we find in a statement 
such as, “There is no there there.” The notion of tenuousness expressed through these figures is 
invoked in relation to declarative statement, where two kinds of communication are placed in 
direct and oppositional relation—explicit vs. implicit, exposition vs. suggestion. Djamilaa’s 
“proportion” introduces a theme characterized by “ghostly ongoingness,” communication that is 
never final, whose articulation continues on into eternity, beyond the grave, ultimately 
indefinable. Recalling Bishop Berkeley’s “ghosts of departed quantities,” Djamilaa’s proportion 
summons a ghost of meaning-making, sensed but unknown/unknowable.  
 Yet Djamilaa’s ghostly theme does not leave one longing to know that which cannot be 
known, i.e., to finally receive the message. Rather it undoes, N. says, one’s need to know, to be 
told in certain terms the answer—i.e., it provokes a preference for resonance over resolution. 
That is, the asymptotic represents a “ghostly ongoingness” that ideologically counters the 
conclusiveness of exposition (exposed, visible, unghostly, made from available options for 
admissible truth) as a destination reached. There’s no way out but through. The passage moves 
explicitly toward this idea as it continues: 
There was a sense in which the angularity we increasingly cultivated (anticlimactic 
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impact, pseudoclimactic ash) took advantage of the persistence or the apparent 
pervasiveness of the conditions from which it offered an escape.346  
 
If angularity is a figure of resistance to dominant structures of thought and feeling, then it has to 
be acknowledged that the relation that angularity necessarily depends upon is reproduced in 
one’s commitment to it as a counter-relation. And in that case, then is an asymptotic sprint really 
headed “out” of the system of meaning that reproduces the status-quo? Can the circle be broken? 
Because, as N. puts it, 
No such “out” as it proposed or appeared to posit had any reason to endlessly allude to 
the centrist ordeal from which it flew.347 
 
“Centrist” here invokes three discourses: the center of the circle, whose centripetal force keeps 
one in orbit around it; the center as dominant power to which those in the periphery are always 
defined; and, centrist politics, a politics of “moderation” between political sides, the politics of 
running in place. The trap of defining one’s oppositional position in relation to the center is a 
consistent problem addressed by post-1968 left intellectual thought and politics, appearing as a 
common objection raised regarding identity-based politics of representation and recuperation348 
that were underway in the 1980s-90s. The argument is that if marginalized groups defy the 
stereotypes that have been deployed to oppress us, are we not merely reinforcing those 
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348O’Leary, “Deep Trouble/Deep Treble,” 529. O’Leary uses the word “recuperation” as well: 
“[J]ust as Mackey’s writing is infused with version of loss, he writes not toward recuperation, the 
kind I believe we find in Duncan—Mackey’s telltale model in this endeavor—but toward the 
exacerbation of loss, toward loss as endemic process of the creaking of the word [The Dogon 
name for the weaving block that Mackey writes about in regards to his notion of “discrepant 
engagement” in the introduction to his book of that title: “the noise upon which the word is 
based, the discrepant foundation of all coherence and articulation, of the purchase upon the world 
fabrication affords. Discrepant engagement, rather than suppressing or seeking to silence that 
noise, acknowledges it.”]. [. . .] Instead of recuperation, Mackey sees catastrophe,” what O’Leary 
reads as “a kind of negative capability.” 
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stereotypes by defining ourselves against them? By arguing that women are rational, black 
people are intelligent, gay people are family-friendly, and so forth, we participate in a 
respectability politics that validates the value system in which such binaries order social 
hierarchies —rational/irrational, intelligent/primitive, family-friendly/perverse. What strategy 
then remains? N. continues, 
The insensate rhythm into whose order we’d been inducted maintained neither a directly 
dialectical nor a directly diametrical but an oblique centrifugal relation to the metronomic 
center whose initiatic split between “bottom” and “top” now seemed so remote. One ran 
the risk, we fully realized, of endorsing overstatement in the other direction by appearing 
to ignore such a split or by annulling its catalytic distinction. Such a risk inhabited and 
haunted the need for a new conception it paradoxically fed.349 
 
The difference between dialectical/diametrical (both words suggest binary opposition in this 
case, the stress on “di” in their alliteration) and oblique centrifugal relation brings the 
mathematical figures back into the picture. The diameter of dialectical/diametrical relation is a 
straight line that in the dialectical formula marks the hard division between opposites, and in the 
diametrical the fixed boundary of the circle. The oblique angle, by contrast, is a slanted line that 
moves away from a point indefinitely outward. 
The “center” around which the dialectical/diametrical would relate in this passage is 
described as “metronomic”—time-keeping, rhythm-determining. Djamilaa’s play with rhythm, 
which N. describes as “insensate,” another invocation of ghostliness, of not being able to be 
nailed down. But, N. insists, its insensateness, its defiance of sense, is not strictly defined as such 
by its relation to conventional rhythm (dominant center).350 It seems to leave that center behind, 
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the fundamental experience of music and jazz in particular involves its own time, distinct from 
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the same dominant center in which white is on top and black on bottom (“initiatic split”). This 
would seem to mark then a successful escape from the dominant ideology, having overcome the 
trap of reproducing the dialectical binary (top/bottom, rhythmic/arrhythmic) by simply swapping 
one term for the other (bottom makes it way to the top, sending top to the bottom). Such an 
escape from ideological entrapment is averted in this case, N. suggests, by Djamilaa’s recourse 
to a centrifugal movement that counters the centripetal force of diametrical opposites—i.e., she, 
along with the crowd, gets dizzy with it. 
But N. cautions that it is too soon to celebrate, for this flight runs the new risk of not 
taking into account the historical reality of the force it ostensibly escapes. One has to remember 
and recognize where one came from. There’s a contradiction at hand that can’t be escaped. Any 
“new conception” that would signal successful overthrow of the status-quo into a new order is 
birthed from, and therefore inextricably linked to the need for such a conception in the first 
place. We are thrown back to the paradox: you can’t hear what you don’t yet know, but we want 
to hear what knowledge can’t offer.351 The new conception that Djamilaa inaugurates may not 
take us all the way out, but it’s a start. Mackey is proposing a symbiotic relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the mathematical subdivisions of the clock.  […] If music itself has the ability to transform 
present time, writing follows the fact of music.” Writing, which involves language, Johnston 
argues, involves a fundamental psychoanalytic loss or cut, quoting Kristeva that “language is 
acquired in childhood after the loss of a primal object.” “Writing,” Johnston argues, “is thus 
haunted […] The relation drawn here between language and fallen time is […] a pervasive 
concern in Mackey’s work.” In Hrera and Hrera’s reading of Bedouin Hornbook they write of N., 
following the lead of free jazz musicians, “breaking free of Western time signatures,” the 
percussion in early free jazz, “liberated from its timekeeping role,” as the “music is set adrift […] 
the emphasis on playing ‘outside’ of the ‘acceptable’ harmonic and rhythmic structures of the 
time.” 
 
351Sun Ra, The Immeasurable Equation: The Collected Poetry and Prose (Wartaweil: 
Waitawhile, 2005): 419. Resonance: Sun Ra: “This Myth are these / We be potential / This Myth 




status-quo and revolutionary action, what in other discourses is called total revolution—the 
notion that revolution is never complete, that every new conception that replaces the status quo 
becomes a new status quo that in turns requires a new conception—i.e., successful revolution is 
asymptotic. So that we don’t mistake process for conclusion, resonance for resolution, total 
revolution produces and depends upon cautiousness—that emblematic character of post-1968 
approaches to revolutionary action that I’ve been documenting. What might seem or feel like 
revolutionary success, when put under closer scrutiny, will prove (in the best cases) to be a much 
humbler step in the right direction, on course to destination out. In the worst cases, it will merely 
reproduce the status quo by its susceptibility to capitalist cooption, consumerism, and spectacle. 
“Hold your horses,” N. seems to be saying.352 Ideologies of dominance are not easily overcome, 
and perhaps not overcome at all. If fugitivity is the only option left, that too has its limits—even 
if those limits are meta-articulated as immanent within a politics of fugitivity itself.353 
Furthermore, N’s hesitation provokes us to carry out the same cautious accounting of the 
new conceptions we find in Mackey’s writing itself. While there are many readings of the novel 
and Mackey’s poetics in general that claim the text offers radical revolutionary answers, upon 
closer scrutiny, we observe the same paradoxes at play in the novel that N. so painstakingly 
traces throughout its writing. In fact, the asymptote itself produces a paradox as a figure of 
Mackey’s poetics. 
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O’Leary thinks is apocalyptic, what he identifies in Mackey’s work as a poetics of “catastrophe”: 
“a disruptive end-time that endlessly persists, the revelatory scrolls of the ‘beginningless book 
thought to’ve ended’ that hasn’t. As such, Mackey enacts a kind of gnostic rasp on the world 
poem.” 
 
353Though there are various iterations of fugitivity—ranging from the goal of mere survival to 




Morris argues that Mackey’s asymptotic poetics offers a radical break from 
Enlightenment systems of Reason underwritten by the “logic of mathematics,” writing that 
Mackey’s, “notion of ‘slippage’ suggests a more radical reading practice, a practice which uses 
the generativity of language to undermine the way of knowing whose constraints it brings to 
light … privileging process over outcome. Instead of a ‘right answer’—a logic of mathematics, 
in Ulmer’s terms—we enter instead into the generative logic of semiotics.”354 Morris’s reading 
of Gregory Ulmer’s essay “The Puncept in Grammatology,” suggests that “puncepts” (pun + 
concept) conceptualize an alternative epistemology built on multiplicity, a destabilized system of 
signification that produces another kind of knowledge which is recognizably “postmodern” in the 
Western intellectual tradition at the same time that is old news in non-Western and classical 
traditions, such as Dogon and ancient Greek philosophies. Morris’s approach reflects a wider 
tendency in the literature on Mackey’s postmodern aesthetics, and in Mackey’s own work, to 
contrast the postmodern philosophy of White Europeans (Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, et al) to 
black cultural aesthetics that precede or otherwise exist outside of similar ideas in the former 
set—in order to demonstrate how Mackey’s work performs a “radical break” from Western 
tradition. We see this, for examples, in Edwards’ quotation of James Snead writing about 
“circulation” as an example of the kind counter-hegemonic logic that Mackey’s work participates 
in: 
In black culture, repetition means the thing circulates (exactly in the manner of any flow, 
including capital flows) there is an equilibrium. In European culture, repetition must be 
seen to be not just circulation and flow but accumulation and growth. In black culture, the 
thing (the ritual, the dance, the beat) is ‘there for you to pick up when you come back to 
                                                 




get it.’ If there is a goal (Zweck) in such a culture, it is always deferred; it continually 
‘cuts’ back to the start, in the musical meaning of ‘cut’ as an abrupt, seemingly 
unmotivated break (an accidental da capo) with a series already in progress and a willed 
return to confront accident and rupture not by covering them over but by making room 
for them inside the system itself.355  
Yet the asymptote is squarely a figure of “the logic of mathematics.” As a dominant figure of 
Mackey’s centrifugal poetics, it must then itself be accounted for in terms of its revolutionary 
limitations within Mackey’s own terms: The poetics of mathematics as a figurative system offers 
beautiful conceptions of outness at the same time that it re-inscribes the totalizing impulses of 
European Enlightenment’s colonizing project to represent and order the world. The Calculus 
after all makes the universe infinitely calculable. It wasn’t until the seventeenth century that the 
very notion that “there must exist a simple representation of the world, one that could be 
coordinated with a world of numbers”356 occurred to mathematicians as possible or desirable. 
Yet by the end of that century, European mathematicians had achieved it: “The real world had 
been reinterpreted in terms of the real number.”357 As a symbol of impossibility, the asymptote 
both supports and undoes the rational system that depends upon it. The asymptote—figure of the 
limit, incalculability, and the empty set—emerges within this system as the return of the 
repressed, the lie at the center of the Enlightenment project of knowing the world. But even these 
ghosts of departed quantities find themselves re-inscribed into the project’s domination of the 
world as infinitely knowable. As part of the Calculus, the asymptote is firmly rooted and 
                                                 
355Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 585. 
 
356Berlinksi, A Tour of the Calculus, 9. 
 
357Berlinksi, A Tour of the Calculus, 10. 
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enfolded in the ideology of the European Enlightenment whose project of representation is not 
only an ontological and epistemological one, but an aesthetic and cultural one as well. The 
Enlightenment’s universal subject and the autonomous individual make possible the system of 
social domination that Mackey is writing against, while the aesthetic forms and values it 
produces are used to justify those systems. 
We use the name, “European Enlightenment” to designate the ways in which intellectual 
work of “the long eighteenth century” was supported by and moved forward toward world-
colonizing ends whose consequences we live in the wake of. Yet the term is misleading insofar 
as the European Enlightenment was not a monolithic project. This becomes clear when we turn 
to the work of the period itself, which is full of paradoxes to which various thinkers responded in 
diverse ways that reflected their political investments. Kant, Hegel, and Diderot, for example, 
each pushed back in their own ways against the colonizing tendencies of Enlightenment 
rationalism.358 Which is to say that since the beginning of the Enlightenment, people have been 
variously fighting against or otherwise taking flight from the totalizing impulses of its 
commitments to reason, individualism, and progress. In that sense, the asymptote as a structuring 
principle of the poetics of Mackey’s novel returns us to the beginning of a struggle that the 
asymptote both symbolizes and participates in, placing the liberatory poetics of the late twentieth 
                                                 
358Kant critiqued the limits of rationality by arguing how all scientific or rational inquiry 
presumed the existence of some stable object “out there;” however, since every object cannot be 
proven to exist separate from the subject who observes it, the logic of scientific rationalism 
encountered a limit according to Kant: rationality relied on a notion of the observable object 
whose existence had to be posited but could not be observed (i.e., “noumenon”), but which was 
nonetheless taken as the foundation of scientific inquiry. Hegel’s critique comes at rationalism 
from a different point, arguing that subject and object can neither be separated nor joined, but 
must be seen to be part of a dialectical oscillation in which both are co-constitutive; and it is only 
rationalism’s tendency to privilege pragmatic and material outcomes over processes that leads to 
the mistaken view that either the subject or object should be privileged as one being more stable 
and real over the other. 
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century within an intellectual, cultural, and aesthetic history that stretches back to the 
seventeenth century. We are still in it.359 In other words, what we recognize is that fugitivity is 
immanent to the Enlightenment itself. The Enlightenment is always undoing itself.  Mackey 
continually asks: How do you find a way out by critique if the critique is already itself inside?  
When the Scarab moves one block east, have we impossibly crossed the asymptotic line 
or has the asymptote retreated one block east itself? In his analysis of Mackey’s “utopian poetics 
of the cut” in From a Broken Bottle, Anthony Reed observes that “[u]ncertainty is an obscured 
component within the prevailing ontological notions, requiring that we imagine an ecstatic ‘out,’ 
which may be involuntary or unwilled.”360 Reframed by my historical account, I would argue 
that such moments of “outness” as occur in the band’s (and audience’s) performance of 
“Bottomed Out” are flashes361 of “Enlightenment Reason’s” undoing of itself—involuntary and 
unwilled because it’s continuously happening. In that sense “out” is immanent in both the sense 
that it has already arrived and that it is paradoxically “inside.” In “Destination Out,” Mackey 
writes that centrifugal work begins at the “horizon it wants to get beyond.” The horizon is a 
limit—as we move toward the horizon, it recedes: the limits that bound us are always being 
reconstituted, such that “out” as a destination is also always on the move. Destination Out then 
would seem to be defined more by the movement we make then where we end up—infinite 
                                                 
359Fred Moten, The Feel Trio (Tucson: Letter Machine Editions, 2014): 65. Resonance: Fred 
Moten: “I ran from it and was still in it.” 
 
360Mackey, FBB, 195. 
 
361Harris, Selected Essays, 49; Terri Francis, "Cosmologies of Black Cultural Production: A 
Conversation with Afrosurrealist Filmmaker Christopher Harris," Film Quarterly 69.4 (2016): 
47-56. Filmmaker Christopher Harris, talking about Mackey’s influence on his filmmaking, says, 
“But what I like about it [Bedouin Hornbook] is that it’s about how flashes of revelation, 
illumination or insight, are so fleeting that once you grasp them they’re gone. You have to let 
them be in order to engage them. You can’t fix them. That’s what I like about the book a lot: it’s 
about not being able to fix experience or insight.” 
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approach to the asymptotic limit that is always out of reach. In this sense, the aesthetics of 
fugitivity, like the novel’s form, is processual, but that doesn’t mean the movement itself is the 
destination. The horizon is also a point of intersection—where the earth’s surface meets the sky: 
a perceptual representation of a real place in the world. The horizon too is a circular boundary 
that defines the shape of the rotating, revolving earth. “Horizon” in these latter two senses comes 
into the English language in the fourteenth century, but it was only in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries that it began to be used to described conceptual limits. “The horizon we 
want to get beyond” is this representational system that bounds our thought at the same time that 
it produces it, which is always already trying to get outside of itself. The question remains: How 
do you find a way out by critique if the critique is already itself inside?  
One response to the question is to take it as a challenge that must be creatively answered. 
But I want to suggest that when we begin to understand that “Enlightenment Reason” is not an 
external force to be overcome or escaped, but an historical occurrence, then we leave aside 
transhistorical questions of transcendence,362 immanence363 or essential conditions,364 and may 
instead perceive the particularity of our moment in relation to a larger historical struggle in 
which we participate—Glissant’s “totality,” Jameson’s “cognitive map,” Wallerstein’s “world-
                                                 
362O’Leary, “Deep Trouble/Deep Treble,” 531. “Mackey fends off apocalypse by mastering time 
in his verse.” 
 
363Reed, Freedom Time, 173. “The challenge, I argue, is to see the diversity of textual 
elements as necessary, as harbingers of the genuinely new that does not come as 
a break with this time but from within this time. Serial work extends the boundaries 
of the text, making the literary production a kind of running subtheme, an 
explicit object of thought.” 
 
364Edwards, “Notes on Poetics,” 586. “[A]bsence or alienability is the condition of the unfolding 
poetic search in the Songs of the Andoumboulou, precisely because it is the constitutive condition 
of being [my emphasis]—even if that condition is one human narratives of grounding and origin 
endlessly attempt to deny or heal.” 
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system,” and so forth—in order to strategically enact political change. In the physics of sound, 
resonance is the prolonged sound made by reflection from a surface or by the 
synchronous vibration of a neighboring object—a way of mapping365 an enclosed space by 
echolocation. Resonance over resolution, but also resonance over revolution—Mackey’s 
asymptotic serial work does not give us the tools to overcome or escape history,366 rather it gives 
us to the tools to map out the terrain and terms of the struggle. The horizon is an impossible 
destination shaped by the sphere that is the Earth—the locale of our struggle. What we need is a 
map of that terrain, a map of its area. Mackey’s asymptotic aesthetic produces a linguistic 
echolocation—resonance filling the sphere with sound—to bring that totality impossibly into 
sonic-linguistic view. When we have that map, we’ll know where to strike. This is the promise of 
the poetic producing the (im)possibility of politics. 
The paradoxical nature of revolution that Mackey highlights with his asymptotic method 
of analysis and poetic meaning-making Susan Howe extends to a wider field of contradiction, 
and contra-diction, that lies at the root of American history, culture, and literary production. As I 
turn now to study two of her major creative-critical works from the 1980-90s, Roberson’s 
labyrinth and Mackey’s asymptote, as figures that tenuously and ambiguously suggest escape 
and enclosure, will continue to resonate in Howe’s poetic excavation of American history and 
literature. 
                                                 
365Titlestead, “Contesting Maps,” 35. “Bedouin Hornbook is exceptional in that it links 
improvised music and discourse on all levels, eschewing the allegory [music: literature] in favour 
of the proliferation of meaning and the endless evasion of certainty. Its success seems an 
important instance of mapping as a material instance of the production of what it represents, and 
what it represents is precisely the proliferation of tactics.” 
 
366Naylor, Poetic Investigation, 95.  Naylor similarly observes, “N. is particularly concerned that 
his efforts with the band not be seen as an attempt to resolve the oppositions in history in order to 
get ‘outside’ history.”  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CANDOR IS THE ONLY WILE: CONTRADICTION AND 
COMMUNION IN SUSAN HOWE’S MY EMILY DICKINSON AND THE BIRTH-MARK 
 
Antinomian Beginnings: U.S. American Contradictions 
 
Both of Susan Howe’s major creative-critical works, My Emily Dickinson (1985) and The 
Birth-mark: unsettling the wilderness in American literary history (1993) are framed by an 
interest in the U.S. antinomian tradition—as a religious movement, as an historical event, and as 
a secular term for anti-authoritarianism. All three of these senses of the term come together in 
Howe’s study of women writers of U.S. American literary history whose work was invested in 
resisting definition as an act of contradiction. 
In The Birth-mark, Howe argues that contradiction is sewn into the fabric of U.S. 
American identity. The founding contradictions involved in making a frontier of a land already 
inhabited; the necessary contradiction involved in fleeing religious persecution in order to enact 
religious persecution: the necessary contradictions involved in the development of a language to 
navigate the social and political contradictions of “separating nonSeparatists.”367 In Howe’s 
account, the binary that post-1968 U.S. writers are trying to find a way out of through a poetics 
of multiplicity, is an originary and essential characteristic of the U.S. and its language(s), as 
documented in the archive of its texts. Every textual rock one turns over reveals this foundational 
paradox:  e plurubis unum—out of many, one—aspires at once to multiplicity and authoritarian 
domination. The nation’s motto is semantically ambiguous: does the nation forgo the usual sense 
of “oneness” that does not recognize multiplicity; or are the many subsumed, through 
                                                 
367Howe, TBM, 3. 
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assimilation or oppression, to a necessarily singular national identity? “As if speech must always 
recall sensation to order, the covenantal dialect installed its particular violences; its singular body 
and monologue of command expressions.”368 Howe excavates the layers of contradiction buried 
in U.S. language practices from the seventeenth century to the present by innovating a feminist 
critical poetics. The undoing of language that such poststructural projects enacts is not unique to 
the U.S. but Howe’s work illustrates how its practice and meaning in the U.S. is historically 
particular to its context and so runs into its own problems and anxieties. Howe sees in these early 
American texts the roots of what is otherwise considered a contemporary problem: “One moral 
sense soon cancels another in a country of progress and force.”369 Americans are continually 
trying to justify their moral contradictions. As “separting Nonseparatists” the colonial settlers 
“tried to bury their guilt [for the execution of King Charles.] […] In America the regicides were 
heroes—in England, villains.” 370 The settlers occupied both territories of identification—were 
susceptible to the national myths of both the old and new countries, which when internalized (as 
ideology always is) produced a conflict that would shape their national stories and language in 
contradiction. Howe traces this phenomenon in the landscape of other writers’ texts as well as 
her own—placing her own practice within the field of texts placed under her and her reader’s 
critical examination. 
In what follows, I study the unresolved contradictions in Howe’s work—those she 
documents and those she activates—as she discloses the contradictions in things, actions, and 
people, including herself, at the same time that she engages in the act of contradiction: going 
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369Howe, TBM, 127. 
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against the grain, defying, refusing, resisting. I have identified a series of subjects in Howe’s 
work for which contradiction is a fundamental characteristic and consequence of its study: The 
European colonial settling of America; lines of kinship; being a woman in predominantly 
male/masculine creative and intellectual traditions; the use and interpretation of language; the 
social and political pressures that determine authorial choice in the writing, editing, and 
circulation of textual compositions; the desire for human connection and communion in the 
figure of love; and, the relationship between self and other. I present these subjects as distinct yet 
in reality they are interwoven and at times collapse into one another. Kinship, in particular, 
emerges in Howe’s work as a master thread entwining each of the other subjects, which is to say 
that Relation is a dominant concern. Each of the threads produces a limit that keeps Howe 
questioning the relations between things, situating her work in this post-1968 moment in which 
resolution is not only undesirable but impossible. For these writers, contradictions are productive 
tools of study rather than problems to overcome—which is usually achieved by denial, 
suppression, or obfuscation. Howe’s unique contribution is to leave her own contradictions 
visible as she teaches her readers to see and sit with them.   
A number of scholars have commented on the contradictions involved in Howe’s writing, 
but they consistently make arguments that resolve those contradictions, either by showing them 
to not be contradictions after all or by arguing for the positive or generative aspect of 
contradiction. While my project is sympathetic to this latter move, I try to leave open the 
possibility that Howe’s contradictions may not always be recuperable to the goals of avant-garde 
or otherwise oppositional poetics, but may in fact be symptomatic of a larger cultural 
phenomenon among writers of the post-1968 period who were trying to balance competing ideas 
and feelings about the field of liberatory poetic practice. John Paletella recommends that 
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“contiguities” is a better descriptor than contradictions for the multiplicities that we find in 
Howe’s writing. In response to a section of My Emily Dickinson in which Howe explicates 
several possible interpretations of the phrase “My Life” in Dickinson’s poem, for example, 
Palatella reflects: 
My first impulse was to define these listed meanings to be contradictions (the first and 
second are "A Soul finding God" and "A Soul finding herself") but I think that they are 
contiguities. To label an idea a contradiction is to define it in terms of a norm, but on 
Howe's terms "My Life" tries to evade such a system. Paradigmatic constraints, though, 
still define possibilities. […] Norms exist but are not definitive or secure. Not one of the 
possible meanings of “My Life” is designated the primary, explanatory allegory, so to 
dwell in Possibility is to negotiate the interstices between the possible allegorical 
meanings of “My Life.”371  
 
I agree with Palatella’s analysis except that I think “contradiction” is a word that does suggest 
the need to “negotiate the interstices” that bring words or ideas into tension with one another—
i.e., observing contradictions does not imply the need for resolution. It is precisely my contention 
that contradiction is an engine of resonance.372 
                                                 
371John Paletlla, "An End of Abstraction: An Essay on Susan Howe's Historicism." Denver 
Quarterly 29.3 (1995): 74-97. Reprint in Poetry Criticism 54 (Detroit, MI: Gale, 2004): np. 
 
372Quartermain, Disjunctive Poetics, 183, 189, 2; Clark, 371, 372, 381; Nichols, “Tensing the 
Difference,” 40. Quartermain identifies contradiction—what he calls “tension”—as fundamental 
to Howe’s poetics: “I think that the great energy of Howe’s writing arises from a series of 
tensions, between the more-or-less explicit themes and subject matter of the work, and the 
unstated verbal and schematic activity of the poem (between the algorithmic and the heuristic 
might be one way to put it); between Howe’s enchanted fascination with and desperate 
possession by history and with language, and her intense desire to be free of them; between her 
desire for the secure, the stable, and the defined, and her apprehension of them as essentially 
false; between her impassioned attraction to, and sheer terror of, the wilderness.” On the 
enigmatic opening line of Howe’s “Scattering as Behavior Toward Risk”—to which Howe offers 
a footnote to its original source that documents Melville’s manuscript markings for Billy Budd, 
Quartermain is able to “decode”—Quartermain comments, “It may indeed look as though Howe 
is trying to eat her cake and have it, using the footnote reference as a source, using it to declare 
that this writing, so difficult to sort out and decipher, so uncompromising in its eschewal of 
conventional meaning, so determined in its rejection of conventionally intelligible syntax, is after 
all not eschewing or rejecting those things, but is instead actually decodable, is indeed ‘about’ 
something, does have a paraphraseable content.” Quartmermain does not seek to resolve the 
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contradictions, instead arguing that the “resulting tension is not only one source of energy for the 
poem […] it also, in grounding the language of the poem in the perceived and physical world, 
reminds us that language is, itself, physical, the perceived and felt world,” thus supporting his 
larger intention to place Howe’s “disjunctive poetics” in the objectivist tradition, in which an 
approach to poems as everyday objects of the world provokes a kind of defamiliarization that 
“challenge our assumptions about the process of reading, about what constitutes ‘value,’ about 
knowledge and about ‘knowing.’” Clark makes a compelling case for understanding Howe’s 
critical and creative practice in the tradition of pragmatist philosophy, arguing that such an 
alignment “complicates critical narratives of estrangement and disruption that have been used to 
describe the work of difficult poetry in the twentieth century, offering in their place an 
understanding of knowledge as evolving, grounded in experience and inquiry, and inherently 
fallible; of inquiry as communal; and of thought itself as a continuum.” The pragmatist lens 
accounts, in Clark’s view, for what otherwise makes Howe’s practice hard to pin down, or 
contradictory, offering “a Peircean semiotics that challenges both feminist narratives of 
recuperation and postmodern narratives of disruption, fragmentation, and linguistic 
disintegration,” as “Peirce advances a concept of the real that is associated with infinite inquiry 
and tied to an infinite future in which ‘reasonableness’ is advanced through inquiry and 
experience.” The pragmatist connection is to some degree obvious: Howe’s interest and intense 
critical and creative engagement with the American pragmatist philosophers and her later 
marriage to a professor of pragmatist philosophy. Clark’s is the first study that demonstrates how 
this connection is expressed in Howe’s poetics itself. That said, the distinction between 
pragmatism and other philosophical or critical traditions that Clark relies on, is not developed 
enough beyond brief quotations and summaries whose formulas don’t, on their own terms, seem 
particularly distinct from the postmodern philosophies she seems to be calling into contrast. For 
example, Clark’s summary of what she identifies as “four basic, enduring elements of Peirce’s 
thought: his understanding of knowledge as communal rather than individual, of ideas as fallible, 
of thought as continuous through inquiry and experienced, and of the real as teleological, the 
summum bonum toward which human inquiry, reflection, and reasoning move”—does not seem 
inconsistent with the postmodern philosophies and theories of Glissant, Derrida, Foucault, 
Jameson, Kristeva, de Man, et al. What is instructive for me about this observation is that when 
we as literary scholars make connections between literary practices and philosophies, it is more 
productive to think about how those philosophical discourses are woven into the poetic 
imagination of the writer than to attempt to map an entire philosophical system onto the poetry or 
vice-a-versa. The way Clark brings her readings of Howe in relation to her readings of 
pragmatist philosophy helps me better understand elements of Howe’s work, but I’m not sure it 
is necessary nor helpful to nail down Howe’s practice to a single philosophical sensibility, since 
she draws from many traditions and sensibilities. Being a poet rather than a philosopher, Howe is 
not bound to one over the others. In that regard, I find really helpful Miriam Nichols opening to 
her essay, “Tensing the Difference,” in which she offers a useful summary of the different 
theories and philosophies of “difference” and then makes an argument for why we should not 
worry about choosing one over another. Instead, she asserts: “What I can do, however, is model a 
particular kind of reading that aims to preserve and contextualize the different vocabularies and 
textual strategies of my writers, with an eye to promoting a cultural ecology of the arts rather 
than a market-like economy of competition and obsolescence.” 
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 I will begin my analysis by moving through her two major creative-critical works 
drawing out her critiques of the exclusive nature of canon formations, textual editing practices 
that close otherwise open texts, and dominant hermeneutic practices that privilege definitive 
interpretations over multiplicity. Then, I will look at how Howe’s aesthetic responds to these 
problems by developing a liberatory poetics that prefers resonance over resolution—through 
formal innovation and a commitment to love over reason. 
The foundational contradiction for Howe’s work as a writer is her training in a male-
dominated, masculine literary and intellectual tradition that, as much as she critiques it, is still a 
home to her. Her love for literature and philosophy was nurtured in a space that excluded her 
participation as a woman, a tension that shapes her innovative practice as she navigates a creative 
and intellectual field full of traps. “Rungs of escape and enclosure,” she writes, “are compelling 
and confusing.” In the one-page introduction to My Emily Dickinson, Howe opens with a one-
sentence paragraph: “My book is a contradiction of its epigraph.”373 The epigraph she refers to is 
a passage from William Carlos Williams’ In the American Grain, in which he writes about Emily 
Dickinson: “Never a woman: never a poet.” In that sense, Howe’s book says the opposite: Emily 
Dickinson is a poet; women are poets. But the first half of this first sentence—an independent 
clause—says also: “My book is a contradiction.” Howe disapproves of Williams’ ideas about 
Dickinson, “But,” she writes, “I love his book.” Howe struggles with this contradiction 
throughout her critical writing: “The ambiguous paths of kinship pull me in opposite 
directions.”374 At times she is critical of those men who have become her kin—the path leading 
to their encounter becomes an ambiguous one since they speak to her insofar as she is compelled 
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by what they say; but they also refuse to speak to her as their words exclude her as a woman 
from the conversation. At other times, she jumps to their defense. On Williams’ statement about 
women and poetry, she says: “I think that he says one thing and means another. A poet is never 
just a woman or a man,” suggesting that Williams is not concerned with essential sexual 
differences and that we should read him more generously and not get distracted by gender 
politics. Throughout her critical work, at the same time that she takes pains to document the way 
sexism is stitched into the fabric of American culture, Howe consistently expresses a desire to 
“transcend gender,”375 to leave this trouble behind rather than have to struggle against it.376 
Pulled in opposite directions, she doesn’t cover up the contradictions, doesn’t resolve them, as 
they at once activate the inquiry and disrupt it. She doesn’t tame her personal investment: love 
produces trouble. “A great poet” Howe writes of Dickinson’s relation to literary tradition, 
“carrying the antique imagination of her fathers, requires each reader to leap from a place of 
certain signification, to a new situation, undiscovered and sovereign. She carries intelligence of 
the past into the future of our thought by reverence and revolt.”377 This paradox of the co-
presence of contradictory terms, “reverence and revolt,” is deeply embedded and productive in 
Howe’s work, particularly in relation to male/masculine tradition and authority, as I will discuss 
below, but also more generally in terms of how to navigate the literary and intellectual traditions 
that Howe both loves and resents, as she allows her critique to register her conflicted feelings. 
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376DuPlessis, The Pink Guitar, 125. DuPlessis similarly observes: “She maintains a Woolfean 
admiration for the odd and quirky, the resistant and wayward. And makes fruitful a subtle play 
between determinate meaning and indeterminacy: a woman—a person mainly gendered 
female—writing ‘feminine’ discourses, knowing and rewriting ‘masculine’ discourses, in the 
name of a feminist and critical cultural project which wants to transcend gender.” 
 
377Howe, MED, 85. 
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Reverence and Revolt: Contradicting Feminism 
 
Howe is widely regarded as a feminist poet and critic, but her relationship to feminism is 
vexed. Howe comments in an interview, “Well, I am not a critic. And that’s where I disagree 
with a good many feminist critics. I think that when you write a poem you use sounds and words 
outside time. You use timeless articulation.”378 This desire to transcend gender is clearly a 
reaction to an identity-based brand of feminism of the 1980s-90s that Howe resents. She is wary 
of poetry and criticism based in an identity politics that lacks radical formal innovation. In a 
comment about her 1987 book of poetry, Articulations of Sounds Forms in Time, Howe writes, 
"It would have been easy to end on the second to last poem as I have done in readings of it and 
which makes it more overtly feminist. It's too easy that way. There are no answers and life is 
hard. Hart Crane leaped off the boat to his death; Hope Atherton was treated like a fool-like Pip 
in Moby. Melville and Dickinson died in obscurity.”379 In this comment, we see Howe pitting 
her own feminism against her formal commitment to open field poetics—the former supplying 
easy answers while the latter, she argues, respects complexity. Returning to the nineteenth 
century, Howe argues that for Dickinson, “who was geographically separated from European 
custom, the past, that sovereign source, must break poetic structure open for future absorption of 
words and definition.” The need to “break poetic structure open” is an argument to which Howe 
is committed to in the literary battles of her own time, when different schools of poetry were 
drawing lines in the sand about what politically engaged poetry should look and sound like.380 
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379qtd in Perloff, “Collision or Collusion with History,” 532. 
 
380Throughout Howe’s critical writings, she wages an argument about politics and poetry that 
returns us to the collection of essays Charles Bernstein edited in 1989, The Politics of Poetic 
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Howe’s stance is that it isn’t enough to write about social transformation, poetic form must enact 
it. 
Howe traces this division in the literary history she studies. Critiquing the poetry of one 
of Dickinson’s nineteenth-century British literary sources, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Howe 
writes that “she thought the formal linear plot of a poem was enough for its telling,” a belief 
symptomatic of the larger cultural resistance to formal innovation—a resistance Howe elsewhere 
discusses as endemic to twentieth-century literary permissions: “Victorian scientists, 
philosophers, historians, intellectuals, poets, like most contemporary feminist literary critics—
eager to discuss the shattering of all hierarchies of Being—didn’t want the form they discussed 
this in to be shattering.”381 Howe is clearly annoyed. In multiple interviews she has similarly 
pointed out that the kind of formal innovation—formal shattering—that has been allowed and 
celebrated in other arts such as painting has not been embraced when it’s done with language, 
since language’s stability as a representative system is understood as too precious and necessary 
to take the risk. “This is because words are used as buoys, and if they start to break up … Then 
everything goes because words connect us to life.”382  
In Howe’s critique of Higginson at the end of My Emily Dickinson, in a coda or appendix 
titled “Thomas Wentworth Higginson: 1823-1922,” she points out how progressive and even 
radical his politics were, fighting for Women’s Rights the liberation of black Americans before, 
during and after the Civil War, recording and publishing black music, as well as encouraging the 
literary pursuits of “intellectually ambitious women.” “All his life,” Howe writes, “Higginson at 
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introductory chapter of the dissertation. 
381Howe, MED, 116. 
 




heart a gentle person, was fascinated by wanderers, outlaws, and rebels.”383 Yet, she argues, his 
“lack of imaginative intensity” caused him to overlook and dismiss the most radical formal 
interventions in literary production, “deaf to the rebellion, the act of lonely daring, in the poetry 
of Emily Dickinson,”384 among other innovators Howe admires such as Melville.385  
Furthermore, Howe’s feminism is wary of the project of recuperation both because it 
does little to unsettle the logic of oppressive power structures—“Instead of questioning the idea 
of power itself, many women want to assume power”386—and because it privileges gender 
inclusion at the cost of what she considers sound literary judgment—“[W]hitman is simply in 
another league from Lydia Sigourney, Helen Hunt Jackson, or T.W. Higginson for that matter. 
It’s no good for Women’s Studies departments to pretend this isn’t so. What will that solve?”387 
In this latter vein, Howe holds to a position that great women poets, like Dickinson, transcend 
the social world of gender difference. In her interview with Ed Foster, reprinted at the end of the 
The Birth-mark, she comments, “So here, while I am trying to believe and think I do believe that 
genius transcends gender, sometimes I honestly wonder”388—a position that could easily label 
her a “bad feminist.” But, as the latter part of this comment (“sometimes I honestly wonder”) 
suggests, Howe’s training in a tradition of transcendent genius is challenged by the material 
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evidence that she finds in the archives and in her own experience. She is constantly trying to 
reconcile this rift in her own intuition. For example, she writes, “A subject I would truly love to 
write on—but I know it’s way too much and I never will—is the feminine in Melville. There has 
to be a reason why his writing speaks so directly to me.”389 There is a kind of desperation 
beneath her “there has to be a reason”—a kind of hope or pleading that explains why she would 
love someone who wouldn’t recognize or appreciate her. Is it a rationalization? Yes. Which 
doesn’t mean there is no truth to what she reads in Melville. He may write against the dominant 
in ways that align Melville and Howe politically and socially, but to claim his work as 
“feminine” belies a desire to resolve a tension that Howe is not sure can be resolved. Paul Naylor 
doesn’t see, or chooses not to see, the tension. He writes, 
In reading Williams against his own “grain,” Howe simultaneously points at and beyond 
gender. Throughout My Emily Dickinson, she sustains a poetic assault against essentialist 
notions of gender that would reduce to only “men” and “women.” Instead, she posits a 
more inclusive category, “poets,” and list qualities that obtain in both men and women 
poets—being “salted with fire,” being a “mirror” or “transcriber.” As she writes in the 
final paragraph of her book, “poetry is the great stimulation of life. Poetry leads past 
possession of self to transfiguration beyond gender.” It would be a great mistake to see 
Howe’s move “beyond gender” as a lack of concern with gender; there is in all of Howe’s 
work a persistent investigation of how gender both confines human to and releases them 
from assigned roles. […] Howe is very concerned with the ways in which issues of 
gender affect literary history.390 
 
Naylor jumps to Howe’s defense, offering weak arguments for why she really is a good feminist 
by resorting to empty emphases, insisting that she “is very concerned” with feminist issues 
without explaining what makes him say so. He thus tries to resolve what can’t be resolved in 
Howe’s relationship to gender politics. He then tries to leave the issue behind by reducing 
Howe’s intervention to a merely formal one, arguing: “In short, Howe’s version of feminism 
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involves an investigation of poetic form as a means by which women writers intervene in 
culture.”391 I agree that this is the part of her feminism that is most clearly articulated and the 
easiest to document, but I don’t think it accounts for all of her feminism, which is complicated 
and in-process.  
Sometimes her feminist critique of the literary and philosophical canon is relentless and 
full of fire. And at others, she seems almost embarrassed by that kind of project and returns to an 
aesthetic commitment that would transcend the weeds of social critique. In a 2010 Kelly Writers 
House interview with Al Filreis,392 when pushed to explain what he interprets as a critique of 
masculine abstraction in a passage from My Emily Dickinson, Howe says “My Emily Dickinson 
is early angry work. I’m not so angry anymore.”393 Similarly, in another interview conducted 
only 4-5 years after My Emily Dickinson’s publication, she comments, “First I wanted to fight, 
but now I think it’s more important to just keep writing poems.”394 While her feminism can itself 
be recuperated to the radical aesthetic projects of avant-garde poetics in which gender identity is 
not central,395 I think she struggles with it, largely because of the tradition in which she is trying 
to place herself, even as an act of intervention—defying her exclusion—she nonetheless respects 
                                                 
391Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 67. 
 
392Apropos, Filreis constantly interrupts and talks loudly over Howe in this interview, in which 
his ostensible enthusiasm and respect for her work is overshadowed by what appears to be an 
unregulated mode of male dominance bordering on downright mansplaining. 
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Howe knows there are contradictions in her relationship to the material that she studies 
with love; she names them: 
I am drawn toward the disciplines of history and literary criticism but in the dawning 
distance a dark wall of rule supports the structure of every letter, record, transcript: every 
proof of authority and power. I know records are compiled by winners, and scholarship is 
in collusion with Civil Government. I know this and go on searching for some trace of 
love’s infolding through all the paper in all the libraries I come to.396 
 
In this passage, Howe puts into opposition “love” and “authority and power,” forces that are 
expressed in and structure the archive and state rule, maintaining that the texts we find in 
libraries are themselves records of both. But what she also suggests is that authority and power 
are these books’ explicit content, what we encounter on the surface, while love is found as a 
trace of itself, necessarily extinguished by authority and power yet remaining, there to be found 
in the material by way of feeling it. Or that is both the hope and the gamble of her critical 
reading method. But one has to wonder if Howe disavows too strongly her attraction to the 
authority and power of books, even as she is excited to find this other thing. She is wrestling with 
something, and she doesn’t hide her struggle, because her project is to bring contradictory 
elements together in order to split them open.397 398 
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398 Harack. "Representing Alterity,” 446. For example, while Harack characterizes Howe as 
“averse to traditional academic analysis,” I think “averse” is too strong. Howe is wary at the 
same time that she is drawn to traditional academic analysis. She doesn’t turn entirely away from 
it. There’s also a foil being constructed here, since many of those whom she admires could be 
said to have conformed to the conventions of traditional academic analysis—Perry Miller, F.O. 
Matthiessen, Howe’s father, et al. I think then what we have to recognize is a contemporary 
institutional context that Howe and Harack are reacting to—a particularly post-1968 
institutionalization and professionalization of academic study that has come to even more 
trenchantly define “the academy” as we know it today, in which careerism takes precedence over 
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In response to a question about how her work “involves the intersection of several 
different traditions,” Howe answers: 
I am not sure what intersections and traditions you mean. 
 
Often I think of myself as an interloper and an imposter. 
 
Something Nietzsche wrote I copied out because it both helps and haunts me. “People 
still hold the view that what is handed down to us by tradition is what in reality lies 
behind us—while it in fact comes towards us because we are its captives and are destined 
to it.” 
 
Because I am a woman I am fated to read his beautiful observation as double-talk of 
extraordinary wisdom and rejection. Us and we are disruptions. These two small words 
refuse to be absorbed into proper rank in the linear sequence of his sentence. Every 
sentence has its end. Every day is broken by evening. A harrowing reflection is cast on 
meaning by gaps in grammar, aporias of historic language.399 
 
Howe finds herself caught in paradox as she admires and finds compelling the recorded thoughts 
of male writers who are constantly reproducing the structure of the male imagination. She can’t 
reject entirely what Nietzsche says, as she finds “his beautiful observations” compelling and 
compatible with her own ideas about the relationship of the past to the present.  What can she do 
with this problem, except to just keep pointing it out? She constantly catches herself: “I seem to 
have wandered away to the monument of Melville when you asked me about women and the 
community of Poetry.”400 She quotes Kenneth Burke—“Ahab was pursued by the white whale 
he was pursuing.”401  
Similarly, on Foucault’s influence on Howe’s work, she writes: “Foucault’s influence is 
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problematic. This wide-ranging philosopher and library cormorant’s eloquent, restless, 
passionate interrogation of how we have come to be the way we are remains inside the margins 
of an intellectual enclosure constructed from memories, meditations, delusions, and literary or 
philosophical speculations of European men.”402  She admires him but also recognizes the 
limitations that his influence reproduces in her own work, implied by calling his influence 
“problematic.” She doesn’t say Foucault himself is problematic, she says his influence is 
“problematic.” In that way she doesn’t (just) distance herself from him. She wants to distance 
herself perhaps, but can’t totally. She still loves him. “I hope to stray”403 she writes.404 The 
longing and uncertainty of the word “hope” is telling.  
As we will see, when Howe is talking about Emily Dickinson’s work, she is confident in 
her defense of values that are otherwise occluded—hesitation, incompleteness, and other 
characteristics coded feminine. But there’s a standard of mastery to which she still aspires that is 
caught up in the values she wants to critique. For example, in a 1989 interview that concludes 
The Birth-mark, she describes her process of working on an essay called “Loss of First Love,” 
about the Mathers—a subject that her father knew well. She writes, “I was all caught up in it and 
thought it was wonderful. But it was weak. Weak because the ghosts of my father and [American 
intellectual] Perry Miller just prevented me from having any confidence.”405 It is interesting that 
she uses the word “weak” here to describe what she thought made the essay inadequate and 
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worth abandoning.406 Weakness is a feminized characteristic. Much like Howe asks of the 
otherwise denigrated act of “hesitation,”407 one might ask what a positive weakness makes 
possible that strength otherwise can’t hear or say. Instead, Howe opposes weakness to a 
confidence she wants to possess, reflecting on the way the male intellectual figures in her life 
made her feel unwelcome and inadequate as a woman in the tradition in which she aspired to 
participate. She wants to fit in to this tradition and doesn’t fit in, and she’s not entirely sure how 
to feel about that. The stakes of this contradiction are deeply personal, as Howe struggles with 
the contradictions involved in being a woman writer following a lineage that excluded women 
out of hand. She is not willing to disavow her heroes but is not silent on their exclusionary 
practices and how those exclusions have shaped the tradition of American literary production 
and study that is the subject of her work. Miriam Marty Clark demonstrates how critics who have 
argued that Howe’s work is part of a feminist “revisionist project” contra a male-dominated and 
misogynist literary canon have opted to overlook Howe’s complicated relationship to the deeply 
sexist literary tradition in which she was trained by strategically quoting her critiques of male 
figures in the American literary tradition while leaving out her expression of debt to and love for 
them: “Howe’s vigorous defense of [Perry] Miller’s work suggests that she understands her 
intellectual and scholarly inheritance […] as more complex and historically situated than [Brian] 
McHale, [Ming-Qian Ma], and others suggest.”408 
Howe says that she knows the library is a tool of the ruling class—of settler colonial 
patriarchal “civil government”: 
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The selection of particular examples from a large group is always a social act. […] 
Knowledge, no matter how I get it, involves exclusion and repression. National histories 
hold ruptures and hierarchies. On the scales of global power, what gets crossed over? 
Foreign accents mark dialogues that delete them. Ambulant vagrant bastardy comes 
looking through assurance and sanctification.409 
 
Not everything that is written makes it into the library—i.e, the canon—and the criteria by which 
selections are made often reflect the values of the dominant class. “Assurance and sanctification” 
occlude any expression of hesitation or doubt by erasing the voices that express them—either by 
excision or distortion. Knowing this, can Howe continue to love the books that are in the library, 
knowing that they only made it there, only survived, because they could somehow serve this 
oppressive power?410 In order to say “Yes,” Howe develops a mode of reading within the canon 
what is without: “When we move through the positivism of literary canons and master 
narratives,” she writes, “we consign ourselves to the legitimation of power, chains of inertia, an 
apparatus of capture.”411 It sounds like we are trapped, but Howe offers here a distinction, a way 
out: there is the positivism of what is included, but that means there is an alternative: to move 
through the negativism of the library catalog, to read what is excluded, as the absence leaves a 
trace of what is missing. Reading the positive content leaves us trapped by institutional forces, 
but reading the negative content, we stand a chance of escaping those forces. Katrina Harack 
connects this relationship to the authority of canons to Howe’s “open” form: “The result is a 
poetics that is based, not on authority, but on questions, on the quest for knowledge, and on the 
search for historical and artistic antecedents—a poetics whose very form remains open, difficult 
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to paraphrase, and resistant to communicating a direct message or sentiment” 412 In practice, 
however, we read and are seduced by both the positivism and negativism of the literary canons 
and master narratives to which we are drawn. Howe is pulled in at the same time that she 
struggles to get out—a contradiction that she does not disavow. 
Nonetheless, Howe’s distinction between positive and negative movements through the 
canon asks us to consider the potential difference between any work itself and the way it is 
deployed, catalogued, retrieved: canonization can, perhaps always does, distort the original 
intention. In a conversation with Ed Foster about how few women poets are regarded as 
important influences on recognized poets, Foster says that Ashbery’s debt to Stein is an 
exception. Howe replies, 
There are always exceptions. […] But I haven’t heard that much about Ashbery and 
Stein. I hear about Ashbery and Stevens, Ashbery and Emerson, Ashbery and O’Hara, 
seldom Ashbery and Stein. This is not Ashbery’s fault. In fact, he is going to talk about 
Laura Riding in his lectures at Harvard this year. It’s what critics do with him. It’s what 
canonization does to everyone.413 
 
Should we have ever not known this distinction? Is there a reason it has to be stated, has to be 
sorted out? There may be many reasons, but one has to do with the question that so many people 
who occupy marginalized subject positions encounter at some point in their pursuit of knowledge 
within existing cultural institutions: is this a space where I can exist and not disappear? Howe 
documents this problem in her study of historical subjects—Emily Dickinson, Ann Hutchison, 
Mary Rowlandson—as well as in her own experience as a poet-critic. She is consistently 
commenting on the challenges of navigating a male/masculine tradition as an external problem—
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that is social and structural—as well as an internalized conflict that results from learning to love 
and appreciate literature through that tradition.414  
 This internalized conflict in relation to the external pressures of the dominant cultural 
traditions is one most of us struggle with, whether or not we confront it directly. The 
consequences are not merely personal. Howe shows us the way that self-censorship as much as 
editorial censorship—though the two are not always easy to distinguish—contributes to a canon 
that reproduces social inequality through exclusion and erasure of those experiences and modes 
of expression that are deemed inadmissible. In the introduction to The Birth-mark, for example, 
Howe discusses the work of F.O. Matthiessen, the American literary critic whose book American 
Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1941) paved the way for 
a study of American literature in the academy that did not exist prior, during a time when the 
literary canon in American universities, especially for literature published before 1900, was still 
primarily British. Matthiessen was also a closeted gay man who committed suicide in 1950, who 
lived among the same Harvard literary and intellectual crowd in which Howe grew up. Howe 
reads between the lines of Matthiessen’s text for the traces of love in his book that informed, 
transformed and distorted his scholarship—forbidden love, ashamed love, insecure love, 
otherworldly love. In Howe’s view, Matthiessen wanted to highlight something about nineteenth 
century U.S. literature that was so important to him, but he held himself back from the love that 
prompted him on, creating a work that would shape the field in ways that we now have to 
undo—he helped establish an American literary canon that would be entirely masculine, rational, 
and decent. To do so, he erased femininity, uncertainty, and messiness. But, Howe asserts, “the 
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heart may be sheltering in some random mark of communication.”415 For example, Howe finds 
evidence of Matthiessen’s love of Shelley that he suppresses by championing Hawthorne 
instead—the more acceptable, masculine preference.416 
 Howe demonstrates that while one may read “through the positivism” of Matthiessen’s 
canonical text to find only what supports and legitimates that canon’s exclusions, one may also 
read “in the margins” of the text for what is nonetheless smuggled in. One way then to deal with 
the canon is to read against the grain, suggesting that even the canon’s exclusions leave a trace 
that is legible by practices designed to “read” them by other means. As Rachel Blau DuPlessis 
writes, “Howe has taken the responsibility of writing the book outside the book. Thus rewriting 
the books that we assumed we knew, against the grain of the most precious canon”417 On the 
other hand, one can also simply refuse to participate in the canon, to create spaces, practices, and 
communities of writing and reading that do not require to be printed for posterity. Howe is 
attracted to this possibility, which is most explicitly expressed in her embrace of Dickinson’s 
outsider status.  
Since Dickinson did not publish her body of work in her lifetime, but instead circulated it 
among friends and lovers, it is left to scholars to debate the nature of her relationship to literary 
publication. Howe argues that Dickinson actively chose not to publish in her lifetime, against the 
grain of then-prevailing scholarship that Dickinson was simply too shy or didn’t have enough 
confidence to publish. Howe asserts, “Far from being the misguided modesty of an oppressed 
female ego, it is a consummate Calvinist gesture of self-assertion by a poet with faith to fling 
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election loose across the incandescent shadows of futurity.”418 Howe emphasizes that Dickinson 
didn’t care about her poetry being preserved for inclusion in the canon of great literatures, that 
she believe poetry had higher aims than worldly recognition. Perhaps that is the case. There is 
textual evidence to back up the claim. But there is likewise evidence that Dickinson, like Howe, 
very much wanted to be part of a literary tradition—it is there in the same work Howe is 
documenting, in who Dickinson read and how she read them. It is there in her letters to 
Higginson. But I can see why this version of Dickinson, Howe’s (“My”) Emily Dickinson, 
would be important to affirm Howe’s own resentment for the “oppressed female ego” that the 
community of male intellectuals around whom she grew up—her father, Perry Miller, et al—and 
the tradition of male writers that formed her own literary imagination forced her to reckon with 
and to overcome. 
Howe’s relationship to the authority of the library is complicated by this internal conflict: 
a desire to participate and the knowledge that participation is fatal to the spirit of the work itself. 
For even if radical work makes it into the canon, editors and critics are then given the 
opportunity to shape the meaning of the text in ways that repress its most liberatory form and 
content. Both My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark offer critiques of the way (mostly male) 
scholars have controlled and distorted the words and texts of women writers through editing—
particularly Johnson’s and Franklin’s editing of Dickinson’s manuscripts and John Rowlandson’s 
editing of Mary Rowlandson’s “captivity narrative”—and other critical apparatuses of reception, 
interpretation, and canonization.  
Dickinson’s editors, for example, took the manuscripts that Dickinson left behind without 
instructions, and made choices about how the poems should appear on the printed page which, 
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Howe and others argue, erased much of what is most distinctive about Dickinson’s writing: her 
unconventional spelling and grammar, her ambiguous line breaks, her defiance of genre 
categorization—e.g., is it a poem, a letter, a fragment, a fiction?—her use of extra-textual 
elements, and her “variants”—lists of words appearing at the bottom of poems that Johnson 
argues were potential word alternatives (variants) that were part of Dickinson’s editing process 
but that Howe argues should be read as part of the poem itself. These editors have written 
lengthy, and in Howe’s view often impertinent, defenses of their choices. “The purpose of 
editing is to reach the truth”,419 writes Howe, in a critical tone that expresses wariness of both 
“truth” and “editing,” calling into question those criteria by which texts are judged as valid or 
valuable insofar as they are instruments in service of dominant structures of power. If the 
purpose of editing is to produce a final edition, Howe’s rhetoric provokes us to ask, then what 
does the “draft” offer before it is edited for the ostensible purpose of “reaching the truth?” Is the 
unedited draft not reaching after truth as well? Is it a different truth, or a different kind of truth? I 
would wager the answer to each of these questions is “Yes”: There is an implicit battle between 
value systems built around different understanding of and desires for what truth is and what 
constitutes the definitive version of a text. There is the truth that reproduces the status-quo and 
then there is the truth that unsettles it. Howe is interested in a truth that creates openings to 
possibility by respecting the text’s multiplicity, while she condemns the kind of truth that is most 
concerned with reproducing dominant structures of power by taming a text to conform to 
convention. 
Howe argues that Dickinson’s first serious editor, Johnson, who “[b]y choosing a 
sovereign system for her line endings—his preappointed Plan—he established the constraints of 
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a strained positivity. Copious footnotes, numbers, comparisons, and chronologies mask his 
authorial role.”420 At the same time that Johnson ostensibly “restored” what other editors had 
erased from Dickinson’s original manuscripts, he “created the impression that a definitive textual 
edition could exist.”421 In Howe’s view, Dickinson was not interested in producing the kinds of 
final editions that her later editors would impose on her work. Howe argues, “During her lifetime 
this writer refused to collaborate with the institutions of publishing. When she created herself 
author, editor, and publisher, she situated her production in a field of free transgressive 
prediscovery.”422 Howe says “refused” where Johnson says “feared.”423 Dickinson becomes the 
matron of process. 
Emily Dickinson’s writing is a premeditated immersion in immediacy. / Codes are 
confounded and converted. ‘Authoritative readings’ confuse her nonconformity.424 […] 
Use value is a blasphemy. Form and content collapse the assumption of Project and 
Masterpiece. Free from limitations of genre Language finds true knowledge estranged in 
it self.425  
 
In Howe’s formulation, “Project” and “Masterpiece” are no longer exclusive of one another. 
Rather, she argues that a project can be a masterpiece—an ongoing work can be regarded as “a 
work” itself rather than being in service of “the work” that it should in the end produce. Genre is 
just another way to control and corral the work into something legible, marketable, whose value 
can be assessed in a hierarchical and competitive system of cultural-economic valuation. The 
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relationship between Language and knowledge is that Language discloses knowledge’s 
unknowability: “estranged in it self.” The unstitched word—“itself” to “it self”—enacts what it 
expresses, self-identification splits into its two parts, self and other (i.e., not-self), that together 
reflect the nounness of the self, an object in the world rather than a position from which the 
objects of the world are perceived, felt, loved.426 Howe’s investment in this debate is not to 
assert the definitive interpretation of Dickinson’s manuscripts—admitting that Dickinson escapes 
even her own careful readings—but to forge a critical path toward feeling Dickinson’s writing 
across the distance of time and unknowability: the telepathy of archives. Howe personifies 
Knowledge in order to apprehend its similar composition as noun and verbing subject—what is 
known (object/noun) versus knowing (subject/verbing). To similar ends, in Disjunctive Poetics, 
Peter Quartermain places Howe in the objectivist tradition, in which an approach to poems as 
everyday objects of the world provokes a kind of defamiliarization that “challenge our 
assumptions about the process of reading, about what constitutes ‘value,’ about knowledge and 
about ‘knowing.’ […] The kind of interaction that takes place between perceiver and object in 
this situation is such that the very term object begins to lose its identity as noun, becoming 
agency, or verb”427 When the purpose of editing is to reach the truth—as an object that is 
known—then what is edited out as “shortcomings and error”428 is judged to be in the way of 
reaching that truth. What kind of material is judged as such in this system of evaluation? Howe 
suggests that it is “places of flight” that are corrected by the rational reach for truth that is violent 
                                                 
426Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 48. Naylor observes about Jack Spicer’s poetics, in whose 
lineage be places Howe (as do I): For Spicer, “Language is, in short, a precondition of the 
relation between a subject and an object, not a passive or transparent medium flowing between 
them.” 
 
427Quartermain, Disjunctive Poetics, 2-3. 
 
428Howe, TBM, 58. 
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in its operations of exclusion and oppression. It is the kind of truth that excludes Anne Hutchison 
because she is a woman. It is the kind of truth that tames Emily Dickinson into a respectable 
poetess. 
 For Howe, then, the radical purpose of hermeneutics is not to determine and argue for a 
definitive reading of a text but to create pathways to meeting the author in their writing.429 In this 
regard, the reader interprets the text the way an actor interprets a role, not in order to dominate 
every other interpretation but to add another relationship to the totality of relationships that texts 
produce among writers and readers. Such an approach, Howe wagers, doesn’t require the 
violence of correction, distortion and repression that authoritative readings rely on to justify their 
primacy.430 Howe attempts to model such an approach by rendering her own, and other critics’ 
methods transparent so that readers can ostensibly see the operations of interpretation as a series 
of subjective choices rather than objective truth legitimated by (and for) institutional authority. 
But given her critiques of authority, which she genders masculine, Howe is faced with the 
problem of how to relate to her own authority—which she addresses through various tactical and 
rhetorical maneuvers. For one, she displaces claims of final authority by calling attention to the 
process of authorship, attempting to make her own process transparent so as to leave her work 
open to disagreement and critique by her readers. This rhetorical move defers the question of 
                                                 
429Finkelstein, Lyrical Interference, 83. Normal Finkelstein offers a useful description of Howe’s 
“hermeneutics of the margin”: “One reason that Howe has emerged as an exemplary poet-critic 
is her commitment to writing a hermeneutics of the margin. By hermeneutics I mean a carrying-
across, a movement between realms of discourse which radically interprets and inscribes one in 
terms of the other.”  
 
430Palatella, “An End of Abstraction,” np.  Palatella observes the way Howe’s work “intersects 
with recent revisionary work in ethnography.” Interestingly, his description of what that 
revisionary work uncovers resonates with Howe’s critique of mainstream textual scholarship, 
particularly in the editing of Emily Dickinson by Johnson and Franklin: “The ethnographer and 
colonialist can only profess an unimpeachable authority if they conceal the extent to which their 
observations and authority are founded on contestable interpretive grounds.” 
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authority indefinitely—announces that her word should only be taken as one of many, it is only 
my Emily Dickinson after all.431 At other times, however, she more explicitly disavows authority 
by asserting her lack of credentials, which supports her assertion of outsider status working 
within the institutions of state power that she critiques. 
As in the interview discussion of feminist criticism above in which Howe says, “Well, I 
am not a critic,” she writes in the “Notes” at the end of the essay on Dickinson’s manuscripts in 
The Birth-mark, “I am a poet, not a textual scholar.”432 Who is she addressing? What kind of 
authority is she trying to inhabit or not inhabit here? She makes this statement in order to insist 
later in the note: “Now the essentialist practice of traditional Dickinson textual scholarship needs 
to acknowledge the way these texts continually open inside meaning to be rethought. In a 
Dickinson poem or letter there is always something other.”433 Who are these “textual scholars” 
with whom she does not want to identify? Is this a cultural-institutional relationship she is 
navigating? Is it a kind of Rowlandson-like, pre-emptive move to ward off criticism that she 
anticipates by the real “textual scholars” who would attempt to write off her claims for lack of 
authority? Her assertion seems to be motivated by implicit questions of credentials: What 
qualifications does she possess to engage in this work? What authority to make these critiques 
and demands of the field? What right to claim such authority? While elsewhere she defies such 
                                                 
431Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 446. Harack emphasizes the responsibility that this technique 
places in the reader of Howe’s work: “Answers are suggested but not given, so these ‘gaps’ 
allow for an openness to change, to the new, and to alternate possibilities that scholarly critics 
too often ignore. This does not mean that any interpretation can be forced upon her work, but 
rather that readers must work to understand a diversity of voices, and the effect is to make 
readers aware of their own complicity in shaping any kind of holistic interpretation.” 
 
432Howe, TBM, 153. 
 
433Howe, TBM, 153. 
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doubts, offering, “It takes a poet to see how urgent this subject of line breaks is”434 and, “It takes 
a woman to see clearly the condescending tone of these male editors when they talk about their 
work on the texts.”435 These comments suggest that the field of “critics” and “textual scholars” is 
deficient without the insights of those poets and women whose credentials leave them 
necessarily outside the field—such that she finds herself in a stronger position by identifying as a 
poet rather than as a scholar, as outsider rather than insider. Howe can then claim her outsider 
status as a value, as the form in which a poet expresses her insights may not follow the 
institutionally sanctioned methodologies of literary interpretation and criticism. Howe walks a 
fine line between claiming an outsider status while establishing her authority in the fields of 
scholarship in which she wants to intervene.436 
Returning to a passage we looked at earlier to understand Howe’s vexed relationship to 
the traditions in which she was trained, we can see as well Howe’s unresolved relationship to 
hermeneutics, as her intentions are split between making visible what has otherwise been 
rendered invisible by authorized history and practicing a hermeneutics of multiplicity that 
challenges the clear-sightedness of such revelations. Recall her statement: 
                                                 
 
434Howe, TBM, 157. 
 
435 TBM 170 
 
436Nicholls, “Unsettling the Widlerness,” 586. Consider Peter Nicholls observation: “Howe 
regards herself as first and foremost a poet, but she is also a freelance historian in a long and 
distinguished line which includes writers such as Ezra Pound and Charles Olson, each of whom 
shared a keen sense of American history as a carefully policed regime of knowledge. For Howe, 
as for those predecessors, academic study is hedged about with prejudices and covert 
investments of power and privilege. For the poet to enter this enclosure is to be branded 
immediately as a kind of interloper” which Howe acknowledges at the beginning of The Birth-
mark. Of course, the poet-critic is not in fact an anomaly. Cf. Norman Finkelstein’s chapter “The 
Academy, the Avant-Garde, and the Poet-Critic: Historical Observations, Hermeneutical 
Speculations” in Lyric Interference. 
241 
 
I am drawn toward the disciplines of history and literary criticism but in the dawning 
distance a dark wall of rule supports the structure of every letter, record, transcript: every 
proof of authority and power. I know records are compiled by winners, and scholarship is 
in collusion with Civil Government. I know this and go on searching for some trace of 
love’s infolding through all the paper in all the libraries I come to.437 
The first-person statements of self—“I am drawn,” “I know,” and “I know this and go on”—can 
be read as markers of humbling self-reflection but they also produce a rhetorical appeal to her 
authority, letting readers know what she knows, anticipating a critique of her reliance on libraries 
and archives that legitimate power while needing to defend her love of those institutions. She is 
trying to convince herself perhaps as much as her readers that one doesn’t have to walk away 
altogether from the apparatus of capture that holds these texts hostage. That is, Howe’s first-
person confession creates an ethos of candor by making her method and motivations transparent: 
despite her distrust of transparency, Howe often performs its operations, being careful to disclose 
the choices that authors, editors and critics make that are otherwise left unstated and therefore 
difficult to examine. At times this appears as sign-posting. For example, consider the lengthy 
prefatory clause in this historical account of early American culture: “Authorities in the 
academic study of American literature have decided that a candidate for membership in the 
congregation of the Church of Christ in Cambridge in New England had been carefully screened 
by the church elders […]”438 Howe wants to point out that historical accounts are based on 
choices people have made: e.g., “Authorities…have decided.” At other times, she performs 
transparency by documenting the varied and conflicting interpretations of an archival text, not in 
                                                 
437Howe, TBM, 4. 
 
438Howe, TBM, 66. My emphasis. 
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order to make a case for which is most likely correct or most persuasive but to re-introduce 
process into our understanding of the hermeneutics of textual analysis. For example, upon 
encountering differing translations of the Latin contained in an epigraph in the seventeenth-
century American minister Thomas Shepard’s journal, she writes, 
We will never know if this entry refers to John Cotton, Thomas Shepard, or the human 
condition. It could be a questionable interpretation of any evangelical minister’s 
profession. It could be a self-accusation or a reference to John Cotton’s preaching. It 
could be a note for a sermon or merely a sign that the author knows St. Augustine. […] 
Alone on the second leaf the citation assumes its own mystery.439   
 
As in the preceding example, Howe wants to remind us the text—its composition and its 
interpretation—is a product of choices that reflect the investments, fears and desires of the 
person who chooses. When choices are presented as objective Truth—led by assurance and 
sanctification—they erase other available options while simultaneously removing the mystery of 
inscription. For Howe, it is not as important to conclude which interpretation is best as to call 
attention to the multiplicity of meaning inherent in any textual record, to acknowledge that each 
interpretation comes with its own consequences, and that together the multiplicity adds up to a 
truth that defies the need for one correct meaning: multiplicity itself, which maps the field of 
cultural activity that is the world, adding up to a Totality without totalizing. Furthermore, 
highlighting rather than hiding the role of speculation in hermeneutics—even arguing for 
speculation as hermeneutics—honors the ghostliness of print’s movement through time. We 
choose what the author meant based on the evidence that remains combined with our own 
imaginations, shaped by historical forces as much as the text itself. But these acts of transparency 
do not resolve the relationship between the positive and negative content that libraries shelter. 
For one, you can never be one hundred percent transparent, because we aren’t transparent to 
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ourselves, and so it’s not always clear what is happening. Plus “opacity” has its own value. 
Howe is not interested in restoring what is missing to the canon. The canon itself is the problem 
that no amount of transparency can correct. But the dialectical relationship between transparency 
and opacity is at the heart of Howe’s critical and creative aesthetic.  
Candor is the Only Wile: Concealment and Revelation 
 
Contradiction: against the words chosen. How does one express this antinomian 
opposition? Say one thing mean another; mean one thing say another. The relationship between 
saying and meaning reflects a problem as fundamental to language and expression as it is to 
interpretation. “Candor - my Preceptor - is the only Wile,” writes Emily Dickinson to T.W. 
Higginson, to which Howe responds: “This is the right way to put it.”440 One of the important 
interventions of Howe’s work on Dickinson in the 1980s-90s, alongside other scholarly 
reconsiderations of her work,441 was to demonstrate her intimate relationship to dictionaries, 
particularly her family’s 1844 edition of Noah Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the 
English Language.442  In order to appreciate why Howe thinks equating candor and wile is the 
                                                 
440Howe, MED, 7. 
 
441Cf. Sharon Cameron, Lyric Time: Dickinson and Limits of Genre (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1979); Cristanne Miller, A Poet’s Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987); Sharon Cameron, Choosing Not Choosing: Dickinson’s Fascicles 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Martha Nell Smith, Rowing in Eden: Rereading 
Emily Dickinson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); Paul Crumbley, Inflections of the 
Pen: Dash and Voice in Emily Dickinson (Lexington : University Press of Kentucky, 1997). 
 
442Tim Cassedy, “‘A Dictionary Which We Do Not Want’: Defining America against Noah 
Webster, 1783–1810.” The William and Mary Quarterly 71, no. 2 (2014): 229-54. The story of 
Webster’s dictionary bears on the American history Howe studies in her works. The abstract of 
Cassedy’s article reads: “Noah Webster has usually been understood as a cultural nationalist 
whose advocacy of an ‘American-English’ language helped to unify the fledgling American 
republic after the Revolution. That understanding, however, elides the overwhelmingly bad 
reception of Webster and his linguistic ideas in the early national United States. Even as 
Webster's 1783 spelling book became ubiquitous in American primary education, his subsequent 
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right way to put it, and what “it” is, I will follow Dickinson and Howe to the Webster dictionary 
Dickinson would have referenced in the writing of the line. What do the words “candor,” 
“preceptor,” and “wile” mean?  
CAN'DOR, n. [L. candor, from 
candeo, to be white.] 
 
Openness of heart; frankness; 
ingenuousness of mind; a 
disposition to treat subjects with 
fairness; freedom from tricks or 
disguise; sincerity. – Watts. 
PRE-CEP'TOR, n. [L. 
præceptor. See Precept.] 
 
1. In a general sense, a teacher; 
an instructor.  
 
2. In a restricted sense, the 
teacher of a school; sometimes, 
the principal teacher of an 
academy or other seminary. 
WILE, n. [Sax. wile; Ice. 
wul; W. fel, fine, subtil.] 
 
A trick or stratagem 
practiced for insnaring 
or deception; a sly, 
insidious artifice. That 
ye may be able to stand 
against the wiles of the 
devil. – Eph. vi. 
 
The definition of “candor” in Dickinson’s 1844 edition of Webster’s dictionary accords with our 
twenty-first-century sense of the word: open and honest. The Latin candor from which the 
English derives means “whiteness.” The relationship between candor—honesty—and the color 
white—equally and oppositely suggests transparency and opacity. One meaning of white is 
colorless, uncolored, transparent, or clear. At the same time white is the color of absolute 
opacity: white only reflects light, impenetrably never absorbing it. In an 1989 interview with 
Howe, Janet Falon asks the poet: “If you had to paint your writing, if you had one canvas on 
which to paint your writing, what might it look like?” To which Howe responds, “Blank. It 
                                                                                                                                                             
plans to discard British linguistic standards and institutionalize ‘American’ spellings, 
pronunciations, and vocabulary prompted an extensive and vehement print backlash. Newspapers 
and magazines devoted hundreds of thousands of words in the 1790s and 1800s to condemning 
Webster's ‘vulgar perversions,’ ‘horrible irregularity,’ ‘subtle poison,’ and ‘illiterate and 
pernicious’ ideas about language. Although these controversies arose around apparently narrow 
linguistic issues, they persisted because they implicated broad and thorny questions about the 
meaning of America. For several decades, opposing Webster was a powerful way for Americans 
to articulate their ambivalent desires for self-differentiation from Europe, their uncomfortable 
sense of diversities within and among the United States, and their enduring commitments to 
transnational norms and identities.” 
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would be blank. It would be a white canvas. White.”443 In response to this answer, a number of 
scholars have drawn a connection between the blank or white canvas and the white of the page, 
which Howe puts to use in her poetry, provoking yet another valence of candor as whiteness—
the background against which signification is visible as ink on the page.444 As the poet lays down 
ink on the page, in an ostensible act of signification, what is their relationship or responsibility to 
candor? The notion that a poet’s social role is to disclose the truth has a long history that emerges 
as an important topic for twentieth century writers of Howe’s tradition. Yet the word candor does 
not directly mean truth-telling, rather it denotes the desire or attempt to tell the truth. Or, given 
the challenges of language’s ambiguities and opacities, to practice candor suggests one does not, 
at the very least, willfully obscure the truth.  
 “Wile” on the other hand denotes willful deception, a trickster’s use of the tools at hand, 
including language, to manipulate other people to act, believe, or feel the way one wants them to. 
Dickinson suggests that the ultimate act of wiliness is candor; in fact, she writes, “Candor is … 
the only Wile,” suggesting that any other deliberate attempts at wile are only reaching toward 
                                                 
 
443Howe, “Interview,” 42. 
444Quartermain, Disjunctive Poetics, 193; DuPlessis, The Pink Guitar, 127, 133; Wilksinson, 
“Out of Bounds,” 287. Quartermain: “And the impulse to disorder the world leaves its mark in 
the sheer isolation of Howe’s poems on the page, surrounded by white: a visible trope of Howe’s 
tough and difficult feminism. There are figurations in these figures who are figured as against no 
ground, who move away from ground, who move without. Such a movement, to be free of the 
burden of ground, freed of the necessity to be sane or to be mad, freed of history, is terrible and 
is exhilaration.” DuPlessis: “To write: to be caught in hopeless joy between black and white, said 
and unsaid, between the overwritten and underwritten, between desire and obliteration. Divided 
in language, but speaking the language. […] Howe bases her poetics on the evocation or 
proposition of ‘silence’ or ‘a white canvas. White’ as a trope for an anti-authoritarian practice. 
The foregrounding of otherness. The critique of centers, hierarchies, authorities. The suspicion of 
dominant meaning. The apprehension of power. The claim of power via critique. The seductions 
of dominant meaning scored with suspicion. And, often this has a gender valence.” Wilksinson 
offers that Howe’s answer to Falon’s question suggests “an acknowledgment, perhaps, that the 




what candor achieves by its nature: deception. Because “is” is a word of equation, of one-to-one 
identification, Dickinson is not asking us to consider what candor and wile share in common, but 
to recognize their equivalence. 
One meaning then of “Candor … is the only Wile” might be “transparency is the only 
obfuscation,” which aligns with a familiar critique promoted by writers in the 1980s-90s that to 
approach language as transparent is a universalizing impulse that aligns with conquest and 
domination, a desire for mastery linked to the instrumentalization of global capital through 
ideological manipulation. In this view, to respect, on the other hand, language’s opacity is to 
safeguard difference (Glissant), to “dwell in Possibility” (Dickinson), in “the creaking of the 
Word” (Mackey). But another way to interpret Dickinson’s line is “to speak frankly is an elusive 
task.” That is, to say what we mean is an endless struggle in which we must engage while 
acknowledging that language never arrives at any lasting coherence. Plus, as Nathaniel Mackey 
reminded me in a conversation on the topic, the struggle to be candid is hard: “Sometimes it is 
easier,” he said, “to tell someone what they want to hear.” 
 For some, the liberatory project is to press on in the struggle toward candor, despite its 
wiliness, a call for candor despite language’s slipperiness. Emily Dickinson says, “Tell all the 
truth but tell it slant,” in a poem whose ostensible subject is the overwhelming brightness of 
truth, which requires we approach it “gradually.”445 But we might also understand the poem to 
be about language’s wiliness: we have to trick language in order to sidestep its ideological traps. 
Telling it slant, then, is to dwell in possibility—to infinitely approach meaning rather than 
assume its transparency. 
                                                 
445Emily Dickinson and R. Franklin, The Poems of Emily Dickinson (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1999): 494. 
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Between the alternatives presented above, one interpretation of “candor is the only wile” 
strikes a wary tone: mistrust of candor. While the other is more rallying: we press on despite and 
in full consciousness of the limitations of the medium. Dickinson doesn’t resolve which it is, nor 
does Howe, so that we end up with a meta-problem of using language to comment on language, 
when candor is the only wile. But whatever trust or distrust we must place in words, they are the 
material Dickinson and Howe rely on for their work. “Words are candles lighting the dark,”446 
writes Howe about meeting an author across the various distances of time, place, cultural 
difference and existential separation. This act of loving communion—rather than of rational 
understanding—is one of the primary motivations of her work. In this regard, Howe is less 
concerned with knowing what language users mean when they express themselves in writing 
than with feeling what they mean—a distinction that doesn’t entirely turn away from the question 
of linguistic transparency versus opacity, but shifts the stakes from philosophical Truth to human 
relation. Howe’s investment in the materiality of language’s record—as marks on paper—leads 
her interest in linguistic, and extra-linguistic, meaning. 
As we’ve seen, in Howe’s study of the archives of seventeenth-to-nineteenth century 
manuscripts, she further argues that “the dark” that words as candles light is one created by the 
overt and covert erasures and silences that editing, publishing and canonization produce. Her 
biggest gambit as a scholar is that what has been ostensibly elided leaves a trace in the semantic 
and extra-semantic material: “Strange translucencies: letters, phonemes, syllables, rhymes, 
shorthand segments, alliteration, assonance, meter, form a ladder to an outside state outside of 
States.”447 Howe often refers to the “translucency” of the marks on the page—how in some sense 
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we read through the word-object to perceive the sound and sense of language. In the discussion 
above regarding language, “translucency” provides a productive alternative to “transparency.” 
The opaque whiteness of candor doesn’t let the light through, and transparency makes invisible 
the mediation of language. It is precisely the obfuscation of that opacity and transparency—the 
wile—of these various State institutions of literary production, distribution and reception that 
Howe’s mode of study must see through.448 But with translucency, the medium is visible—one 
can both look at it and through it. 
Howe writes of Dickinson: “The vital distinction between concealment and revelation is 
the essence of her work.” Revelation is a process—makes the light visible, let’s the light 
through: translucent. Howe holds up this formula as essential to poetry of “the first rank.” The 
common yet distinct relationship between concealment and revelation: both involve hidden or 
secret knowledge, but toward different ends. Concealment wants the secret to remain secret, 
what is hidden to remain unfound, by whatever means necessary: obfuscation, misdirection, even 
candor. Revelation on the other hand aims toward disclosure. As Spicer writes in After Lorca: 
"prose invents—poetry discloses”: It is the difference between prose and poetry/possibility, as in 
“I dwell in Possibility –  / A fairer House than Prose –.” Both language and literary meaning 
participate in this polar relation, but they also have a symbiotic relationship to each other. Howe 
writes, “Symbol is concealment and revelation.”449 Concealment and revelation—that symbol is 
both at the same time doesn’t suggest that one must or should choose one over the other, but that 
one must learn how to work in full awareness of the double-sided nature of language—to look 
                                                 
448Howe, TBM, 177. In a 1989 interview with Ed Foster, Howe talks about icons as things that 
hide contradiction. In response to the question, “What is in the word?” she says: “It’s a 
catastrophe of bifurcation. There is a sudden leap into another situation. The ghost (the entrance 
point of a singularity) is the only thing we have.” 
 
449Howe, MED, 77. 
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both at it and through it. It is in the push and pull, the process of moving from concealment to 
revelation, over and over again, that one strives toward liberatory truth: "I think a lot of my work 
is about breaking free: starting free and being captured and breaking free and being captured 
again.”450  
As Howe sets out then to “unsettle the wilderness in American literary history,” she is 
cautious of her methods. She wants to listen for the voices that have been occluded or distorted 
without recuperating them into the canon. She wants to disclose those truths that have been 
elided from official history without reproducing textual authority. Holding these positions 
against recuperation and transparent language have aligned Howe with Language poetry—both 
in terms of Howe’s personal social and institutional affiliation as well as the critical reception 
and framing of her work by scholars. When My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark were 
published, the proponents of Language poetry positioned themselves as against “confessional” 
poetry invested in the “Lyrical ‘I,’” asserting to be part of a lineage of oppositional or avant-
garde poetics of the twentieth century451 (with a prehistory in Dickinson and Whitman) that were 
                                                 
450Howe, TBM, 166. 
 
451Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 18, 3. Naylor: “Howe, Mackey, [Lynn] Hejinian, [Kamau] 
Brathwaite, and [M. NourbeSe] Philip continue the modernist assault on the ossification and 
commodification of language in conventional form, the form in which ideology lies lowest. […] 
These contemporary poets inherit the modernist preoccupation with language; they investigate 
innovative ways of writing about the past in the forms of collage and montage; and they explore 
the political implications of poetry and the poetic implications of politics. Yet they submit these 
modernist practices to considerable criticism and revision and the result is a disparate body of 
poetic work that is more than a mere repetition of an earlier movement.” While the tradition of 
writing that Quartermain highlights in this collection, what he calls “disjunctive poetics,” 
including the work of Howe, he asserts “can be said to be political” because “it refuses to be 
programmatic. It is too conscious of the world as, in the long run, unknowable, impenetrable, and 
unpredictable. Similarly, of the incapacity of language to describe or fix, and also of the blur, 
rather than the distinction, between the outer and inner world: Language is unreliable as a 
register of either, for what we say registers accurately neither our thought nor our feeling, our 
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anti-hegemonic, anti-academic, anti-institutional, a line from Pound-Williams-H.D. to Olson-
Duncan-Creeley, et al, inheritors of The New American Poetry, the 1960 anthology edited by 
Donald Allen as an alternative to establishment anthologies, a book that many contemporary 
leftist poets like to fondly recall they used to carry around with them like a bible. Today, the 
anthology is still used as an introduction, and induction, to the tradition.452 Marjorie Perloff 
writes in 1989, for example: “[T]here is not, in any case, so much as a trace in Howe' work of the 
confessional mode so ubiquitous in the poetry of the early seventies. Except for ‘Buffalo. 
12.7.41’ in Pythagorean Silence (and this only in part), I know of no Howe poem that is directly 
autobiographical or personal. Which is not to say that the work isn't emotive, but its emotive 
contours depend upon the collisions (and sometimes, it may be, collusions) of three codes - the 
historical, the mythic, the linguistic - all three, it should be added, as informed by an urgent, if 
highly individual, feminist perspective.”453 Perloff’s discussion of the problem of what poetry is 
and isn’t, what it could be or should be, or certainly should not be, in the late twentieth century is 
interesting insofar as it registers the sense of urgency felt by those who identified as part of a 
leftist project in the face of increasing consumerism in the Reagan Era. She suggests that 
confessional poetry on the one hand and popular television leaves “real” oppositional poetry 
                                                                                                                                                             
anguish nor our desire. Regular syntax is, like the language of classical mathematics, incapable 
of describing a world whose unity seems more often delusional than actual.” 
452Golding, “‘The New American Poetry’ Revisited, Again,” 180-1. As Alan Golding wrote in 
1998, “As regards writing practice, The New American Poetry, more than any other anthology, 
helped promote and canonize ideas of field composition based on Charles Olson's ‘Projective 
Verse’; a (re)definition of poetic form as immanent and processual; a poetics of dailiness and of 
the personal (as distinct from the confessional); and a poetry of humor and play (as distinct from 
wit). It is the anthology, in short, that marked the early postmodern turn, in Charles Altieri's 
terms, ‘from symbolist thought to immanence.’ And it retains enough staying power as an 
anthological touchstone for alternative poetries that editors of avant-garde anthologies continue 
to invoke it as a model over thirty years after its publication.” 
 
453Perloff, “Collision or Collusion with History,” 520. 
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surrounded by enemies: “[T]here seems to be a felt need to remake a language that, in its 
ordinary, which is to say formulaic, state […] cannot approximate the difficulties of what the 
postmodern poet and her/his readers perceive to be a multitrack experience.”454 Against the 
grain, DuPlessis describes Howe as a lyric poet, if only of a special kind, arguing that “Howe 
makes works which seem to distill the quintessence of traditional lyric poetry, its luminous 
greeny white sap-filled songs. This essence she tests and recreates by projecting the lyric into the 
hardly populated vastness and silence of modern page space.”455 But for DuPlessis, Howe’s 
lyricism is consistent with her poststructuralist poetics: “She is suspicious of languages and 
discourses as already made and inhabited things; she wants to enter and inhabit the untoward 
crevices of language…archaic words, names that may no longer have things, shadows of things 
and feelings difficult to name.”456 I agree with Stefania Heim’s perspective that these divisions 
between lyric/confessional and aesthetic or Language poetry propagated by poets and critics in 
the 1980s-90s limit one’s reading of Howe’s work. Heim writes, “This difference speaks less to 
the complex actualities of […] Howe’s writing as to the lenses through which [her] formal and 
disciplinary experiments have been viewed and, as a result, what gets highlighted and 
described.”457  
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457Heim, Dark Matter, 16-17. Heim continues: “Here are the positions: where some feminist 
readers sought portrayals of real lives of women with which they could identify, and experienced 
a distance from actual political concerns in overly ‘aestheticized’ texts (a position lucidly 
delineated by Toril Moi in Sexual/Textual Politics), the very legibility of such resulting 
constructions rendered them false, manipulative and totalizing to post-structural thinkers. In 
other words, to the Language poets, what is required to destroy the hegemony of the normative 
lyric is precisely the kind of radical formal experimentation Howe practices – such 
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Language poetry’s affiliation with Theory—coded largely white and male/masculine—
extends Howe’s vexed relationship to the literary and intellectual traditions that she is both 
working in and against. She carries this tension into her work on Dickinson and Rowlandson’s 
texts, as she sets out in My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark to make an argument for a 
feminine writing that has been devalued yet whose value is its counter-hegemonic 
epistemology—non-colonizing, non-dominating and resistant to closure. 
Emily Dickinson took the scraps from the separate "higher" female education many 
bright women of her time were increasingly resenting, combined them with voracious 
and "unladylike" outside reading, and used the combination. She built a new poetic form 
from her fractured sense of being eternally on intellectual borders, where confident 
masculine voices buzzed an alluring and inaccessible discourse, backward through 
history into aboriginal anagogy. Pulling pieces of geometry, geology, alchemy, 
philosophy, politics, biography, biology, mythology, and philology from alien territory, a 
"sheltered" woman audaciously invented a new grammar grounded in humility and 
hesitation.458  
 
This is a complicated portrait of a writer whom Howe greatly admires and with whom she 
identifies. Dickinson was a white woman of a prominent New England family, receiving a 
“genteel education”459 like Howe, sheltered from many of the conflicts and oppressions that her 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘aestheticization’ is what makes a work more ‘real.’ Perloff celebrates Howe’s work both 
because ‘the fragmentation of the universe is somehow mirrored in the fragmentary nature of the 
text’ and because this fragmentary text functions, too, as ‘a response to the all too ordered, 
indeed formulaic syntax that characterizes the typical ‘workshop’ poem.’ But […] Howe’s 
readers to miss the multi-faceted negotiation of private and public life that her texts make 
possible. Perloff’s own well-documented, deeply problematic conflations of the ‘workshop’ 
poem – a common contemporary code-word for mainstream verse, a tracing of whose etymology 
is out of the scope of the present study – with, for example, the ‘one-dimensional and simplistic 
lyric outburst against injustice or racism to be praised because its author is a member of a 
minority group and hence not to be subjected to the literary norms of the dominant race and 
class,’ highlight the gross limitations of her perspective.” 
 
458Howe, MED, 21. 
 
459Howe, “Interview,” 30. In her interview with Janet Falon published in the 1989 special issue 
of Difficulties dedicated to her work, Howe responds to the question, “Were you encouraged to 
think about a career?”: “Not a career like a doctor, lawyer, historian or philosopher. I was given a 
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contemporaries suffered under less privileged circumstances. Howe, similarly grew up against a 
background of war and violence of which she was aware but not immediately affected by as 
others. See for example, her statement for “The New Poetics Colloquium,” which I return to at 
the end of this chapter, which opens with the line: “For me there was no silence before 
armies,”460 and goes on to describe the world of war that she was born into in 1937.461 At the 
same time Dickinson was a non-conformist within her own class by defying the constrictions of 
a “ladylike” education, refusing to join the Revivalist religious movement. She immersed herself 
in traditions from which she was excluded but rather than be cowed by the “masculine voices” 
that modeled assertive confidence and control, she “built a new poetic form” and “invented a 
new grammar” based in the opposite—"humility and hesitation”—an ecriture feminine. In My 
Emily Dickinson, Howe writes: 
HESITATE from the Latin, meaning to stick. Stammer. To hold back in doubt, have 
difficulty speaking. "He may pause but he must not hesitate"-Ruskin. Hesitation circled 
back and surrounded everyone in that confident age of aggressive industrial expansion 
and brutal Empire building. Hesitation and Separation. The Civil War had split American 
in two. He might pause, She hesitated.462 
 
A writing practice that holds back in doubt and is not afraid to display difficulty in speaking 
defies the criteria by which mastery is measured. Hesitation, unlike the pause Ruskin allows, 
registers the confusion, disorientation and loss of ground that having one’s eyes open to the 
contradictions of reality often produces—a perspective that people from minoritarian positions 
                                                                                                                                                             
genteel education. The understanding was that I might dabble a bit at something but then I would 
marry a gentleman with money. Not too much money, but money.” 
460Howe, “Poetics Statement,” 12. 
 
461Howe’s relation to WWII in some ways parallels Dickinson’s relation to the Civil War—the 
major war of their age touching them each in ways that affected them deeply without being 
neither in the war themselves nor the central actors or victims of its conflict. 
 
462Howe, MED, 21. 
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do not have to work hard to possess. Hesitation, as a positive value, is not about caution, it is 
about the humility of remaining open to what you don’t know: “What voice when we hesitate 
and are silent is moving to meet us? Tragic and eternal dichotomy—if we concern ourselves with 
the deepest Reality, is this world of the imagination the same for men and women?”463 
Throughout My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark Howe often wagers that the answer is 
“No,” and that the world of the imagination of women is constantly being bowled over by the 
imagination of men. 
Responding to a question about feminist criticism, to which she responds with 
ambivalence and wariness, Howe discusses how the editing of Dickinson’s work by “gentlemen 
of the old school” has greatly distorted what is found in the manuscripts and laments how 
confidently they claim to know what is best for the work, suggesting that feminist criticism can 
and must intervene. But she goes on to reflect on how difficult it is for anyone really to do 
Dickinson criticism because “one of Dickinson’s abilities is to escape everything. If you think 
you can explain a poem, she quickly shows you there is a way out of that interpretation.” Howe 
concludes: “I think she may have chosen to enter the space of silence, a space where power is no 
longer an issue, gender no longer an issue, voice is no longer an issue, where the idea of a printed 
book appears as a trap.”464 In my reading, Howe is clearly talking about herself here, and her 
own longing to enter “a space where power is no longer an issue.” She sees these desires and 
frustrations in Dickinson, perhaps that is what draws her to her. I see it in Howe and perhaps that 
is what draws me to her, as a woman in a tradition still dominated by men. Howe does not 
attempt to cover up these personal identifications—in fact her method invites us to read them as 
                                                 
463Howe, MED, 22. 
 
464Howe, TBM, 170. 
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she blurs the boundaries between subjects—“My voice formed from my life belongs to no one 
else. What I put into words is no longer my possession. Possibility has opened.”465 The textual 
relationship between self and other opens up a reconsideration of the social relationships that 
literary work discloses.466 
Feeling Over a Distance: Giving Oneself to the Authority of Others, or Authorial 
Communion 
 
While my discussion so far has been largely concerned with the social context of Howe’s 
writing against dominant institutional forms of authority, Howe’s critical engagements are 
woven directly into her poetics. Specifically, the relationship between self and other—those 
relations structured by “authority and power” as well as those structured by “love”—is the 
predominant fiber of her composition. “The other” is a category of social exclusion produced by 
social othering. In a previous chapter, we looked at Mackey’s theory in “Other: From Noun to 
Verb” of how artists who have been socially othered develop a practice of artistic othering, a 
theory that applies to Howe’s descriptions of how women writers have innovated literary form in 
the face of an exclusionary literary tradition. Recall, for example, Howe’s description of 
Dickinson’s innovation in the face of the oppressive tools with which she’d been given to work: 
She built a new poetic form from her fractured sense of being eternally on intellectual 
borders, where confident masculine voices buzzed an alluring and inaccessible discourse, 
backward through history into aboriginal anagogy. Pulling pieces of geometry, geology, 
alchemy, philosophy, politics, biography, biology, mythology, and philology from alien 
territory, a "sheltered" woman audaciously invented a new grammar grounded in humility 
                                                 
465Howe, MED, 13. 
 
466Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 15. Naylor: “The open text resists this authority [to commodify 
the writer, the reader, and the processes of composition] by disrupting the relation between writer 
and reader that presupposes an understanding of language in which meaning passes relatively 
unmediated from person to person. In an open text, then, the reader as well as the writer must 
make meaning, not just receive it.” 
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and hesitation.467 […] Forcing, abbreviating, pushing, padding, subtracting, riddling, 
interrogating, re-writing, she pulled text from text.468 
 
But “the other” is also a figure in a metaphysical relationship to “the self”—dynamics of social 
power aside.469 Howe’s poetics are invested in the other’s necessary relation to the self. For 
Howe, the co-constitutive relationship between self and other470 is the foundation of reality. The 
world only exists in relation to one another. Across difference, we meet one another, and in that 
meeting, the world emerges. From this philosophical tenet, language and text emerge as 
occasions to meet one another across the difference, i.e., distance, of time, space, custom, etc. 
“Telepathy”—which means literally “feeling over a distance”—is a Howesian word that is both 
precise and provocative as a descriptor of her poetic project.471 In order to be co-constitutive, 
                                                 
467Howe, MED, 21. 
 
468Howe, MED, 29. 
 
469Of course, the deployment of “the other” in acts of social othering in service of social 
exclusion and oppression draws on metaphysical understandings of self-identification and 
difference. I am not suggesting that the relationship between self and other is transhistorical. 
Rather, I want to highlight an aspect of that relation that Howe engages in positively in her 
poetics, though it too runs up against the social world in which such relations have meaning in 
relation to power.  
 
470Harack. "Representing Alterity,” 436; Nichols, "Tensing the Difference,” 41. The ethics of the 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas comes to mind here—Howe briefly quotes him in The Birth-
mark. Harack similarly observes: “These poets [Howe and Olson] reveal the act of writing poetry 
as an artistic expression of grappling with the other.” Harack is interested in Levinas’s notion of 
death as the ultimate other, through which she studies Howe and Olson’s engagement with the 
other “as a masking of the face of death with linguistic presence, and as a search for meaning in 
the past that might allow revision of ideas in the present.” This focus on the relationship between 
self-other in relation to historical temporality—the present’s relation to past and future—bears on 
my discussion of history and temporality in chapter one of this dissertation. Nichols: “Howe's 
construction of the subject points to Giorgio Agamben or, in the infinitely demanding call of the 
other, Levinas.” 
 
471Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 448. Harack writes: “Influence may not be predictable, but 
its power arises out of an affiliation with the acts and voice of another. Howe reflects that ‘[a]ll 
who read must cross the divide—one from the there … Remember we are traveling as relations.’ 
257 
 
Self and Other must remain separate, must know (feel) each other across the distance of 
difference. 
We can thus understand Howe’s approach to reading and interpretation not only in terms 
of reading against the grain of institutional methodologies but also as motivated by the desire for 
communion with another writer across the distance of textuality. Howe says she looks to the 
margins to find what is otherwise cut out of the edited text: “Marks in the margin are immediate 
reflections. Reflection is also a coupling. Marginal notes are not works.” Unedited, raw material 
in the manuscripts Howe finds in library archives are clues leading to the love that is excised 
from the texts that have been passed through the machine of institutional literary traditions. 
“Marginalia,” she notes, “may be called speed reading or ghost writing.” She looks for the traces 
that haunt the edited text.472 Writing in the margins calls attention to something,473 shows us the 
writer and reader in the process of responding to the text that is in their hands and ours—the 
distance of time collapses, the present tense of both moments coincides. Russell Cheney writes to 
F.O. Matthiessen: “Deezie, on the back of your letter this morning was a shopping list, and with 
a flood the actual scene of your life—your being alive there—was all through me. It sort of took 
my breath it was so real—as though I’d reach out and touched you…”474 This reading practice 
that reaches for the presence of the writer—Howe asserts, “To reach is to touch”475—is invested 
                                                                                                                                                             
For her, everything occurs in relation to others, others with whom we have relationships even if 
they remain essentially unintelligible, and whether they are alive (like her readers) or dead (like 
those she admires in history).” 
 
472Resonating with contemporary theories of “the trace” from Derrida to Gilroy, et al. 
 
473Howe, TBM, 122. 
 
474Howe, TBM, 14. 
 
475Howe, SP, 60. 
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more in a telepathic meeting between reader and writer than in what texts mean in the traditional 
sense of literary interpretation. If canonization by exclusion and editorial distortion produces a 
problem for Howe in relation to institutional authority and the authorized text, she focuses 
instead on the author as another with whom the reader is invited to commune. 
In that sense, as an alternative to resisting authority, Howe gives herself over to the voice 
of others, thus complicating her various forms of critiquing and disavowing authority that I’ve 
discussed above. Howe makes us aware of the fact that for the reader, the author is another: 
“Was it you or is it me? Where is the stumbling block?” Howe is continually giving herself over 
to the authority—that is, the words and text—of others at the same time that she asserts her own 
voice, as the two come to co-constitute one another in a new text, word, and authority. In order to 
approach authorship in this way, Howe unsettles entrenched beliefs about the stability of the 
written word. Howe constantly highlights the complicated metaphysics of the writing medium. 
There is the ontological problem of what words are—marks on the page carrying semantic 
information, as well as indexing social, historical and political realities—and the epistemological 
question of how knowledge is mediated by that system. But crucially, there is also the 
phenomenological problem—how the experience of reading someone else’s words, produces a 
new co-authored text.476 Howe’s condemnation of confessional poetry,477 which has aligned her 
                                                 
476Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 436. Harack: “All poetry is ‘fixed’ in the form it has taken, 
but it contains ‘room’ for future interpretation, as the work is committed to examination without 
the presence of the author.” 
 
477Keller, “An Interview with Susan Howe,” np. In her 1995 interview with Lynn Keller, Howe 
remarks: "But I do not like confessional poetry. These days, in America, confession is on every 
TV program, let alone in most poems. Just today as I was eating breakfast in your college dining 
hall, there was a TV suspended from the ceiling blaring out a program called True Confessions--
where people come on and say, ‘My father molested me when I was three,’ or ‘My mother was 
an alcoholic,’ et cetera. By now it's totally boring, or maybe it's my Yankee sense of decorum. 
Yet if a reader really loves a writer--and if he or she doesn't love a writer, it doesn't matter--but if 
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with Language poetry, is especially energized by this latter point—as any expression of “the 
Lyrical ‘I’” must take into account the way the “I” does not belong to any one person. Reading 
and writing about the text of another is a ripe occasion to see this observation play out—as the 
reader enters the language and feeling of the author, the writing they produce is unique to that 
relationship. For Howe, like Rimbaud, “I is Another”—and when regarded as such, its lyrical 
power is about the relation of communion that such a transformation suggests.  
This perceptible process of authorial communion takes various forms in Howe’s writing. 
In My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark, her composition often takes the form of collage—
collecting and presenting a patchwork of quotations from the texts she studies. Sometimes these 
quotations are accompanied by a direct commentary that resembles a familiar scholarly form, but 
more often Howe writes with the quotations, engaging in them as if they are each characters 
gathered together in conversation.478 Similar to the way that people in a conversation tend to 
build a common language, style and tone through the process of one another’s words coming into 
relation to each other, Howe’s writing often inhabits the voice of the text(s) to which she is 
                                                                                                                                                             
he or she does love a writer, that reader will probably do some research. He or she will look for a 
biography. And yes, yes, yes, I think it's a gender issue, because women tend to get lied about, 
and exaggerated stories are told about them, if they are not obliterated. So I think it's important to 
find a story, to save a story, but I don't think it's important to bray a story." 
 
478Perloff, “Collision or Collusion with History,” 523. Perloff argues that this technique creates a 
sense of historical “authenticity”—making the reader feel as if we are in a real encounter with 
the past: “Howe displays an uncanny ability to enter the experience of an actual historical 
woman and to make that experience her own. It is not, of course, a question of accuracy: who 
knows what went through the mind of the ‘real’ Mary Rowlandson? The ‘real’ Emily Dickinson? 
Rather, the seeming authenticity, the credibility of Howe's documentary collage depends upon 
the positioning of the language field, the juxtaposition, for example, of flat narrative […] with 
extracts from Deuteronomy and Psalms, from Increase Mather's Brief History of King Philip's 
War, and so on.” I appreciate Perloff’s analysis, but I believe the experience of the reader is less 
that we feel in the “real” presence of Mary Rowlandson as we feel Howe’s sense of being in the 
presence of Rowlandson. 
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responding at the same time that her own voice moves to meet them.479 For example, in her 
essay on Mary Rowlandson, which offers a patchwork of direct quotations by men from their 
writings about American democracy, Howe writes, 
Mr. Mather Mr. Hubbard Mr. Prince. Listen to me.  
 
What is finite freedom? Is every founder confounded by error? How is the hammer of the 
whole earth cut? I hope I will not be unwilling. Always desire to subscribe myself Yours 
in what I say.480 
 
The first-person pronouns here—“me,” “I”—appear where we expect Howe, the scholar—to be 
writing commentary on the passage she’s quoted. Against that readerly expectation, we find 
Howe here inhabiting the voice of Rowlandson, voicing what Howe hears her saying between 
the lines of what has been printed as her word. Yet in slipping into Rowlandson’s first-person, 
because “I is a public election,”481 Howe slips into her own first-person as well. How are we to 
read this passage—who is speaking?482 There is a problem of identification here. What does it 
mean to identify with the writer and/or the words, particularly in the form of a representation 
                                                 
479Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 449. Harack points out Howe’s related observation of Olson: 
“According to Howe, Olson succeeded in integrating ‘Melville into himself’, so his criticism 
reflects a fusion of the self and the artistic other.” 
 
480Howe, TBM, 120. 
 
481Howe, TBM, 65. 
 
482Wilkinson, “Out of Bounds of the Bound Margin,” 281; Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 58.  
Wilkinson makes a similar observation in her reading of Howe’s “Melville’s Marginilia, in 
which “many of the phrases on Howe’s pages involving first-person and third-person pronouns 
do not hold firm to any one character. […] Is the ‘I’ Mangan? Howe? Melville? The reader?” For 
Naylor, Howe’s pronoun ambiguity speaks to the silences, or in Naylors terms, the “holes” in the 
official historical record, expressed by “her refusal to recononcile in one linguistic register the 




(writing)?483 What is the relationship between representation and expression? Ex-press: Coin; 
Print. Howe is looking for Rowlandson in her words, as they are printed, trying to meet her in 
Howe’s own printed words that would stamp her into a stable, fixed identity. Trying to meet 
across various material distances, Howe inhabits Rowlandson’s first person and invites 
Rowlandson to inhabit Howe’s first-person. “Love is the interdiction of history.484” Interdiction: 
                                                 
483 Harack. "Representing Alterity,” 435; Blasing, "The Birth-mark,” 110-11; Gelpi, “Emily 
Dickinson's Long Shadow” 102: Wilkinson, “‘Out of Bounds of the Bound Margin,’” 265. 
Harack writes: “As they [Howe and Olson] examine historical and creative documents they face 
themselves as artists in those men and women they admire. Quite often, these figures are those 
who have ‘failed’ in the view of the majority—those who created texts that reflect the 
impossibility of a final authoritative interpretation and were not necessarily popular when they 
were published.” In her rather scathing critique of the The Birth-mark, Mutlu Konuk Blasing 
accuses Howe of “reading Dickinson into her poetics program [namely, Language poetry]” in 
order to “place Dickinson as precedent for her own writing” in “an American tradition of 
nonconformism,” arguing that “Howe wants a line of legitimate descent for her dissent.” As a 
scholar of 20th century lyric poetry, Blasing is arguing along familiar battle lines between 
Language and Lyric that are less trenchant today than they were in the 1990s. Like Blasing, 
Albert Gelpi argues that Howe’s “own poetic assumptions and practices have led her to see 
Dickinson as a crypto-Language poet, for whom the radical play with and against linguistic 
conventions, unsettling meaning and form, is necessitated and driven by dissenting critique of 
bourgeois, patriarchal culture.” Gelpi prefaces this observation with the note that “Since the 
1970s, Howe has been loosely identified with a group that calls itself the Language poets,” 
making visible the same internal divide in American poetics that Blasing is enmeshed in. While 
the Language vs. Lyric debate has cooled over time, it has had a strong foothold that has shaped 
the field of poetry and poetics—for practitioners, readers, critics and scholars alike—in divisive 
ways. It has also sent many of us on a wild goose chase to define Language and Lyric poetry so 
that they can remain distinct. Gelpi, for example, argues that Howe’s identification with 
Dickinson is odd considering that in his estimation, “Howe has a historical imagination whereas 
Dickinson has a lyric imagination”; while Jessica L. Wilkinson argues that what distinguishes 
Howe from the Language poets is precisely her historical imagination: “Whilst Howe has been 
compared with the postmodern Language poets, whose writing (amongst other things) challenges 
the lyrical/authorial ‘I’ voice and emphasizes the materiality of language, her concentrated 
interest in history arguably distinguishes her from the language-based practices of her peers.” 
Howe, Mackey, and Roberson are often cited as poets who can’t be easily categorized into one or 
the other so-called schools, or cited as poets who bridge the divide. It is becoming increasingly 
clear however that the divide never really existed in any prescriptive way that one could trace in 
very many poets’ actual bodies of work, but was used primarily to demarcate social and 
institutional affiliations and antagonisms, which certainly did/do exist. 
 
484Howe, TBM, 120. 
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to prohibit or prevent, to stand in the way. Interdiction: inter+diction—between the choice of 
words. In the essay on Mary Rowlandson, Howe writes: 
Dear sister, I can go no further; a weary body and sleepy eyes command. 
Write to the authorities. Not to be known when I sink down. I have  
made your face wrong. Vulnerable as mortal. In the no man’s land I remain  
Your forever. 
History certifies this.485 
Here, a direct address between women. Howe addresses Rowlandson or imagines Rowlandson 
addressing her. Or rather, it is an alchemical combination of both: Howe addresses herself as 
Rowlandson; Rowlandson addresses herself as Howe, or as any of us women reading. A 
community emerges in the communion of a shared voice—my mouth stops for the written 
system, so that I can hear you speaking, sister. Yet the same operation yields different results—
my mouth stops for the written system of men who silence the imagination of women. Double-
edged sword: Rungs between escape and enclosure are confusing and compelling. In this 
passage, the author worries about making her subject’s “face wrong,” failing in her attempt at 
representation. At the same time, the writing is not about faithful representation of an image but 
a documentation of love—“in the no man’s land” of unrepresentability, “I remain / Yours 
forever.” The final line “History certifies this” is double-edged. History certifies both the wrong 
record—the face made wrong—and the right one—the expression of love and community 
between women. 
In Howe’s close reading of Dickinson’s “My Life had stood a loaded gun” she turns over 
the many sides of this important pronoun—“My”486—which is also the decisive first word of 
                                                 
485Howe, TBM, 122. 
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Howe’s book title. In the poem, Dickinson extends the metaphor of the speaker’s life as “a 
loaded gun,” a material object moving through the world in various ways, Howe argues, that 
comment on the American situation. Howe writes, 
When MY is identified and carried away, MY becomes anonymous and refuses to budge. 
[…] Say one thing and mean another. Strange absence of this presence MY is following, 
or Absence carrying. The only constant is motion and identification of nothing. Symbol is 
concealment and revelation.487  
 
The act of being “carried way” might be a violently repressive one—losing one’s agency and 
being used for someone else’s purposes. The way a woman’s voice is carried away by male 
editors; the way any person’s literary expression is carried away by canonization to serve the 
State. It can also be an act of love and intimacy—the way we are carried away by one another to 
leave off the siloed ego to become part of a collective consciousness.  
These first person pronouns—“my” “myself,” “me,” “mine,” “I”—appear often in the 
form of Howe being carried away by her commentary or explication of a quotation to the point 
of occupying the author’s position—“she” turns suddenly into “I.” Yet as soon as the “I” is 
spoken, it speaks doubly as Howe herself, as if the pronoun is a point of departure from her 
representation of another to a representation of herself. And it is undoubtedly both: In a passage 
about the Bronte sisters (whose reading by Dickinson Howe documents), Howe writes, “Myself 
was as another, now ‘I’ dare to go farther.”488 This is one of the ways that the self is constituted 
in relation to the other, and the other in relation to the self: reading as transfiguration. It is also 
how the present and the past co-constitute one another’s representation, so that writers and 
                                                                                                                                                             
486Howe, MED, 76. 
 
487Howe, MED, 77. 
 
488Howe, MED, 61. 
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readers can meet each other across temporal distance—what Howe calls the telepathy of 
archives.  
The ambiguity of pronouns also brings Howe into relation with positions that make her, 
and her readers, uncomfortable. For example, in Paul Naylor’s reading of Thorow, he comes 
upon an example that troubles him. In Howe’s “indictment of the barbarism of contemporary 
commercial capitalism,” she writes, “I am / Part of their encroachment.” Naylor responds: “The 
temptation to identify these first-person pronouns directly with the author as traditionally 
conceived—as Susan Howe, writer—is great and not entirely inappropriate. Read this way, 
Howe is acknowledging her own complicity with the past.”489 Naylor’s framing of this reading 
as “tempting” and “not entirely inappropriate” underscores his own desire to not read it that way. 
He immediately follows up with “Yet […],” and goes on to justify why we shouldn’t accept 
Howe’s identification with those seventeenth-to-nineteenth century Europeans who violently 
settled the United States. That is, rather than leave open the contradictions that Howe makes 
visible, Naylor wants to resolve them, by absolving Howe of any identification with an 
oppressive class. But Howe recognizes that she occupies both. She is the daughter of a 
descendant of European Puritans and an Irish immigrant, raised in a home split between colonial 
and subaltern cultures and languages; she is a white woman in a racist, sexist patriarchy; she is 
part of the educated class, at the same time that she is excluded from it; and so on. 
But most importantly, my exploration of the operations of pronouns is a way of looking 
for Howe. “The closer I look—the farther away your interlaced co-conscious pattern.”490 This 
                                                 
489Naylor, Poetics Investigations, 57. 
 
490Howe, SP, 60. The ostensible object of this line is frost in Early November, but the “you” 




longing to be close that is never satisfied is a symptom of love—another refusal to closure: the 
open text respects the limits of communion that produce the longing that texts embody. “Love is 
a trajectory across the hollow of history,”491 Howe writes, suggesting that when we read in love, 
we traverse impossible distances. Strategically, in the project of resisting dominant institutional 
structures, love counters power and authority by following this path.492 In My Emily Dickinson 
and The Birth-mark, Howe finds that by reading along paths of love, she encounters radical 
forms by women whose innovations have been buried by editorial and critical erasure, whose 
                                                 
491Howe, TBM, 99. 
 
492Duplessis, The Pink Guitar, 133; Nichols, “Tensing the Difference,” 51. In DuPlessis’s essay 
on Howe, she puts this vexed relationship to “authority” in a tradition of experimental women 
writers: “An important, underutilized essay of Gertrude Stein argues implicitly that 
experimentalist writing occurs in opposition to ‘forensics,’ and in temptation by it. The mastery 
and the power. […] For Stein, forensics is a system of normative definition, which, in the 
imposition of authoritative norms, trains one to patterns of assumptions (including those of 
gender). […] The writer of ‘Forensics,’ the she seems to be debating the value, if any, of 
forensics to her—forensics as disputation, as power, as definition, as ‘eloquence and reduction.’ 
Among other functions, this essay, therefore, is a debate between authority and the anti-
authoritarian. […] The question is “how to write” […] when the writing space is colonized by 
forensics. How to gather authority without authoritarian power; how to indicate clarifies without 
rhetorical or generic proscriptions; how to indicate one’s volume without squatting hibernations 
of mass. How to Write. This, Gertrude Stein indicates, is her problem; this, Virginia Woolf 
indicates, is her problem; this, Marianne Moore indicates, is her problem; this, Susan Howe 
indicates, is her problem.” DuPlessis’s analysis rhymes with Nichols whose move from justice to 
love usefully ties together my analysis of Howe’s interest in a hermeneutics motivated by love 
over logical reason: “The irreparable, however, opens up a dimension of ethical thought in which 
judgement is forever forestalled because the particularity of historical subjects and events can't 
be fully articulated. From this point of view, we can never reach a verdict because we can never 
get past the enigma of the ‘who’ in ‘whodunnit.’ It is thus appropriate that Howe positions her 
work outside the purview of States, because the State with its juridicial apparatus is a device that 
substitutes for the kind of love that can't be actualized in time - the infinite love that used to be 
attributed to God. In The Birth-mark she writes that ‘letters, phonemes, syllables, rhymes, 
shorthand segments, alliteration, assonance, meter, form a ladder to an outside state outside of 
States. Rungs between escape and enclosure are confusing and compelling.’ Locating the work 
of poetic discourse in this ‘outside state outside of States,’ Howe aligns poetry with love rather 




formal interventions she is able to trace by innovating her own form of critical engagement with 
their texts. 
Love as Critical Compositional Methodology: Feeling Over Knowing 
 
Howe’s interest in the relationship between self and other, and relationality itself, in the 
various stages of composition leads to and is born of her interest in Love.493 Because Love is 
about communion through feeling across distance—i.e., telepathy—Howe’s emphasis on feeling, 
as opposed to knowing, offers a counter-logic to the dominant categories of knowledge-
production that authorizes canonization of literary texts and offers a counter-path of reading not 
in order to abstract knowledge from texts but to commune with another, in love. As I discussed 
above, Howe is interested in the distance fundamental to human communication and 
communion: In order to be co-constitutive, Self and Other must remain separate, must know 
(feel) each other across the distance of difference. But the work is equally underwritten by the 
theory that knowledge is achieved through feeling, or that feeling produces a kind of knowledge 
that is distinct from otherwise “rational” modes of knowledge production.  
Yet it is not rationality or reason per se that Howe is countering with feeling as much as 
those practices that have claimed to be rational or reason-based in order to justify ideological 
ends motivated by feelings that are otherwise denied, repressed, and edited out. Reason and 
feeling are not opposed modes of inquiry or expression in Howe’s writing—but since feeling is 
the denigrated term in the dominant approaches to knowledge production, she invests in its 
                                                 
493Case, “Introduction to Susan Howe,” np. Kristen Case: “Corresponding to its origin in 
devotion, Howe’s writing works toward the recognition and rendering-visible of all forms of 
relation. […] Against the background of this culture [patriarchy], Susan Howe’s work announces 
another possibility—to use language not as a means of erasing the extra-textual world and our 
connections to it, but as a way to render visible and active the invisible web of relations that 
animates and informs our every act of reading and writing and thinking. As a mean, itself, of 
relation, of love. It is a possibility we need.” 
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discursive power to unsettle and resist those approaches: “I am pulling representation from the 
irrational dimension love and knowledge must reach.”494 Reaching toward irrationality, the 
impossibility of knowing the other: “To reach is to touch.”495 In an interview, Howe describes 
the writing of My Emily Dickinson: “Gradually, the book became a feeling toward this thing I’m 
talking about. […] she [Dickinson] is always somewhere else.”496 Howe writes, 
The recipient of a letter, or combination of letter and poem from Emily Dickinson, was 
forced much like [Jonathan] Edwards’ listening congregation, through shock and through 
subtraction of the ordinary, to a new way of perceiving. Subject and object were fused at 
that moment, into the immediate feeling of understanding. This re-ordering of the forward 
process of reading is what makes her poetry and the prose of her letters among the most 
original writing of the century.497 
 
“The immediate feeling of understanding”—Howe emphasizes the word “feeling” to draw the 
reader’s attention to its unusual appearance—particularly in the 1980s498—in a work of literary 
scholarship. She provokes us to consider: What does it feel like to understand something and 
how is feeling different than knowing? What is the sensation of understanding? For me, it’s a 
kind of breathless excitement and restlessness, my chest fills and I feel expansive, happy, 
curious, afraid, impatient. Like falling in love, I fall into the moment of “a new way of 
perceiving” in an encounter with language.499 There’s a meta-awe at the medium, too—amazed 
that this strange and troubled representational system has delivered such a feeling. Subject and 
                                                 
494Howe, TBM, 83. 
 
495Howe, SP, 60. 
 
496Howe, TBM, 157. 
 
497Howe, MED, 51. 
 
498Emerging work on affect theory and feminist theories that centered feeling, but that work 
didn’t take a strong hold in the academy until the 21st century. 
 
499E.g., what some call “the event.” 
268 
 
object are fused, disrupting the subject-verb-object’s otherwise progressive movement through a 
sentence in “this re-ordering of the forward process of reading.” 
I also appreciate this formulation of feeling over knowing in terms of how it bears on 
hermeneutic methodology: the explication of a text in order to share with another person what it 
felt like to read this text and to experience a new way of perceiving; to articulate, speculatively, 
how it happened in order to recreate a path to understanding. Not in order to pass on that 
understanding as some kind of objective500 knowledge, but as a representation of my experience 
that becomes yours as you read it. In that sense such a methodology is pedagogical—the writer 
models how meaning is produced; sharing in the process of meaning-making and putting her 
experience in conversation with others’ experiences rather than providing evidence that the 
meaning it produces for one reader is the correct meaning. The notion that there are multiple 
meanings that are equally “valid” is a hallmark of post-structural hermeneutics that is continually 
misconstrued as leading to chaos—critics of post-structuralism argue that if a text can mean 
anything then it must mean nothing.501 But the investment in multiplicity that writers like Howe, 
                                                 
500“Objective” and “subjective” are troubled words to use in the context of truth and knowledge. 
In part due to their overuse. They have become coded words in the post-1968 period, wherein for 
the intellectual left—or those who would wish to belong to that group—objective knowledge is 
colonizing, totalizing, universalizing, while for the intellectual right, subjective knowledge is 
wishy-washy, hippy, and lacking rigor. That is, objective vs. subjective stands in for a 
conservative vs. liberals as those positions defined themselves in the culture wars of the last 
quarter of the 20th century. In other words, these are cultural claims more than theoretical or 
philosophical ones, though their cultural usage derives from academic theoretical/philosophical 
work of the 1970s-90s—some of which was more nuanced, some not.  
 
501Wilkinson, “Out of Bounds of the Bound Margin,” 276, 278; Palatella, “An End of 
Abstraction,” np. Wilkinson writes: “A postmodern interpretation, in which the reader 
acknowledges the text’s multiplicity and the difficult of disentangling various textual references, 
thus takes us only so far.” Wilkinson argues that Howe leaves her texts open so that “different 
interpretations send us off along different trajectories of thought, which will affect the way in 
which we understand Howe’s lines.” But I don’t understand how that description is different than 
the postmodern interpretation she says “takes us only so far.” I am led then to observe that 
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Mackey, and Roberson share with thinkers of the time like Glissant, Deleuze, Jameson, et al, is 
that it is the addition of the particulars that produces a Totality that is not totalizing; and it is only 
by recognizing the multiplicity of meanings that one avoids reducing every particular to one 
                                                                                                                                                             
there’s an anxiety about “postmodernism” that these critics want to keep Howe away from, want 
to somehow protect her from. And I think it’s fairly obviously a European white male/masculine 
tradition that they want to find some alternative to. But they aren’t able, as Howe is, to tease out 
what about that tradition is valuable and what “takes us only so far.” I think it’s because they 
know it’s not a compelling argument, to condemn the tradition for its practitioners’ subject 
positions. And they don’t have the distance to see the difference between the text itself and how 
it’s been deployed institutionally and socially etc. Palatella, writing in 1995, is similarly worried 
that Howe’s poetics might be interpreted as an example of postmodernist irony, as Palatella 
understands Jameson’s theory that was in high circulation across various disciplines of the 
academy at this time (Postmodernism was published in 1991) as follows: “There is no hope for 
positive change for the prophetic artist in postmodern America: An artist either despairs of art's 
paralysis, its inability to imagine and encourage social and self- transformation, or she happily 
accepts the rule and community of the marketplace--which operates according to an ethos of 
consumption that endlessly manipulates representations to stimulate change in desire and 
demand--and repackages herself into an avant-garde stylist.” I don’t believe Jameson’s cultural 
observation was meant to draw the boundaries of what is possible for artists in America, but 
rather was a description or diagnosis of the dominant cultural trend, but the anxiety is real. 
Against the background of this anxiety about art’s efficacy at the end of the 20th century, 
Palatella has to find some way to rescue Howe’s book from this fate. Commenting on both the 
preface to “Thorow” in which Howe describes the town she visits as a postmodern simulacra and 
the despairing ending of Articulations of Sound Forms in Time, Palatella writes, “While I don't 
deny that Hope's lyric self-possession is laced with irony, I nonetheless think that considering 
irony to be the end of Howe's poetics would enervate the reconstructive impulses that animate 
Howe's poetics. To focus exclusively on the despair of the passage I've quoted from ‘Thorow’ 
would be a mistake because it is uncharacteristic of Howe's otherwise meticulous work. Such 
despair is too easy, and as hollow as the culture it upbraids. Her litany of trinkets, eateries, and 
outlets merely identifies a capitalist framework instead of considering whose interests it 
channels. And, as I've tried to indicate in the discussion of poems, although Howe ‘quotes’ a 
variety of languages in ‘Articulation of Sound Forms in Time,’ she is not the consummate 
postmodern stylist who tries on a wardrobe full of tropes with as much flair as a fashion model. 
‘Postmodern’ negativity need not entail that a meaningless simulacra is the only social arena in 
which the self can be defined. A braid woven from historically distinct strands of language can 
unravel at its end into a snare of contradictions that the despairing artist cannot even hang him or 
herself with. Conversely, a braid can also trace out new resources of meaning in each strand of 
language, and thereby lead to a renewed strength. The braid may be unraveled into strands, but 
as a means for weaving some strands into other braids. Or the braid is unwoven when it becomes 
a strand in another skein. Corrosive irony is not an end, but the means necessary for allowing one 
to move beyond negation to fabricate other stories, necessary fictions. Rebuking various 




thing and instead holding them together to map the inter-connected complexity of the world-
system. It is also, as David Arnold points out, a way of building community: “[T]he variability of 
definition is a mark of respect for the truths of others,”502 a respect that is mutually required for a 
community to function. Rachel Blau DuPlessis, in her essay on Howe in The Pink Guitar, 
introduces a beautiful phrase to describe Howe’s “plumbing” of genre in her creative-critical 
work as “fermented by her mapping, weeping eye.” Howe’s “mapping, weeping eye” is a 
beautiful and useful portrayal of Howe’s feminist historicist imperative—she maps the non-
totalizing Totality through feeling. She brings mapping—coded masculine—and weeping—
coded feminine—into sensible relation. 
Howe’s critical compositional methodology led by Love503 takes the shape of a radical 
formal poetics that defies dominant notions of the individual subject as a meaning-making unit—
even as she critiques objectivity. In the introduction to The Birth-mark, Howe writes in a 
sentence whose incomplete grammar is suggestive of a thought unfolding: “Voices I am 
following to the margins.” Following voices where they lead her, Howe wants to find the voices 
of the writers, the people, whom she loves: “They walk in my imagination and I love them.” She 
has a sense here already of loving them in a place that doesn’t exist in the world, but in the 
margins, in love, like in the letter she quotes by American literary scholar, F.O. Matthiessen to 
                                                 
502Arnold, “Another Kind of Writing,” 129. 
 
503Kristen Case, “Introduction to Susan Howe’s ‘Spontaneous Particulars: The Telepathy of 
Archives’” (Introduction to Susan Howe’s lecture at The Woodberry Poetry Room, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA, October 7, 2014). My work on love in Howe’s creative-critical 
work was buoyed by Kristen Case’s observation that “Howe’s acts of collage and of 
juxtaposition, of marginalia and of philosophical trespass, do indeed, as many critics have 
pointed out, speak to us of the possibilities and limitations of language, but to me they speak 
more urgently of a suppressed devotion, of the way the movement of a body and the gestures of a 
mind in writing words may be reanimated by the kind of love that haunts an archive. Against the 
boundaries set by an entrenched view of scholarship as verification, as instruction and carrying 
report, Howe’s acts of trespass mark out a space for scholarship as act of love.” 
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his secret lover Russell Cheney, “Our union has no name, no label; in the world it does not exist. 
It is simply the unpalpable, inexpressible fullness of our lives.” She writes, “Somewhere 
Coleridge says that Love may be a sense of Substance/Being seeking to be self-conscious.” The 
lover is a mirror that makes ourselves visible to ourselves, i.e., self-conscious—a seeking that is 
not fulfilled but forever in process, as the relationship between I and you—I, Susan, and you, 
Emily; I, Adra, and you, Susan; I, F.O. and you Russell; I, Author, and you, Reader; and, so on—
is one of infinite approach, trying to meet, to see each other, never able to get close enough, yet 
the love expanding in that reach, where does that expansion go? Into what space but that of the 
imagination, a world large enough to walk in together.  
But if self-consciousness seems to bring the matter back to the individual who is in love, 
Howe immediately wants to come back to the other who is not the self: you. She asks: “you. Fate 
flies home to the mark. Can any words restore to me how you felt?” The pronoun sits alone, 
uncapitalized, an extension of the self produced by the compound, “self-conscious,” but also 
separate, enigmatic, we feel the full mystery and power and necessity and longing of “you” as it 
appears on the page. “In what language shall I address you? Self-assertion by letter writing.”504 
Is poetry always addressed to another—the reader? Might reading likewise take the form of an 
address to the writer? And in both cases, in our address to another, do we meet ourselves? Is it in 
the address that we find the only possible way to meet ourselves, and the only possible way to 
meet another? Meeting implies two—an intersection defined by the relation between two people, 
who encounter each other and themselves as those-who-meet, who feel each other across the 
difference of not being the other: by telepathy.  
                                                 
504Howe, TBM, 38. 
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The page on which “you” appears introduces another problem of communion produced 
by the text itself: the mark on the page is a record of what? The material meeting point of reading 
an author across chronology, geography, cultural-historical change, is the mark of ink on paper—
from one hand to another. The words are an expression of something that we want to believe is a 
record, as well. But writing is a medium that feelings pass through. What happens in the 
mediation? How is feeling transmitted, transformed, or lost? The idea of restoration, of bringing 
something back to the present is a tricky one. Rungs of escape and enclosure are compelling and 
confusing: Can restoration really ever sidestep recuperation? Once you bring them (the person 
who writes from a distance) into this world, this world gets into them. Like children—we can’t 
protect them from that. Howe acknowledges it: “Thoughts delivered by love are predestined to 
distortion by words.”505 She asks the necessary questions: 
Was it you or is it me? Where is the stumbling block? […] If experience forges 
conception, can quick particularities of calligraphic expression ever be converted to type? 
Are words children? What is the exchange value? Where does spirit go? […] Is there any 
way to proof it? Who or what survives the work? Where is the patron of the stamp.506 
 
These questions, a grocery list of inquiries, are all over the place—perhaps eliciting Howe’s own 
fever507 in response to reading. The questions are unsorted into the categories that would make 
them more immediately legible: “Oh, you’re talking about Dickinson’s manuscripts versus their 
transcription into type;” or “Oh, you’re talking about how editorial decisions are often market-
driven,” or “Oh, you’re talking about what is lost in the process of editing, printing, and selling 
literature,” and so on. Before we can sort this out, the list of questions strikes the reader as 
                                                 
505Howe, TBM, 4. 
 
506Howe, TBM, 4. 
 
507To play on the word Coleridge passage quoted by Howe in which he uses the word “fever” 
pejoratively to oppose the more honorable “enthusiasm.” 
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immediate and present, eliciting the sense of being in Howe’s mind, or seeing a picture of it 
“straying, seeking, scattering.”  
Howe asks, in a direct address to Dickinson, or to anyone who might occupy the position 
of “you”: “Can any words restore to me how you felt?” Felt is in italics, distinguishing feeling 
from thought, or from statement. The emphasis provokes one to inquire what information words 
are meant to convey. But it isn’t just about what the words might communicate. The notion that 
the words could restore how a person felt is a desire to transcend the limitations of distance—of 
time, geography, language, and otherwise—to commune with a person. But perhaps more than 
that, to inhabit them—to stand inside the place from which expression issues forth. But 
restoration—a form of re-creation—reconstructs something that time has damaged from the 
material that remains, to bring it back. There is a primary experience that is irretrievably lost. 
And what is that I want when I say I want to know how Emily Dickinson felt when she wrote the 
words? I’m saying that I want to know what the words meant to her, how the words were an 
emanation of what she was feeling and thinking and being.508 There are forms of literary 
exegesis that fall flat on this count, methodologies we are familiar with that persuade us to a 
                                                 
508Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier, 4. Here I disagree with Walter Benn Michaels who 
argues that Howe’s commitment to textuality forfeits any interest in the intention of the author. 
Michael’s very rational reading of Howe’s materialist intervention leads him to the logical 
conclusion that Howe doesn’t really care about Dickinson at all. While I take the rhetorical 
point—which is designed to be provocative—it is also an ironically good demonstration of the 
way an appeal to rationality erases feeling from knowledge-production. Michaels writes: 
“Indeed, despite the fact that our interest in the text’s materiality was provoked first by an 
interest in Dickinson’s intention, we can no longer have any principled interest in Dickinson at 
all. Even though she played a no doubt crucial causal role in producing the object, our interest in 
its materiality requires our attention to every feature of the text, regardless of Dickinson’s 
involvement. Thus the most radical form of Howe’s commitment to Dickinson produces a certain 
indifference to Dickinson—for the things Dickinson didn’t care about (say, the kind of ink) must 
matter just as much as the things she did care about (say, the shapes of the letters). So to see the 
material object just as a material object is to make no distinction between what Dickinson cared 
about and what she didn’t. A thoroughgoing materialism needn’t deny that the object has been 
made by someone but must nevertheless treat it as if it had been made by no one.” 
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reading that makes sense of the words, which gives them a literary intention, a semantic 
intention, an intellectual or philosophical intention, but is there a form of literary exegesis that 
allows us to meet the writer in love? In an exchange of letters, when we are addressing someone 
or being addressed, there is a feeling of the person conveyed. We consume their words to be 
closer to them, not to understand their theses. Howe writes, “I am pulling representation from the 
irrational dimension love and knowledge must reach.”509 
At the beginning of My Emily Dickinson, Howe writes, “My voice formed from my life 
belongs to no one else. What I put into words is no longer my possession. Possibility has 
opened.”510 The possibility of what one’s voice will become as it comes into the possession of 
others is opened by ex-pressing oneself. But an impossibility is initiated as well, as the reader 
tries to reach the writer through words that are no longer in the writer’s possession, and therefore 
do not belong to them. The longing is double—to possess one’s own voice (“my voice”) and to 
let it go. It travels in both directions—the writer longs to be possessed by her reader, to be heard; 
the reader wants to hear the writer, to possess her. “Possession” is a provocative word to choose, 
since it denotes control, suggestive of domination, not to be used lightly. Undermining that 
connotation, Howe uses the word to say that what she puts into words is no longer under her 
control—it no longer belongs to her. “What” she puts into word is her voice, or a representation 
of her voice—coined, printed, pressed—or further still a translation of her voice—what her voice 
says, the words produced by her voice. Words voiced are already expressive of a longing both to 
belong to the speaker as faithful representative of her-self and to be taken up by someone else, 
i.e., to be heard, understood by another. “Possession” is a word associated with passion, love and 
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510Howe, MED, 13. 
275 
 
sexual desire; but also, with jealousy and control. Desire consumes itself, fueled by and fueling 
contradiction. Across the space of feeling, writing, reading, feeling—possession, dispossession, 
repossession—sharing words makes us reflections of one another. Love produces a desire to be 
so close to someone that you could possess them the way you possess yourself, to be made one, 
along with a desire for the opposite, to remain separate so that you can love them. 
Thinking with Howe about the relationship between writer and reader as a love affair 
foregrounds love, or feeling, as a motivating factor that disrupts the otherwise rational pursuit of 
knowledge—i.e., it de-universalizes and de-objectifies knowledge, makes it particular and 
intimate, occasioning talk about the inner social lives of writers and readers that are otherwise 
edited out as irrelevant or dangerous. At the same time, the love affair points toward the desire 
for connection, communion—to meet or feel another person across the distance of time, space 
and circumstance. Underwriting this latter point is Howe’s ethical interest in the co-constitutive 
relationship between self and other—“An author takes the reader in. Enchantment of the 
other.”511 It is only in relation that we find each other through the mess of the colonizing, 
isolating, alienating force of modern history. But there are limits to this communion that could be 
considered barriers to overcome—“Locked alone in the vision of my brain, even language never 
truly connects me to another.”512 Howe draws out the paradoxical necessity of the limits that 
draw the boundary between one person and another, between you and me: in love, we desire to 
overcome what separates us from one another, but in order to love, we must remain separate. It 
might even be the impossibility of complete communion that produces love in the first place, 
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producing the ground from which we reach out to one another.513 “If limits disappear,” Howe 
writes, “where will we find bearings?”514 Howe wants to meet Dickinson in the text, but what 
she also most cherishes about Dickinson is her inability to be captured, the way she is always 
slipping away from her readers. 
This image of moving infinitely closer to one another without meeting—asymptotic—
connects to another aspect of the social in Howe’s discussion of the “outside” as other and the 
other as fundamentally outside.515 The outside that liberatory poetics seeks is perhaps an 
essential outsideness that remains outside: i.e., only by remaining outside, does it provide 
relationality. The asymptotic limit is not a failure but the most necessary condition of possibility: 
“[I]t’s about impossibility anyway. About the impossibility of putting into print what the mind 
really sees and the impossibility of finding the original in a bibliography,”516 i.e., the 
impossibility of meeting, the impossibility of love’s fulfillment. The limit of signification for 
Howe is a symptom of the limit of communication and communion: “I write quietly to her. She 
is a figure of other as thin as paper.”517  
                                                 
513In Lacanian psychoanalytic terms, this is called desire for a lack. 
 
514Howe, TBM, 144. 
 
515Naylor, Poetic Investigations, 48. Paul Naylor points out that this was true for Spicer, as well. 
I agree with both him and Davidson on this account. “I believe [Michael] Davidson is correct 
when he claims that Spicer’s notion of a dictation from the ‘outside’ is ‘more dialogical and 
social’ than metaphysical or mystical; the ‘outside,’ Davidson contends, ‘has its base in human 
intercourse within a community and … its reception takes the form of a conversation.’” 
 
516Howe, TBM, 175. 
 
517Howe, TBM, 47. 
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Howe writes, in an ostensible address to Dickinson: “Sometimes I know you just from 
reading.”518 Howe has a faith in the communicative—communitive—potential of writing, that 
we could come to know someone through and despite the mediation of language, and the double 
mediation of text. Yet in this statement, the words “sometimes” and “just” do a lot of semantic 
work, pointing to difficulties that challenge that faith. “Sometimes” suggests an exception—rare 
moments in which such knowing occurs. “Sometimes” gives the sentence a breathy and 
uncertain quality—one almost expects an “it is as if” to follow—as in, “sometimes it is as if I 
know you…” That Howe could know Dickinson “just” by reading similarly suggests an 
exception to what is usually considered necessary to knowing, such as biographical and historical 
context—the study of which makes up a large part of Howe’s critical works on Dickinson. Yet 
despite that, Howe suggests there is, or might be, an immediacy available in the experience of 
reading itself—that Dickinson has expressed something in writing that is then impressed on 
Howe.  
Love Produces Trouble: The Limits of Love and False Narratives 
 
Yet Howe returns again and again to the limits of reading as a medium through which 
one might know the writer as another person. On the scholarly project of restoring Dickinson’s 
fascicles—these small collections of poems that Dickinson appears to have arranged and sewn 
together as chapbooks, but that were taken apart by her sister-in-law without noting their original 
arrangements—Howe writes, “If we could perfectly restore each packet to its original order, her 
original impulse would be impossible to decipher. The manuscript books and sets preserve 
insubordination. They can be read as events, signals in a pattern, relays, inventions or singular 
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hymnlike stanzas.”519 As we’ve seen, Howe consistently defends Dickinson against scholarly 
claims that we could know her, could know what she wanted or intended for her poetry. In that 
sense she wants to draw out the resistance of the text to delivering Dickinson to the reader “just 
from reading.” There’s an implicit distinction between the institution of scholarship and critical 
writing out of love that accounts for these apparent contradictions. But the contradiction is real 
and internal to Howe’s own work: She is explicitly engaged in a scholarly project at the same 
time that she is writing out of love—her own project is entwined in these practices that she tries 
to somehow disentangle.  
  “The subject and conflict of Wuthering Heights and “My Life had stood – a Loaded Gun 
– ,” Howe writes, “is complete union with another soul and absolute separation.”520 Complete 
union: absolute separation. Union and separation are intimately linked in Howe’s writing about 
literature, history, kinship and love, not as binary opposites but necessarily coincident attributes 
of these subjects. She continues to explain, 
Catherine and Heathcliff are each other’s central source. They contain, define, and defy 
one another, and everyone else around them. In Dickinson’s poem, this same unity is at 
the core of identity – Gun and hunter, My and Master. […] Sadism knocks down barriers 
between an isolate soul and others. Violence forces reaction. That unity of souls may be 
linked to sadism is the sad riddle of the world. In these works of imagination by two 
women vulturism is the human condition. Voice throws heart against flint.521 
 
In this accounting, the coextensive link between union and separation is not romantic so much as 
tortured—an inescapable reality of relations that here Howe names as part of the human 
condition, but that she traces throughout the books as a historical phenomenon particular to the 
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colonial-settlement of the New World. “Sexual, racial, and geographical separation are at the 
heart of Definition.”522 
Communion, communication, community, commons. Webster’s 1844 definition of 
“common” is inclusive of many senses, but what is striking is the legal sense of “common” as 
property that is open to public use. As I was browsing Webster’s Dictionary, as Howe does and 
as Howe suggests Dickinson would do,523 “commorant” appears next to common, a word that 
also has to do with the use of space. The OED offers: 
commorant – obsolete  
A. adj. 
a. Abiding, dwelling, resident. 
Formerly applied technically, at Cambridge, to members of the Senate resident in the 
town (commorantes in villa) who were no longer members of their colleges: this became 
obsolete with the Act of 1856, which abolished the qualification of residence.  
†b. Of water: Standing, not running away. 
B. noun 
A dweller, sojourner, resident. 
(Also as in note to A.) 
“Commorant” is a word which is close to “cormorant,” a name Howe lovingly ascribes to writers 
like herself who dwell in libraries looking for sustenance: “library cormorant.”524 A cormorant is 
                                                 
522Howe, MED, 21. 
 
523Howe, SP, 28. Howe observes: “Running over affinities and relations, as was her practice, 
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a sea bird that dives into the water to find sustenance. “I go to the libraries,” Howe writes, 
“because they are the ocean.”525 In my chance encounter in the dictionary, “library commorant” 
emerges as another appellation for those who engage in this kind of work—dwelling in the 
words of others, as property that is open to public use.  
But there’s also a kind of violation of property involved in the poetics Howe practices. As 
she puts it in the introduction to The Birth-mark: “To feed these essays I have dived through 
other people’s thoughts […] I have plagiarized […] In the acquisitive spirit I have borrowed 
back […] I have broken up these sentences and presented them out of context.”526 She has done 
these things not in order to profit from their work—rather she has found these maneuvers 
necessary to her goal of meeting the writers, i.e., these are acts of love that are nonetheless 
destructive. Katrina Harack points out that “[i]n the Levinasian formulation of the call of the 
other, she [Howe] fails to remark upon how her acts of naming and delimiting—as in My Emily 
Dickinson, for example—may perpetuate a cycle of ‘rescue’ that is characterized by violence, 
even as she tries to leave her conclusions as open as possible,”527 and then counters: “If violence 
is committed, it is committed with the best of intentions, and occurs through the subjugation of 
another’s voice to a new poetic project. […] Howe ‘rescues’ Dickinson from worse violence in 
terms of misrepresentation, and so her appropriation is mitigated by her genuine affiliation with 
Dickinson.528 I think this is right, and I respect Harack for not erasing the paradox that is at play, 
but I would further point out that framing and then resolving the issue in terms of “degrees” of 
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violence holds open the door to a larger critique of Howe’s project: Perhaps Howe is doing the 
best she can with the tools at hand. But if the best she can do is more violence, perhaps there is 
another layer of conflict in her poetics to push against. I think as much as Howe, like Harack, 
makes a strong case for her poetic-critical choices, she also feels uneasy and wonders if she’s 
still inside a trap she can’t yet see—rungs of escape and enclosure are confusing and compelling. 
That’s why it is important to lay the contradiction bear, even as one attempts to resolve it. 
Or is it all a rhetorical game? Candor is the only Wile. Howe doesn’t need to put it this 
way, to talk about language in the logic of property ownership. Elsewhere, for example, she 
describes her process of working with the words of others as such: “the outsideness—these 
sounds, these pieces of words—comes into the chaos of life, and then you try to order them and 
to explain something, and the explanation breaks free of itself.”529 Here, in contrast to the earlier 
statement, Howe’s rhetoric aligns her process with a collective liberatory project that she and the 
writers whose words she listens to collaborate toward together: words are loosed from the writer 
to share in what Glissant calls the echo-monde—the world of things resonating with one another. 
After all, “Every source has another center so is every creator.”530 The contradiction between 
these two framings—using the words of others as the transgression of property ownership versus 
picking up on the sounds and pieces loosed from their origins—is again pushing against a 
problem: belonging and possession are tied up in love and domination. Naylor suggests that 
Howe works against capitalist property relations via an open field poetics that leaves language 
open to multiple interpretations loosed from authorial ownership:  
This act of hermeneutical resistance parallels the kind of cultural resistance implied in 
Howe’s critique of the European traders who ‘discovered’ Lake George—‘Pathfinding 
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believers in God and grammar [who] spelled the lake into place.’ Naming is an essential 
step in the capitalist process of appropriating and mastering nature in order to convert it 
into private property. And regulating nature’s representation in language with the tools of 
grammar and spelling keeps the lines of ownership and mastery well defined and open to 
adjudication by the ‘European grid; of property-rights law.531   
 
While I agree that Howe is engaging this critique of language, I do not think she believes such 
“hermeneutical resistance” erases one’s complicity, does not guarantee one is not engaging in 
language-as-property. How do you know which you are involved in? “Other to other we are all 
functions in a system of War,”532 Howe ominously writes. We are caught up in narratives that 
extend beyond the relationship between one writer and one reader. Love can feel like a shelter, a 
refuge, but personal communion leads us to the public commons—when we are open, we meet 
not only the one we love but the world itself, exposing us to a world on fire. 
Howe follows writers to the margins to find love, but also to find the fundamental 
contradictions that are otherwise resolved and erased in the proofed text. “If history is a record of 
survivors, Poetry shelters other voices. / Dickinson, Melville, Thoreau, and Hawthorne guided 
me back to what I once thought was the distant seventeenth century.”533 Howe recognizes a 
structural relation between what is happening in these texts of “the past” and what she observes 
in “the present”—namely American contradictions: “The break with the Old World was a 
rupture into contraries.”534 Of the early colonial settlers, she writes: 
Schismatic children of Adam thought they were leaving the ‘wilderness of the world’ to 
find a haven free of institutional structures they had united against. They were 
unprepared for the variability of directional change the wilderness they reached 
represented. […] Rage against authority and rage for order, desire for union with the 
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Father and the guilty knowledge they had abandoned their own mothers and fathers. […] 
Oppositional wreckers and builders considered themselves divine instruments committed 
to the creation of a holy commonwealth.535 
 
This is not the way the official U.S. American story is usually told. Howe’s interest in the 
falseness of collective myths ranges from national to local to personal narratives, from the story 
of America to the story of Harvard to the story of the Howes. She understands how all of these 
myths are in fact part of the same story. In My Emily Dickinson she interrogates the “national 
myth [that] had been shaping itself”536 in the time of Cotton Mather and sustained over centuries, 
still today dominant and still being interrogated. The early settlers needed a wilderness, not an 
already-inhabited continent, so they created a mythical American wilderness that still finds 
traction today. They needed to construct a patriarchy though they had rebelled against the king, 
so they created a mythical American providence to guide an otherwise contradictory moral order. 
“Everything I’ve been saying comes back to this,” Howe writes: “Behind the façade of Harvard 
University is a scaffold and a regicide. Under the ivy and civility there is the instinct for murder, 
erasure, and authoritarianism.”537 
As I’ve discussed above, Howe writes and talks significantly about her father, who was a 
Harvard professor of law and an intellectual of the (liberal) left of Cambridge. Howe loved and 
admired her father greatly—of Emily Dickinson’s relationship with her own father, Howe writes, 
“I understand her sense of awe and devotion in relation to him.”538 Howe wishes her father had 
lived long enough to see her become a writer, to be able to share her work with him, to stay up 
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late in the study discussing the Mathers. At the same time, she constantly acknowledges that his 
intellectual world was one that necessarily excluded her as a woman, and that this exclusion 
shaped her own struggle to find her voice as a writer. I’ve discussed the story we find in this 
relationship about Howe’s relationship to gender, but there’s also a story about family myth. As 
she continues to discuss what she and Dickinson share in relation to their fathers, Howe writes: 
“My father also died suddenly. He was sixty. He died in 1967 so never knew the changes that 
were coming in ’68. He was a professor at the Harvard Law School, very much involved in the 
civil rights movement, and the official biographer of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.”539  “The 
changes that were coming in ’68” included the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr and 
Robert Kennedy, mass protests ending in arrest and/or murder of protestors in Oakland, New 
York, Cleveland, and Chicago, the nomination of Richard Nixon as Republican candidate for 
president, the ever-increasing rise of spectacle in American politics and culture via television. 
There were some liberal gains as well, but in the end, 1968 seemed to mark the end of the 
progressive promises that Howe’s father believed in. The utopian vision of the civil rights 
movement could no longer be sustained. I think Howe had to reconcile the narrative she grew up 
with—that social change was immediately possible and just on the horizon—because she lived 
longer than her father to witness the reality of what came next. In her 1989 interview with Ed 
Foster, Foster asks Howe if she has any background in Marxist theory to which she gives the 
succinct answer: “No.” Foster presses her that her sister Fanny Howe described “the Cambridge 
world in which you and she grew up as leftist, and I was wondering…” Howe interrupts him to 
explain: 
Well, I guess I wouldn’t describe it quite that way. Yes, it was leftist in the sense that 
Democrats were considered to be leftists during the fifties. The shadow of the McCarthy 
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hysteria was heavy over Cambridge then. And my father, unlike some others, was 
outspoken and very courageous. But he was a solid Truman Democrat. He worshipped 
the American Constitution. It was really his faith. Constitutional law and legal history 
were the subjects he taught. He was far from being a Marxist. My mother is more 
theatrical, but they basically agreed politically with each other, and their friends were 
probably about the same: saddened by what was happening but really pretty safe at the 
same time, simply because they were at a place like Harvard. Harvard, and I suppose 
most Ivy League universities, were more sheltered.540 
 
The contrast between this narrative and the one above that her father was “very much involved in 
the civil rights movement” demonstrates a critical relationship Howe had developed in response 
to inherited family myths. Fanny Howe doesn’t in fact use the word “leftist” in the essay Foster 
is referring to “Artobiography” (published in 1985 in Bob Perelmans Writings/Talks), but does 
refer to socialism and communism as du jour in the Harvard circles in which her parents 
belonged,541  a characterization that Susan Howe reacts to with retrospective wariness. 
Recognizing the limits of her father’s liberal politics goes hand in hand with a larger 
reconsideration of the culture of meaning in which she was raised: 
Harvard was very privileged during the forties and fifties, so male. The Matthiessen 
book: an intellectual and poetic Renaissance minus Emily Dickinson. Minus Harriet 
Beecher Stowe. Minus Margaret Fuller. Of course, minus Frederick Douglass as well. 
Woman weren’t the only ones subtracted. It’s these kinds of contradictions that get me. I 
know Marxist-influenced scholarship, really exciting work now being done in American 
studies, has made me more conscious of such contradictions. I mean it’s important to try 
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to get under the official history of Harvard. What does that place represent? I can’t quite 
so simply say I grew up in a false community—a community that fancied itself as liberal. 
I don’t want to be so hard on it because these were honorable scholars, careful 
researchers, and this was their profession, and they felt it was a calling. But you see, it 
was false if you were a girl or a woman who was not content to be considered second-
rate. […] I would dearly love to sit down and show my father what I know now. We 
would talk about the garden and the wilderness together [he wrote a book The Garden 
and the Wilderness in which he writes on Puritan law in early America], and all would be 
well. All manner of things would be well. Yet this place I want to come home to was 
false to women in an intellectual sense. It was false.542 
 
It takes Howe a few rounds to make the unqualified statement that ends her comment: It was 
false. Not just for women, not just for black people. False histories, false communities, false 
family narratives. The changes that came in ’68 and the intellectual work produced out of that 
moment makes the fallacy visible. Howe is working through it. She is partly resistant, because 
she doesn’t want to lose her past, doesn’t want to loosen her hold on her heroes. But it keeps 
coming back up anyway: “It’s these kinds of contradictions that get me.” Contradiction keeps 
coming up. The contradictions are productive. But they can be a solace too, a way of holding on 
and letting go at the same time. And that too comes back to love. She takes these 
reconsiderations personally: “I don’t want to be so hard on them.” She feels protective. It is clear 
who she is protecting: the people whom she loves. But does she know what she is protecting? 
The Trick of Her Text Is Its Mix: The Radical Form of Howe’s Wily Candor 
 
The narratives we tell out of love can be false too. There’s a tension Howe externalizes 
onto “institutions”—those external forces—but the tension ultimately keeps coming up as her 
own to observe. She lets her contradictions display themselves, allows the reader to perceive 
them, probably more than she necessarily is able to herself, without neatly resolving them. That 
may be the ultimate payoff of her method, by documenting her own process—making it 
transparent—she leaves her text open to her readers to meet her, and therefore to meet herself in 
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some way that she would otherwise not be able to. That is, Howe teaches us how to read between 
the lines of her own writings by reading between the lines of Mary Rowlandson’s text and the 
journals of public intellectuals of seventeenth-century New England to make legible the 
fundamentally schismatic imagination of the nation’s storytellers: 
Split forever in the discontinuous drama of Promised Americanus, God is a thunderer, a 
clockmaker, a deer tamer. There is always a political message in the language of grace. 
Progress. Watch democratic King-birds and naked Nature. […] Typology projects 
theocracy into our fictive future.543 […] One moral sense soon cancels another in a 
country of progress and force.544  
 
She sees Rowlandson’s writing as caught up in and cautiously navigating this drama of 
contradictions, which we in turn see Howe’s own writings caught up in. Accordingly, Howe is 
sympathetic to the position Rowlandson finds herself in as she tries to tell her story within the 
larger national myth that her community is attempting to project into the fictive future we live in 
now. Addressing Rowlandson “model-muse,” Howe writes, “You are a passive victim, captured 
and threatened by a racial enemy until God’s providence (later a human hero) can effect your 
deliverance. You must shelter the masculine covenant as lost lady and lofty ideal. You will water 
the American venture with your tears.”545 Howe describes the specific situation in terms general 
enough to apply to the many stories Rowlandson’s stands as model for throughout the American 
centuries to come. Howe, a white woman, raised in liberal Harvard, carrying her own race and 
class guilt, asserts: “I think Rowlandson is the mother of us all. American writers, I mean. 
Already in 1681, the first narrative written by a white Anglo-American woman is alive with rage 
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and contradiction. She is a prophet. She speaks for us now, in the same way that slave narratives 
do. She says our sin.”546  
Howe is interested in the way Rowlandson’s form betrays the rage and contradictions of 
the culture of writing in which she composed. She figures, “Rev. Joseph Rowlandson’s wife 
knew that her ordeal might mark her as suspect; vulnerable to ambivalent charges ranging from 
pride (she had set a high price on her own head) to sexual promiscuity, even to sorcery. Perhaps 
she told her story to assure herself and her community that she was a woman who feared God 
and eschewed evil.”547  The kinds of maneuvers Rowlandson made to accommodate this social 
reality produces a text that when read outside the context of its production will make a different 
kind of sense: “Future distortions, exaggerations, modifications, corrections and emendations 
may endow a text with meanings it never formed.”548 But these later distortions are made 
possible by the choices writers make, under pressures internal and external, compromises whose 
consequences they may or may not have been able to anticipate—as we saw in Matthiessen’s 
case. Similarly, the kinds of choices that Rowlandson made, likely under the advice of her 
husband, produced a text that could be used to ends she may not have wished to authorize—
perpetuating a racist war against the indigenous people in the name of protecting white women, 
for example, under the auspices of divine providence. “Rev. Joseph Rowlandson, who had once 
been publicly whipped and fined for writing a satirical prose poem, helped his wife to choose 
scriptural parallel and referents that would support and censor her narrative at the same time that 
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they entwined the telling in a becoming Christological corporate pattern.”549 Nonetheless, a 
careful reader like Howe is able to trace Rowlandson’s necessary subversions of her own 
method, those contradictions that can’t be entirely erased:  
Like the aboriginals she assures us she hates (at the same time noting their frequent acts 
of kindness to her), Mrs. Rowlandson attributes causation to spiritual force.550 […] 
Near the end of her narrative she interrupts the homeward direction of her impending 
restoration with a list of specific criticism of colonial policies toward her captors. […] 
[T]hen she stops her slide into Reason’s ruin by pushing her readers back to the 
imperatives of Wonder-Working Providence.551 […] Her view of King Philip’s War and 
her picture of Metacomet himself is a contradiction of orthodox Puritan history.552 
  
As Howe registers and makes sense of Rowlandson’s text and its many contradictions, and how 
she is able to pass the censors despite these subversions, she comes to the conclusion: “The trick 
of her text is its mix.”553 Rowlandson’s narrative shelters contradiction and discursively 
navigates the political terrain of publication as a white woman in seventeenth-century New 
England by mixing the rhythm of the old world and that of the new in the rhetorical and 
grammatical style of her text. The “trick” it achieves is to pass the censors while smuggling in 
what otherwise would get her in trouble. What trick is Howe trying to achieve in her texts? And 
by what mix? 
Howe achieves reception among mainstream academia554 where her experimental and 
poetic methods would otherwise be deemed unfit for scholarly consideration, at the same time 
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that she finds recognition among experimental poetry and poetics. What rhythms are being 
mixed to make it past the censors of each literary/intellectual world? She mixes archival research 
and the citation of scholarly sources with lyrical expression and institutional critique. The terms 
with which her methodology might be described shift from “citation” and “evidence” to 
“collage” and “juxtaposition” but the methodology itself remains consistent. So that both 
audiences’ expectations are met.555  
What is most surprising is the way Howe smuggles radical form into the fields of 
Dickinson studies and early American literary scholarship. She achieves this, I think, by 
                                                                                                                                                             
554Schultz,”Review of The Birth-Mark,” 216, 217; Schreiner, “The Birth-Mark,” 193-194. 
Contemporary book reviews of The Birth-mark by academics confirm this point. Lydia A. 
Schultz even suggests that Howe is more rigorous in her scholarship than those with the 
credentials to edit anthologies: “[Howe] provides some relevant and fairly recent factual material 
about Rowlandson’s revised date of birth. (The two anthologies that I checked still referred to the 
earlier, apparently inaccurate date, even though they were published after this new information 
was uncovered.)” She further comments: “I found this book has provided me with a much fuller 
understanding of the complexities of this era in American literary history. Howe’s highly poetic 
style is a refreshing and welcome change from the usual academic criticism. Her challenging 
approach fascinates and engages, even for readers like me who do no specialize in this particular 
period. This book has done what good critical works can do: it has piqued my curiosity to the 
point that I want to revisit these texts, to see them in this new light.” While C.S. Schreiner writes: 
“These resonant texts from New England village libraries and major collections at Harvard, are 
melded together by Howe’s intuitive, almost telepathic sensibility into a kind of spiritual drama 
informed by critical acumen. […] Some scholars will find her method obscure. But it’s hard to 
find anything negative at this height. Howe would have us meet others at their most exposed, 
delicate point, where their vulnerability becomes our own, the precondition of our expressions.”  
 
555Nichols, “Tensing the Difference,” 50. Nichols offers: “When Howe ‘lift[s a subject] from the 
dark side of history,’ then, she lifts to presence not an isolate being or delimitable topic, but the 
whole unpronounceable world that has been inflected by her subject. Hence the relaxation of 
scholarly rigor that seems to be indicated in the title of her My Emily Dickinson is actually a most 
strenuous act of attention—the conjuring of an immense latent historical content. The "my" is 
about the genetive nature of subject formation. Emily Dickinson is everywhere dispersed in the 
world she once inflected and can only be approached by the traversing of that world. To borrow 
a figure from Dickinson, the textual artifacts the poet leaves behind are analogous to the tumbled 
blossoms that witness the hummingbird's ‘Route of Evanescence.’ But in the pursuit of her 
quarry, the poet's own subjectivity is formed through the inflection of a world which now 
contains Emily Dickinson.” 
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appealing to a minoritarian/feminist imperative in regards to recovering voices from the canon. 
Such that she appeals to the liberal project of recuperation, while smuggling in a poetics that is 
squarely against recuperation,556 that prefers “revelation over recuperation” to return to 
N.’s/Mackey’s concern. The trick of her text is its mix.557 Miriam Nichols observes: 
Susan Howe's forays into the archives of literary history differ from these uses of the past 
- commodification, ethical judgement, or political action. In a key comment, Howe says 
that she wants to ‘tenderly lift from the dark side of history, voices that are anonymous, 
slighted – inarticulate.’ Her project, then, sounds like that of many feminist and cultural 
revisionists, but she approaches her subjects not only through narrative (which already, in 
                                                 
556Wilkinson, “Out of Bounds of the Bound Margin,” 279; Harack, “Representing Alterity,” 435; 
DuPlessis, The Pink Guitar, 132. Many scholars have commented on Howe’s wariness of 
recuperation. Wilkinson: “An important aspect of her work is that she avoids merely reversing, 
and thus also perpetuating, the efforts of mainstream literature and history, in ‘canonizing’ the 
marginal voice” (279). Harack: Howe and Olson “acknowledge that the gaps in the historical 
record itself—what has been lost or silenced—forces them to consider their ‘rescuing’ of the past 
a coercive need to make sense of it.” DuPlessis, who confronts Howe’s complicated feminism in 
this essay, similarly reflects on how Howe’s position against recuperation is reflected in her 
form: “If there is a zero or nul [sic] space of ‘Woman,’ a ‘hole’ in discourse, it cannot always be 
filled by a mechanism of reversal, from zero to totality, from negative to positive, from anguish 
to affirmation. It must recognize and acknowledge—must pull into textuality, and put into 
culture the elements of its almost effaced stories in all their residual, fragmentary quality. And 
claim the dynamism of the hegemonic stories in their canonical splendor.” 
 
557Mackey, FBB, 77. I am reminded as well of the “mixtery” in the oft-quoted line of an ex-slave 
from the Georgia Sea Islands: “Notes is good enough for you people, but us likes a mixtery.” 
The quotation appears in Mackey’s From a Broken Bottle as well as scholarly writing about the 
relationship between jazz music and literature that I read in the context of studying Mackey’s 
work. I’ve highlighted three examples that pull out different aspects of “mixtery’s” relationship 
to black cultural production in the New World, in which the writers argue how the word 
“mixtery” expresses something fundamental about that production, resonating with Howe’s 
reading of Rowlandson and my reading of Howe’s works as white women in the New World: 
“the trick of her text is its mix.” The “mixtery” line appears in a parenthetical nod in N.’s 
discussion of “the virtue of imprecision:” 
The other thing I would stress is that “imprecision” relates in a non-pejorative sense 
where the parameters of expression have become too profound for anything other than a 
notional approximation. The distinction between the notional and the notational. (“Notes 
is good enough for you people, but us likes a mixtery.”)  
Mackey’s promotion via N. of the “virtue of imprecision” rhymes conceptually with Howe’s 
promotion in My Emily Dickinson of uncertainty and hesitation (“in a non-pejorative sense”) as 
feminine impulses that lead to alternative modes of knowledge production that are not 
(necessarily) as violent as their masculine counterparts. 
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its exclusions and inclusions, implies judgement), but also through the physical artifacts 
that have been marked by their passing, and which establish their absence in the narrated 
present. It is the artifact, rather than perception or the dance of signification, that 
organizes her texts and marks the difference between present knowing and the otherness 
of historical subjects. It is thus not just the past which is to be measured and judged, but 
the present as well, and, perhaps the act of judging itself.558  
 
That is, by presenting her form as an antidote to false narratives and masculine/mastery tradition, 
she is able to practice a form that extends into the more radical project of formal shattering to 
which she is most committed. 
But, like Rowlandson’s text, it is precisely that mix that makes traceable the 
contradictions at play in Howe’s work.559 That is, her mix makes evident the cultural and 
institutional contradictions she was navigating—between confessional and Language poetry; 
between poetry and scholarship; between different schools of feminism; and so forth. It also lays 
bear her more personal or internal contradictions. It strikes me that in her critical work on 
Dickinson, and especially on Rowlandson, Howe has established a kind of American nature—
characterized by contradiction—that she traces from its “founding” to the present, and writes 
herself into that history, recognizes herself as an “American,” as shaped by American literary 
tradition, American stories, etc. The desire to move toward limitlessness—in the 1970s-90s 
figured as multiplicity, deferral, fugitivity, etc.—is yet another expression of this American 
nature trying to come to terms with its contradictions, and in that sense extends them. If Howe 
begins with the wager that exposing the foundational contradictions might be a step toward 
creating something else—an otherwise American tradition that is unsettled, de-settled, 
decolonized—she ends up in an ambivalent position whether any American writer can do 
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anything other than re-inscribe the American myth of contradiction that fuels its colonial 
movement in the world. We might read Haracks’ observation that “Each author [Howe and 
Olson] confronts a tradition of American poetics and American history that is primarily framed 
in masculine, patriarchal terms, based on a continual tension between self and other that results 
in acts of colonization but also fosters innovation”560 as further evidence to support Howe’s 
ambivalence. Even moves of resistance are double-edged: rungs of escape and enclosure are 
confusing and compelling because that “ladder to an outside state outside of States” was only a 
cage after all. In her poetics statement for The New Poetics Colloquium held in Vancouver in 
1985, Howe writes, "North Americans have tended to confuse human fate with their own 
salvation. In this I am North American."561 I take her to mean that the myth of providence with 
which U.S. American identity was first forged as an exceptional nation, the stakes of whose 
survival was the survival of the world is sewn into the fabric of every oppositional project. In 
response, Howe’s move toward social love attempts to break from the logic of providence 
toward a poetics of communion and community. 
The contradictions that Howe maps in the production of social, cultural, and literary 
history; in acts of communication, communion and love; as well as in her own relationships to 
the world—as a feminist, as a writer, as a community member, and as a person committed to 
social transformation—underscores the complexity and contradictions involved in liberatory 
projects. Howe shows us that resisting definition means disclosing and engaging with 
contradictions rather than hiding them: both resonance and dissonance are preferred over 
                                                 
560Harack, “Representing Alterity” 435. 
 
561Howe, “Poetic Statement,” 14. 
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resolution, as a necessary response to the duplicity of post-1968 discourse and a corrective to the 




CONCLUSION: EXPANDING THE FIELD OF LIBERATORY POETICS IN 
AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY 
 
Chapter Review: Relating Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s Liberatory Poetics 
 
Through the previous four chapters we accumulated a number of themes, figures, and 
poetic strategies that tie Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work together in a common liberatory 
project that responds to the historical pressures of writing poetry in the late twentieth-century 
U.S. While each single-author chapter focused on the particular characteristics of the individual 
poet’s work, when considered in relation to one another, we perceive how these characteristics 
apply across all three authors’ bodies of work. Bringing Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work 
into literary-historical relation suggests a liberatory impulse and sensibility that was moving 
through the post-1968 period that is not otherwise accounted for by the existing narratives of 
innovative, experimental, avant-garde and oppositional poetry. Because those narratives continue 
to reproduce artificial divides between language- and identity-based work, formal innovation and 
social commentary, theory and multiculturalism, and so on, Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s 
work is often marked as “hard to categorize” within a single poetic tradition, lineage, or 
movement.562 By showing that what makes their individual work distinctive points to a shared 
                                                 
562Lawrence, A Sense of Regard, 213; Williams, “The Authenicity of Difference,” 128-9; 
McClane, “Susan Howe,” 145. Consider for example, Patrick S. Lawrence’s contribution to the 
2015 collection, A Sense of Regard: Essays on Poetry and Race, in which Lawrence is 
scandalized to learn that Mackey’s influences include “collosi of the Western canon” including 
Pound, Olson, and Williams. He writes, “Mackey’s poetry can be and has been read as both 
resisting and enacting dominant discourses” (emphasis in original). Roberson is continually 
asked to account for his relationship to the Black Arts Movement to which critics find his work a 
rickety fit. For example, Tyrone Williams, also writing in 2015, offers: “The ‘career’ of Ed 
Roberson provides another example of a putatively black poet writing himself from the “inside” 
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set of concerns and innovations, we are able to leave those false dichotomies behind and see a 
wider field of liberatory poetics operating in much of the work of the period—characterized by a 
commitment to resonance over resolution by resisting definition. I’ll briefly review the literary 
techniques, themes and figures that each chapter puts forward in this common project. 
In the first chapter, we established how Howe, Mackey, and Roberson, as writers writing 
after “1968” adapted open form and open field poetics to the new circumstances in which they 
found themselves as writers in the liberatory tradition. Frist, given the rise of a dominant social 
conservatism, consumerist spectacle, and the threat of a postmodernist “perpetual present” that 
eroded historical consciousness, they innovated the open forms of the previous generation by 
creating a poetics that foreground historical relation and study with special attention to the co-
constitutive relationship between the past and the present. Specifically, we looked at Howe’s 
foregrounding of coincidence in constructing historical narratives, Mackey’s revision of the 
processual, and Roberson’s use of the interval. Second, given the general perception that “the 
sixties” had failed, leftist artists and intellectuals alike moved away from the dogmatism, 
militarism, and binary oppositions that were laid down in order to take a stand on one side or the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the outside, or to the margins, of Black Art aesthetic criteria for authenticity. Although 
Roberson’s poetry is more explicitly concerned with political and social issues than that of [Carl] 
Phillips, it interrogates these issues, and their relation to language, from both formal and 
thematic perspectives. The trajectory of the published work by Roberson signals his aesthetic 
affiliation not only ‘with’ the political and cultural nationalism of the Black Arts Movement 
(especially in his first two books) but also with the oral incantations and concrete hieroglyphics 
of the Black Mountain School and the Beats. Roberson’s work intersects with the ethnopoetics of 
Robert Duncan, Jerome Rothenberg, Nathaniel Tarn, and Nathaniel Mackey. Roberson’s work 
has thus pursued several lines of inquiry, only one of which concerns the question of ethnic and 
racial ‘authenticity.’” Introductions to Susan Howe’s work nearly always include a hesitant 
categorization of her work as Language poetry. For example, in her introduction to a 2012 
interview with Howe, Maureen N. McLane explains: “As a poet, Howe has been most often 
associated with the experiments and rigors of the Language School, emergent in the 1970s. Yet 
her combination of formal invention and historical consciousness recalls modernists like Joyce, 
Williams, and the poet H. D.” 
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other; and invested instead in multiplicity and resonance over resolution by resisting definition. 
In particular, we looked at how all three writers engage in the acoustic and visual resonances 
found among words not otherwise brought into relation by traditional etymological or dictionary 
definition. In turn, we saw how Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work with linguistic play and 
creative etymologies draw out the cross-cultural and cross-temporal relationships between word 
and world. 
In chapter two, the figures of Icarus as hover-flier and Daedalus as mapmaker provided a 
frame with which to think about how writers of post-1968 liberatory poetics were concerned with 
gaining the aerial view in order to see the uneven terrain of social, linguistic and ideological 
struggle in the late twentieth-century United States. The story of Daedalus as parent and 
inventor, whose creations are motivated by the desire to protect his child from the dangers of an 
oppressive world, further focuses that struggle to the field of the word. Roberson reveals the 
double-edgedness of language as a liberatory tool—a theme that each of the authors of the 
dissertation meditates on at length. Roberson’s re-visioning of the American landscape as one 
shaped by fragments and gaps in historical memory and historical consciousness, also carries 
through the chapters on Mackey and Howe’s work. Finally, Roberson’s working of the theme of 
“trial”—as legal judgment, weariness, and rough draft—threads through all three chapters of the 
dissertation as Roberson, Mackey, and Howe call into question the efficacy of justice, hope, and 
action in a post-1968 world. 
 In chapter three, our study of Mackey’s asymptotic poetics helped place post-1968 
liberatory poetics within the dominant narratives of postmodernist cultural production by 
framing the themes introduced in chapter one in terms of “the limit” of signification which 
necessitates a poetics of impossibility—investing in the impossible as a horizon toward which 
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political struggle must reach, even if its approach is infinite. N.’s band’s performance of 
“Bottomed Out” at the end of the first volume of From a Broken Bottle provokes us to think 
about the implication of “the bottom” as limit. Resonating with Roberson’s “floating without 
bottom in that earth,” the image of bottomless earth points the asymptotic movement toward a 
project of excavation—digging beneath the labyrinth, quarrying U.S. history, and grounding 
poetic flight in the particularity and contingency of the material world. Additionally, 
N./Mackey’s preference for resonance over resolution provides another tool for mapping that 
world by what I termed “socio-linguistic echolocation.” By drawing out the multiple and layered 
meanings of words, figures, events by their social and sonic relations, we are able to perceive the 
world in its non-totalizing totality.563 Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s creative etymological 
work and investment in dictionaries, which we looked at in the introduction, is recruited to this 
excavational and echolocative mapping. 
The project of mapping by excavation of what is hidden, obscured, and marginalized 
continues in chapter four, in our study of Howe’s critical engagement with the social world in 
which literary texts are produced, circulated, and consumed. The theme of contradiction that 
frames Howe’s critical poetics adds a further component to this project, as she is careful not to 
reproduce the obfuscations that claims of certainty rely on. As such, she makes visible the 
contradictions of historiography without resolving them, returning us to the post-1968 tendency 
to pursue resonance, even dissonance, over resolution by resisting definition. Contradiction, as 
contra-diction, challenges us to consider the other side of the word’s ostensible meaning, 
registering the contradictions that underlie the language we use, whether they are spoken in 
service of the status quo or toward liberatory ends. Howe’s methodological commitment to 
                                                 
563 I take the concept of “non-totalizing totality” from Édouard Glissant.  
299 
 
feeling over knowing and to following the impulse of love rather than mastery produces formal 
innovations that break from forms of capture and enclosure. In addition to discussing the way 
Howe struggled with the contradictions and paradoxes involved in working with material that 
has been authorized by and in service of racist, sexist and settler-colonial power, we considered 
how in the context of the poetic impulse to communicate and commune with others—as writers 
and as readers—authority is not something to resist. By giving ourselves over to the authority, 
i.e., authorship, of others, we are able to hear the voices in the margins, in the gaps, and holes of 
textual production and reproduction. 
The narrative of literary history that my study of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work 
produces allows us to reconsider how poets responded to the conservatism, consumerism, and 
global U.S. hegemony of the post-1968 period. Rather than a retreat into academia564 or signal of 
defeat, Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s commitments to open inquiry represent a strategic move 
                                                 
564There is a substantive conversation to enter about how post-1968 liberatory poets did in fact 
take up posts in and around the university. Cf. David Arnold, “The Scholarly Life of Language 
Writing”; Gillian White, Lyric Shame; Susan Schultz, A Poetics of Impasse in Modern and 
Contemporary American Poetry; Kevin Walzer, The Resurgence of Traditional Poetic Form and 
the Current Status of Poetry’s Place in American Culture. In his preface to The Politics of Poetic 
Form, Bernstein celebrated the fact that almost all of the contributors, “with more than a couple 
happy exceptions,” were not affiliated with any university or receiving any institutional support 
for their work. Explicitly, Bernstein expresses that work created outside the established 
structures of literary and intellectual production, holds the radical potential to construct a new 
public commons. Implicitly, his emphasis legitimates his coterie as the vanguard, making their 
cohort the inheritors of a twentieth-century tradition of resistance and innovation, from the 
modernist avant-garde to the mid-century counter-cultural rebels. “Mainstream” poetry, they 
claimed, was not only formally and stylistically conservative, it was also institutionalized within 
university English departments and creative writing programs (i.e., “the workshop”). What is the 
significance of the fact then, that most of the contributors would at some point either be 
university faculty, have books published by university presses, or be frequently invited guests of 
the university, by the time of the writing of this dissertation? Did they sell out? Or did they 
continue to challenge the institutions from within—"undercommoning,” as Fred Moten and 
Stefano Harney would put it? Did they grow out of their oppositional phase? Did their tactics 
shift over time in response to historical changes? These are questions I would like to take up in 
further work on the period. 
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that responds to the political needs of their historical moment. 
Fifty Years Later: We Must Be Careful 
 
Today, fifty years after 1968, where are we? On the one hand, we seem to be living in the 
dystopia that writers of the post-1968 period could have written themselves—suggesting a 
continuum between their moment and ours, even featuring the same cast of characters and 
cultural icons—like Donald Trump and McDonalds: 
 
Figure 14 – Postmodernism + Trump Fast Food Buffet 
On the other hand, the leftist response—as hard as it is to identify exactly who or what comprises 
“the left”—has changed tactics in recent years, suggesting the post-1968 period may be at its 
close. Post-1968 calls to cautiousness have been superseded by calls to urgent action. Deferral of 
meaning is no longer on the table as a viable option, as the line between fact and fiction becomes 
critical to discern in the age of “fake news.” 
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“I must be careful,” Ed Roberson exhorts in the opening line of his poem “be careful,” 
collected in 1970 in his first book, When Thy King Is a Boy, and re-writes in 2009 for the 
anthology Black Nature: Four Centuries of African American Nature Poetry as “We must be 
careful” in a short essay statement about Roberson’s ecopoetics565 in which he discusses the 
relationship between “humans” and “nature” in the anthropocene, or what has recently been 
called the capitalocene—both monikers that mark, on a geological scale, our age as one in which 
the activity of humans, and capitalism, in particular have shaped the environment of the Earth. In 
his statement, Roberson observes that at our current historical moment, “[o]ur technology […] is 
more likely to conserve, regenerate, and nourish the limiting and exclusive resource base of 
capitalism than our larger human or Earth/Nature. Restoring this larger Earth to urban poetry, 
embedding city life within a living Nature focuses on an interrelation that should keep us 
sensitized to exploitative relationships which could cut us off, cut us out of life.”566 Roberson’s 
call to caution is multivalent, registering on levels ecological, cultural, social and linguistic. In all 
of its applications, it is about considering the consequences of our actions—the smallest of which 
can set off an avalanche—an image deployed both literally and figuratively in the poem, in 
which he reflects on the precariousness of one’s movements through the world: 
 
                                                 
565I am currently developing a theory that there is a relationship between the ethnopoetics of the 
twentieth century and the ecopoetics of the twenty-first. Specifically, I believe the development 
of ecopoetics represents a continuation or evolution of ethnopoetics, necessitated by the move 
from the twentieth to the twenty-first century, as a way to continue following an impulse to study 
“the outside” or “the other” in keeping with a sacred or visionary tradition of liberatory poetics. 
In Lynn Keller’s 2019 keynote lecture at the 47th Louisville Conference On Literature & Culture 
Since 1900, her representation of the problems that face plant-study, especially anxieties about 
anthropomorphizing plant life as a gesture of domination, seems to me to parallel critiques 
waged against anthropology and ethnography for its colonialist exoticizing of “the foreign 
other.” I intend to develop this insight in my next project. 
 
566Dungy, Black Nature, 5. 
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i must be careful not to shake 
anything in too wild an elation.    not to jar 
the fragile mountains against the paper far- 
ness.   nor avalanche the fog or the eagle from the air. 
of the gentle wilderness i must set the precarious 
words.   like rocks.   without one snowcapped mistake.567 
 
In this image, Roberson recognizes that the poet’s use of words, set precariously on the page to 
build the structures of literary imagination, has the potential to release a powerful force into the 
world. Roberson comments, “By the end of this early poem, nature turns into words; the poem is 
as much about the experience of writing as it is about the experience and observation of nature. I 
think this poem is also my early understanding of words as appropriation, not just a simple 
picture of the unknown focused into the realm of the known.”568 The technology of literature 
must likewise “keep us sensitized to exploitative relationships which could cut us off, cut us out 
of life.” Roberson’s “cut us off, cut us out” echoes the rhythm of Nathaniel Mackey’s 1983 paper 
presented at “A Symposium of the Whole: Towards a Human Poetics” at USC, titled, “On 
Edge,” in which Mackey writes, “We cannot even begin to talk about the whole without 
observing that ideologies of dominance cuts us up and cuts us off,”569 similarly calling on his 
listeners to consider the double-edgedness of the words and concepts we deploy in projects 
ostensibly aimed toward liberatory ends. Similarly, Susan Howe warns about writing from 
literary and historical archives: “Knowledge, no matter how I get it, involves exclusion and 
repression. National histories hold ruptures and hierarchies. […] When we move through the 
positivism of literary canons and master narratives, we consign ourselves to the legitimation of 
                                                 
 
567Roberson, When Thy King Is a Boy, 10. 
 
568Dungy, Black Nature, 3. 
 
569Mackey, DE, 262. 
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power, chains of inertia, an apparatus of capture.”570 Such that even as we seek to move 
strategically through those apparatuses of capture, it isn’t always easy to know if you are 
breaking from or reproducing their structure. Howe warns us: “Rungs between escape and 
enclosure are confusing and compelling.”571 
Post-1968 writers made a persuasive case for why a poetics of multiplicity and openness 
was necessary to counter Grand Narratives and the kind of universal transcendentalism that 
counted as Truth and abetted the commodification of cultural production. But even in the 1980s-
90s, which is also Donald Trump’s era, the developing language of mass advertisement and 
political manipulation, combined with the hyper-commodification of personal, work, and civil 
life, was creating the conditions for our “post-truth” moment, which is why Roberson warned: 
“We must be careful.” These writers were very self-conscious and wary of the fine line between 
liberatory versus oppressive, and radical versus conservative, deployments of the methods they 
were developing. In trying to complicate these binary distinctions, they were at times accused of 
retreating from the front lines of political action into theoretical reflection. You can hear them 
struggling with their own doubts in statements defending the relationship between poetry and 
political action—as I discussed in the introduction, in my reading of The Politics of Poetic Form. 
Today, poststructuralism seems to have fallen irretrievably out of favor. Even over the past ten 
years since I returned to the university to pursue my PhD, I have noticed this shift. Which 
demonstrates how we are in a position now to look back at the late twentieth century from a 
historical perspective that contextualizes what questions of deferral and truth meant then versus 
now. At the same time, this critical distance gives us an opportunity to recognize what we share 
                                                 
570Howe, TBM, 45-46. 
 
571Howe, TBM, 46.  
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in common with that moment as we try to balance a very real sense of urgency that doesn’t have 
the time to endlessly defer meaning, that requires a conclusion in order to act, with the need to 
not reproduce the systems of knowledge that have produced the ideologies of colonization and 
exploitation against which we are fighting, which requires careful study in a different temporal 
relation to “action.” That said, I think there has always been a sense of urgency. As I’ve 
demonstrated in my studies of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s works, their strategies should be 
read as urgent responses to the social crises of their moment. In her introduction to American 
Literature in Transition: 2000-2010, Rachel Greenwald Smith describes our contemporary 
situation as one that resonates with the challenges of the post-1968 period. She writes: 
The literary production of the early twenty-first century was therefore born out of a 
paradox, where the events of the period demanded both an urgent need to represent the 
lived experience of individuals and a heightened attention to the ways in which 
individuals are molded and shaped by media, technology, and diffuse forms of power. 
These two impulses appear in diverse and sometimes conflicting aesthetic movements 
during the decade, playing against one another in literary form just as they do within the 
historically constituted subjects that write, publish, and read literature.572  
 
Our study of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s liberatory poetics helps us better understand the 
post-1968 period while offering a poetics that is timely for our own moment—a moment that 
requires a liberatory poetics that can be urgent and cautious at the same time. 
Looking Ahead: The Visionary Tradition of Liberatory Poetics  
 
Another aspect of Howe, Mackey, and Roberson’s work that emerges as an area for 
further inquiry is the visionary aspect of post-1968 liberatory poetics. In keeping with the general 
commitments of liberatory poetics, the visionary is concerned with innovation, imagination, and 
creative insight. Yet, another aspect that I did not dwell on in the previous pages of the 
dissertation—though it is an important aspect of Howe, Mackey, Roberson, and other post-1968 
                                                 




poets’ liberatory poetics—is the visionary tradition’s interest in dream, the occult, and 
supernatural or religious sources of knowledge and understanding. In the previous three chapters 
we saw instances of how all three poets are interested in voices that reach them from “the 
outside.” A different path of reading through their work would find us encountering dream as a 
major theme and location of the work’s composition and content.573 The specific significance of 
the visionary tradition in post-1968 liberatory poetics is another line of inquiry to pursue in a 
                                                 
573In a future project, I would like to develop the link between the visionary tradition and the 
development of ethnopoetics in the post-1968 period, with which Roberson and Mackey, among 
other writers of the liberatory tradition, engage directly. I contend, that is, that ethnopoetics 
emerges as a “third way” between the language vs. lyric, innovation vs. multiculturalism binaries 
that dominate narratives of the period. This third way continues the tradition of poetics as 
“sacred activity,”  a phrase I take from a recent conference paper delivered by Michael Heller at 
The 47th Louisville Conference On Literature & Culture Since 1900 in Louisville, KY in the 
panel “'Beyond' Identity: New Directions in Jewish American Poetry,” in which Heller cites 
Allen Grossman’s lament that contemporary “poetics” (which he puts in derisive scare quotes) is 
mere “simulacrum” rather than “a sacred activity.” Jerome Rothenberg, another Jewish poet, 
publishes the foundational anthology Technicians of the Sacred: A Range of Poetries from 
Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania in 1968 and releases the first issue of the 
ethnopoetics journal, Alcheringa, edited with Dennis Tedlock, in 1970. The significance of 
Rothenberg’s Jewishness combined with Tedlock’s affiliation with the Poetics Program at 
SUNY-Buffalo bears on my observation that the “ethno-“ of ethnopoetics is not only about the 
other as ethnic other—e.g., non-Western—but as the sacred other, as figured in Judaism, as God, 
death, or “existence itself” to again quote Heller, this time in his discussion of Walter Benjamin, 
among other forms of otherness or outsideness. (Cf. Christine A. Meilicke, Jerome Rothenberg’s 
Experimental Poetry and Jewish Tradition [Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2005].) If the 
dominant forms of liberatory poetics in the post-1968 period, despite their differences, shared a 
common grounding in the immediate social world, ethnopoetics provided a space for thinking 
about social issues across temporal and cultural difference alike. The apparent need for this third 
way that attends to the visionary is expressed in Michael Boughn’s lament over Language 
poetry’s usurpation, in his view, of the English Department at SUNY-Buffalo when Charles 
Bernstein and Susan Howe founded The Poetics Program there, he argues: “Gnosis and the 
transformational knowledge were replaced by ‘theory.’ The knowledge that [Charles] Olson 
sought was abandoned to the ontological narcissism of ‘construction.’ Official poetics in the 
United States were then determined either by the technique of creative writing classes or the 
theory of the UB Poetics Program (where you could get a PhD in Poetics)” (“‘Poetics’ bodies – 
Charles Olson and some poetry wars, 1913-1990,” Dispatches from the Poetry Wars, np). Of 
course, there are many more than three “ways” through the liberatory tradition. I highlight 
ethnopoetics because it is one of the major one’s with which the poets I study and the scholars I 
follow have been variously involved. 
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future project, but I want to end on the figure of dream, as Roberson does in Voices Cast Out to 
Talk Us In. “Dreamtime, altjeringa” Mackey writes in his preface to Splay Anthem, “is a way of 
enduring reality […] It is also a way of challenging reality, a sense in which to dream is not to 
dream but to replace waking with realization, an ongoing process of testing or contesting reality, 
subjecting it to change or a demand for change” (xiii). Mackey’s meditations on dream play on 
the epigraph to the book’s first poem—“because to dream is not to dream / if waking is never 
finished”—which  is a line taken from Roberson’s poem, “dreaming has made more strict the 
terms of dreaming” published in his first book When Thy King Is a Boy while recalling Wilson 
Harris—to whom Splay Anthem is ostensibly dedicated, “for Wilson”—who writes in The Eye of 
the Scarecrow: “The continuous birth of poetry needs to be more (and less in its true cryptic 
outcry and dialectical landslide) than an imitation of a preservative fluid: it is the lifeblood of 
seeing and responding without succumbing—in the very transparent mobility of consciousness—
to what is apparently seen and heard.”574 Harris presents the paradox involved in a liberatory 
poetics based in careful observation of the material world and its relations. Since the status quo, 
ruled by ideologies of dominance, is what is apparent, i.e., immediately, transparently legible; 
then a liberatory poetics must develop tools of observation which lays bare the reality of the 
world “without succumbing” to the dominant ideology through which that world is filtered for all 
of us. Roberson comments on his own method: “My orderly handling of the nature poem came 
from my feel for basic scientific observation and technique, not the order of a metaphysical 
imperative. Not even a green peace.”575 Visionary poetry then, in Harris, Roberson, and 
Mackey’s terms, follows materialist imperative aimed at transcending ideology. When asked by 
                                                 
574Mackey, FBB, 97. 
 
575Dungy, Black Nature, 4. 
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Kathleen Crown if he would dislike being called a visionary poet, Roberson answers: 
Visual, I like visual. Visionary, I don’t know. It has all that stuff about being prophetic, 
which I’m not quite sure I’m ready for. Visionary also has the sense of respected, deep 
insight. Sometimes I might have that, but I don’t think I’d be a visionary. I don’t stay 
there very much. Well, I guess the visionary would die if he stayed there! Yeah, I would 
like to be considered a visionary poet. But, first, visual. Because I think people need to 
open their eyes a lot more. 
In a time of global rising rightwing nationalism, impending ecological disaster, increased border 
policing in response to mass refugee crisis, and social emergencies, Roberson’s words resonate 
with our urgent need for care. It is an urgent need to see and respond without succumbing to the 
dominant ideology that structures our language and imagination; to resist definition—to dwell in 
possibility / a fairer house than prose—in order to reach toward the impossible. 
Conclusion: Post Post-1968 Liberatory Poetics 
 
 Bringing Howe, Mackey, and Roberson together in literary-critical framework of 
liberatory poetics that leaves behind the dominant narratives of post-1968 cultural production 
makes it possible to speak with a common language about those poets who are continuously 
presented as difficult to categorize or moving between poetic traditions, such as: Theresa Hak 
Kyung Cha, Chana Bloch, Rachel Blau DePlessis, M. NourbSe Philip, Leslie Scalapino, Hannah 
Weiner, Kathleen Fraser, Myung Mi Kim, and so on. At the same time, without reproducing an 
exclusive logic of divisions, liberatory poetics remains inclusive of those poets who have been 
easier to categorize as Language or Lyric poets, and so on, by re-characterizing their projects 
within the terms of liberatory poetics that this dissertation lays out.  
As we move into the next period of literary production, fifty years post post-1968, my 
hope is that my study gives us the tools to identify the continuity of liberatory poetics as it adapts 
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